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Abstract 
This thesis examines Pakistan’s success in technological and organizational capability 
development for enhancing competitiveness in its industrial sector, focusing on the 
automotive industry as a case study, under several policy regimes. Pakistan has had 
to face many adverse conditions since it gained independence and as a result its 
growth has been sporadic, with periods of growth spurts followed by periods of slow 
growth. Successful interventions supporting capability development have happened 
in other developing countries without ‘good governance’ and with rent-seeking so a 
deeper analysis of the institutional failures in Pakistan is required. The thesis locates 
Pakistan’s institutional choices and performance in the context of changes in its 
political settlement to explain why performance was weak at key points in the 
automotive industry’s history. The analysis focuses on the contests over potentially 
growth-enhancing rents in the context of the distribution of power between the 
groups and organizations affected by these policies. Policy had to be implemented in 
the context of extensive political clientelism that was increasing in its fragmentation 
with low levels of political stability and frequent changes in government. The 
proliferation of clientelist groups resulted in the state compromising on long term 
economic growth in an effort to ensure its short-term political sustainability. 
Production in the automotive industry has also become increasingly globalized in 
recent years and Pakistan has found it hard to break into global value chains on 
account of the weak technological capabilities that it could develop. Two case studies 
of relatively more successful instances of technology acquisition within the 
automotive industry of Pakistan show that even in this adverse policy environment, 
intervention can still assist some capability enhancement. The policy challenge is to 
develop instruments that can enable capability development on a broader level in the 
context of the clientelist processes that characterize the political settlement. 
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CHAPTER 1. TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION, CATCHING 
UP AND COMPETITIVENESS IN THE AUTOMOTIVE 
INDUSTRY 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Whereas developed countries have exhibited strong and fairly consistent growth 
performance historically, developing countries (including those in the South Asian 
region) have had a more chequered past. The crucial issue that confronts the 
international community is how to encourage growth and development in developing 
countries across the globe, to bring them at par with developed countries. The 
Commission on Growth & Development (2008) highlighted five areas where policy 
has historically been important for achieving sustained high growth1 in economies. 
One vital area is in innovation promotion and imitation and accelerated or sustained 
catching up policies, while other areas include macroeconomic stabilization, 
supporting high levels of accumulation, effective allocation of factors of production 
(land, labour and capital), and social inclusion in developmental goals. It is generally 
agreed that positive progress is required on all the five policy fronts highlighted 
above, for there to be sustained growth over long time horizons. Against this 
backdrop, a key concern for developing countries that merits further research in the 
context of learning by doing and innovation promotion is: what has been the country’s 
performance with regard to technology acquisition for purposes of enhancing 
productivity? Has the country been effective in its efforts to acquire the appropriate 
technology needed to boost productivity levels? Has the country made effective use 
of the technology acquired? What market failure(s), if any, are constraining the 
country’s ability to acquire the technology and make appropriate use of it? This 
research will address these questions in the light of the experience of Pakistan’s 
economy, focusing on the development of the automotive industry. 
 
                                                             
1 A pre-requisite for poverty reduction, increased productive employment, education and 
health, and innovation. 
17 
For developing countries to converge with the developed countries in terms of their 
development and growth requires an increase in productivity2. This productivity 
growth is expected to result in an improvement in international competitiveness of 
the domestic economy and led to an increase in income levels, as well as demand for 
products, both imported and domestic. Johnson (1962) and Boltho (1996) found that 
the increase in demand is expected to lead to further increases in domestic output 
and trade, as supply adjusts to the increase in demand. Such was the experience of 
Great Britain after the Green Revolution in agriculture and the introduction of the 
steam engine, in the United States when there was a quantum increase in 
manufacturing output as a result of mass production techniques being perfected and 
applied and in Japan when Just-in-Time production techniques were introduced. 
 
Dahlman (2007) has very convincingly argued for the key role played by technology 
since the 1500 when key developments led to increasing per capita incomes despite 
corresponding increases in population. This role has persisted till now when 
production activity in virtually all industries has become dependent on technology in 
one form or another and in one way or another. Developing countries tend to have a 
weak technological base on which to build their productive activities, and technology 
tends to be of a dated origin where it does exist, necessitating the acquisition of new 
technology and techniques in an effort to raise productivity levels. In fact, Amsden 
(1990) has argued that late developers all managed to grow without any original 
indigenous technology present to serve as an asset to be monopolized. The successful 
experience of these late developers suggests they were able to procure technology 
from foreign sources, absorb it into the domestic economy and utilize it effectively. 
The physical technology required is one piece of the puzzle; the recipient developing 
country also requires workers and managers to have the knowledge and capacity to 
make the most effective use of this technology. Lall (1992) refers to these particular 
qualities as the technological and organizational capabilities that are required to 
increase productivity levels and also have to be built up and developed in these 
countries as part of the technology acquisition efforts. This is the part where 
developing countries tend to falter. 
 
                                                             
2 Numerous studies, by Denison (1967), Maddison (1970), Maddison (1972) and Denison & 
Chung (1976) to name a few, were founded on the classical belief of production functions and 
assumed Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as the sources of growth. 
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In contrast to the promising development outlook of the high growth economies (late 
developers) of South East Asia, the experience of many South Asian economies 
(including Pakistan) in catching up has been remarkably unimpressive, and as such 
development efforts in Pakistan warrant a closer look. As one of the latter countries, 
the development efforts of Pakistan are warranted a closer look. Since the time of 
independence in 1947, Pakistan has had to face multitudes of adverse conditions that 
have tempered its growth, with periods of growth spurts followed by periods of slow 
growth. High incidence of corruption and poor governance are two issues that are 
widely accepted as having marred Pakistan’s development efforts over the years. 
However, other developing countries have successfully intervened in the economy to 
foster capability development in the presence of rent-seeking but without ‘good 
governance’ (a term first used in World Bank (1989)) so a deeper analysis of 
institutional failures in Pakistan is warranted. The discussion locates Pakistan’s 
institutional choices and performance in the context of changes in its political 
settlement to assess weak performance at key points in the history of the automotive 
industry. The focus is on the contests over rents, in particular potentially growth 
enhancing rents, given the distribution of power between different groups and 
organizations affected by policies. Policies were implemented under extensive 
political clientelism with increasing fragmentation signified by low levels of political 
stability and frequent changes in government. The research that follows will show 
that the increased fragmentation and multitude of clientelist groups compromised the 
ability of the state to direct long term economic growth in favour of ensuring its short 
term political sustainability. 
 
The global automotive industry as it has evolved is currently characterized by global 
production networks and with the weak domestic technological capabilities that have 
developed Pakistan has found it a challenge to successfully enter the industry’s global 
value chain. The domestic automotive industry is composed of a number of foreign 
OEM affiliated manufactures/assemblers supported by a component manufacturing 
industry that is itself struggling to enter the global automotive component market. 
That is not to say that domestic technological capabilities are absent; firms in two 
segments, motorcycles and tractors in particular have managed to successfully 
develop their technological and organizational capabilities. Two case studies3 of 
                                                             
3 Millat Tractors and Atlas Honda Limited 
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relatively successful instances of technology acquisition and capability development 
within the automotive industry of Pakistan are proof that even in an adverse policy 
environment, intervention has borne fruit. The policy challenge now is to develop 
instruments that can enable and assist in capability development at a broader level in 
the context of the clientelist processes that characterize the prevalent political 
settlement. The discussion and analysis that follows will examine Pakistan’s 
experience with acquisition of technology and the technological as well as 
organizational capability development for enhancing the competitiveness of its 
industrial sector, focusing on a case study of the automotive industry, under different 
policy regimes. 
 
This chapter sets the stage for the discussion and analysis that follows and is 
organized as follows. Section 1.2 brings to light the issues surrounding technology 
acquisition, strategies of catching up and the competitiveness of firms in developing 
countries. The economic performance of Pakistan since independence and myriad of 
economic challenges that face the country are covered in Section 1.3, as is the 
changing political landscape in the country. Section 1.4 links the preceding discussion 
to the framework of analysis to be used in subsequent chapters; learning rents and 
their management in the context of political settlements that have emerged in 
Pakistan. Section 1.5 concludes this introduction. 
 
1.2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In today’s world, global competitiveness is considered a pre-requisite for achieving a 
high and sustainable level of growth; the greater the level of industrialization and 
productivity of the economy, the higher the level of competitiveness of the economy4. 
Economies across the globe can thus be categorized according to the level of 
industrialization of the economy and the degree of competitiveness they have 
achieved; more developed and advanced countries are considered to be highly 
competitive, while developing countries tend to have lower levels of industrialization 
and are less competitive. Over the years developing countries have utilized several 
approaches for the purpose of catching up with the more advanced developed 
countries in terms of their level of industrialization. 
                                                             
4 based on a Kaldorian analysis of economic development in Kaldor (1967) 
20 
 
One approach for achieving this goal was pro-active intervention by the state through 
industrial policy with the aim of guiding and nurturing domestic industries to allow 
them to become globally competitive, as Japan and Korea did in more recent times. 
This policy stance was a variation of the ‘infant industry’5 argument, first proposed by 
Hamilton (1790) and Daniel Raymond and in general abandoned after the lukewarm 
performance of numerous developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s. The strategy 
was over-shadowed by adoption of the liberal route promoting free markets and 
exposure of domestic producers to the global market in a do or die scenario. This 
liberal policy view has come to be accepted as the more common and preferred 
response for dealing with any short-comings; to engage in market-enhancing 
governance reforms across the board, in the hopes of making markets more efficient 
and rent-free and thereby removing any hurdles and obstacles to achieving a high and 
sustainable rate of growth. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of countries took off on the path to development 
guided by the belief that a swift and rigorous industrialization process would put 
them on the convergent path with already developed countries. These countries 
implemented infant industry protection schemes that were at the heart of fairly 
ambitious industrial policies, and designed to promote domestic technological 
capabilities by subsidizing imports, exports, credit, inputs and other components of 
the production process. Due to the mediocre and lack-luster performance of 
economies in response to these policies, as compared to the massive financial burden 
of financing these subsidies, developing countries entered into a phase of 
liberalization across the board by the 1980s. The liberalization process yielded 
promising results in a number of economies, but the pertinent question remains as to 
how much of this improvement was due to the liberalization process in and of itself, 
and how much was due to the liberalization process coupled with technological 
capabilities built up during the preceding rapid industrialization process. 
 
It is important to consider that if producers in developing countries are operating 
below the global technology and productivity frontier (as is likely to be the case given 
their lower level of industrialization) when they enter the global market, this 
                                                             
5 See for example Chang (2002) for details 
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precludes the possibility of their receiving much, if any, support in competing globally 
when markets open up and can lead to a collapse of any domestic productive capacity 
that already exists. With the widespread market failures that are known to exist in 
developing countries, the result can be catastrophic as these countries can become 
trapped in vicious cycles of low growth. These outcomes have also been referred to 
as low-growth traps (by Stokey (1991) and Redding (1999)) or lock-in (by David & 
Greenstein (1990), David (1985), David (1986a), David (1986b), David (1992), David 
(1993), Arthur (1986) and Arthur (1989)) in the literature. Essentially these 
countries will be unable to complete the transition to a situation where they can reap 
the benefits of producing high value added products, and instead can remain stuck or 
locked in a state of producing low value added products. The missing link in this 
equation is the indigenous technological and organizational capabilities required to 
push the domestic industry to the global technology and productivity frontier and 
beyond, but this is generally underdeveloped or even lacking in developing countries. 
The crucial role played by indigenous technological capabilities in mastering new 
technologies (adapting the technology to use in the local environment, diffusing the 
technology throughout the rest of the economy and even allow greater access to 
foreign markets) did not receive much attention in economic literature till the 1980s. 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of catching-up industrialization (as detailed by 
Suehiro (2008)) and the efficacy of technology acquisition and implementation in an 
economy for promoting growth have traditionally been focused along one of two 
branches. The first branch is concerned with the penultimate goal of achieving 
economic and social development and the competing approaches that can be used to 
achieve this goal. One approach (Approach B in Figure 1.1) is to set up the appropriate 
institutions to guarantee and secure property rights to create the conditions 
necessary for economic growth, and the second approach (Approach A in Figure 1.1) 
supports increasing capital accumulation levels, and accelerating the pace of 
capability development, which leads to economic growth and eventually effective 
institutions can be set up for securing property rights. To increase capital 
accumulation in this fashion requires many institutions to be set up for this strategy 
to be effective, and the institutions for securing property rights are not the most 
essential. The latter may even be poorly defined in the early stages and are 
strengthened selectively as sectors become globally competitive. The second branch 
is concerned with the political economy of technology acquisition strategies in 
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developing countries; and more specifically focuses on the political economy 
supporting the emergence or introduction and enforcement of appropriate 
institutions that is essential for technology acquisition strategies to succeed and this 
is where the current research is located. 
 
The conventional or neoclassical approaches to industrial development, championed 
by Balassa (1982), Krueger (1983) and others, minimize the role of technological 
activity in developing countries and by extension, the need for policies that nurture 
and promote such activity, according to Pack & Westphal (1986). The focus is on 
“getting prices right” and minimizing the role of the state in industrial activity. Lall 
(1992) found that any interventions that necessarily have to be made in industry are 
limited to being neutral or functional in nature, as opposed to selective, discretionary 
and sector specific. 
 
Figure 1.1: Literature Tree 
 
Source: Author 
 
This traditional literature (in Nelson (1987) and elsewhere) has tended not to place 
any great emphasis on the demand for technological activity in developing countries; 
simply assuming that technology is freely accessible, countries opt for capital/labour 
intensities based on factor price ratios, all firms operate on the same production 
function and there are no complications in the acquisition and implementation of 
ApproachesBranchesTheme
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technology transfers, and so on. Developing countries are assumed to select and 
costlessly apply innovations in production (in other words movement of the 
production frontier rather than movement along it), and there is no role or need for 
state intervention. The political economy implications of this assumption are that it 
ensures stable property rights and encourages foreign investors to enter the domestic 
market bringing in foreign capital and technology to thus bolster economic 
development. In so doing it also sends a clear message to foreign investors that 
ownership of their investment will not be contested by the state.  
 
Having the institutions in place to protect property rights as a precondition for 
achieving growth is what prompted Montesquieu (1752) and Smith (1776) to suggest 
constraining government, and this notion was later highlighted in various historical 
accounts of European development6. Walras (1874) developed those ideas further 
along traditional lines while theoretical support from new institutional economics 
proponents such as Buchanan & Tullock (1962), North & Thomas (1973), North 
(1981) and North (1990) emerged more recently. Early empirical support for this 
hypothesis was provided by, among others, Long & Shleifer (1993) using data on 
urbanization of European regions to find evidence of faster city growth under 
constrained governments. Knack & Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995) initiated 
research along the lines of analysing the impact of good institutions on economic 
growth. Based on the work by researchers including Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 
(2001), Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002), Dollar & Kraay (2003), Easterly & 
Levine (2003), Hall & Jones (1999), there appears to be an intellectual consensus that 
political institutions of limited government do cause economic growth. This suggests 
that economic growth can be achieved by having institutions that are market-
promoting in developing countries; this will encourage technology to flow to these 
countries, and nothing more needs to be done. However, history has shown that this 
is not always the case. 
 
When thinking of improved market access, it naturally begs the question of how 
useful is it to have open and free markets if the domestic economy does not have the 
capability, let alone the resources, with which to deliver competitive products in the 
                                                             
6 Such as the account of the Norman d’Hauteville dynasty in Kantorowicz (1957) and Haskins 
(1915) 
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market (be it international, or even domestic). The less popular response mentioned 
earlier favours growth-enhancing strategies that target specific market failures and 
focuses on building the productive capacity and capability of industries given that 
markets are imperfect, through technology acquisition and implementation. A more 
thorough examination of this issue coupled with an understanding of the underlying 
structure of the domestic economy will shed light on the debate of whether it is better 
to focus on market-enhancing strategies or growth-enhancing strategies. This will in 
turn allow for the formulation of an effective policy mix that takes into account the 
conditions prevalent in the economy at the time, as well as the limitations that exist 
and constraints on proper implementation of the policy. 
 
A proposition put forward earlier was that technological competitiveness and 
capability are vital for an economy’s survival in today’s global market, and a pre-
requisite for achieving a high, sustainable growth rate. It was also suggested that the 
productivity and performance or competitiveness of producers critically hinges on 
the level of capabilities that they possess – the ability to efficiently turn inputs into 
competitive final products. The popular route for achieving this goal has been the 
introduction of free markets and exposing the domestic market to global competition 
(from developed as well as other developing countries) in a survival of the fittest 
sense. However, this approach does not address the more nebulous aspect of 
technological productivity, which is “capability”7; the ability to organize and produce 
effectively and efficiently. 
 
Thus, a much more stimulating and far more noteworthy challenge to address is the 
acquisition of tacit knowledge and capabilities. It has been pointed out by Lall (1992) 
that neoclassical approaches ignore the “peculiar nature and the costs of 
technological learning in specific activities the externalities it generates and the 
complementarities” that can result, all can lead to market failures requiring selective 
policy intervention. 
 
It is meaningful to think of ‘capability’ on two levels according to Sutton (2005); one 
level, the ‘revealed’ capability, is the unit variable cost of production as well as a 
measure of buyer’s willingness to pay for a unit of output; i.e. the perceived quality of 
                                                             
7 Lall (1992), Kim (1999) and others 
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the product. The second level is the ‘underlying’ capability or know-how and working 
practices by employees (or ‘tacit knowledge’). The technological and entrepreneurial 
capabilities to effectively utilize investments in capital and machinery are 
intrinsically linked to said investments. Lall (2000) points out that while developing 
countries are able to attract the initial investment with relative ease, and even to find 
well qualified workers to operate the machinery, they are often unable to make 
sustained progress in acquiring the requisite tacit knowledge. Without this 
knowledge, the machinery will be operating at less than optimal capacity and the 
industries will be hard pressed to compete in the global market. The popular response 
to this failure (described earlier as one that downplays the role of state in developing 
technology and the capability to use it effectively) is to enhance the markets, in an 
attempt to make them more efficient by reducing the inherent transaction costs and 
let market forces weed out the weak and inefficient firms. This market-enhancing 
approach, according to Stiglitz (1996), is not without its problems and suffers from a 
variety of issues, on account of which it does not appear to be the ideal solution for 
developing countries  
 
The alternative approach that acknowledges variation that exists between the 
operational levels of firms and the crucial role of technology and technological change 
(based on the evolutionary theory of technological change of Nelson & Winter (1982)) 
holds more water. Developing countries acquire matured technology (through 
various channels such as FDI, Joint Ventures and the like) from firms in the developed 
countries and the state implements policies and actions to assist in the absorption 
and assimilation of this technology in the domestic economy. According to Lall 
(1993a) the speed of absorption and assimilation of the technology is what depends 
on the level of capabilities (both revealed and underlying) in the domestic economy. 
These capabilities include technical and managerial skills and know-how that are 
lacking and more often than not need a long period of learning in the developing 
country, but that have already been developed in advanced countries. Development 
of these technological capabilities is not just a firm level effort, but a much broader 
social effort that involves substantial investment in a range of public goods by the 
state). 
 
In a nutshell, and as laid out in Table 1.1, at the micro (firm-level), investments must 
be made by entrepreneurs that cover a host of activities that occur within a typical 
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firm acquiring technology, all equally important and interconnected. First, labour 
(workers as well as management) will need on-the-job training to familiarize 
themselves with the new technology and new developments taking place in the 
industry. Second, the process of capabilities development is a dynamic phenomenon, 
not a static one, so investments will need to be made in the search for new technical 
and related information that the firm can absorb and utilize when a given level of 
capabilities have been developed. Third, spillovers from knowledge creation must be 
ensured by investing in an environment that encourages creating, communicating 
and diffusing any knowledge that has been acquired by the firm. Lastly, streamlining 
the production process requires prototyping of products and trial runs of the 
production process itself to identify any anomalies or issues with the final product, 
which in turn require substantial investment. Prototypes tend to be deficient in some 
fashion or the other and since they cannot be sold in the market, they represent a sunk 
cost for the firm that must be financed. Till workers are proficient in the use of 
production technology, production runs will lack the standard of quality the firm is 
aiming for, and again will represent a sunk cost that has to be financed if the firm is to 
continue production. 
 
Table 1.1: Technological Capabilities Development Effort Requiring Investment 
Micro (Firm-Level) Social (State-Level) 
Trainings Trainings 
Search for new technical and related 
information 
Enabling access to information 
Creating, communicating and diffusing 
knowledge within the organization 
Education 
Production trial runs and product 
prototyping 
Promoting interactions between firms and 
institutions for research and learning, 
quality control 
Source: Based on Lall (1993) 
 
Industries are comprised of groups of firms operating independently but also 
collaborating in activities and benefitting from the public good nature of knowledge. 
It falls on the state to create an enabling environment for the industry and 
manufacturing sector as a whole that will facilitate access to information by any firm 
in the industry. As highlighted in the discussion earlier, capabilities cannot be 
developed independently of formal education, and the state is responsible for 
financing and investing in the education of society and its members. Finally, 
knowledge cannot be created in a vacuum, or by one firm alone, so it falls on the state 
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to invest in and promote interactions and collaborations between firms and the 
various institutions that have been established for R & D, technical training and 
quality control. 
 
Lall (2000) found that the period of learning that is essential to development of these 
capabilities will be risky as it is not guaranteed the firm will be able to absorb the 
technology and make efficient use of it. The costs incurred both in terms of financing 
as well as in terms of time, add to the risk. Developing countries will therefore depend 
on the incentive or return to firm. Moreover, the success of the endeavour will hinge 
on several factors, including the existing level of skills, and the complexity of the 
technology being acquired in relation to that which is already present in the economy 
and the firm. A conflict of interest may arise between the firm in the developing 
country and the provider of the technology if the developing country is aiming to 
expand its industrial base while retaining national ownership of technology and the 
capabilities developed. Such a goal will be perceived as a threat to the profitability of 
the provider and is likely to impact the outcome of the acquisition effort if the process 
is hindered. 
 
Lall (1993b) pointed out that the complexity of the learning period points to the 
likelihood of market failures (externalities, lack of information, inability of the firm to 
finance the learning) occurring and disrupting the process in developing countries. 
The general response has been to finance the learning period by allowing the firm or 
industry to operate in a protected (closed) market free from international 
competition from firms that have already gone through the learning period, as was 
the case in a number of developing countries such as South Korea (see Kim (2001) for 
details). At a very basic level this can lead to a market failure itself, since the absence 
of competition will remove the incentive to streamline operations and reduce costs 
by developing the requisite capabilities. However, Kim (1999) showed that the East 
Asian Tigers were able to successfully compensate for this market failure by the 
credible threat of opening up domestic markets to international competition after a 
specified period of time had elapsed. 
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1.3. PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY AT THE CROSSROADS 
1.3.1. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
When Pakistan gained independence from British rule and partition from India under 
the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the nascent state was faced with the daunting 
task of legitimizing itself with the migrant Muslim population while at the same time 
building up a viable economic base from the weak infrastructure it had inherited. 
Compared to several neighbouring countries and a number of countries that started 
on the journey to development facing roughly similar initial conditions, Pakistan’s 
performance (in terms of GDP growth) has been relatively unremarkable, as shown 
in Table 1.2 below. 
 
Table 1.2: Decade-wise Annual Average GDP and GDP Per Capita Growth Rates 
 (%) 
Variable Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
GDP 
Bangladesh 3.89 1.52 3.22 4.80 5.81 6.37 
India 3.91 2.93 5.69 5.73 6.93 6.70 
Nepal 2.52 2.60 4.09 4.84 4.06 4.44 
Pakistan 6.79 4.84 6.86 3.98 4.64 3.56 
Sri Lanka 4.67 4.23 4.15 5.26 5.00 7.56 
China 3.01 7.44 9.75 9.99 10.29 9.17 
Korea 8.25 8.29 7.68 6.25 4.39 4.02 
GDP per 
capita 
Bangladesh 0.85 -0.65 0.50 2.57 4.34 5.16 
India 1.75 0.59 3.39 3.79 5.35 5.35 
Nepal 0.59 0.40 1.74 2.26 2.44 3.25 
Pakistan 4.03 1.79 3.37 1.26 2.67 1.79 
Sri Lanka 2.21 2.50 2.59 3.96 4.25 7.77 
China 0.89 5.34 8.19 8.75 9.62 8.64 
Korea 5.64 6.32 6.38 5.24 3.83 3.44 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
 
A commonly cited case (see Amsden (1989) and Rodrik (1999) for details) is that of 
South Korea, which also embarked on its development agenda in earnest in the late 
1960s, but due to a combination of factors; including a strong developmental state, 
national cohesion and a favourable political settlement arrangement was able to leap 
frog ahead of Pakistan. Pakistan’s neighbour India exhibited a more sluggish 
performance compared to Pakistan in the 1960s, but managed to surge ahead in the 
1980s. Both South Korea and India invested heavily in human capital and 
infrastructure development, foregoing an immediate payoff in favour of reaping the 
benefits in later years from higher value added manufacturing output thanks to a solid 
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technological capabilities base. However, Pakistan underinvested in education 
compared to India, as evident from the trends in Table 1.3 below. 
 
Table 1.3: Decade-wise Public Expenditure on Education in Selected Countries 
(%) 
Decade / 
Years 
Share of Public Expenditure on Education 
in Government Expenditure   in GDP 
India Korea Pakistan  India Korea Pakistan 
1970s  18.73 4.88    2.95 1.97 
1980s  24.57 6.03  3.94 2.29 
1990s 12.64 17.34 7.34 3.56 3.61 2.66 
2000s 11.14 15.34 10.51 3.43 4.37 2.45 
2010-11 10.76  10.04 3.24  2.30 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
 
Historically, the national defence industry has overshadowed the social sectors in 
terms of government expenditure (31 percent versus 2.7 percent for Public Health 
and 7.3 percent for Education in Table 1.4) reflecting the priorities of the state. The 
trend has improved in recent years, with military expenditures falling to 17.6 percent 
while Public Health and Education have increased to 3.6 percent and 10.1 percent 
respectively. 
 
Table 1.4: Major Social Sector Expenditure versus Military Expenditure Shares in Pakistan (1995-
2011) 
(%) 
Year Military Education Public Health 
1995 31.37 7.34 2.67 
1996 28.20 7.12 2.86 
1997 27.52 8.07 2.76 
1998 27.19   2.41 
1999 26.34   2.42 
2000 23.42   2.40 
2001 24.84   2.41 
2002 24.95   2.95 
2003 25.23   2.76 
2004 28.49 6.42 3.00 
2005 27.67 10.94 3.11 
2006 24.69 12.18 3.47 
2007 21.90 11.24 3.19 
2008 18.39 11.15 3.16 
2009 19.28 11.15 3.29 
2010 18.53 9.93 3.42 
2011 17.55 10.14 3.58 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
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In terms of per capita income, Pakistan’s economic performance over the years has 
been quite respectable, averaging an increase of 2.5 percent in annual GDP per capita 
income growth (at 2005 prices) from USD 220 to 802, but pales in comparison to the 
performance of a number of other countries in the region such as China, India and Sri 
Lanka. However, all countries in the South Asian region have exhibited a more 
consistent positive trend in the decade wise growth rate of per capita income. 
 
The sectoral contribution to GDP growth in Pakistan has been strongest from the 
manufacturing sector, averaging 6.83 percent (1961-2012), even though Pakistan is 
primarily an agrarian based economy, with agricultural sector growth of 3.71 percent 
over the same period (see Table 1.5). The economy has undergone substantial 
structural transformation over the years, with share of agriculture in GDP falling from 
over 46 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 2012. To put this in a regional perspective, 
consider the fact that the corresponding share in India has gone down from 43 
percent to 17 percent, in China from 22 percent to 11 percent and in South Korea from 
38 percent to only 3 percent. The share of manufacturing sector on the other hand, 
has increased from over 14 percent to almost 19 percent over the same period, a shift 
that suggests the economy has become more resilient in recent years; less vulnerable 
to the seasonality of agricultural output driving GDP growth. This shift away from the 
agriculture sector has also been mirrored in the structure of labour employment, 
though it appears that rather than moving towards the industrial and manufacturing 
sectors, surplus labour force from the agriculture sector is starting to find its way to 
the services sector instead. This is not a detrimental shift per se for the economy; 
rather it is worrisome in terms of the fact that spillovers of improved performance in 
the services sector are unlikely to have as great an impact on the general economy as 
that from the manufacturing sector, or even the agriculture sector. 
 
1.3.1.1.  Agriculture 
Value added in agriculture has grown at a rate of over 3 percent, highest among 
Pakistan’s neighbours in the South Asian region, but less than China. Production of 
the major crops of Pakistan (wheat, rice, sugarcane and cotton) has grown at a rate of 
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3.3, 3.8, 4.2 and 4.5 percent respectively, the result of increase in area under 
cultivation as well as increase in yield per acre8.  
 
Table 1.5: Sectoral Contribution to GDP Value Added 
(% of GDP) 
Sector Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Agriculture 
Bangladesh   31.59 27.13 21.19 18.13 
China 37.16 32.35 29.39 20.50 12.45 10.06 
India 42.23 38.57 31.71 27.38 19.75 17.64 
Korea 33.78 26.16 13.43 6.64 3.52 2.67 
Nepal 67.88 67.44 56.02 43.49 36.31 37.01 
Pakistan 41.16 33.78 28.55 26.13 22.31 20.96 
Sri Lanka 30.32 28.97 27.23 23.64 14.09 12.45 
Industry 
Bangladesh   21.17 23.94 27.12 28.40 
China 35.18 44.48 44.33 45.39 46.44 46.60 
India 19.87 22.27 25.52 26.11 27.35 26.68 
Korea 23.26 29.82 39.20 41.39 37.10 39.03 
Nepal 10.21 10.11 14.20 20.92 17.97 15.35 
Pakistan 19.22 22.79 23.27 24.36 25.45 25.31 
Sri Lanka 20.69 26.08 27.02 26.37 28.89 29.66 
Manufacturing 
Bangladesh   13.76 14.87 16.59 17.75 
China 29.02 37.22 36.04 32.93 32.37 29.52 
India 13.82 15.24 16.03 15.80 15.31 14.26 
Korea 15.57 21.61 27.51 27.14 27.21 30.75 
Nepal 3.57 4.11 5.24 8.77 8.28 6.44 
Pakistan 14.30 15.89 15.98 16.44 17.24 18.44 
Sri Lanka 15.59 19.02 15.39 15.68 18.19 18.11 
Services, etc. 
Bangladesh   47.24 48.93 51.69 53.47 
China 27.67 23.17 26.27 34.11 41.11 43.34 
India 37.89 39.16 42.77 46.51 52.89 55.68 
Korea 42.96 44.02 47.37 51.98 59.38 58.30 
Nepal 21.91 22.46 29.78 35.59 45.72 47.72 
Pakistan 39.62 43.43 48.19 49.50 52.24 53.73 
Sri Lanka 48.99 44.96 45.75 49.99 57.02 57.89 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2014) 
 
Though performance of the agriculture sector is considered to be quite satisfactory 
and the sector continues to form the backbone of the economy; however this 
performance has not been consistent. During the Fifties, adverse terms of trade 
resulted in a growth rate of 1.7 percent; agricultural produce was procured at low 
prices and subject to various restrictions at the time of export. 
 
                                                             
8 areas under these crops having increased by 1.8, 1.6, 0.8 and 2.5 percent respectively. 
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Green Revolution technology9 was introduced in the country in the Sixties and 
benefitted the agricultural sector as expected, with growth averaging 5.1 percent per 
annum. Agricultural growth was adversely affected in the Seventies due to 
uncertainty arising from failed land reforms, poor weather and a cotton virus, 
resulting in a slow-down of growth to 2.3 percent. The performance of agriculture 
sector in the Eighties improved, averaging 4.10 percent over the decade and rising to 
4.5 percent in the Nineties. This performance is impressive when one takes account 
of the fact that the cotton crop had repeated failures and in certain years, wheat and 
sugarcane crops also suffered from water shortage due to drought conditions. Despite 
these hardships, the improvement in agricultural productivity has had the knock on 
effect of improving the per capita availability of various food items in the country10. 
The general trend has in fact now turned towards international export of high quality 
rice and cotton. 
 
The state actively sought to intervene in the market for essential goods by 
implementing price support scheme to ensure prices were kept at a reasonable level; 
not too high to be out of reach of domestic consumers, and not too low as to incur a 
loss for local farmers, but the intervention had the unintended impact of depressing 
agricultural output. To offset this impact after the 1960s, the state undertook to boost 
infrastructure support by providing timely availability of adequate water supply, 
fertilizer, pesticides and improved quality seeds at affordable prices. The state also 
prioritized production of tractors for farm use, as a result of which tractor purchases 
per annum have increased from virtually nil in 1947 to as many as 20,000 in recent 
years. Water availability has been increased by more tube wells being installed every 
year; however, this would appear to be a short term measure since the state has 
neglected to increase reservoir capacity in the country, and water provision will be 
no doubt be adversely affected when the water table drops. 
 
1.3.1.2. Manufacturing 
At the time of independence, Pakistan inherited a very weak and limited industrial 
base, thanks in no part to being the agricultural hinterland of the British India. 
                                                             
9 Including improved seeds, broader application and use of fertilizers and water use by both 
large and small farmers 
10 Cereal availability increased from 139.3 to 172.7 kg, sugar from 17.1 to 32.4 kg, milk from 
107.0 to 148 kg, meat from 9.8 to 18.2 kg, and edible oil from 2.3 to 12.3 kg 
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Considering this low starting point, the industrial sector as it stands today has 
managed to advance significantly, even though in comparison to other developing 
countries the performance has been less than stellar. The large scale industrial base 
was comprised of only a few industrial units producing sugar, vegetable ghee, tea 
blending, cement and cotton textiles at the time of independence and they contributed 
only 1.8 percent of GDP, which has increased to over 12 percent in recent years. Large 
scale industries have grown at a rate of 8.8 percent and the total manufacturing sector 
at a rate of 6.8 percent during the period. The small-scale industries however, 
contributed 4.6 percent of GDP at the time of independence, but the share has 
witnessed only a nominal increase to 5.3 percent lately. Except for the Seventies and 
Nineties, the manufacturing sector has attained a respectable growth rate of 8 
percent. 
 
The manufacturing sector witnessed growth averaging 7.7 percent during the Fifties, 
with large-scale industries growth registered at a very impressive 15.8 percent. Given 
the state of the industrial sector this is not surprising, but foretells a bright future for 
the economy if the growth impetus can be maintained in the coming years and 
decades. In an effort to capitalize on the rich natural resources available domestically, 
the industrial policy at the time was designed to encourage the manufacture of 
products based on indigenous raw materials such as cotton, jute, hides and skins, etc. 
The assumption was that there was an assured market at home and abroad for these 
products and supply of raw material would be easier to facilitate and less of a burden 
on the local economy. Demand in the home market for consumer goods was rising 
and the country was therefore heavily dependent on imports to satisfy this demand. 
The state opted to develop the domestic consumer goods industry at the same time 
to relieve the pressure on imports. The state played a highly active and interventionist 
role in the development of industrial activity at this time, and the policies 
implemented tended to feature direct controls on imports, investment, and prices; all 
designed to regulate and guide economic activity in the sector. A number of key 
industries were also set up by the state and turned over to the private sector (dis-
invested) for profitable operations.  
 
Growth of manufacturing sector accelerated to almost 10 percent during the Sixties. 
A number of initiatives helped in realizing the high growth rate, including a liberal 
import policy, subsidies to encourage exports through a number of schemes such as 
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Export Bonus Scheme (EBS), Export Performance Licensing Scheme (EPLS), tax 
rebates, tax exemption, Pay-As-You-Earn Schemes etc. Of these incentives, two in 
particular (EBS and EPLS) received much attention from the state and private sector 
alike. The Export Performance Licensing Scheme (EPLS) was designed to alleviate the 
bottleneck created from the absence of imported raw material by deliberately linking 
licensing (import) of raw materials directly to export performance11. The Export 
Bonus Scheme (EBS) was another export promotion scheme launched in January 
1959 for the purpose of boosting Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings and remained 
in effect for over a decade, finally being abandoned in 1972 (Spring) with the 
devaluation of the Pakistani Rupee against the US Dollar (see Box 1.1 for details of the 
mechanics of the scheme). The efficient running of these schemes was contingent on 
well-functioning, able state machinery, and it appears the schemes did not achieve 
their intended goals to the full extent possible. For example, the former scheme 
turned into “an administrative nightmare of such horrendous complexity” (Child 
(1968), p.176), which undoubtedly created many opportunities for rent-seeking 
behaviour. 
 
 
 
Source: Ikram (1970), Ikram (1972) 
 
Where the allocation of resources under EPLS was administratively determined, 
under the EBS it was partially market-oriented and price determined (see Table 1.6 
for a comparison of key highlights of the two schemes). EPLS coincided with Ayub 
                                                             
11 Ikram (1972) 
i. Domestic exporter earns local currency equivalent of foreign exchange for sale of 
goods produced 
ii. Foreign exchange is sold to SBP for local currency 
iii. Domestic exporter also receives voucher entitling owner to purchase foreign 
exchange equal to 20 or 40 percent of amount initially earned by the exporter 
iv. Vouchers issued for all exports except raw jute, raw cotton, hides and skins, raw 
wool, tea and rice 
v. Transferable voucher can be sold at a market determined premium price 
 
EBS Vouchers entitle the bearer to import foreign goods (consumer goods and 
capital goods alike) which makes them highly sought after, and in much demand. As 
a result the premium price for these Vouchers in the market escalates and the 
original exporter can receive a windfall gain from the scheme by selling Vouchers in 
the market rather than using them to import raw materials and capital goods as 
intended by the EBS.  
  
Box 1.1: Mechanics of Export Bonus Scheme and Susceptibility to Rent-Seeking  
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Khan’s more hands-on approach to development and was more selectively applied. 
This placed a greater burden on the bureaucracy and the state and created 
opportunity for rent-seeking behaviour among entrepreneurs. On the other hand, EBS 
reflected the more market-oriented and hands-off approach of the state, but the easy 
transferability of vouchers under the scheme created greater opportunities for rent-
seeking and profiteering behaviour. 
 
Table 1.6: Export Performance Licensing versus Export Bonus Schemes - Key Highlights 
Key Highlight Export Performance Licensing Export Bonus 
Operational Dates: 1961 (January) - 1968 (January) 1959 (January) - 1972 (May) 
Allocation of 
Resources 
Administratively determined Partially market-oriented, price 
determined 
Incentives Exhortation, minor incentives, 
export quotas 
Monetary 
Import Licenses Non transferable Transferable 
Rent-seeking Considerable, but limited to 
licensees 
Encouraged by scarcity of foreign 
exchange 
Source: Hecox (1970)  
 
The high protection rates afforded by these subsidy schemes meant that producers 
received excessive profits, which the state did not capitalize on, rather encouraged 
through provision of tax holidays and accelerated depreciation allowances that 
increased the post-tax profits in the production of manufactured products. According 
to Hecox (1970), there were well established opportunities for illegal transactions 
created by licensing that were even indirectly acknowledged by the state.  
 
A sharp fall was witnessed in the growth of manufacturing sector in the Seventies, 
down to just 5.50 percent and for large scale manufacturing to only 4.84 percent. The 
policies pursued by state had a lasting impact on the industrialization process in the 
country, including the initiative to nationalize heavy industry and reserving a number 
of sectors (including cement, fertilizer, oil refining, engineering, chemicals etc.) 
exclusively for public sector operations. The bias against private sector profiteering 
by the state was also reflected in the discontinuation of the policy of dis-investing 
profitable public sector units. Moreover, the private sector industrialists were also 
subjected to a number of restrictions under Profiteering and Hoarding Act designed 
to curb price fixing. These measures created considerable amount of uncertainty and 
tainted the outlook of the private sector regarding the role of the state as a facilitator 
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and enabler of entrepreneurial activity in the country, resulting in a fall in private 
investment and flight of capital. 
 
During the Eighties direct controls were replaced with market-oriented forces to 
correct the bias against the private sector; import policy was liberalized, tariff 
structure was rationalized, par value of rupee was brought nearer to its equilibrium 
value and it was made convertible on capital account. The requirement for investment 
licensing was abolished, prices were de-controlled, and performance of public 
enterprises improved due to signalling system. The market friendly policies did result 
in a marked recovery of industrial activity, with growth accelerating to 8.21 percent.  
 
However, political uncertainty on the domestic front and economic slowdown on the 
international front in the Nineties contributed to the growth rate decelerating to 3.88 
percent. Large scale manufacturing also mirrored this disappointing trend, falling to 
3.54 percent. Even more worrisome is the fact that growth in this sector slowed down 
even further to an average of 2.26 percent per annum during the last four years of the 
decade. A whole host of adverse conditions manifested themselves during this time. 
Political instability, a worsening of the law and order situation, and poor cotton crop 
yield, on the one hand, and on the other hand insufficient industrial and infrastructure 
investment resulted in an energy generation infrastructure that was woefully 
inadequate at meeting industrial demand, and further compounded by bottlenecks in 
infrastructure provision all caused a virtual stagnation of growth in the sector. 
 
In the early years of industrial development, the state opted to develop domestic 
production in a number of key industries and also focused on developing consumer 
goods production by encouraging import substitution, as evidenced by its 
contribution to manufacturing industries growth of 96.9 percent for the period 1951-
52 to 1954-55. On the other hand, export promotion has not had as great an impact 
on manufacturing sector growth till the latter half of the Eighties.  
 
It is clear that the manufacturing sector has grown since concerted efforts first got 
underway, but value added in this sector is over-stated and highly distorted. If value 
added in the manufacturing sector is evaluated at the world prices, its contribution to 
GDP is relatively much smaller, reflecting gross inefficiencies and/or excessive 
profits. For instance, though some distortions had been removed by early 1990s, 
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more than 30 percent of value addition in the sector could be ascribed to protection. 
It has been observed by Kemal, Din & Qadir (2002) that since then a number of 
initiatives have been taken to reduce the level of protection further and maximum 
import duty was reduced to 45 percent by the end of century and to 30 percent in the 
following years. 
 
The manufacturing sector has evolved in not only breadth but depth as well over the 
years and is today represented by a number of very promising industries; including 
textiles, surgical goods, leather and vehicles (automotive). Of these sub sectors, the 
automotive sector is of particular interest; the sector has shown itself to be quite 
resilient and has evolved to encompass a great deal of versatility. Pakistan’s 
automotive sector has not limited itself by specializing in the production of a single 
automotive category; rather it produces virtually the whole gamut of automotive 
products, from two and three wheel vehicles to large buses and trucks and all manner 
of passenger cars as well. Domestic firms in the industry are attempting to break into 
production employing emerging technologies such as alternative fuel sources, with 
varying levels of success. Technology acquisition in the sector holds the greatest 
promise for yielding spillovers with the rest of the economy and the greatest scope 
for development of local capabilities and competitiveness. 
 
For sustainable economic growth and development to be achieved through 
industrialization, a diverse industrial base of the economy is required12. An analysis of 
disaggregated industrial output data from 1963 onwards suggests that though Pakistan 
established manufacturing capacity in a number of areas, the industrial structure remains 
concentrated in relatively few products. Three product categories; textiles, food and 
beverages and chemicals and chemical products (ISIC 17, 15 and 24 in Table 1.7) 
accounted for over 66 percent of total industrial output in the 1960s, and this share 
decreased to slightly over 61 percent by the end of 2000s. The remaining share was 
spread among 15 categories in the 1960s and 19 in the 2000s, primarily in comparatively 
low value added products. Of note is the share of automotive products (ISIC 34 in Table 
1.7), which has increased from 2.99 percent in the 1960s to 5.14 percent in the 2000s. 
This marginal structural transformation suggests Pakistan is making progress is 
diversifying its industrial base, and moving towards the production of complex products. 
                                                             
12 Kemal (2006) 
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However, what is not clear from the data, but will be apparent from the analysis of the 
automotive industry in later chapters, is that the increase in output shares is on account 
of assembly operations or production of basic products, rather than in movement up the 
value chain towards higher value added products. 
 
Table 1.7: Disaggregated Industrial Output by Decade (1960 – 2000) 
ISIC 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
D: Total manufacturing 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
17: Textiles 37.69 29.49 23.26 31.24 28.47 
15: Food and beverages 21.62 23.03 20.64 18.29 20.40 
24: Chemicals and chemical 
products 
7.46 8.98 10.68 11.72 12.21 
16: Tobacco products 6.09 5.41 4.57 2.44 1.90 
23: Coke, refined petroleum 
products, nuclear fuel 
3.44 7.77 11.57 6.85 9.11 
27: Basic metals 3.43 3.81 5.98 4.98 2.79 
31: Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 
3.11 2.91 3.28 3.92 2.11 
26: Non-metallic mineral 
products 
3.06 3.35 4.53 4.33 4.37 
34: Motor vehicles, trailers, 
semi-trailers 
2.99 3.83 3.72 4.13 5.14 
28: Fabricated metal products 2.23 1.61 0.95 0.79 0.86 
18: Wearing apparel, fur 2.15 2.82 3.70 4.11 4.12 
25: Rubber and plastics 
products 
1.79 1.76 1.68 1.33 1.16 
29: Machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. 
1.45 1.79 2.51 2.08 1.94 
21: Paper and paper products 1.29 1.32 1.10 1.48 1.90 
22: Printing and publishing 1.16 0.88 0.86 0.99 0.32 
36: Furniture; manufacturing 
n.e.c. 
0.72 0.77 0.47 0.81 0.65 
33: Medical, precision and 
optical instruments 
0.23 0.33 0.26 0.30 0.39 
20: Wood products (excl. 
furniture) 
0.09 0.13 0.24 0.22 0.32 
35: Other transport equipment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.06 
19: Leather, leather products 
and footwear 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
32: Radio, television and 
communication equipment 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
37: Recycling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
30: Office, accounting and 
computing machinery 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: UNIDO INDSTAT2 Industrial Statistics Database 
 
The previous analysis of disaggregated industrial output has revealed that Pakistan has 
made limited progress with diversifying its industrial base. A similar analysis of 
disaggregated export data reveals that Pakistan’s export comprised primarily of textile 
yarn and fabrics in the early years of 1972-77 (38.42 percent in Table 1.8), and this level 
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of specialization increased by 1989-99 to over 50 percent. Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories which comprised only 3 percent of exports in 1972-77 accounted for over 20 
percent of exports in 1989-99. 
 
As evident from the trends in Table 1.8, which presents the top ten export categories of 
Pakistan (by share), 7 categories in 1972-77 comprised 82 percent of all exports, while 
this share increased to 90 percent in 1989-99. By 1989-99 there were three new export 
categories (line 8-10) that accounted for 4 percent of all exports, while three categories 
that accounted for 5 percent of export in 1972-77 were not in the top ten export 
categories in 1989-99.  
 
Table 1.8: Disaggregated Export Data by Period 
Sr. 
No. 
SITC 
Code 
Classification 1972-
77 
1978-
88 
1989-
99 
1 65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, NES, 
and related products 
38.42 38.72 50.37 
2 84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 3.06 9.23 20.14 
3 04 Cereals and cereal preparations 19.25 12.79 5.78 
4 26 Textile fibres (not wool tops) and their 
wastes (not in yarn) 
10.20 12.74 5.01 
5 89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, NES 3.30 2.38 3.79 
6 61 Leather, leather manufactures, NES, and 
dressed furskins 
5.05 5.52 3.34 
7 03 Fish (not marine mammals), crustaceans, 
molluscs and aquatic invertebrates, and 
preparations thereof 
2.67 2.72 1.88 
8 87 Professional, scientific and controlling 
instruments and apparatus, NES 
 1.01 1.49 
9 06 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey 0.60 1.00 1.46 
10 05 Vegetables and fruit 0.99 1.45 1.02 
Source: UN COMTRADE Database, online access 
 
It can be concluded from the trends described above that even though Pakistan has 
made substantial strides in generating growth; it has been unable to sustain a high 
level of self-reliant growth due to a myriad of challenges faced over the years.  
 
1.3.1.3. Infrastructure 
Infrastructure development plays a vital role in the development process of a country; 
without the road or railway links (at the very least) to get crops to the market, 
agriculture would collapse, and without adequate power generation and supply to 
today highly mechanized manufacturing firms, the industrial sector would be 
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hamstrung and unable to compete effectively. Poor infrastructure availability also 
harms quality of life and wellbeing of the population of a country. Improved supply, 
quality and affordability of infrastructure is thus essential for stimulating growth and 
reducing poverty levels in a country.  
 
Given the fact that the topography of the country is rugged with varied and significant 
mountainous regions, roads would be the preferred choice of transport, and in fact by 
2012-13, the road network in Pakistan is responsible for over 96 percent of inland 
freight traffic and 92 percent of all passenger traffic in the country; the veritable 
transport backbone of the economy. 263,415 km of road are networked across the 
country, with 40 percent lying in Punjab, almost 31 percent in Sindh, a little over 16 
percent in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 11.3 percent in Baluchistan.  
 
The railway network which is considered essential for movement of freight has 
tended to be relegated to the back seat in terms of receiving funds from the state. Out 
of a total inventory of 515 locomotives, by June 2012 only 92 passenger locomotives 
and 8 freight locomotives remain in operation. Revenue of the state run Pakistan 
Railways has fallen by 25 percent while working expenses have increased by 33 
percent, comprised for the most part by employee related costs and maintenance 
costs associated with operating over aged infrastructure and rolling stock.  
 
Trends in growth of electricity generation suggest that the country lacks the capacity 
to generate sufficient power to meet its current needs, let alone those of the future. 
Losses due to transmission failures and theft have also placed a growing burden on 
the domestic economy while at the same time compromising the ability of the 
manufacturing industries to develop and grow. In fact, after the substantial 
investment made in installed capacity after independence, the rate of growth has been 
slowing down, except for a slight increase on account of commissioning of Tarbela 
Dam in the 1980s (see Table 1.9). Adequate generation of power has created a 
bottleneck for development of the economy, which the state has attempted to 
alleviate in the short term by importing power from abroad, renting private power 
plants and making long term investments in nuclear and hydroelectric power 
projects. 
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Table 1.9: Growth Rate of Installed Capacity and Generation of Electricity 
 (%) 
Decade Installed Capacity (MW) Generation (GWH) 
1950s 21.50 21.75 
1960s 13.83 20.00 
1970s 7.75 8.97 
1980s 8.61 9.59 
1990s 8.23 5.88 
2000s 1.89 3.87 
2010s 4.00 0.00 
Source: Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, various issues 
 
Alternative sources of power, including wind and solar are also being pursued; 
however, the demand for power continues to outstrip any additions made to the 
installed capacity from these alternative sources, and the technology involved is 
relatively new and costly, which impedes its implementation in the economy. The 
continuing power brownouts and blackouts across the economy have prompted 
many firms to invest in independent generators and back-up power supplies to 
ensure production operations remain unhindered by the lack of this infrastructure 
component. 
 
1.3.1.4. Demographic Trends 
Pakistan is credited as being the 36th largest country in the world in terms of surface 
area, but it is also the sixth most densely populated country in the world, with an 
estimated population of 179.2 million in 2012, and among the highest growth rate in 
the region (see Table 1.10) according to World Bank (2014). If present trends 
continue unabated, the country is slated to become the fifth most densely populated 
country by 2050 (UN projections). It is generally accepted that the country is now in 
the midst of a demographic transition and it is on the threshold of a demographic 
dividend, which can yield immense benefits if state and society work together for the 
common good. 
 
The age distribution of population has also been undergoing a transformation, with 
the population aged 0-14 years decreasing in number, while 15-64 year olds were 
also decreasing in number till the end of the 1980s, and on the upward trend since 
then. Finally, the proportion of 65 years + individuals has also been increasing. Thus, 
overall population growth has been driven by the increase in the young and energetic 
15-64 age group who represent almost 60 percent of the total population by the end 
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of the 2000s. The rising number of youths will place an increasing strain on already 
scarce resources available for health care provision, while also requiring education 
and jobs to be productive. 
 
Table 1.10: Population Growth Rates by Decade 
(%) 
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Bangladesh 3.03 2.17 2.70 2.18 1.41 1.14 
China 2.37 1.99 1.45 1.14 0.61 0.48 
India 2.13 2.32 2.23 1.87 1.50 1.29 
Korea, Rep. 2.46 1.85 1.22 0.96 0.54 0.55 
Nepal 1.94 2.19 2.31 2.53 1.58 1.15 
Pakistan 2.67 2.99 3.38 2.68 1.92 1.75 
Sri Lanka 2.36 1.68 1.52 1.25 0.71 -0.18 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
 
Total fertility rates (TFR, or number of births per woman) paint a very disturbing 
picture (as evident in Table 1.11) when the rates are compared across countries since 
the time of independence. For the decade of 2000, by the end of 2009, Pakistan’s TFR 
stood at 3.9; the highest among countries of the region, including China and India. 
 
Table 1.11: Cross Country Comparison of TFR by Decade 
(births per woman) 
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Bangladesh 6.9 6.8 5.6 3.8 2.7 2.3 
China 6.0 4.1 2.7 1.9 1.6 1.7 
India 5.8 5.1 4.3 3.5 2.9 2.5 
Nepal 6.0 5.9 5.5 4.7 3.4 2.6 
Pakistan 6.6 6.6 6.4 5.4 3.9 3.4 
Sri Lanka 5.0 3.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
 
Infant mortality rates (cross country comparison presented in Table 1.12) in Pakistan 
paint a similarly disturbing picture, with the country making major strides in 
reducing the number of infant deaths (from 157.8 in the 1960s to 70.7 per 1,000 live 
births in 2010s); though the number is the highest in the region. 
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Table 1.12: Infant Mortality Rates 
 (Numbers per 1,000 live births) 
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Bangladesh 156.2 144.0 118.8 82.9 52.4 35.3 
China 82.7 63.6 43.0 37.9 21.7 12.9 
India 152.2 129.8 101.6 78.6 57.4 45.4 
Korea, Rep. 60.0 25.4 9.0 5.1 4.8 3.4 
Nepal 201.2 162.1 121.8 80.4 48.5 35.0 
Pakistan 157.8 130.2 114.8 97.8 80.4 70.7 
Sri Lanka 60.5 48.9 27.5 17.3 11.8 8.6 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
 
1.3.2. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FACING THE ECONOMY 
The discussion above has highlighted the trends in Pakistan’s economy as it has 
evolved since the time of independence almost 65 years ago. Between 1949 and 2013, 
GDP growth has averaged 5.29 percent which compares quite favourably with other 
countries in the region. Despite a swift rise in population, per capita income has 
managed to more than triple since 1960, and the growth in GDP has been made 
possible due to substantial increases in output from the agricultural and industrial 
sectors. Production of wheat rose almost ten-fold from 2.4 million to 23.9 million 
tonnes, rice 0.83 million to 6.9 million tonnes, maize also witnessed a ten-fold 
increase from only 0.35 million to 3.5 million tonnes and cotton from 1.9 million to 
12.9 million bales between 1953 and 2010. Industrial production began with only a 
textile mill and cement plant and has since then blossomed into a wide variety of food 
industries, cigarettes, fertilizers, engineering and automotive, electrical and 
mechanical engineering, metallurgy, pharmaceutical and even ship building 
industries. 
 
Despite the quantum increases in agricultural crop yields, production in the sector is 
subject to weather conditions, and industrial firms are finding it difficult to break into 
the global market for their products. Unable to export products of any meaningful 
value addition means that import levels invariably exceed exports and this places an 
almost intolerable strain on the economy’s foreign exchange reserves and has led to 
a mounting external debt. Traditionally debt servicing has been the major component 
of the federal budget, second only to funds set aside for defence, with the result that 
only meagre amounts are set aside for investment in other areas considered crucial 
for successful development; infrastructure, health and education, to name a few. It 
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can be concluded that the development of human capital is more of an afterthought, 
rather than a national imperative, and the fruits of economic growth are not in 
evidence in the lives of the ordinary populace of the country. Economic growth has 
clearly taken place, but the distribution of gains has been uneven, as evidenced by the 
persistent levels of poverty across the country. With a high growth rate of population, 
the country is on the brink of witnessing a demographic dividend; the proportion of 
able bodied, young persons is increasing by the day, and the pressure is mounting on 
the labour market which is ill-equipped to handle the increased levels joining the 
market. The state is faced with a new challenge of effectively managing this 
demographic transition, a challenge that can be met by focussing on industrial sector 
development, but the outcome will be determined by the nature of political 
settlements in the country, as will be further explored in the next section and 
following chapter. 
 
Despite the bias towards promoting industrial sector development and the growing 
importance of the services sector, agriculture sector continues to be the mainstay of 
the economy to this day. This has implications for the consistency and sustainability 
of medium and long-term growth of the economy since it is painfully clear that 
agricultural output is subject to the vagaries of the weather. Traditionally the 
industrial sector is tapped as the engine of growth in developing countries; as the 
sector most suited to absorbing and utilizing large pools of labour for productive 
means and generating the spillovers that will ensure productivity in the other sectors 
of the economy also increases. Even though the industrial sector has shown the 
potential time and again to drive growth of the domestic economy, the state has failed 
to put forward a meaningful ideology and vision for long term development of the 
sector. 
 
The lack of investment in infrastructure development, especially power generation 
and affordable rail transport has meant that firms have to allocate resources towards 
meeting their needs from private sources, which tend to be more costly. Not only that, 
but the industrial sector as a result is unable to realise its full potential due to the 
infrastructure bottlenecks. Despite inheriting only a very meagre industrial sector at 
the time, the state had the foresight early on to make significant investments in 
building up the infrastructure required to industrialize successfully while at the same 
time directing the development of the local industrial sector and deepening of 
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production capabilities through technology acquisition efforts. Both the internal and 
external environments since independence have not been truly conducive to 
promoting economic growth and development. 
 
1.3.3. THE CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
Pakistan’s political history since gaining independence has been colourful, to say the 
least, and quite turbulent at the best of times, being ruled by a powerful military for 
over half of its 64 years in existence, and by democratic parties that struggled to 
remain in power once they were elected, for the remainder of the time. Attempts at 
finding stability have been constrained by the disharmony between the provinces on 
the domestic front, and on the international front a fundamental conflict with its 
neighbour India. The powers that be have attempted to legitimize their rule by 
capitalizing on secular policies or by taking on the mantle of “frontline state” (see 
Baxter (1985) and Hussain (2008)) in the Cold War or the war against terror.  
 
The founding of Pakistan marked the largest ever migration of population between 
what is now known as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; almost seventeen million 
Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims moved between India and the East and West Pakistan 
wings.  
 
Despite having been founded on the idea of having a separate homeland for all 
Muslims to live freely without fear of persecution or prejudice, Pakistan has continued 
to struggle in establishing a national identity and settling on a political system capable 
of accommodating a diverse population. Officially the country has two main 
languages, English and Urdu however, unofficially provinces are partial to their own 
regional languages. This has led to regional tension, an inability to form a constitution 
and repeated contestation over allocation of scarce funds. The perception in the 
smaller provinces and the Eastern wing of the country was that the province of Punjab 
had a monopoly on power, patronage and profits and this has created further tension.  
 
The All India Muslim League (AIML) under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah 
proposed that Indian Muslims should share the reins of power with Hindus and AIML 
should represent the interests of Indian Muslims in Muslim majority as well as Muslim 
minority provinces of India. Interestingly enough, the power base of the AIML rested 
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with the Muslims in the minority provinces, and not the majority provinces as would 
have expected. This lack of support meant that AIML was unsuccessful in setting up 
effective political machinery in the majority provinces and lacked the ability to 
influence politicians or the population of those provinces in a meaningful way. A 
unified religious ideology was deemed to be the best option of bringing the disparate 
provinces and wings together, however the differing traditions and language 
preferences impeded this process, and AIML was unable to solidify its support to 
represent all Indian Muslims after rallying the population under the banner of 
religion. Thus, at the time of independence the main central political party (Muslim 
League) lacked a central administrative apparatus to govern the provinces and was 
weakened by politicians who did not have the support of the population. Millions of 
refugees within its borders created a great strain on limited resources, while the lack 
of an industrial base meant that the administrative setup had to extract resources 
from the landed elite (who dominated the ML). All these factors combined to create 
conditions that would compromise the ability of the state in subsequent years in 
directing development efforts.  
 
The years immediately following independence were chaotic and the country ran 
through a number of corrupt politicians who were more interested in remaining in 
power and forging closer ties with elites than ensuring the democratic process 
provided freedom and justice to all Pakistanis. All these factors combined to prime 
the economy for the first successful military coup led by General Ayub Khan. Under 
the authoritarian rule of General Khan, government functions were consolidated and 
a stop was put to unstable ministerial coalitions that had characterized the earlier 
political climate. Ayub Khan was of the view that the politicians in their quest for 
power were causing irreparable harm to economic development and needed to be 
replaced. All politicians were disqualified under an Elective Bodies Disqualification 
Order (1959) and a coalition of Punjabi army officials and civil bureaucrats, and a 
small influential group of industrialists and landed elites was formed to replace the 
existing admittedly flawed governmental setup with a Basic Democracy system. Only 
a limited number of voters or basic democrats were chosen to elect members of 
provincial and national assemblies to office. Ayub Khan had hoped to legitimize his 
rule by addressing the core grievance of the people of injustice, inequality and 
misrepresentation and giving the chosen few in bureaucracy a role in politics. The 
earlier corrupt system was deemed undemocratic and thus swept away; to be 
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replaced by a new system that was supposed to embody democracy suited to the 
people, but in fact turned out to be flawed itself since the basic democrats could be 
bribed or coerced into voting for particular candidates. What actually transpired was 
a tightening of bureaucratic control by a state that implemented policies that widened 
the gaps between provinces and especially the two wings of the country, while 
productivity increases in West Pakistan were offset by rising inequalities in the 
agricultural sector and lack of representation, and mounting concentration of wealth 
with a handful of families.  
 
Coupled with the war with India in 1965, Ayub Khan’s authority was undermined and 
General Yahya Khan led the second successful military coup against the establishment 
in 1969. Things came to a head in the general elections of 1970 which revealed how 
authoritarian attempts at centralization under Ayub Khan had resulted in politics in 
Pakistan coming to be dominated by regionalism and social conflict. The Awami 
League capitalized on discontent in the East Pakistan wing to capture all but one seat 
in East Pakistan and an absolute majority in the national assembly by promising a 
program of provincial autonomy. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party rose to 
the front in West Pakistan on a populist platform and managed to oust Muslim League. 
West Pakistani politicians were naturally against the shift of power to East Pakistan 
under Awami League led by Mujibur Rahman as they feared loss of power that would 
inevitably followed, and conspired with the military to prevent the transfer of power. 
The result was an armed rebellion in East Pakistan against the injustices of the West 
wing and intervention by India to quell the disturbance led to Pakistan’s third war 
with India since gaining independence only a few years earlier.  
 
The aftermath of the war saw the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, and a severely 
crippled bureaucracy and military. PPP drew its political power from Punjab and 
Sindh only and used the state of affairs to wrest control from General Yahya Khan. 
However, lacking sufficient backing in the provinces of Baluchistan and NWFP, Bhutto 
had to rely on support from the civil bureaucracy and military to maintain a working 
government. Despite losing credibility due to the events that led to the separation of 
Bangladesh in 1971, in the eyes of the public the military was still a crucial pillar of 
the state. The 1973 constitution was formed to provide a measure of national 
cohesion by granting substantial concessions to NWFP, Baluchistan and even Sindh. 
Bhutto was only able to achieve a marginal modicum of success from implementing 
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economic reforms which meant that he was unable to draw on support from all 
quarters of the economy and PPP did not emerge as a national party. The army once 
again intervened when charges of vote rigging were made against the PPP in the 1971 
election and resulted in violent political unrest. Military rule was again established in 
1977 under General Zia-ul Haq. 
 
To solidify support for his rule and legitimize the role of the military in Pakistani 
politics, General Zia used religion as the justification for banning all political parties, 
and non-party elections were held while policies for Islamization of society picked up 
speed. The Zia regime received support from the international community when 
Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979 and the country became a front-
line state bordering Soviet territory. Despite receiving substantial military and 
financial aid, discontent within the country started to rise again, no doubt fuelled by 
the exodus of Afghan refugees fleeing Soviet occupation and continuing disparities in 
the distribution of wealth. Martial law was finally lifted by Zia in 1985 after holding 
an “Islamic” referendum to confirm his own position and non-party elections of 
provincial and national assemblies. 
 
What followed was a democratic era in the country’s political history that proved to 
be just as turbulent and fraught with controversy as earlier attempts. Political parties 
boycotted the 1985 elections, but candidates and voters participated in the renewed 
attempt at democracy as hope for a brighter future was rekindled. To further 
consolidate his power, the newly elected President Zia implemented constitutional 
amendments that guaranteed his right to power would not be challenged or usurped 
by his subordinates. The President first exercised this power when he dissolved the 
National Assembly in 1988 on the charge of corruption and failure to enforce an 
Islamic way of life and removed sitting Prime Minister Muhammad Junejo from power 
on the pretext of conspiracy against the presidency. 
 
President Zia attempted to hold non-party elections again, but this was challenged by 
the Supreme Court. The President responded by turning to religion again and 
attempted to mould the political system according to Islam, but this was met with 
scepticism and political confusion. These developments culminated in the death of the 
President in a plane crash and appointment of Ghulam Ishaq Khan as President till 
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elections could be held in November of 1988 on a political party basis for the first time 
in fifteen years. 
 
The political events that followed read like a game of catch between the two main 
political parties in the country, the PPP and the PML. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of 
Zulfiqar Bhutto was elected as Prime Minister when PPP secured the most seats in 
elections of 1988, but rather than working with the opposition led by PML, the two 
parties developed an antagonistic relationship. Politicians were bribed by either 
party to sway their allegiances and little to no progress was made in economic 
development. Benazir Bhutto was dismissed by the President on charges of 
corruption less than two years later, and the elections of 1990 saw Nawaz Sharif as 
leader of the PML being sworn in as the new Prime Minister. The political parties 
continued their squabbles unabated till Nawaz Sharif was dismissed in 1993 and the 
President was accused of conspiring with the leader of the opposition to oust the 
sitting Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif and the PML were reinstated to power by the 
Supreme Court, but the victory was short lived as allegations of incompetence against 
the Prime Minister surfaced in Punjab in 1993. Both the President and Prime Minister 
were forced to resign and new elections held with the PPP again securing more seats 
and Benazir Bhutto once more taking over as Prime Minister. 
 
Benazir Bhutto was able to get the candidate of her choice elected as President, the 
expectation being that a sympathetic President would not oust her government from 
power. However, when governmental processes were again corrupted, the 
opportunity presented itself to President Leghari and the Chief Justice to solidify their 
own position and joined forces to dismiss Bhutto from power. In early 1997, the 
country was preparing to go to the ballot boxes and cast their votes for the fifth time 
in the short span of twelve years. This time the misconduct of the PPP had left a bad 
taste in the mouths of the public and PML headed by Nawaz Sharif came to power. 
The PML worked to limit the powers of the President (that had been expanded by Zia) 
and restored the parliamentary form of government. The PML government inherited 
a Pandora’s Box of issues plaguing the economy and their time in power was not a 
resounding success as a result, but Nawaz Sharif appeared to be gaining power and 
support, which was a cause for concern for the military as they were being side-lined 
in important decision making. What ensued was a tussle between the Prime Minister 
and the military headed by General Musharraf, which ended when the latter staged a 
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successful coup to unseat Nawaz Sharif from power in 1999. There were ample 
reasons to justify leading a coup against the government that General Musharraf 
cited; chief among them being terrorism, factional disputes and a volatile situation in 
Kashmir that had led to a worsening law and order situation and merited action by 
the nation’s military. 
 
Tired of the corruption, infighting and poor state of the economy, the country received 
the General with open arms and assumed elections would be held when the situation 
stabilized. General Musharraf declared himself President in 2001 and agreed to hold 
elections in 2002 only after a deadline had been set by the Supreme Court. By allying 
himself with the US and the Western world at large in the “war on terror”13, Musharraf 
strained relations with Afghanistan on the international front, and factions 
sympathetic to religious ideologies on the domestic front. 
 
Thus, it can be seen that politics in Pakistan has evolved over time to include more 
interest groups and factions over time that are actively contesting power with the 
elected government, leading to frequent changes in the setup that are interspersed 
with military rule when the situation is deemed to have got out of hand. The same two 
political parties hold the majority votes despite being repeatedly charged with 
corruption and unfair practices. 
 
1.4. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
One of the frameworks which have been used to study technology acquisition and 
capability development builds on the importance of rents in creating the appropriate 
incentives, opportunities and compulsions required. In advanced countries the role 
of Schumpeterian rents in innovation is well known, and in developing countries 
there has been considerable research on the importance of rents in the ‘learning’ 
process as referred to by Amsden (1989) and Khan (2000a). We begin with a general 
discussion of rents before discussing the specific issues relevant for technology 
acquisition in developing countries.  
 
                                                             
13 A term first coined by US President George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001 attacks. 
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First, one needs to establish what is meant by a rent, and establish the role of rents in 
enabling the learning process in developing countries. According to Milgrom & 
Roberts (1992), a rent is “the portion of earnings in excess of the minimum amount 
needed to attract a worker to accept a particular job or a firm to enter a particular 
industry”. This definition suggests that a rent is the amount over and above the 
minimum amount needed to attract an unemployed worker to accept a job (for 
example). In many developed countries the minimum amount needed is an 
unemployment benefit, but according to this definition it would not be considered a 
rent. However, if the worker has no desire to re-enter the job market in the first place, 
then the benefit would be considered a rent. Therefore, this view appears to be a bit 
simplistic in nature and limited in its scope, and a more precise formulation has been 
given by Khan (2000a) describing a situation where an economic agent is the 
recipient of a rent if the agent earns an income higher than the minimum that agent 
would have otherwise accepted, the minimum being income from the agent’s next-
best employment opportunity. With this definition in mind, and quite contrary to the 
prediction of simplistic models, one comes to the conclusion that rents are a part and 
parcel of economic activity, and one even finds numerous examples of rents in 
developed as well as developing countries ranging from monopolistic profits to 
income accruing to ownership of scarce resources, and politically organized transfers 
of subsidies and rebates. This suggests that many rents can be useful to economic 
activity completely efficient, rent-free markets are a pipe-dream and rents, in one 
form or another, are part and parcel of the modus operandi of real world markets. 
The question then remains as to the impact of rents on economic activity and 
ultimately growth and development? Which rents are beneficial to economic activity 
and which rents are like a cancer eating away the healthy economic body? 
 
If some rents can aid growth and development, while others can spur inefficiency and 
mis-use of scarce resources, then following the popular liberal policy prescription 
that all rents are bad and must be done away with, would likely cause more harm than 
good. Further investigation and a deeper understanding of the role of rents in a 
specific economic set-up is required to design reforms that will deal effectively with 
growth-retarding rents as well as enabling other rents to benefit the economy. 
 
It is believed that developing countries that achieved, or came close to convergence 
with the growth paths of industrialized countries, did so by addressing the market 
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failures in acquiring technology effectively and thereby boosting their technological 
productive capacity. These countries did so with arrangements that were uniquely 
suited to the conditions prevalent in individual countries and not by opting for a 
generic set of arrangements designed for developing countries. The infant industry 
protection of the 1950s and 1960s provided the revealed capability needed for the 
countries to grow, while the liberalization policies allowed the underlying capability 
to be developed, and the growth process to be sustained in some cases. Addressing 
the hurdles in learning by doing and acquisition of tacit knowledge is the key to 
ensuring developing countries achieve and maintain high growth rates. 
 
Learning by doing by its very nature requires a period of loss-making that needs to be 
financed by investors (be they private, or public, or both), and its success depends on 
the level of effort made by firms’ employees. Market failures result when investors 
are unwilling or unable to finance the period of loss-making and the effort required 
to make the venture a success cannot be effectively monitored and enforced. 
Understanding the nature of these two market failures is the main ingredient in 
formulation of an effective policy mix that will promote successful technology 
acquisition initiatives in developing countries. 
 
Policy interventions that are designed to address market failures associated with 
learning by doing will create rents and encourage rent-seeking activity that can have 
the effect of completely off-setting any potential benefit correction of the market 
failure(s) achieved in the first place. Since rents can be value and welfare enhancing 
for the society or welfare reducing, as explained by Khan (2000a) and Khan (2007) , 
a crucial element here is the management of rents to prevent the creation of new 
market failures while enhancing or increasing social welfare. 
 
Keeping in mind the fact that a rent is the difference between the minimum amount 
needed to attract inputs to an industry and the payment necessary to induce the 
inputs to produce the good or service of interest, one can see that not all rents are 
damaging to economic activity. This fact, though glossed over in early neoclassical 
models that were based on hypothetical perfectly competitive markets, was later 
acknowledged in analysis as intrinsic to ensuring some measure of efficiency of 
resource use. Models of asymmetric information by Stiglitz (1996) and institutions 
analysis of Milgrom & Roberts (1992) that followed demonstrated a fundamental 
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weakness of competitive market models, and allowed for the possibility that rents 
may be necessary or required to compensate for deficiencies in information 
generation and monitoring and ensuring markets function. 
 
The theoretical discussion on rents in Khan (2000a) and elsewhere makes it clear that 
there are no clear cut growth and efficiency implications of rents . Moreover, an 
analysis of rents is incomplete without an understanding of the process(es) through 
which rents are generated and maintained. Without this insight we are unable to 
determine why rents that are designed to be welfare enhancing do not achieve their 
desired goals; especially in the context of learning rents in developing countries. 
 
The process of rent seeking is the expenditure of resources to generate, sustained or 
transfer rents, a definition which does not limit the analysis to illegal rents only, but 
encompasses legal rents as well. The resources expended are a social cost on the 
economy in either case and as such warrant further study. From the given definition 
of rent seeking, it is apparent that the ability to generate and sustain or transfer rents 
depends not only on economic, but also socio-political factors as well. Rents are 
related to rights, and rights can only be changed through the process of institutional 
change. Determining the beneficiaries of rents (especially in developing countries) 
depends to a fair extent on political power and political settlements. Thus a 
meaningful approach to implications of rent and rent seeking activity must 
incorporate aspects of political and institutional economics to explain how much 
effort is expended, and the types of rights and rents created in the process. 
 
Rent seeking literature has its roots in the work of Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975), 
and others who showed that the costs involved in attaining monopoly rents were 
greater than the deadweight loss of the monopoly themselves. However, history has 
shown that when individuals have access to rents, considerable effort is made to 
secure this access and this in turn can lead to the creation of other rents, favouring 
particular individuals, and associated rights to maintain or change the status quo. 
Naturally then the overall effect of rent seeking activity depends on both the cost 
incurred and the rent created. Khan (2000b) considered it as analogous to the 
traditional production process. The rent seeking cost is equivalent to the cost of 
inputs used in production, and the rights and rents created are the equivalent to 
output. However, the literature on rent seeking has focused on social costs of the 
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resources expended in rent seeking and not so much on the rents created by such 
activity in different contexts. 
 
The net social benefit of rents varies, depending not only on the rent itself, but also on 
prevailing political and institutional conditions. History has shown that learning rents 
that do not generate any learning due to state inability or weakness in effective 
monitoring and allocation result in significant losses to the economy, while the same 
rents can deliver rapid technological development if they are managed effectively. In 
much the same way, the cost of rent seeking also varies. 
 
The early rent seeking models Krueger (1974), Posner (1975), Buchanan (1980), 
Tullock (1980), etc. considered monopoly rents to be associated with high rent 
seeking cost, with high negative net effect, and represented by a high degree of 
intervention by the state in the market. Pro market states were represented in these 
models as generating high positive net effect. Later models relaxed some assumptions 
and showed this was not necessarily the case. Congleton (1980), Rogerson 
(1982)Congleton (1980); Rogerson (1982) and others showed that not only could 
rent seeking cost vary significantly, but also that a rent being present did not 
necessarily imply high rent seeking costs.  
 
Bhagwati (1982) showed that rent seeking could result in destruction of value 
reducing rents, rather than in their creation. This led eventually to the notion of rent 
seeking as a process through which the structure of rights in society can change by 
North (1990). Chang (1994), and others developed models arguing that institutions 
in the East Asian economies (at the time of the promising growth experience), were 
able to keep rent seeking cost low and coupled that with a combination of rents 
associated with substantial value enhancements to achieve growth. The differences 
in rent seeking cost across countries were not significant, but the types of rents 
sustained were significantly different. This suggests that more important than high 
rent seeking cost is the ability or failure to create and maintain socially valuable rents 
to explain the success or failure of countries development trajectories. 
 
Analysis of rent seeking costs and outcomes is not very meaningful unless it relates 
to a specific part of the rents process. It is virtually impossible to determine total rent 
seeking cost in an economy, or the structure of rights in the absence of any rent 
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seeking activity. However, it is possible to look at the rent seeking process in the 
context of creation or reallocation of specific rights such as a particular type of import 
license or rent seeking activity in a particular sector in the context of policies 
promoting technology acquisition and learning by doing. 
 
Given the importance of rent seeking activity in influencing economic development, 
it would be useful to look at the empirical evidence of this relationship. One approach, 
following Krueger (1974) was to estimate the input cost of rent seeking activity as a 
percentage of GDP, explaining differences in performance across countries in terms 
of their differential exposure to rent-seeking costs. However, according to Khan 
(2000b), it is not possible to accurately measure these costs in the manner prescribed 
nor will the magnitude of differences be sufficient to explain all the variations in 
performance observed across countries and periods.  
 
Khan (2000b) looked at overall output and industrial growth rates and corruption 
indices in the South Asian region for the period 1970-2000, and found that while 
production increased after the 1980s, rent seeking expenditures had increased since 
the 1960s, as the contestation over ownership of rents had escalated. The 
liberalization process which started in the late 1980s did not appear to have resulted 
in reduction of rent seeking expenditures, or in the subjective perceptions of 
corruption levels in the countries. Though rent seeking was present in South Asian 
countries as well as in the East Asian Tigers, “a subjective assessment of the balance 
of evidence suggests that over the 70s and 80s, relative rent seeking expenditures 
were greater in the Indian subcontinent and Thailand, less so in Malaysia, and least in 
South Korea.” Some variations in rent-seeking expenditures were observed by the 
author in the sample countries; however, these were relatively small while the 
differences in cross country performance indicators were substantially more. This 
suggested that the types of rents that were created, and the subsequent management 
of the conditions governing the rents were significantly different in these countries, 
and this variation has implications for the growth experience of these countries. 
 
Rent seeking outcomes have exhibited considerable variation across countries. In the 
case of South Korea, for example, the industrial policy of the 1960s was found to have 
created learning rents from subsidies that ensured recipients did in fact reap the 
benefits of the learning process. Furthermore, Amsden (1989), Chang (1994) and Kim 
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& Ma (1997) found that these rents and rent-seeking activity were thus growth and 
value enhancing. Pakistan’s experience was not so fruitful; rents created from 
barriers to entry for infant industry protection did not encourage widespread 
learning, and technology acquisition was sporadic. A substantial portion of rent-
creation activity in this case appears to have created rents that in the end turned out 
to be value reducing. Khan (2000b) found that the failure to allocate and manage the 
conditions associated with these rents meant that they (the rents) effectively took the 
form of redistributive rents (for competing groups and factions that protected them 
in the prevailing political settlements) rather than true learning rents. 
 
This naturally begs the question of why the state in Pakistan and other developing 
countries was unable to effectively manage industrial policy and learning rents 
effectively. Opponents of industrial policy have argued that policy may fail if the state 
lacks sufficient information to “pick the winners” (Bruton (1989) and Grossman 
(1988)) or if state-created rents lead to “social waste” by diverting resources from 
productive activities towards unproductive activities such as lobbying (Krueger 
(1974) and Buchanan (1980)), or if state-induced rents are harder to remove once 
they have been implemented (as in the case of infant industries). According to Chang 
(1993), the information problem is not the real cause of such failures. Moreover, the 
existence of state created rents and therefore the opportunity of rent-seeking does 
not imply there actually will be social waste. Therefore, the key factor here is the 
unwillingness and inability of the state to withdraw support whenever performance 
has lagged.  
 
Khan (1999) has argued that measures to encourage technology acquisition in 
Pakistan did two things that undermined the effectiveness of the policy initiative. One, 
the measures led to the exclusion of the middle class groups from the immediate 
benefits of development. Second, the measures were designed to discipline capitalist 
recipients of state subsidies. However, the mechanisms for disciplining of the subsidy 
recipients were inadequately developed and enforced which meant that those same 
recipients could buy protection from any of the strong political factions that had 
emerged. These political factions were interested in gaining access to the resources 
and subsidies the recipients had preferential access to, and the cost of protecting them 
from discipline by the state was insignificant in comparison. Due to the nature of the 
socio-political framework in South Asia, and Pakistan in particular, sustained 
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exclusion of the middle class was not possible, and attempts to accommodate the 
demands of this class compromised the effectiveness of industrial policy when 
subsidies and licenses were allocated in response to political pressure, and not based 
on economic criteria such as the productivity growth that the recipients were 
potentially and actually achieving. Capitalists cultivated relationships with powerful 
political figures to protect their interests. Thus, India and Pakistan were unable to 
reap the benefits of East Asian industrial policies since they lacked the political 
settlements that would allow effective compulsion for high levels of effort according 
to Khan (2009). Well-connected firms were able to benefit from various types of 
“learning rents”, and at the same time secured protection through various factions to 
circumvent threats of subsidy withdrawal from the state. Khan (2000b) found that 
the outcome was significant levels of industrialization in the economy in the early 
stages, accompanied by slow growth of competitiveness that resulted in the growth 
eventually slowing down. 
 
President Ayub Khan staged a coup and assumed leadership of Pakistan and was faced 
with the task of ensuring his political sustainability and legitimacy. This was 
accomplished in East Pakistan with the creation of a Bengali bourgeoisie that would 
ensure he had political support in the province. Educated Bengalis with powerful 
contacts in the bureaucracy were provided permits and licenses which could be sold 
to businessmen from West Pakistan in exchange for ready cash. According to Alavi 
(1973) this process created a parasitic group of individuals, the contactors, who 
capitalized on their contact with political figures(s) to attain power and accumulate 
resources to live large while contributing little to industrial development of the 
country. A second group of individuals, contractors were also courted by the Ayub 
regime through the Industrial Development Bank. These small businessmen were 
encouraged to setup industries by putting up a mere 10 percent of the investment 
funds required, and later provided generous loans and support to become 
industrialists. 
 
In aligning themselves with the political leadership and reaping the benefits from 
Ayub Khan’s bid to create an industrialist class, Pakistan’s business community were 
victimized by the incumbent leadership of Bhutto, and lost access to their rents, 
Kochanek (1983) found that this community emerged as a small, fragmented, family-
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oriented group dominated by the state and unable to play a significant role in 
transforming the domestic economy. 
 
Chibber (2002) has argued that as long as state agencies have to compete for access 
to limited resources, they are bound to employ non-cooperative strategies when 
dealing with rival agencies, and the various economic ministries tend to be in tension 
with development focused policies. These two factors can combine to create a state 
bureaucracy that will be at odds with state cohesion. This is precisely what was 
observed in India where the Indian state was well poised to embark on a promising 
industrialization process, but it succumbed to a lack of state cohesiveness for policy 
design and implementation. As a result, the Indian state was unable to assert 
selectivity in resource allocation, and licenses were granted on the basis of technical 
feasibility rather than investment priorities. The South Korean state was able to 
successfully impose discipline within its ranks by giving the lead agency power over 
other agencies in the institutional setup and this kept state cohesiveness intact and 
also allowed discipline of domestic economic activity without fear of contestation. 
 
In conclusion, we see that a number of explanations have been put forward to explain 
the promising performance of some economies in generating the requisite returns 
from learning rents, while other countries have had rather bleak outlooks; with the 
traditional explanations lacking the insight on state control and disciplining 
capabilities based on historical or other factors. There were significant differences 
between the industrial policy of the 1960s and 2000s in Pakistan, both in terms of the 
instruments used and the political settlements in which the instruments were located. 
In the 1960s the instruments (given the political settlement) achieved horizontal 
growth but not much capability development in the final stages of reaching global 
levels of competitiveness. The instruments of the post 1980s industrial policy were 
very different, as was the political settlement.  
 
1.5. CONCLUSION 
The divergence of industrial development and by extension, overall economic growth 
trends between developed and developing countries, and even among various groups 
of developing countries is a disturbing trend. The expectation had been that when late 
developers would accelerate their growth efforts the growth trajectories of all 
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countries would converge. However, this has not turned out to be the case; several 
developing countries managing to close the gap while the majority languished behind, 
and this has rekindled interest in trying to identify the reason for this gap. Earlier 
explanations did not give much weight to the role of technology and technological 
capabilities, their acquisition and development, in determining competitiveness of 
firms and thus growth of the economy. Instead, openness, free markets and a minimal 
role of the state were showcased as the driving force of the success stories of 
development in early mainstream explanations. Later explanations drew inspiration 
from the work on evolutionary theory to argue convincingly for the key role played 
by technological change and capabilities in driving competitiveness and growth. 
Research in this area, and in particular on the political economy reasons that can 
explain and account for the varied experience of developing countries in improving 
their competitiveness and successfully driving growth is still at a nascent stage. This 
thesis seeks to contribute to this important area of research by examining the 
experience of a developing country in acquiring and absorbing foreign technology to 
develop its industry and competitiveness in the global market. 
 
As a developing country, Pakistan has had a very turbulent history since gaining 
independence, managing significant growth of the economy, only to lose the 
momentum gained shortly thereafter with a change in political leadership and 
policies. Growth in the 1960s was achieved at the cost of high levels of inequality in 
the country and corruption, leading to a misplaced faith in the market enhancing 
growth strategies that were actually reaping the benefits of significant investments 
during the previous period in infrastructure and capacity building. Similar 
experiences by other developing countries have yielded positive results without 
‘good governance’ (World Bank (1989)) and even in the presence of rent-seeking, so 
analysis of institutional failures in Pakistan is required. The aim is to locate 
institutional choices and performance in Pakistan in the context of changes in its 
political settlements that will shed light on why performance is weak in the country’s 
industrial sector, and specifically in the automotive industry. 
 
The political landscape in Pakistan has become increasingly fragmented and unstable 
with frequent changes in power leading to extensive political clientelism and state 
policies had to be implemented in this unfavourable environment. Resources and 
opportunities were limited in Pakistan, and the distribution of power between 
60 
various stakeholders affected by the development policies in the industry, led to 
contests over potentially growth-enhancing learning rents. Proliferation of clientelist 
groups has compromised the ability of the state to forsake long term economic growth 
and development in favour of actions to ensure its own short term sustainability. 
 
Despite having built up substantial productive capacity in the early stages of the 
industry’s establishment, only limited and fairly weak technological capabilities were 
built up in the industry. This has adversely impacted the industry’s attempt to break 
into the global automotive value chains that symbolize the industry now. However, as 
the two case studies of relatively successful attempts at technology acquisition will 
show, intervention even in an unfavourable policy environment can lead to capability 
development. The policy challenge that emerges is to develop the policy instruments 
that can enable capability development at a broader, industry wide level in the 
context of the clientelist political settlement that exists in the country today. 
 
Chapter 2 covers the evolution of political settlements and the link with rent-seeking 
behaviour in Pakistan’s economic development, focusing on the growth take-off 
during Ayub Khan’s regime and in the post-Zia democracy periods. Technology 
acquisition, technological capabilities and rent seeking are discussed in Chapter 3. 
The relevance of the automotive industry in serving as a driver of transformation and 
growth of not just the industry, but the economy at large are discussed in Chapter 4, 
while Chapter 5 takes a closer look at the general trends and characteristics of 
Pakistan’s automotive industry. Technology acquisition efforts at Millat Tractors Ltd, 
one of two leading tractor manufacturing firms, and the efforts that have culminated 
in establishment of the most advanced motorcycle assembly plant by Atlas Honda 
Limited, the largest motorcycle manufacturer in Pakistan are covered in Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7 respectively. The conclusions one draws from these case studies are 
covered in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2. POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS AND RENT-
SEEKING IN PAKISTAN’S DEVELOPMENT: AYUB’S 
GROWTH TAKEOFF AND POST-ZIA DEMOCRACY 
PERIODS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries are faced with the prospect of having to industrialize at an 
accelerated pace, if they hope to ever match the development and growth trajectory 
of developed countries. The focus of these countries is not on starting from scratch 
but on acquiring the capabilities (technological as well as organizational) and physical 
technology required to effectively compete in today’s global market, and technology 
acquisition has been the preferred conduit for enabling such activity. However trends 
of such efforts among developing countries have not been very promising. 
 
As a developing country, the experience of Pakistan in this regard has been far from 
consistent; the country has experienced a number of very promising periods of 
growth, but these have been followed by periods of great instability and faltering 
growth trends. Frequent changes in political leadership and reversals in policies by 
the state are linked to these shifts in growth trends. For example the period of the 
1960s was characterized by high incidence of income inequality within the country 
and corruption within the state. As a result there was a shift towards market 
enhancing policies that were actually reaping the benefits of the capabilities built up 
during the previous period and did not yield the benefits one had come to expect 
based on the experience of other developing countries. The reason why Pakistan had 
such a lacklustre experience lies in the changes in political settlements in the country 
that impacted the institutional choices and performance of the domestic economy. 
 
Keeping in mind the broad trends in the Pakistani economy highlighted in the 
previous chapter, we now turn to a brief discussion of the early development of the 
country, focussing on industrial policies and the industrialization process in key sub 
periods of the country’s history14. A background of the political economy factors is 
                                                             
14 For a chronology of major events in Pakistan’s history see Ghazali (1996) 
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provided to understand how effectively the explicit and implicit subsidies involved in 
technology acquisition in the automobile sector were managed. The hypothesis is that 
in Pakistan these learning rents were managed in a suboptimal way as compared to 
other contemporary developing countries. By identifying the specific political 
economy factors that could explain this performance, this chapter aims to make a 
contribution to the policy debate on industrial policy in Pakistan. Towards that end, 
Section 2.2 deals with the evolution of political settlements during two major sub-
periods of industrial development in Pakistan, while Section 2.3 presents the main 
findings.15 
 
2.2. EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS 
2.2.1. IMPORT SUBSTITUTION DRIVEN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1947 – 1958) 
As a result of the partition of the Indian sub-continent, Pakistan emerged as an 
independent sovereign State on August 14, 1947 under the Indian Independence Act 
of 1947. While both India and Pakistan were underdeveloped at the time of partition, 
Pakistan was relatively more underdeveloped and poor in comparison to India, and 
other developing countries at the time as well, the new born state was faced with the 
daunting task of legitimizing itself with the migrant Muslim population while at the 
same time building up a viable economic base from the weak infrastructure it had 
inherited. The early years of Pakistan’s economic history were marked by the 
dominance of agriculture, absence of a well-developed industrial sector, and weak 
institutional and physical infrastructure. There were considerable regional 
disparities in the pattern of industrialization in the sub-continent, and the areas 
which constituted Pakistan lagged behind in industrial development.16 To make the 
situation worse, infrastructural facilities were extremely inadequate. With less than 
25 MW of power generation, even low levels of power consumption required import 
of power from India. Railways were particularly affected by the partition as many of 
the major railway lines were disrupted by the new borders. In addition, the limited 
handling capacity of Karachi and Chittagong ports did not help facilitate the country’s 
foreign trade. 
                                                             
15 The discussion that follows is based on work done by the author for the Global Research 
Project (see Kemal, Din & Qadir (2002)) 
16 While major industries were established in India, Pakistan inherited a small industrial base 
that comprised mainly raw materials processing industries. 
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Khan (1999) has identified three critical factors that led to the initial import 
substituting industrialization phase of the country’s industrial development. For one, 
the level of industrial development in the areas that comprised Pakistan, the 
agricultural hinterland of the Indian subcontinent before partition, was very low and 
it had a very weak industrial base. For another, Jalal (1990) found that the leadership 
at the time perceived the country to be at risk and a disadvantaged position with a 
strong and potentially hostile neighbour in India. Lastly, the leadership felt itself 
compromised internally by the lack of a strong power base in the areas that now 
comprised Pakistan. These reasons provided an exceptionally strong compulsion for 
the country to embark on an accelerated industrialization process that was beyond 
similar efforts undertaken in other comparable countries. It also led to an unhealthy 
allocation of resources among sectors; gearing the economy towards industrial 
development at the expense of social sector development and even the agriculture 
and services sectors. The severity of this strain can be judged from the fact that 
Pakistan’s per capita spending on provincial development was much less than that of 
its neighbour, India (by a factor of 6 according to Jalal (1990)). Moreover, the military 
was able to gain a strong foothold in the power structure and ruled the country at 
various points in its history. 
 
Khan (1999) also pointed out that the desire for political survival drove the 
leadership at the time towards authoritarianism and increased their reliance on the 
bureaucracy to help maintain control. This is contrary to Alavi (1983)’s view that the 
bureaucracy gained control because of the poor quality of political leadership. 
Creating a new capitalist class from scratch in society, in a relatively short period of 
time as opposed to their gradual evolution over time was accomplished through the 
import industrialization process; sacrificing equity and social inclusion in the near 
term to reap the benefits of a strong industrial base in the future. There were four key 
components of the industrialization process; one, de-linking of the currency from the 
Indian rupee and pound sterling to over-value the exchange rate and make Pakistani 
exports more profitable and imports cheaper. Two, a differentiated tariff regime was 
implemented to mould demand preferences in favour of domestically goods. This had 
the effect of encouraging industrialization in the consumer goods industry. The third 
component was import licensing, as a mechanism of rationing scarce foreign 
exchange resources required by industrialists to import capital goods. This was 
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coupled with a centralized system of allocating the country’s limited supply of credit 
to ensure it was efficiently utilized. The final component of the import substitution 
process was the innovative institutional initiative of the government to shoulder the 
risk of setting up new and emerging enterprises that would be divested to risk-averse 
Pakistani capitalists once they were established and viable17. 
 
The early death of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and the assassination of 
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 led to considerable political instability 
immediately after the creation of Pakistan. There were frequent changes in the 
political leadership between 1951 and 1958: the country had six Prime Ministers and 
three Governors-General during this period. The first constitution of Pakistan was not 
approved till March 1956, and this too proved short-lived as Martial Law was 
declared on October 7, 1958 and the constitution was abrogated. 
 
Economic policies in the early years were largely shaped by the need to establish a 
diversified industrial base, to build institutions, and to put into place critical 
infrastructure. A key aspect of economic policy in the early years was the provision of 
strong protection to industry after 1952 when serious shortages of foreign exchange 
emerged. Excessive protection to industry severely distorted economic incentives not 
only for agriculture but also within the industrial sector. For example, on the 
recommendation of the Economic Appraisal Committee, tariffs on consumer goods 
were set higher than the tariffs on intermediate and capital goods. This cascaded tariff 
structure obviously favoured the consumer goods industries by restricting the import 
of consumer goods and hampered the establishment of capital goods and 
intermediate goods industries since imports of these goods were either freely allowed 
or were subject to low tariffs. Furthermore, the policy regime was characterized by 
an excessive reliance on economic controls in the form of administered prices, 
industrial licensing, and a host of other regulations. 
 
While the government vigorously pursued a pro-industrial development strategy, it 
neglected the development of the agriculture sector. Consequently, growth in the 
agriculture sector could not even keep pace with the rate of population growth 
leading to severe food shortages. The lack of agricultural growth also exposed the 
                                                             
17 The PIDC was setup with precisely this objective in mind 
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limitations of the pro-industrial policies in that it led to stagnation in the domestic 
market for manufactured goods. To remedy these problems, the government began 
to place more emphasis on the development of the agricultural sector. In 1956, the 
government announced a comprehensive strategy for agricultural development that 
envisaged provision of fertilizers at subsidized rates, distribution of better seeds, pest 
control schemes, and control of salinity and water-logging. However, these policies 
largely remained unimplemented due to the political upheavals towards the end of 
the decade. 
 
Economic policies to achieve longer term goals were embedded in the first five year 
plan (1955-60), which aimed to develop human and physical resources, to build 
infrastructure, and to maximize the productive capacity of the economy. However, for 
various reasons, mainly political instability, the plan’s performance fell below the 
projected targets. Although the plan commenced in 1955, it did not get government 
approval until 1958. Adequate attention was not paid to its recommendations and 
priorities, and there was no proper coordination between planning and budgeting. 
Against the plan’s expectation of a 15 percent increase in national income, the actual 
increase was about 11 percent. The rise in per capita income also did not exceed 3 
percent mainly because of the rapid growth of population. 
 
During the period 1949-50 to 1959-60, the economy grew at a moderate rate of 3.11 
percent per annum. Given the predominant share of agricultural output in GDP, the 
growth performance was obviously influenced primarily by the agricultural sector, 
which grew by a modest 1.76 percent per annum (see Table 2.1). Notwithstanding an 
expansion in cropped area in West Pakistan, growth in agricultural output was 
dampened by stagnant average yields of major crops. 
 
Owing to the low level of manufacturing activity in Pakistan at the time of partition, 
the manufacturing sector exhibited high growth rates during the Fifties: the growth 
rate in manufacturing averaged over 10 percent annually in the first half. Import 
substitution was the hallmark of the government's industrial policy in the early years, 
and protection of domestic industry provided strong impetus to the production of a 
broad range of commodities including cotton textiles, sugar, vegetable ghee, and 
cement. Though the expansion in large-scale manufacturing did not make an 
appreciable contribution to the overall performance of the economy due to its small 
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share in the gross domestic product, the creation of a more diversified economic 
structure than was inherited at independence was a major achievement of these early 
years. 
 
Table 2.1: GDP and Sectoral Growth Rates - (1950 – 1959) 
(%) 
Years Sector GDP (FC) 
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
1950-51 2.55 8.39 4.60 3.82 
1951-52 -8.28 7.74 4.01 -1.73 
1952-53 0.16 9.96 2.25 1.86 
1953-54 14.93 12.98 4.00 10.03 
1954-55 -2.78 12.35 5.00 1.66 
1955-56 2.32 10.05 2.94 3.49 
1956-57 2.02 5.43 3.09 2.91 
1957-58 2.07 3.74 2.33 2.63 
1958-59 3.76 4.18 7.05 5.49 
1959-60 0.83 2.53 0.85 0.93 
Period Averages 
1950s 1.76 7.73 3.61 3.11 
1950-51 to 1954-55 1.32 10.28 3.97 3.13 
1955-56 to 1959-60 2.20 5.19 3.25 3.09 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999a) 
 
The development of the industrial sector was made possible by heavy initial 
investments: fixed investment rate in Pakistan increased sharply from 2.8 percent of 
nominal GDP in 1949-50 to 9.3 percent in 1959-60. Despite a sharp increase in the 
price of investment goods triggered by the devaluation of the rupee in 1955, the rate 
of investment, especially public investment, remained upbeat primarily due to the 
fact that increased availability of foreign resources helped the government to meet 
the high cost of capital goods. Increased level of public investment in infrastructure – 
electric power generation and distribution, ports, telecommunications, and irrigation 
– laid the basis for faster growth. 
 
Though the share of agricultural sector dropped from 52.58 percent in 1949-50 to 
45.61 percent in 1959-60, the economy continued to be dominated by the agricultural 
sector, with an average share in GDP of around 47.70 percent (Table 2.2). There was 
considerable expansion in the manufacturing sector: its share in GDP increased from 
6.39 percent in 1949-50 to 9.91 percent in 1959-60. While the services sector 
contributed significantly to national output (average share of 41.07 percent), there 
was little variation in its share over time.  
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Table 2.2: Sectoral Shares in GDP (1950 – 1959) 
(%) 
Years Sector 
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
1950-51 51.94 6.68 39.68 
1951-52 48.48 7.32 42.00 
1952-53 47.67 7.90 42.16 
1953-54 49.80 8.11 39.85 
1954-55 47.62 8.97 41.16 
1955-56 47.08 9.53 40.95 
1956-57 46.67 9.77 41.02 
1957-58 46.42 9.87 40.90 
1958-59 45.66 9.75 41.50 
1959-60 45.61 9.91 41.47 
Period Averages 
1950s 47.70 8.78 41.07 
1950-51 to 1954-55 49.10 7.80 40.97 
1955-56 to 1959-60 46.29 9.77 41.17 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999a) 
 
On the external economic front, the surge in Pakistan’s export earnings led by the 
Korean war-related commodity boom in 1950 quickly subsided owing to at least three 
broad factors. First, Pakistan's decision not to follow the sterling and the Indian rupee 
in devaluation hurt Pakistan’s exports18. Second, stagnation in agricultural output 
meant lack of exportable surpluses in agricultural commodities. Third, international 
recession weakened the commodity prices of Pakistan’s export products. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, there was a sharp fall in export earnings in the first half of the 
decade (as evident from the trends in Table 2.3). Export performance, however, 
recovered in the second half, helped mainly by the devaluation of the Pakistani rupee 
in August 1955. On average, imports grew at an accelerated pace in the second half of 
the decade mainly because of the need to import large quantities of food grains. 
Except for the year 1950-51 when Pakistan had a surplus on its trade account, the 
country has continued to face a growing deficit in its balance of trade. 
 
 
 
                                                             
18 Kemal (1978) pointed out that the non-devaluation decision left the rupee over-valued, and 
was based on the presumption that the demand for cotton and jute was inelastic.  
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Table 2.3: Exports, Imports and Trade Balance (1950 – 1959) 
(USD million) 
Year Current Prices Growth Rate (%) 
Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
1950-51 406 353 53 - - - 
1951-52 279 445 -166 -31.28 26.06 -413.21 
1952-53 262 307 -45 -6.09 -31.01 -72.89 
1953-54 194 249 -55 -25.95 -18.89 22.22 
1954-55 149 237 -88 -23.20 -4.82 60.00 
1955-56 156 203 -47 4.70 -14.35 -46.59 
1956-57 147 319 -172 -5.77 57.14 265.96 
1957-58 91 276 -185 -38.10 -13.48 7.56 
1958-59 93 215 -122 2.20 -22.10 -34.05 
1959-60 160 379 -219 72.04 76.28 79.51 
Period Averages 
1950-51 to 1959-60 194 298 -105 -5.72 6.09 -14.61 
1950-51 to 1954-55 258 318 -60 -21.63 -7.17 -100.97 
1955-56 to 1959-60 129 278 -149 7.01 16.70 54.48 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999b) 
 
2.2.2. MILITARY TAKEOVER AND DEVELOPMENT (1958 – 1971) 
By the end of the 1950s, the foundations of the industrial sector had been laid and 
large scale manufacturing was rapidly expanding, the state bureaucracy was 
established, and while the agricultural sector dominated the economy, its growth was 
starting to stagnate. Moreover, high population growth in excess of agricultural 
growth meant there was a decline in per capita availability of food. Per capita income 
in the economy was also stagnant, and the economy was highly regulated. Import 
substitution had placed an intolerable strain on the various segments of the economy 
that resulted in political discontent, and culminated in a military coup in October 
1958 to restore political stability and revive the country’s growth trajectory. 
According to Khan (1999), the military regime led by Ayub Khan was “committed to 
the development of capitalism” and a willingness to intervene in the economy at a 
fairly micro level to achieve this goal. Moreover there was allocation of massive 
amounts of resources to a limited group of industrialists that was reminiscent of the 
earlier import substitution era, and the South Korean chaebols. This resulted in a 
rapid accumulation of assets that provided the stimulus for a highly accelerated rate 
of investment in the manufacturing industry (16.9 percent on average in the early 
1960s, and dropping to a slightly over 10 percent on average in later years) that was 
the most promising among developing countries at the time. It is logical to attribute 
growth in the early 1960s to the rapid accumulation process and investment spurt (as 
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suggested by Khan (1999), and not to the liberalization policies of the time, as 
suggested by Gardezi & Rashid (1983)). 
 
Import controls were relaxed to facilitate the import of raw material and an Export 
Bonus Voucher Scheme for manufactured goods was introduced that gave exporters 
an additional claim on foreign exchange to import goods that they required. While the 
rapid accumulation process did stimulate growth, it also resulted in massive 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few industrialists. The exact degree of 
concentration at the time is not clear; however, according to Mahbub-ul-Haq, 22 
families controlled 66 percent of Pakistan’s wealth in 1968. On the other hand, Amjad 
(1982) found that 18 industrial groups controlled 35 percent of all industrial assets 
and 44 groups controlled approximately 50%. 
 
Large scale manufacturing industries were preferred for investment purposes; 
industries such as cotton and jute textiles, cement, chemicals etc., and these industries 
tended to be more capital intensive. In fact, according to Khan (1970), the capital 
labour ratios in most manufacturing industries were higher in 1962 than those in 
Japan, and Islam (1976) found similar results for the year 1969. This suggests that the 
small and medium scale sector, which was relatively more labour intensive, was 
neglected in favour of large scale manufacturing which was more capital intensive. 
 
To complicate the situation further, the state was unable to deliver conditional 
subsidies based on output performance to the industrialists, as a result of which there 
was poor industrial performance in terms of output. In comparison, the South Korean 
state also allowed concentration, but this did not impede growth since the subsidies 
were made conditional on export growth. Most crucially, the conditionality was 
credibly enforced to ensure chaebols conformed to the state’s objectives. Unlike South 
Korea, the Pakistani state was unable to intervene selectively and push development 
of priority/strategic sectors that would allow sustainable growth of the economy. 
Moreover, at a time when other countries had begun to push industrialization efforts 
towards new, riskier ventures, Pakistan was unable to follow through due to internal 
political instability. Resources had to be diverted away from more productive areas 
to deal with political contestation and unrest. To ensure its political survivability in 
the face of political agitation and to forestall the loss of power, the state opted to divert 
resources towards meeting the demands of political agents of unrest. According to 
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Khan (1999), subsidy withdrawal and other centrally allocated rights were being 
allocated on a political basis rather than on the basis of productivity, and this led to 
loss of credibility and the start of rent-seeking activity in the country. 
 
To gain access to more resources and continued access to such resources, 
industrialists formed connections with the bureaucracy and the political leadership 
in a mutually beneficial way. Small and medium scale enterprises lacked the economic 
power to influence the state but were able to dominate trade associations and used 
their political power to contest for allocation of the scarce resources. 
 
In the wake of the chaotic beginnings of the nation and once the dust had settled, the 
foundations of the industrial sector were laid and evident in the rapid growth of large 
scale manufacturing. The administrative machinery of the state, including various 
institutions such as the central bank, was put in place. The agriculture sector 
dominated economic activity in the economy, but growth in the sector stagnated 
during this period. Population growth on the other hand exceeded agricultural output 
growth, and as a consequence, domestic per capita food availability was reduced. 
With the establishment of the administrative branches of the state, the regulations 
governing investment, trade, pricing and a number of other economic areas increased.  
The military take-over in October 1958 followed a great deal of political instability 
during the most part of the Fifties. To introduce some form of democracy in the 
country despite the promulgation of Martial Law, a ‘basic democracy’ program was 
launched by Ayub Khan in an attempt to legitimize military rule with the masses. This 
set up allowed the military government to settle on a presidential rule, and to ignore 
the important constitutional issues of representation in the federal legislature and 
provincial autonomy. 
 
On the economic front, the government set out to improve economic management and 
to deal effectively with corruption and unfair practices by the private sector especially 
in industry and retail trade. The windfall gains and profits arising after industries 
were set up and the situation was compounded with the earlier lack of regulations 
governing economic activity, which had allowed private sector profiteering and the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few families controlling key companies. 
While it was a necessary evil at the time to encourage economic activity in the desired 
areas, subsequent steps were not taken by the state to follow through and exert 
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control over companies to invest the accumulated wealth in productive activities that 
would yield the maximum benefit to the economy. Besides introducing strict price 
and profit controls in the form of administered prices and profit margins, it also dealt 
with the menaces of hoarding, black-marketing, and smuggling with an iron hand. The 
initial impact of these measures was favourable and the general price index registered 
a fall in the early months after the Martial Law. But the government soon realized that 
the direct controls had introduced rigidities in the system and thus hampered the 
growth of the manufacturing sector.19 Within just one year of taking over, the 
government began to dismantle the price control system and moved towards a 
general policy of economic deregulation through a greater reliance on the market 
mechanism.20 
 
Development strategy during much of the Sixties continued to be heavily biased 
towards promoting industrial growth in Pakistan. The government maintained an 
over-valued exchange rate to ensure the cheap availability of capital goods and other 
imported inputs to the industrial sector. Also, by keeping prices of agricultural inputs 
at below world market prices, it made domestic raw materials available to the 
industrial sector at very cheap prices. This, together with the policy of import controls 
and tariffs, tax concessions such as tax holidays, accelerated depreciation allowances, 
and loans at very low interest rates, markedly accentuated the pro-industrial bias in 
the growth strategy. To further help its industrialization drive, the government 
adopted a series of measures to promote exports of manufactured goods. The most 
significant measure was the introduction of Export Bonus Scheme (EBS), which 
subsidized manufactured goods exports through a system of bonus vouchers21. 
Furthermore, preferential access to credit and a host of fiscal incentives were part of 
a policy package meant to enhance export competitiveness. These policies not only 
led to robust growth in the exports of manufactured goods, but also helped diversify 
the product composition of Pakistan’s exports.  
 
                                                             
19 Direct controls on prices and profits weaken the incentive to expand production.  
20 See Gauhar (1993) 
21 The bonus vouchers often carried a high premium in the market as import licenses were 
automatically issued against the vouchers. Kemal (1978) found that more than 80 percent of 
the total export subsidies were accounted for by this scheme. 
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The incentives provided to manufactured goods exports were partly meant to offset 
the anti-export bias inherent in the policy of import substituting industrialization 
followed during most of the decade, barring a few years when import regime was 
liberalized somewhat22. While protectionist policies did contribute to industrial 
diversification and growth, these had several shortcomings. In particular, protection 
of domestic industry through high rates of effective protection led to inefficiencies in 
domestic production, prevented the country from realizing its full export potential, 
and contributed to a worsening of balance of payments (the increase in capital goods 
and raw material imports outweighed the growth in exports).  
 
The neglect of agriculture in the Fifties not only resulted in food shortages but also 
constrained the domestic supply of agricultural raw materials to the industrial sector. 
These complications led to an agricultural policy that was aimed at achieving self-
sufficiency in food, increasing agricultural production, and reducing unemployment. 
The shift in emphasis in policy also coincided with the advent of ‘green revolution’23 
technology in the economy. The revolution started with introduction of high-yielding 
varieties of seeds (HYV), chemical fertilizers, pesticides etc., and coupled with greater 
use of agricultural machinery, mainly in terms of number of tube-wells in operation 
as well as tractors. The state facilitated the adoption of new technology by heavily 
subsidizing high-tech varieties of agricultural inputs. These factors contributed to a 
marked improvement in the growth performance of the agricultural sector: the 
average annual growth rate jumped to 6 percent in the second half of the Sixties, up 
from 1.8 percent in the corresponding period of the Fifties. 
 
With a view to restructuring land relationships, the state introduced land reforms 
which prescribed ceilings of landholdings at 500 acres of irrigated land and 1,000 
acres of non-irrigated land. However, the reforms were not implemented properly, 
and landlords were able to use a variety of loopholes and exemptions to sidestep a 
bureaucracy hamstrung by political and administrative constraints. As a result only 
modest amounts of land being transferred to small farmers and landless labour, and 
the land reforms did not result in a meaningful redistribution of land holdings. 
                                                             
22 To a large extent, import liberalization was made possible by the increase in foreign loans 
and grants. The process of import liberalization, however, had to be cut short owing to 
drastically reduced foreign aid inflows in the wake of the 1965 war with India. 
23 A term first used by former USAID director William Gauld in 1968 when noting spread of 
new technologies in agriculture (see IFPRI (2002)). 
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The long-term development strategy pursued during the first five years of the Sixties 
was outlined in the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65). The plan sought to accelerate 
the pace of development and overcome the inadequacies of achievement during the 
First Plan period, and to ensure that the stage of self-generating growth was reached 
within a reasonable period. In addition, the plan attempted to restore the balance 
between agricultural and industrial development. Consequently, the pattern of public 
sector expenditure was heavily concentrated in the agricultural sector mainly 
because of the large expenditures on the development of water resources. The Second 
Plan was quite successful in fulfilling its major objectives: the increase in national 
income during this period was over 30 percent as against the target of 24 percent.  
 
The Third Five-Year Plan (1965-1970) was formulated in the light of the 
achievements and shortfalls of the two previous plans. Its principal objectives were 
to attain rapid growth in national output, reduce the degree of intra and inter-regional 
income inequality, increase employment opportunities, strengthen the balance of 
payments, and improve the availability of social services like health and education. 
However, the plan targets were overly ambitious, and soon after the launching of the 
Third Plan, it had to be revised in respect of its resources and priorities in the light of 
various adverse circumstances. These included increased defence expenditures 
following the outbreak of war with India in September 1965, drastic cuts in foreign 
aid along with the hardening of the terms of loans and mounting repayment 
obligations, and successive droughts and floods leading to a fall in agricultural 
productivity and rise in food imports. Not surprisingly, then, achievements in most 
sectors fell short of expectations.  
 
Despite rapid growth in both the industrial and the agricultural sectors, the Sixties 
witnessed rising economic and political tensions, not least because of a lack of interest 
in issues of equity and social justice which contributed to concentration of wealth in 
the hands of a few individuals. In addition, the suppression of provincial autonomy 
sowed the seeds of discontent between East and West Pakistan and there was a 
growing perception that the East wing was not receiving its fair share of resources. 
Besides regional disparities, there was a widespread feeling that income inequalities 
had increased in both the provinces during the Sixties. A statement by Mahbub ul Haq, 
then Chief Economist of the Planning Commission, to the effect that twenty-two 
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families controlled 66 percent of the industrial wealth and 87 percent of the banking 
and insurance in the country, stirred up widespread disturbances in the winter of 
1968 which eventually led to the downfall of the military government. 
 
The fact that strong growth performance was not accompanied by an improvement 
in the living standards of the majority of population led many to question the 
government’s economic policies in the Sixties. It must, however, be pointed out that 
regardless of the controversy on the overall economic policies pursued during this 
period, there is a broad agreement on the fact that the Sixties was a period of sound 
macroeconomic management which contributed to greater monetary discipline, price 
stability, and low budget deficits. Furthermore, in the backdrop of political instability 
that had characterized much of the Fifties to the detriment of economic planning and 
management, a major achievement of the military government was the strengthening 
of the administrative capacity, which greatly facilitated the formulation and 
implementation of policies and programs. 
 
The country’s economic performance in terms of broad macroeconomic aggregates in 
the Sixties is summarized in Table 2.4. Measured by GDP growth, economic 
performance in Pakistan in the Sixties clearly surpassed initial expectations: the 
growth rate of the economy more than doubled from 3.11 per cent per annum in the 
Fifties to 6.60 per cent in the Sixties. After exhibiting stagnant and even negative 
growth in the initial years, the agricultural sector recorded a healthy growth rate of 
6.04 percent in 1961-62. Growth in the agricultural sector peaked at 11.66 percent in 
1967-68, before decelerating sharply to 4.15 percent in 1968-69, and then 
rebounding to 9.12 percent in 1969-70. It is noteworthy that the agricultural sector 
performed relatively well in the second half of the Sixties as compared to the first half: 
the average annual rate of growth in the agriculture sector climbed from 3.88 percent 
in the first half to 6.36 percent in the second half. 
 
Large scale manufacturing sector posted strong growth in both halves of the Sixties, 
though there was a marked slowdown in the second half when industrial output grew 
at an average annual rate of 8.11 percent, down from 11.72 percent in the first half. 
Several factors contributed to the impressive performance of the industrial sector in 
the Sixties. First, a large and lucrative market for domestic production was created by 
a restrictive import regime, especially for consumer goods, resulting in high profits in 
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the industrial sector. Second, relaxation in direct controls on investment coupled with 
improved profitability in the industrial sector led to a substantial increase in real 
gross fixed investment. Third, there was cheap availability of agricultural raw 
materials to the industrial sector, thanks largely to export controls on these products 
which depressed domestic prices of these commodities relative to their world prices.  
 
Table 2.4: GDP and Sectoral Growth Rates (1960 – 1969) 
      (%) 
Years Sector GDP 
(FC) 
Per Capita 
Income (PKR) Commodity 
Producing 
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
1960-61 3.75 -0.39 12.85 5.98 4.67 2.01 
1961-62 6.86 6.04 13.28 3.89 5.61 2.65 
1962-63 6.91 4.91 11.18 7.05 6.97 3.85 
1963-64 6.86 3.83 11.34 6.34 6.65 3.76 
1964-65 6.83 4.99 9.93 13.22 9.46 6.22 
1965-66 3.01 0.86 8.58 11.67 6.70 3.84 
1966-67 5.17 6.00 5.65 1.95 3.74 0.83 
1967-68 9.57 11.66 6.37 3.48 6.90 4.08 
1968-69 6.58 4.15 8.62 5.56 6.15 3.13 
1969-70 10.83 9.12 11.32 6.72 9.10 6.20 
Period Averages 
1960s 6.64 5.12 9.91 6.59 6.60 3.66 
1960-65 6.24 3.88 11.72 7.30 6.67 3.70 
1965-70 7.03 6.36 8.11 5.88 6.52 3.62 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999a) 
 
With an average share in GDP of around 41 percent, the agricultural sector continued to 
play a dominant role in the economy (as evident from the trends in Table 2.5). On the other 
hand, while vigorous industrialization efforts helped to raise the share of manufacturing 
sector in GDP from 10.68 percent in 1960-61 to 13.44 percent in 1969-70, the average 
share of manufacturing sector remained low during the decade at about 12.41 percent. The 
share of services in GDP did not show much variation during the period, and its average 
share stood close to 42 percent. 
 
Total investment increased from PKR 11.51 billion in 1960-61 to PKR 23.68 billion in 
1969-70 (see Table 2.6 for trends), registering an average annual growth rate of 9.20 
percent. Growth in investment considerably slowed down in the second half of the decade 
to -0.29 percent, from 18.69 percent in the first half. On average, the share of total 
investment in GDP stood at 17.36 percent during the period. 
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Table 2.5: Sectoral Contribution to GDP (1960 – 1969) 
 (%) 
Years Sector 
Commodity 
Producing 
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
1960-61 58.02 43.41 10.68 41.98 
1961-62 58.70 43.58 11.45 41.30 
1962-63 58.67 42.74 11.90 41.33 
1963-64 58.79 41.61 12.43 41.21 
1964-65 57.37 39.91 12.48 42.63 
1965-66 55.39 37.73 12.70 44.61 
1966-67 56.16 38.55 12.94 43.84 
1967-68 57.56 40.27 12.87 42.44 
1968-69 57.80 39.51 13.17 42.21 
1969-70 58.71 39.52 13.44 41.29 
Period Averages 
1960s 57.72 40.68 12.41 42.28 
1960-61 to 1964-65 58.31 42.25 11.79 41.69 
1965-66 to 1969-70 57.12 39.12 13.02 42.88 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999a)   
 
Table 2.6: Total Investment and Share in GDP (1960 – 1969) 
   (%) 
Years Total Investment  
(PKR Millions) 
Annual Growth 
Rate 
Share in GDP 
1960-61 11,508 9.59 13.81 
1961-62 13,401 16.45 15.22 
1962-63 17,040 27.15 18.08 
1963-64 20,801 22.07 20.67 
1964-65 24,587 18.21 22.34 
1965-66 21,829 -11.22 18.58 
1966-67 22,773 4.33 18.64 
1967-68 20,534 -9.84 15.77 
1968-69 20,588 0.27 14.86 
1969-70 23,683 15.03 15.61 
Period Averages 
1960s 19,674 9.20 17.36 
1960-61 to 1964-65 17,467 18.69 18.02 
1965-66 to 1969-70 21,881 -0.29 16.69 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1987) 
    
Note:    
GDP MP used for analysis based on expenditure side 
Total Investment = Gross Fixed Capital Formation + Change in Stocks (taken from table "Expenditure 
on GNP at Current Prices" in Pakistan Economic Survey) 
Investment Series derived by dividing the respective investment series (in current prices) by the GDP 
Deflator 
All figures are at constant 1980-81 base  
 
Contrary to the popular belief, official figures on income distribution indicate a slight 
improvement in the distribution of income in the Sixties. The Gini coefficient, which is a 
convenient summary measure of the degree of income inequality, declined from 0.39 in 
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1963-64 to 0.34 1969-70, indicating an improvement in the distribution of income. Another 
indicator of income inequality is the share of the lowest 20 percent and highest 20 percent 
of households in income. During the period from 1963-64 to 1969-70, the share of the 
lowest 20 percent of households increased from 6.4 percent to 8.0 percent, whereas the 
share of the highest 20 percent of households declined from 45.3 percent to 41.8 percent 
(Table 2.7). Notwithstanding this, the pattern of income distribution remained skewed 
towards high income households, as indicated by the substantially high proportion of 
income accruing to households in upper income bracket. The incidence of poverty, as 
measured by the headcount ratio, increased during the Sixties: the percentage of total 
population falling below the poverty line was 46.53 percent in 1969-70, up from 40.24 
percent in 1963-64. 
 
Table 2.7: Household Income Distribution (1960 – 1969) 
Year Household 
Gini Co-
efficient 
Household Income Shares Ratio of 
Highest 20% 
to Lowest 
20% 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
Poverty 
Head 
Count 
Ratio: 
Total 
Lowest 
20% 
Middle 
60% 
Highest 
20% 
1963-64 0.39 6.40 48.30 45.30 7.08 6.65 40.24 
1966-67 0.36 7.60 49.00 43.40 5.71 3.74 44.50 
1968-69 0.34 8.20 49.80 42.00 5.12 6.15 - 
1969-70 0.34 8.00 50.20 41.80 5.22 9.10 46.53 
Source: Government of Pakistan (2000), 
 Author's own calculations 
 
Pakistan’s exports recorded a nearly three-fold increase during the period, increasing from 
USD 114 million in 1960-61 to USD 338 million in 1969-70 with an average annual growth 
rate of 10.72 percent (Table 2.8). The strong growth in exports was accompanied by rising 
imports, which grew at an average rate of 7.37 percent. The country’s trade balance 
remained in deficit throughout the decade. 
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Table 2.8: Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance (1960 – 1969) 
(USD million) 
Year Current Prices Growth Rate (%) 
Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
1960-61 114 457 -343 -28.75 20.58 56.62 
1961-62 114 470 -356 0.00 2.84 3.79 
1962-63 210 588 -378 84.21 25.11 6.18 
1963-64 226 626 -400 7.62 6.46 5.82 
1964-65 239 772 -533 5.75 23.32 33.25 
1965-66 253 605 -352 5.86 -21.63 -33.96 
1966-67 273 762 -489 7.91 25.95 38.92 
1967-68 346 699 -353 26.74 -8.27 -27.81 
1968-69 357 640 -283 3.18 -8.44 -19.83 
1969-70 338 690 -352 -5.32 7.81 24.38 
Period Averages 
1960-61 to 1969-70 247 631 -384 10.72 7.37 8.74 
1960-61 to 1964-65 181 583 -402 13.77 15.66 21.13 
1965-66 to 1969-70 313 679 -366 7.67 -0.92 -3.66 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999b) 
 
2.2.3. DEMOCRATIC RULE (1972-1977) 
The beginning of the 1970s decade was a bleak one indeed for Pakistan; when East 
Pakistan seceded from the country and became Bangladesh; the country suffered a 
military defeat at the hands of India, and the private sector was rife with inefficiencies 
and rent-seeking. After the breakup of the country, a democratically elected 
government came to power in late 1971. This government’s policy stance shifted from 
one of being pro-private sector to that of being pro-public sector. In early 1972, 31 
large firms in 10 basic industries were rapidly nationalized and handed over to the 
public sector. The aim of the government intervention was to retain control of basic 
industries, infrastructure and banking and finance with the public domain. Over the 
course of the next four years, 32 insurance companies, the shipping industry, 
education, banks, cotton ginning, rise husking and flour milling industries were 
nationalized in an attempt to curtail inefficiencies and wealth accumulation in the 
private sector. This was followed by labour and land reforms. The anti-agriculture 
sector bias in government policy was reversed when agriculture procurement prices 
were raised, the currency was devalued to remove the industry sector subsidy, and 
the Export Bonus Voucher Scheme was cancelled. 
 
The industrial sector was no longer given priority over the other sectors and this was 
reflected in meagre large-scale manufacturing growth, while the agriculture sector 
was adversely affected by a spate of natural calamities; a drought, floods and pest 
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attacks. As a result, overall GDP growth averaged 4.8 percent during 1972-77, with a 
boom in the early years and a slowdown from 1974. Industrial sector growth 
performance compared well with that of the 1960s (according to Sayeed (1995)). 
Over half of the manufacturing sector industries (at the 3 digit industrial classification 
level) exhibited double digit growth rates; with no discernable discrepancy between 
export-oriented or import substituting industries. Productivity growth presented a 
far worse picture; averaging a paltry 0.3 percent per annum as compared to the 
corresponding figure of 5 percent for the 1960s, and with far more variation between 
sectors. 
 
If output growth did indeed cloak the underlying inefficiencies in factor allocation and 
use during the period, as suggested by Sayeed (1995), and capital input contributed 
the most to growth, then it leaves questions unanswered about the efforts, if any, of 
the state to increase production efficiency and learning-by-doing in the industrial 
sector. The persistent bias in policy that promotes investing in physical capital, 
especially in choice large scale manufacturing industries, while giving minimal 
attention to investment in human capital also resulted in unsustainable growth when 
production reached the point of diminishing return with respect to physical capital 
investment. 
 
The industrial sector exhibited strong growth during this period, even more 
promising than the mainstay of the economy, the agricultural sector. However, the 
performance of the industrial sector during this time was marred by demonstrations 
that broke out in the latter half of the Sixties in response to the concentration of 
wealth by industrialists and their uncompetitive behaviour. At the same time, the 
state strengthened its administrative machinery and institutions, and attention 
shifted towards improving income distribution, wage rates and worker welfare in the 
wake of the demonstrations. 
 
After the fall of the Ayub regime, general elections were held in December 1970. These 
elections were the first ever held throughout the country since independence on the 
basis of adult franchise. Two political parties emerged as the major political forces in 
the country after the elections: Awami League in East Pakistan and Pakistan People’s 
Party in West Pakistan. This polarity in the country’s politics led to disastrous 
consequences including the break-up of the country in 1971. The collapse of the 
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Yahya regime saw the advent of the Peoples Party government led by Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, who also assumed the office of Chief Martial Law Administrator – the first 
civilian to hold this position. Martial Law remained the source of legal authority till a 
new constitution was approved by the National Assembly in 1973. Following general 
elections in 1977, mass unrest erupted amid allegations of vote rigging, leading 
eventually to the military take-over on July 5, 1977. 
 
Economic management during the People’s Party government was beset by a number 
of exogenous shocks that caused significant macroeconomic instability. Firstly, the 
secession of East Pakistan led to a disruption of trade relations between the two 
countries and deprived West Pakistan of half of its export market. Secondly, thanks to 
a fourfold increase in petroleum prices induced by the newly created OPEC cartel, the 
Seventies witnessed phenomenal increases in Pakistan’s import bill alongside a 
slowdown in exports due to the recession in the world economy. This deterioration 
in terms of trade led to widening resource and trade gap. Thirdly, Pakistan’s 
commodity exports – rice, cotton, and sugarcane – remained vulnerable to wide 
fluctuations in international commodity prices. Fourthly, agricultural output, 
especially the cotton crop, was adversely affected by flooding and pest attacks. 
 
The government of Pakistan People’s Party embarked on its agenda of socialist 
oriented reforms with much enthusiasm. In 1972, the government nationalized all 
private banks and insurance companies, and a large number of manufacturing units 
with the stated objective of reducing the concentration of wealth. The government’s 
nationalization drive is generally held responsible for the weak performance of the 
large-scale manufacturing sector especially in the first half of the Seventies. It must 
be emphasized, however, that the poor performance of the industrial sector owed as 
much to the policy of nationalization as to the pattern of industrialization that 
developed during the earlier decades. This is borne out by the fact that there were 
already signs of weakening in the growth momentum of the industrial sector by the 
end of the Sixties; thanks largely to an inefficient allocation of resources (promoted 
through excessive protectionism) that eroded the capacity to sustain high growth 
rates in the manufacturing sector.  
 
A key development of the Seventies was the emergence of a strong small-scale 
industrial sector which was ignored in the early years due to the capital-intensive bias 
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of Pakistan's industrial regimes. Small scale industries as diverse as leather 
manufactures, sports goods, and surgical instruments not only helped diversify 
Pakistan's industrial structure, but also created employment opportunities for the 
country’s growing labor force. A combination of exogenous and policy factors were 
responsible for the growth of small-scale industries. First, private investment was 
diverted to small-scale industrial units as a result of nationalization policies that 
exclusively targeted the large-scale manufacturing units. Second, trade union 
activities in large-scale manufacturing made investment in these units less attractive, 
thus contributing to the growth of smaller production units. Third, export-oriented 
small-scale industries such as carpets, and garments and made-up textiles received a 
boost owing to devaluation of the rupee. Fourth, remittances from abroad stimulated 
the domestic market for consumer goods, a large proportion of which were produced 
by the small-scale industry.  
 
Throughout the Seventies, the agricultural sector was plagued by stagnation, owing 
to a combination of exogenous and policy factors. Firstly, climatic shocks and viral 
diseases affected the crops, with marked damage to cotton production. Secondly, 
there was an overall shortage of the critical imported agricultural inputs that were 
needed to maintain the productivity gains of the high-yielding varieties. Thirdly, 
despite farm mechanization in the Sixties, inadequate utilization of water and 
fertilizers24 continued to constrain agricultural production. Finally, government 
pricing policy discriminated against the agricultural sector by setting output prices 
well below those in international markets. 
 
In response to the growing income inequalities especially in the rural sector, the 
government initiated important land reforms in 1972. However, the outcome of these 
reforms was not much different from the reforms of the previous decade mainly 
because of lax implementation and low amount of land coverage. Furthermore, the 
land reforms benefited only a small number of tenants while big landlords escaped 
the laws through loopholes such as transfer of land to relatives. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that land reforms did not make any significant contribution towards 
reducing the inequalities in the agrarian structure. 
                                                             
24 There was a sharp increase in prices of fertilizers as a result of higher prices of petroleum 
products. 
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To improve the competitiveness of Pakistan’s exports, the government devalued the 
rupee in 1972. While this bolstered Pakistan’s export earnings, the country continued 
to face serious balance of payments difficulties, due mainly to a fourfold increase in 
the country’s import bill in the wake of oil price shocks. The persistent deficit in the 
balance of payments necessitated large external loans to plug the gap in external 
payments and receipts, leading to mounting external debt. It must be emphasized 
here that the external debt problem would have been much more serious had there 
not been massive inflows of workers’ remittances during the Seventies. 
 
The overall performance of the economy during the Seventies was rather subdued as 
compared with the Sixties: on average GDP grew at a rate of 4.66 percent per annum 
as against 6.60 percent in the previous decade. With the relatively sluggish growth 
rates in the commodity producing sectors (agricultural and manufacturing sectors 
grew at average annual rates of 2.32 percent and 5.50 percent respectively), growth 
in the GDP was fuelled primarily by the services sector, which grew at a healthy rate 
of 5.94 percent per annum (Table 2.9). It is noteworthy that there was a sharp 
difference in the economic performance in the first and second halves of the 
Seventies, and an upturn in economic activity occurred in 1977-78 led by an 
impressive recovery especially in the manufacturing sector. Thanks largely to the 
high growth rate of agriculture and large-scale manufacturing, the commodity – 
producing sector exhibited a growth rate of 7.24 percent per annum in the second 
half, as against 4.62 percent per annum in the first half. The improvement in the 
performance of the commodity-producing sectors in the second half owed as much to 
a fuller utilization of the idle capacity in the manufacturing sector as to an unusual 
spell of good weather which helped recovery in the agricultural sector. 
 
While the agricultural sector continued to dominate the economy, its share in national 
output decreased steadily throughout the decade to 31.5 percent in 1979-80, down from 
38.02 percent in 1970-71 (Table 2.10). The share of the manufacturing sector in GDP 
fluctuated around 14 percent throughout the decade, averaging at 13.9 percent. The 
Seventies saw an increasing importance of the services sector relative to the commodity-
producing sectors: whereas the share of the former in the GDP increased from 41.80 percent 
to 46.5 percent, that of the latter fell from 58.2 percent to about 53.5 percent. 
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Table 2.9: GDP and Sectoral Growth Rates - (1970 – 1979) 
(%) 
Years Sector GDP 
(FC) 
Per Capita 
Income 
(PKR) 
Commodity 
Producing 
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
1970-71 0.16 -2.79 6.44 2.31 1.05 -2.29 
1971-72 1.19 2.77 1.26 3.33 2.08 -0.12 
1972-73 4.62 1.70 8.73 9.52 6.70 3.09 
1973-74 5.45 3.85 6.35 9.05 7.01 3.80 
1974-75 -0.74 -2.52 0.54 8.29 3.26 0.50 
1975-76 4.74 4.47 1.39 1.79 3.37 2.19 
1976-77 2.90 2.98 1.82 2.71 2.81 2.06 
1977-78 5.76 3.50 10.21 10.31 7.84 9.60 
1978-79 5.03 3.41 8.01 6.18 5.57 3.25 
1979-80 7.84 5.89 10.25 5.87 6.91 3.31 
Period Averages 
1970s 3.69 2.32 5.50 5.94 4.66 2.54 
1970-71 to 
1974-75 
2.13 0.60 4.66 6.50 4.02 1.00 
1975-76 to 
1979-80 
5.25 4.05 6.34 5.37 5.30 4.08 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999b) 
 
Table 2.10: Sectoral Contribution to GDP (1970 – 1979) 
(%) 
Year Sector 
Commodity 
Producing 
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
1970-71 58.20 38.02 14.16 41.80 
1971-72 57.69 38.27 14.04 42.31 
1972-73 56.57 36.48 14.31 43.43 
1973-74 55.74 35.40 14.22 44.26 
1974-75 53.58 33.42 13.85 46.42 
1975-76 54.29 33.78 13.58 45.71 
1976-77 54.33 33.84 13.45 45.67 
1977-78 53.29 32.47 13.75 46.71 
1978-79 53.02 31.81 14.07 46.98 
1979-80 53.47 31.50 14.51 46.53 
Period Averages 
1970s 55.02 34.50 13.99 44.98 
1970-71 to 1974-75 56.35 36.32 14.12 43.65 
1975-76 to 1979-80 53.68 32.68 13.87 46.32 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999b) 
 
Total investment grew at a rate of 7.69 percent during the Seventies, increasing from Rs. 
23.57 billion in 1970-71 to Rs. 48 billion in 1979-80 (Table 2.11). Growth in total 
investment accelerated in the second half to 8.90 percent, up from 6.48 percent in the first 
half. On average, total investment accounted for 16.25 percent of GDP during the period. 
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Table 2.11: Total Investment and Share in GDP (1970 – 1979) 
(%) 
Years Total Investment 
(PKR Millions) 
Growth Rate Share in GDP 
1970-71 23,571 -0.47 15.37 
1971-72 23,591 0.09 13.87 
1972-73 22,941 -2.76 12.67 
1973-74 24,747 7.87 13.06 
1974-75 31,592 27.66 16.26 
1975-76 37,346 18.21 18.32 
1976-77 40,473 8.38 19.10 
1977-78 40,571 0.24 17.71 
1978-79 42,594 4.99 17.75 
1979-80 47,997 12.69 18.43 
Period Averages 
1970s 33,542 7.69 16.25 
1970-71 to 1974-75 25,288 6.48 14.24 
1975-76 to 1979-80 41,796 8.90 18.26 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1987) 
    
Note:    
GDP MP used for analysis based on expenditure side  
Total Investment = Gross Fixed Capital Formation + Change in Stocks (taken from table "Expenditure 
on GNP at Current Prices" in Economic Survey) 
Investment Series derived by dividing the respective investment series (in current prices) by the GDP 
Deflator 
All figures are at constant 1980-81 base  
 
Despite the government’s declared emphasis on social justice and equity, income inequality 
increased in the Seventies. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.33 in 1970-71 to 0.37 in 
1979, reflecting deterioration in the distribution of income (Table 2.12). This is also 
corroborated by the fact that the share of the lowest 20 percent of households in income 
declined from 8.4 percent to 7.4 percent, while that of the highest 20 percent of households 
increased from 41.5 percent to 45 percent.  
 
Table 2.12: Household Income Distribution (1970 – 1979) 
Year Household 
Gini Co-
efficient 
Household Income Shares Ratio of 
Highest 20% 
to Lowest 
20% 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Poverty 
Head 
Count 
Ratio: 
Total 
Lowest 
20% 
Middle 
60% 
Highest 
20% 
1970-71 0.33 8.40 50.10 41.50 4.90 1.05  
1971-72 0.35 7.90 49.10 43.00 5.40 2.08  
1979 0.37 7.40 47.60 45.00 6.10 6.91 30.68 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2000-01 
 
Total exports increased manifold in the Seventies, rising from USD 420 million in 1970-
71 to USD 2,365 million in 1979-80, registering an average annual rate of growth of 22.35 
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percent (Table 2.13)25. The growth trend in imports exhibited a similar pattern: on average, 
total imports grew at about 24 percent per annum, increasing from USD 757 million in 
1970-71 to USD 4,740 million in 1979-80. As in the previous decade, the country faced a 
growing deficit in its trade balance during the Seventies. 
 
Table 2.13: Exports, Imports and Trade Balance (1970 – 1979) 
(USD million) 
Year Current Prices Growth Rate (%) 
Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
1970-71 420 757 -337 24.26 9.71 -4.26 
1971-72 591 638 -47 40.71 -15.72 -86.05 
1972-73 817 797 20 38.24 24.92 -142.55 
1973-74 1,026 1,362 -336 25.58 70.89 -1,780.00 
1974-75 1,039 2,114 -1,075 1.27 55.21 219.94 
1975-76 1,137 2,067 -930 9.43 -2.22 -13.49 
1976-77 1,141 2,325 -1,184 0.35 12.48 27.31 
1977-78 1,311 2,810 -1,499 14.90 20.86 26.60 
1978-79 1,710 3,676 -1,966 30.43 30.82 31.15 
1979-80 2,365 4,740 -2,375 38.30 28.94 20.80 
Period Averages 
1970-71 to 1979-80 1,156 2,129 -973 22.35 23.59 -170.05 
1970-71 to 1974-75 779 1,134 -355 26 29 -359 
1975-76 to 1979-80 1,533 3,124 -1,591 19 18 18 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999b) 
 
2.2.4. MILITARY REGIME (1977-1988) 
The military again came to power in a coup in 1977, and the country subsequently 
remained under one leadership for eleven years. Growth during this period has been 
classified as phenomenal by some Zaidi (2005), and most promising; overall GDP 
averaging 7 percent per annum, while manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP 
grew at a very impressive 9.5 percent during the period 1977-88. This positive 
growth performance can likely be attributed to reversal of the anti-private sector bias 
in government policies and attempts made to restore confidence in the private sector. 
An industrial policy was formulated and executed during this time, and the private 
sector was once again given the lead in driving growth of the industrial sector, 
benefiting from tax holidays, preferential interest rates and easing of various 
economic controls, as well as fewer regulations on investment decisions. Just as the 
time of the early 1970s marked a significant reorientation of government policy, so 
too did the time of the late 1970s when the military came to power. 
                                                             
25 The high growth in export earnings was due mainly to the global inflationary trends, and 
not to strong growth in export volume. 
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The consensus reached in the literature on the causes of growth in the period has 
focused on the coming online of several public investment projects initiated under the 
previous government’s rule, the linkages it created with the rest of the economy, and 
the revival of confidence in the private sector investing in industry once again spurred 
by buoyant demand in the economy as a whole. There was a surge in remittances from 
the Gulf and illegal trade from the Afghan war which fed into increased domestic 
demand for goods and services26. However, there is debate about the after effects of 
this growth in terms of “cloaked inefficiencies” that lurked under the surface of the 
positive growth trend. According to a study by the Institute of Developing Economies, 
“growth occurred, not because of the specific incentives provided in the industrial 
policy of the government but in spite of it.” Also the aim of the government policy was 
to give priority to technology-intensive and non-consumer goods manufactures, 
enhancing value added in manufacturing exports, and increasing efficiency in the 
manufacturing sector. The study concludes that the only achievement of the 
government was to lure the private sector back into industrial activity, and it was 
“fortuitous circumstances” which were responsible for the growth performance. 
According to Sayeed (1995), “the country squandered the windfall gains that it 
received as a result of favourable exogenous conditions”. 
 
Growth rate of the industrial sector worsened during this time, while the agricultural 
sector also witnessed a slow-down in performance. The increased role of the state 
and public sector in the economy was much in evidence during this time. 
 
The military intervention in July 1977 came in the wake of strong public protests 
against the Bhutto regime for the alleged irregularities in the elections held in March 
1977. Unlike the two previous Martial Law regimes, General Ziaul Haq did not 
abrogate the Constitution but suspended it, and the period of constitutional 
suspension continued until November 1988, when party-based general elections 
were held, four months after General Ziaul Haq died in a plane crash on August 17, 
1988. The period from 1988 onwards witnessed the revival of democracy in Pakistan 
and the difficult transition to civilian rule. The Pakistan People’s Party secured the 
largest number of parliamentary seats in the general elections, and consequently Ms. 
                                                             
26 See Arif (1995), Zahid (2011) 
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Benazir Bhutto, the head of the PPP, became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. However, 
owing to a lack of clear majority in the National Assembly, the PPP government could 
not last long: only twenty months after coming into power the National Assembly was 
dissolved and the Prime Minister was removed from office by a Presidential Order on 
August 6, 1990. 
 
The economic policies during the Eighties accorded high priority to the restoration of 
business confidence, which was considerably eroded in the previous decade due to 
the nationalization drive of the Bhutto regime. Besides denationalization of a number 
of public sector enterprises, the government provided a host of incentives to revive 
private investment. Moreover, the government initiated wide ranging structural 
reforms that aimed at liberalizing and deregulating the economy, and streamlining 
the investment licensing procedures. Though the initial response of the private sector 
to the reform package was lukewarm, by the mid-Eighties there was a upswing up in 
private investment: the share of the private sector in total investment increased from 
41.39 percent in 1980-81 to 44 percent in 1989-90. Nevertheless, the total 
investment failed to rise. 
 
The agricultural sector continued to play a dominant role in the economy, despite its 
declining share in the GDP. The major objective of the agricultural policy during the 
Eighties was to revamp the agricultural sector through liberalization of agricultural 
markets and production. In particular, the government deregulated the sugar, 
pesticide, and fertilizer industries, removed the monopoly power of the Rice and 
Cotton Export Corporations, and lifted the ban on the private sector’s import of edible 
oil. These measures were complemented by an agricultural pricing policy that aimed 
at bringing prices of critical inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers more in line with 
the market determined prices. In addition, the agricultural sector benefited from a 
large increase in bank credit as the formal lending institutions, led by the Agricultural 
Development Bank, paid greater attention to tackle the problem of credit shortages 
in the rural sector. The major breakthrough during this period was the development 
of a new high-yielding variety of cotton, which led to a three-fold increase in cotton 
production in a span of six years. 
 
However, despite these favourable developments, growth in the agricultural sector 
remained depressed owing largely to the industrialization bias in the overall 
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economic policy. The degree of industrialization bias can be gauged by the fact that 
while industry enjoyed high rates of effective protection, agriculture continued to 
have negative protection. The problems of the agricultural sector were further 
compounded by numerous indirect taxes – especially export taxes on agricultural 
products – and budgetary cuts on vital public services such as agricultural research 
and extension and irrigation. It is not surprising, then, that most of the increases in 
agricultural production were due to the increased utilization of land, and not to the 
improved crop yields, with the exception of cotton.  
 
On the macroeconomic front, the Eighties were characterized by widening fiscal 
deficits, which averaged 8 per cent as a proportion of GDP in the second half of the 
Eighties. The high budget deficit created an upward pressure on interest rates, which 
led to a crowding out of investment on the one hand and mounting debt servicing 
problems on the other. The budget deficit was largely financed by attracting private 
savings at higher than market interest rates (through the National Savings Schemes), 
and this helped avoid the problem of monetization of the deficit, thus mitigating the 
inflationary consequences of higher budget deficits (inflation averaged 7.6 percent in 
the Eighties, in contrast to 13.9 percent in the Seventies).  
 
A major departure in economic policy from the previous decades was the adoption of 
a managed floating exchange rate system. The transition to the new system led to an 
adjustment in the rupee which boosted Pakistan’s exports: on average, total exports 
grew at an impressive rate of 10 percent during the decade. Pakistan’s export 
earnings were further helped by an upswing in world trade which contributed to 
rapid increases in exports of cotton, rice, carpets, and leather products. The inflow of 
foreign aid during the Eighties also increased substantially, not least because of the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that prompted the international community 
to support Pakistan in its endeavours to promote regional security. The Eighties also 
witnessed a strong growth in the inflow of workers’ remittances, averaging at about 
USD 3 billion per year for most of the decade.  
 
Pakistan embarked on a program of economic reforms towards the fag end of the 
Eighties. A key area where the government introduced reforms was the financial 
sector, whose performance was marred by years of excessive regulation through 
administered interest rates and credit ceilings. Furthermore, the government's 
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reliance on non-bank borrowing to finance the deficit had created differential interest 
rate structures in the economy that led to flight of deposits from the banking system. 
Recognizing the importance of financial reforms in the process of economic growth, a 
series of measures were adopted with a view to removing various distortions in the 
financial system, minimizing government’s interference in the banking system, and 
strengthening the prudential regulations. The government also allowed a freer flow 
of private foreign capital and permitted the opening of foreign currency accounts. 
 
Economic growth averaged 6.12 percent per annum during the Eighties, matching the 
high growth performance of the Sixties (Table 2.14). The commodity producing 
sectors grew at an average annual rate of 7.33 percent, whereas the services sector 
exhibited an average growth of 6.60 percent. The manufacturing sector showed a 
healthy performance during most of the decade with an average annual rate of growth 
of 8.21 percent. The performance of the agricultural sector improved somewhat as 
compared with the Seventies but growth in this sector remained rather weak 
averaging 4.10 percent during the Eighties. Economic growth slowed down markedly 
during the second half of the decade owing largely to the slow pace of growth in the 
manufacturing sector: growth in GDP averaged 5.60 percent in the second half, down 
from 6.65 percent in the first half. 
 
Table 2.14: GDP and Sectoral Growth Rates (1980 – 1989) 
(%) 
Year Sector GDP 
(FC) 
Per Capita 
Income 
(PKR) 
Commodity 
Producing 
Agricul-
ture 
Manufact-
uring 
Services 
1980-81 6.12 3.93 10.63 6.31 6.21 1.48 
1981-82 7.27 4.72 13.75 7.90 7.56 3.78 
1982-83 4.64 4.40 7.03 9.24 6.79 6.42 
1983-84 0.38 -4.82 7.89 7.90 3.97 0.06 
1984-85 9.48 10.92 8.09 7.92 8.71 3.79 
1985-86 6.94 5.95 7.55 5.77 6.36 3.32 
1986-87 5.76 3.25 7.53 5.86 5.81 0.94 
1987-88 6.12 2.73 9.98 6.77 6.44 0.44 
1988-89 5.77 6.87 3.96 3.81 4.81 0.93 
1989-90 4.69 3.03 5.72 4.48 4.59 1.81 
Period Averages 
1980s 5.72 4.10 8.21 6.60 6.12 2.30 
1980-81 to 1984-85 5.58 3.83 9.48 7.85 6.65 3.10 
1985-86 to 1989-90 5.86 4.37 6.95 5.34 5.60 1.49 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999a) 
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While the share of the agricultural sector in GDP peaked at 30.83 percent in 1980-81, it 
declined to 25.83 percent in 1989-90, averaging at 27.62 percent during the decade (Table 
2.15). The manufacturing sector accounted for an increasing share in GDP: its share stood 
at 17.59 percent in 1989-90, up from 15.11 percent in 1980-81. There was a slight shift in 
the relative importance of commodity producing sectors and the services sector: whereas 
the share of commodity producing sectors declined from 53 percent in 1980-81 to 50.85 
percent in 1989-90, the share of the services sector edged up from 46.57 percent to 48.62 
percent during the same period. 
 
Table 2.15: Sectoral Shares in GDP (1980 – 1989) 
(%) 
Years Sector 
Commodity 
Producing 
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 
1980-81 53.43 30.83 15.11 46.57 
1981-82 53.28 30.01 15.98 46.72 
1982-83 52.21 29.34 16.02 47.79 
1983-84 50.41 26.86 16.62 49.59 
1984-85 50.76 27.41 16.52 49.24 
1985-86 51.04 27.30 16.71 48.96 
1986-87 51.01 26.64 16.98 48.99 
1987-88 50.86 25.71 17.55 49.14 
1988-89 51.33 26.22 17.40 48.67 
1989-90 51.38 25.83 17.59 48.62 
Period Averages 
1980s 51.57 27.62 16.65 48.43 
1980-81 to 1984-85 52.02 28.89 16.05 47.98 
1985-86 to 1989-90 51.13 26.34 17.25 48.87 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999a) 
 
Growth in total investment exceeded 5 percent in the Eighties (Table 2.16). While 
investment grew at an accelerated pace in the first half, at 7.78 percent, it slowed down in 
the second half to 3.39 percent mainly because of a sharp fall in the growth of public 
investment. Private investment registered a healthy rate of growth of over 6 percent. Private 
investment in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors grew respectively at 6.39 percent 
and 11.39 percent. 
 
In contrast to the rising income inequalities in the previous decade, there was a slight 
improvement in the distribution of income in the Eighties, as indicated by the fact that the 
Gini coefficient fell from 0.37 in 1984-85 to 0.35 in 1987-88 (Table 2.17). The share of 
the lowest 20 percent of households in income edged up from 7.3 percent to 8.0 percent, 
while that of the highest 20 percent of households declined from 45 percent to 43.7 percent. 
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The incidence of poverty also declined sharply during the Eighties: the percentage of total 
population falling below the poverty line was 17.32 percent in 1987-88, down from 24.57 
percent in 1984-85. 
 
Table 2.16: Total Investment and Share in GDP (1980 – 1989) 
(%) 
Year Growth Rates Share in Total 
Investment 
Public 
Investment 
Private Investment Public  Private 
Total Manufacturing Agriculture 
1980-81 - - - - 49.99 41.39 
1981-82 14.45 4.00 9.64 2.40 50.06 37.67 
1982-83 8.85 11.19 20.65 18.54 51.26 39.40 
1983-84 1.41 9.93 16.85 17.32 49.61 41.33 
1984-85 9.13 11.62 21.30 7.55 49.15 41.88 
1985-86 6.04 3.23 9.09 -7.31 49.96 41.44 
1986-87 8.85 -0.68 -14.54 5.62 52.19 39.51 
1987-88 -4.49 2.77 -1.26 -2.36 49.87 40.61 
1988-89 6.14 8.94 22.85 2.33 49.86 41.68 
1989-90 0.26 10.97 17.94 13.39 47.56 44.00 
Period Averages 
1980s 5.63 6.89 11.39 6.39 49.95 40.89 
1980-81 to 
1984-85 
8.46 9.19 17.11 11.45 50.02 40.33 
1985-86 to 
1989-90 
3.36 5.05 6.82 2.33 49.89 41.45 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999a), 
 Government of Pakistan, various years 
 
Table 2.17: Household Income Distribution (1980 – 1989) 
Year Household 
Gini Co-
efficient 
Household Income Shares Ratio of 
Highest 20% 
to Lowest 
20% 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Poverty 
Head 
Count 
Lowest 
20% 
Middle 
60% 
Highest 
20% 
1984-85 0.37 7.30 47.70 45.00 6.16 8.71 24.57 
1985-86 0.36 7.60 48.40 44.00 5.79 6.36 - 
1986-87 0.35 7.90 18.50 43.60 5.52 5.81 - 
1987-88 0.35 8.00 48.30 43.70 5.46 6.44 17.32 
Source: Government of Pakistan (2000), 
 Authors own calculations 
 
Pakistan’s exports increased from USD 2,958 million in 1980-81 to USD 4,954 in 1989-
90, exhibiting an average annual growth rate of 8.55 percent (Table 2.18). As compared to 
the sluggish export growth (2.09 percent) in the first half of the decade, there was a marked 
improvement in the export performance in the second half when exports grew at an 
impressive rate of over 15 percent. Growth in total imports averaged 4.17 percent during 
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the period. Despite healthy growth in exports, Pakistan faced a persistent deficit in the trade 
balance. 
 
Table 2.18: Exports, Imports and Trade Balance (1980 – 1989) 
(USD Million) 
Year Current Prices Growth Rate (%) 
Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
1980-81 2,958  5,409  -2451  25.07  14.11  3.20  
1981-82 2,464  5,622  -3158  -16.70 3.94 28.85 
1982-83 2,694  5,357  -2663  9.33 -4.71 -15.67 
1983-84 2,768  5,685  -2917  2.75 6.12 9.54 
1984-85 2,491  5,906  -3415  -10.01 3.89 17.07 
1985-86 3,070  5,634  -2564  23.24 -4.61 -24.92 
1986-87 3,686  5,380  -1694  20.07 -4.51 -33.93 
1987-88 4,455  6,391  -1936  20.86 18.79 14.29 
1988-89 4,661  7,034  -2373  4.62 10.06 22.57 
1989-90 4,954  6,935  -1981  6.29 -1.41 -16.52 
Period Averages 
1980s 3,420 5,935 -2,515 8.55 4.17 0.45 
1980-81 to 1984-85 2,675 5,596 -2,921 2.09 4.67 8.60 
1985-86 to 1989-90 4,165 6,275 -2,110 15.02 3.67 -7.70 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1999b) 
 
Table 2.19 below provides a snapshot of decade-wise key economic policy and political 
changes that took place in Pakistan’s history since the time of independence. The frequent 
changes in political leadership, not to mention reversals in economic policies are evident 
in the details given. The private sector was promoted in the early years, but the decision 
was reversed in the 1970s when the state was unable to effectively regulate economic 
activity and disparities between income groups reached unmanageable proportions. 
Inefficiencies in the state machinery led to a later reversal of this policy in 1990s and 
brought the private sector to the front again. While in the short term such decisions ensure 
sustainability of the political regime, in the longer term, developments such as these create 
uncertainty in the economic environment and clearly undermine the ability of the state to 
direct industrialization efforts by creating mistrust between the state and the private sector. 
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2.3. CONCLUSION 
Political settlements represent the distribution of power across economic, political 
and bureaucratic organizations in society (Khan (1995), Khan (2010), and Khan 
(2013a)), power which evolves over time. Such distributions are important in the 
context of policies aimed at learning because they determine the capability of 
organizations to affect allocation of various rents. Thus the actual outcome of a policy 
may be significantly different from the intended outcome due to rent allocation and 
its subsequent evaluation and enforcement that could not be enforced given the 
political settlement prevailing at the time. This chapter has provided an overview of 
developments in political settlements in Pakistan that are linked to changes in the 
policy framework and economic performance of the country. The evolution of 
political settlements will shed light on the experience of manufacturing firms in 
Pakistan’s automotive industry that will be explored in the chapters that follow. 
 
The early period of Pakistan’s history was marked by an absence of a viable 
entrepreneurial class that meant the state had to step in and start the 
industrialization process before handing over newly created industries in key sectors 
to potential industrialists. Later, these industrialization efforts were given more 
structure and the state offered a number of rents, including subsidies, preferential 
access to markets, easy access to credit, and tariffs designed to encourage domestic 
production of products (Pakistan’s “deletion program”28). On the political front there 
was considerable upheaval and unrest with frequent changes in leadership, and 
attempts to solidify and sustain themselves by assuring continued access to rents in 
exchange for support. For instance Ayub Khan started the system of basic 
democracies to gain support for his martial rule, while Zia-ul-Haq promoted religion 
and religious parties to rally support for his regime from the marginalized religious 
parties. In each case, the incumbent leadership gave rise to new or supported 
previously marginalized groups in order to guarantee support and sustainability. 
However, once established, these new groups established links within the existing 
political settlements and emerged with their own agenda and direction. This 
                                                             
28 The deletion program refers to a programme of phased indigenization of production; 
components or products that manufactured locally are removed (deleted) from the list of 
components that enjoy concessionary duty rates. 
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development further fractured the existing political settlements in the country and 
compromised the ability of the state to effectively monitor and enforce policies 
designed to influence and direct economic activity.  
 
The political settlement in each military period discussed earlier (Sections 2.2.2. and 
2.2.4.) may be characterized as a clientelist political settlement with vulnerable 
authoritarian coalition (as explained by Khan (2010)) where stability is threatened 
by strong excluded factions, while the state has strong implementation capabilities 
while being weakly in favour economic growth and development. The democratic rule 
during the interim period on the other hand can be characterized as a clientelist 
political settlement with a weak dominant party where there is increased 
fragmentation, especially at the lower levels and excluded factions gained more 
power to disrupt growth and development efforts, as seen by the frequent shifts in 
power between political parties.  
 
This is in contrast to the case of other countries, such as South Korea, where the state 
supported the local chaebols but also managed to exert sufficient control over their 
operations to effectively direct development of industrial activity. Firms in South 
Korea were faced with the credible threat of closure if performance was below 
expectation and provided the incentive to develop capabilities for achieving 
competitiveness. In South Asia, India was able to compel a foreign manufacturer, 
Suzuki, to upgrade the capabilities of domestic component manufacturers by 
threatening to open access to the protected domestic market to other firms if targets 
were not met. This threat was credible and worked as Suzuki did not have any deep 
connections within the political settlement prevailing at the time. In the case of 
Pakistan, automotive manufacturers have sufficient holding power to withstand 
changes in state policy that would impact their profits, as evidenced by the failure of 
the state to impose penalties on automobile manufacturers for failing to meet 
indigenization targets. 
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CHAPTER 3. TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION, CATCHING UP 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND RENTS 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Endowments of capital and skilled labour are insufficient to explain the significant 
differences in manufacturing productivity between advanced and developing 
countries. If these were the only differences between them convergence could be 
expected as developing countries should be able to build up their stocks of capital and 
skilled labour through appropriate investments over time. The work of Amsden 
(1989), Lall (1992), Lall (1998), Lall (2000) and others has established that a 
fundamental difference between countries is the level of technical and organizational 
capabilities embedded in firms and other organizations. Differences in technical and 
organizational capabilities mean that developing countries using the same machinery 
and labour with the same or comparable formal education as in more advanced 
countries achieve significantly lower productivity and are not able to achieve 
competitiveness. 
 
Productive processes have undergone a transformation in recent years, with global 
value chains, clusters and tiered supply networks coming to the front. Technological 
capabilities (in a nutshell the competence and skills of labour), pro-active work ethics 
(discipline and willingness to train and learn), industrial cluster development, 
institutional and infrastructure support and organizational capabilities of 
management are some of the factors and capabilities that are found to be lacking or 
underdeveloped in developing countries. Lall (2004) and others have suggested that 
such a deficiency erodes their competitiveness. We have established the link between 
competitiveness and catching-up in Chapter 1, a link which suggests that the 
development of an economy’s industrial base can be adversely affected if 
technological capabilities are underdeveloped, or otherwise lacking, resulting in a 
vicious cycle of low profitability, low investment and low levels of learning-by-doing 
that sustain these low capabilities. In contrast the dynamism of high capability 
countries enables these economies to operate at the frontier of the global production 
function; and to finance and conduct resource intensive research and development (R 
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& D) to innovate and keep pushing the frontier even further outwards while reaping 
the rewards of being first-movers in various product markets.  
 
Against this backdrop, and in the context of the global economy as it stands today, the 
pertinent questions then are how developing countries can accelerate their 
industrialization and development process enough to catch up with, and possibly 
even overtake developed countries on the development highway. What roles do 
competitiveness and the acquisition of technology play in the catching up process of 
developing countries and what channels are available to facilitate this process in the 
presence of market and state failures common to developing countries, and given the 
foreign ownership of some important segments of technology? This chapter will link 
together the theoretical considerations of technology acquisition with the catching up 
model of industrialization and the competitiveness of firms in late developing 
countries in Section 3.2. The role played by the state in allocating and managing rents 
to overcome market failures plaguing acquisition of technology efforts in these 
countries will then be incorporated into the discussion in Section 3.3, while Section 
3.4 will shed light on the implications of political settlements on technology 
acquisition efforts. Given the difficulties surrounding the measurement and 
comparison of capabilities across countries, the organizational capability model 
proposed by Khan (2013b) and Khan (2013a) is introduced in Section 3.5, which will 
allow for an assessment of firm-level competitiveness that represents the capabilities 
of a firm. 
 
3.2. TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION 
3.2.1. COMPETITIVENESS AND CATCHING UP 
Developing countries have in general found it a challenge to converge towards the 
growth trajectory of developed countries and thereby narrow the gap with their 
standards of living, despite having vast untapped pools of sufficiently educated labour 
and low wage costs. Figure 3.1 gives a concise visual representation of the growing 
gap between developed and developing countries, as represented by the high income 
countries on the one hand and middle and low income countries on the other hand. 
Though a number of developing countries have managed to converge with developed 
countries (as evidenced by the growth experience of the East Asian Tigers and China) 
9
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all developing countries have not shared in this success. The success of some 
countries in catching up was initially attributed to their openness and liberalization 
allowing resource allocation by the free market; but many other studies have shown 
that the role of the state was also critical in overcoming market failures that would 
have otherwise constrained their development. 
 
Developmentalist theories of economic development came to the front after Marshall 
Plan was enacted for European economic recovery at the end of World War II. These 
theories were based on the premise that developing countries were trapped in a 
vicious cycle of economic decline (as shown in Figure 3.2) – a self-sustaining set of 
factors that hamper development unless interrupted by external 
stimulus/intervention. The emphasis was less on economic growth theory (such as 
the Solow growth model) and more on historical and practical approaches to the big 
concern of how to develop, though the approaches differed in their areas of emphasis.  
 
Figure 3.2: Vicious Cycle of Economic Decline 
 
Source: Author 
 
The preferred approach to rapidly develop is to industrialize, which will raise the 
level of income and this increased prosperity will spill over through forward and 
backward linkages into other sectors of the economy. The ideal case envisaged a 
Economic 
Decline
Personal 
Income: 
Low
Personal Funds for 
Education: Low or 
None
Education Level 
Attained: Low or 
None
Labour: 
Undertrained or 
Untrained 
National 
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competitive market and an efficient state working in tandem to achieve the best 
results. In contrast to the classical models, competitive and free markets are the 
means to achieving the goal of development and not an end in itself, while the role of 
the state is to stabilize the economy. 
 
The Big Push Model first proposed by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), and subsequently 
developed and expanded on by Nurkse (1953), Scitovsky (1954), and Fleming (1955), 
dealt with harnessing the hidden potential in developing countries to achieve 
development through large scale industrialization and investment in infrastructure 
development. A concerted and coordinated investment effort is required in a number 
of areas of the economy that will result in an accelerated rate of capital accumulation 
and translate into pushing the economy out of a low level equilibrium. However, due 
to information asymmetries and appropriation externalities that result in market 
failures, the state is required to provide the Big Push. Though a relatively simple 
proposition at first glance, financing industrial efforts solely from domestic sources 
entails a curtailment of domestic consumption and reduced welfare in the short run 
till the investment yields a payoff. Moreover, developing countries tend to lack the 
financing and technical expertise and know-how to effectively implement such an 
endeavour. Rodan instead proposed industrializing with foreign or external 
assistance rather than relying only on internal sources. 
 
Ragnar Nurkse’s Theory of Balanced Growth29 centered on the premise that the small 
size of the domestic market limited the development prospects of developing 
countries; industrialization can therefore only be achieved if the amount of 
investment utilized in numerous industries is increased many fold. Small incremental 
increases in investment in specific industries will not have the desired effect on the 
development trajectory of the whole economy. The key for the development process 
in developing countries is to invest in as wide a range of industries as possible with 
large infusion of new technology and physical capital, and new production processes 
in such industries. The large increase in supply would create its own demand and 
allow further expansion of demand by other firms and workers. Since prices for 
traditional exports of developing countries; primary products were observed by 
Nurkse to be relatively low, exports could not be counted on to provide the impetus 
                                                             
29 For details, see Nurkse (1953) 
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for domestic industrialization. The desired stimulus could be achieved by forced 
savings through increased taxes on high income individuals and allocation of the 
investment funds to promising industries by the state.  
 
Hirschman’s Unbalanced Growth Theory (as detailed in Hirschman (1958)) 
attempted to address the shortcomings of the Big Push and Balanced Growth Models. 
Rapid industrialization could be achieved through large scale capital formation in 
selected industries and sectors. Unbalancing the economy in this way would create 
excess capacity in the selected industries and shortages in other areas, causing 
subsequent reactions to correct the imbalance which would accelerate the 
development process by presenting new entrepreneurs with unique opportunities to 
profit. The key to this theory is the presence of strong backward and forward linkages 
between the different industries and sectors of the economy and changing the social 
organization of the labour. Labour would be forced to become more efficient and 
responsible rather than lax, to keep pace with the advanced capital intensive 
production process being used and over time these would be passed along to the rest 
of society and lead to further increases in productivity. 
 
Despite the shortcoming of not incorporating the role of institutions, and assuming 
adequate capabilities of the state and no market failures, by favouring a historical and 
more empirical based approach, these early models did open the debate to more 
relevant models of development for the developing countries. 
 
Models of development that have been proposed (see Section 3.2.1 for details of 
various Big Push models) rely on industrialization to break the cycle of poverty and 
achieve self-sustaining economic growth. The structural change that takes place at the 
macro level is in the shifting of resources from the agricultural sector to the industrial 
sector. Kuznets (1971) believed that there is a bidirectional causality between 
economic growth and structural change and in fact economic growth would cause a 
structural shift from manufacturing or industrial activity to services. At the micro 
level, industrialization is expected to cause a structural shift from simple, low value 
added products towards more complex high value added products as the industry 
grows and matures. This structural change also drives inter-industry change as the 
economy transitions towards producing more high value added industries. This 
transition from simple production to high value added mass production is expected 
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to result in increased efficiency, as well as domestic and international 
competitiveness. 
 
Traditional Heckscher-Ohlin models of trade30 based on comparative advantage 
theory assume identical technology across countries, but since then there has been a 
realization since that this assumption does not hold true for late developers. Several 
new models have been introduced to explain the trade and country specializations in 
manufactured products, including the technology gap model by Posner (1961) and 
the product life cycle model of Vernon (1966). Posner (1961) suggested that trade 
and industrial development is the result of technical change and there is a time lag 
associated with the diffusion of new technology to the rest of the world. According to 
the product life cycle theory of Hirsch (1965) and Vernon (1966), the life of a product 
has 5 distinct stages; Introduction, Growth, Maturity, Saturation and Decline. In the 
present context, the speed of diffusion of technology is fairly rapid, even in late 
developers, as a result of the spread of information technology. Moreover, it has been 
observed that developed countries exit the product market in the third stage with a 
transition to another product, usually higher value added and more technologically 
advanced, while late developers enter these mature markets by learning to use 
existing technologies with cheaper labour. 
 
In contrast to the widespread use of technical and organizational capabilities in 
developed countries for innovation, late developers have more limited capabilities 
that constrain them from achieving high levels of competitiveness in even relatively 
simple technologies. Late developers can benefit from capturing previously untapped 
segments of the market based on their ability to produce with a lower cost of labour 
inputs and to rapidly adapt to changing consumer preferences. Acquisition of this 
know-how or tacit knowledge is a necessary step towards gaining the capability and 
proficiency to compete effectively with other developing countries as well as their 
counterparts in the developed world.  
 
To achieve this goal requires a level of domestic organizational and technological 
capabilities that late developers lack and must take concerted efforts to acquire and 
                                                             
30 Originally by Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933) and developed further by other 
researchers subsequently 
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develop. Economic history has shown that technological capability can be developed 
in one of two ways (broadly speaking) in late developer nations, given certain 
constraints, as spelled out in Chapter 1. To recap, late developers lack the capabilities 
required to efficiently operate technology and have recourse to two different 
approaches, foreign MNC-led or domestic industry led, to acquiring the technology 
and capabilities they require. Under the MNC led approach, the focus is on achieving 
export ready production as quickly as possible without relying on domestic 
indigenous technological capabilities. This is accomplished by grafting MNC 
production technology and techniques on the domestic industry. What is noteworthy 
about this approach is that production operations do not rely on or even foresee 
cultivating and seeing significant development of domestic capabilities to ensure 
exports. The domestic industry led approach favours acquiring the technology 
needed, learning from it and improving on it where needed to develop domestic 
organizational and technological capabilities to compete effectively. These 
capabilities will be developed from the ground up, by learning-by-doing. Thus a base 
will be built up from which further advancements and improvements can be 
developed without relying on external sources.  
 
The real difference between the two approaches is that foreign companies will bring 
in more advanced technologies that require many advanced inputs and sophisticated 
management and organizational capabilities. The likely outcome is assembly 
operations and limited backward linkages into the domestic economy. If national 
companies engage in learning they will begin with simpler technologies but a broader 
range of organizational capabilities may be acquired because domestic management 
will have to learn all levels of management and manage backward and forward 
linkages in the domestic market to a greater extent. This is not always the case, but is 
a plausible distinction. 
 
Given these dissimilar approaches, late developers have had mixed experiences in 
their efforts to acquire technological and organizational capabilities and catch up with 
the more advanced countries. While it is unlikely that foreign MNCs will bring in the 
latest cutting edge technology into a developing country, the level of technology being 
brought in will likely be higher than the domestic level available since the recipient 
country will either lack the technology entirely or possess only a dated version. The 
new technology will require advanced inputs and complex management and 
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organizational capabilities (such as Just-In-Time supply chains) that will be absent or 
underdeveloped in the recipient country. This gap in technology levels will translate 
into limited backward linkages with the rest of the domestic economy since inputs 
will need to be imported for assembly operations.  
 
If domestic firms are encouraged to begin learning at a lower levels of technology they 
can focus their efforts on learning and developing a broader range of organizational 
and technical capabilities that will allow them to effectively assimilate more complex 
technologies at a later stage. Firm level managers will also acquire the knowledge and 
experience they need to manage and develop backward and forward linkages with 
the domestic economy. The contrasting experiences of automotive industries in 
Pakistan and India are examples of these differing approaches to technology 
acquisition. The state in Pakistan attempted to guide the development of the sector 
after it was set up, but it was unable to effectively manage the learning rents required 
for developing local technological capabilities and shifted focus to liberalizing the 
economy and inviting foreign firms. The expectation was that the new entrants would 
develop the organizational capabilities required in their local plants on their own. On 
the other hand, the state in India took a more hands-on approach to development of 
the domestic industry by first restricting access to allow domestic firms to engage in 
learning-by-doing without immediate international competition, and then slowly 
opening up the market to foreign production. Conditions were imposed in the second 
stage on technology transfer to and developing the organizational capabilities of 
domestic Tier 1 and 2 component producers (Khan (2013b) and Khan (2013a)). The 
large rents offered to the foreign investors (beginning with Suzuki) together with 
credible and enforceable conditions resulted in the rapid development of domestic 
technological and organizational capabilities in the industry and its supply network.31  
                                                             
31 Interestingly enough, developed countries have also embarked on programmes to develop 
their domestic capabilities from time to time. One such instance is the Advanced Technology 
Vehicle Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program of the US Department of Energy 
(http://lpo.energy.gov/programs/atvm/) that is geared towards developing indigenous 
production of “Advanced Technology Vehicles” (currently focused on electric and hybrid 
vehicles) and imposes conditionalities on sourcing of production in exchange for a loan. 
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3.2.2. CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
CAPABILITIES 
It has been established in the preceding discussion that there have been significant 
cross-country variations in economic growth rates between groups of countries, and 
this has been the subject of much discussion in the literature. Numerous explanations 
have been proposed to account for this difference, but their applicability to the 
experience of all developing countries is uncertain, especially when one considers the 
experience of the East Asian countries and China.  
 
Alternative explanations of failed technology acquisition and economic growth in 
Pakistan have hinged on corruption or on weak governance. The common 
misconception is that high levels of corruption lead to weak development and growth 
performance in countries. In actuality, countries have managed to develop and exhibit 
strong growth despite significant levels of corruption. Wade (1990) argued that 
Taiwan had strong growth despite a corrupt public sector, while Khan (1996) 
observed that substantial corruption by state officials was found in South Korea and 
the country still exhibited strong growth. Therefore, the presence of high growth does 
not indicate lack of corruption, and high levels of corruption do not necessarily imply 
low growth rates in developing countries. Furthermore, conventional models based 
on corruption fail to take into account the political context is unaccounted for not 
explicitly analysed. Khan (1996) showed that political settlements (and in particular 
the distribution of power between state and agents) are an important consideration 
when analysing the effects of corruption. Thus, presence of corruption is only part of 
the explanation of failed technology acquisition and growth efforts. Explanations of 
governance failures also suffer from the same shortcomings in terms of historical 
evidence showing that high growth economies had the appropriate governance 
capabilities to manage accelerated learning and technology acquisition efforts, but 
scored low on overall governance indicators. 
 
Traditional explanations of failure of technology acquisition in Pakistan have also 
identified lack of physical infrastructure and low investment in education as two 
reasons. While no doubt important to some degree, these explanations are flawed in 
the sense that the resources required to provide adequate infrastructure are only 
possible with sustained economic growth, leading to a chicken and egg problem as 
indicated by Khan (2009). However, while infrastructure provision does affect 
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productivity and competitiveness at the macro level, the constraint does not 
necessarily apply at the micro level. Individual firms in developing countries, as will 
be evident from the case studies that follow in Chapters 6 and 7, adapt to the lack of 
infrastructure and invest in independent provision of utilities such power and 
transport to maintain their competitiveness. 
 
The development experience of numerous countries over the years has pointed to one 
notion, that for developing countries to converge towards advanced, developed 
countries, they need to transform their societies from agrarian to 
industrial/manufacturing economies and for domestic firms and industries to achieve 
competitiveness in global markets. This competitiveness can only be achieved if 
developing countries (and domestic firms) succeed in acquiring the requisite 
technological and organizational capabilities to produce goods in ways that achieve 
the global price and quality for the product they are attempting to break into. 
 
To understand what is meant by technological and organizational capabilities and the 
implications for competitiveness and the catching up process of developing countries, 
we need to look at the origins of the terms. The theoretical underpinnings for the 
concept of technological and organizational capabilities lies in the analysis of the 
nature of a firm, where the firm is considered to be a cluster of inputs with specific 
characteristics that are organized in a particular fashion to provide a variety of 
productive services (see Coase (1937), Penrose (1959) and Andreoni (2011)). 
Moreover, the growth of the firm is contingent on the ability of the entrepreneur to 
capitalize on productive opportunities that result from conceptualizing consumer 
wants and needs (Penrose (1959) as quoted in Andreoni (2011)). Richardson (1972) 
first introduced the concept of capabilities in economics as the “appropriate 
knowledge, experience and skills” required by the firm to provide productive services 
focusing on successfully conceptualizing and bringing a product to market. Thus 
capabilities are essential to the survival and even growth of a typical firm, and as such 
their development is the key to improving the competitiveness of firms, the industry 
and even the country at large. 
 
To produce a product requires knowledge which first and foremost must be gained, 
mastered and then applied by the firm. The creation of knowledge is a resource-
intensive process involving innovative activity that countries within the global 
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production frontier may be hard pressed to achieve given their limited resources and 
capabilities. Technology is the knowledge regarding productive operations that is 
used in the production of goods Rosenberg & Firschtak (1985), and as opposed to the 
creation of knowledge, the acquisition of technology from more advanced countries 
is an activity that is more affordable for developing countries. There are four variants 
of knowledge relevant for a knowledge-based economy; know-what, know-why, 
know-how and know-who (OECD (1996)). This categorization was developed for the 
OECD and developed countries, but it is possible to apply this categorization to late 
developers as well. Know-what and know-why can be classified as largely codified 
knowledge that is close to being a market commodity that can be measured and 
purchased in the market. Lundvall & Johnson (1994) viewed know-how and know-as 
referring to knowledge and skills about the organization of production and of experts 
that can be classified as tacit knowledge, which is difficult to measure and exchange. 
More precisely, know-what are the facts or information that can be easily codified and 
transmitted or exchanged, while know-why is the scientific information and R & D 
upon which technological change and new products and processes are based. The 
skills required to complete a task is the know-how, while the intricacies to manage 
and tap expertise of individuals falls under know-who. Codified knowledge (know-
what and know-why) represented by manuals, publications and the like are just as 
important as tacit knowledge (know-how and know-who) that are more closely 
associated with learning-by-doing and learning-by-using.  
 
The question is how do firms gain access to these different types of knowledge and 
use it to increase their competitiveness. Gaining mastery over the different forms of 
knowledge requires learning in a variety of forms. In the early conceptualization of 
capabilities by Richardson, it is evident that the focus is on capabilities involving 
know-how, which has been identified as being distinct from the know-what and 
know-why in a knowledge-based economy. Various researchers have characterized 
the acquisition of knowledge, especially know-how, as a learning process or learning-
by-doing (Arrow (1962) and Andreoni (2010)) that is accumulated slowly over a 
period of time and involves a great deal of experimentation, trial and error and 
personal experience. Thus, it is a continuous learning process of accumulating the 
information related to what works and what does not, in organizing the production 
process and actually producing the product. On the other hand, know-what and know-
why, the codified forms of knowledge are gained through formal education, while 
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know-how is learned from an individual with greater mastery of a task (for example 
when an apprentice interns with a master of the trade) or through a process of trial 
and error, but typically involving both. Finally, know-who is the knowledge gained at 
the organizational level from interactions and relationship building with customers, 
suppliers and institutions with links to the productive process, and like know-how is 
not easily transferred in a codified manner, and should be considered as tacit in 
nature. 
 
Firm level efforts to acquire capabilities for competitiveness are bound to lead to a 
degree of specialization within the firm since firms concentrate on acquiring only the 
“appropriate” knowledge and capabilities they need to bring the selected product to 
the market. As Andreoni (2011) has pointed out, this implies greater degree of 
specialization and division of labour in the operations of the firm. It can thus be 
inferred that as firms in developing countries, and by extension the countries 
themselves acquire more capabilities they will exhibit signs of division of labour and 
increased specialization leading to movements up the value chain that correspond 
with their capabilities development. 
 
In attempting to account for the factors responsible for the better growth 
performance and the greater ability of the East Asian countries to catch up with the 
developed countries, Abramovitz (1986) observed that the potential for catch-up is 
contingent upon the following three factors: 
(i) Channels of diffusion of know-how and knowledge in the economy 
(ii) Conditions affecting structural change in the economy 
(iii) Conditions affecting investment levels and effective demand in the 
economy. 
 
Each of these factors relates to the diffusion of knowledge and information relating to 
the technology acquired, conditions prevalent in the domestic economy, and as such 
are considered to be focusing on diffusion capabilities of disseminating the 
knowledge within the economy and not technological or organizational capabilities 
at the firm level. 
 
Ohkawa & Rosovsky (1973) and later Abramovitz (1986) refer to the characteristics 
and even deficiencies that account for a country’s ability to achieve high productivity 
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as “social capability”. The concept of social capability is a complex one to quantify and 
measure, but in a nutshell it refers to the experience of organizing and managing an 
enterprise, as well as the institutions to mobilize resources for firms. Improving social 
capabilities lowers the constraints on the successful assimilation of technology. 
However, the social capability of an economy will depend not just on the level of 
education, and the organizational experience of labour, but also on the role of vested 
interests, historically determined positions, inter-firm and labour market relations as 
well. Olson (1982) researched the catching up paradigm and suggested that a 
catastrophic event (usually negative), such as war and attendant upheavals may 
usher in new infrastructure and abilities and a new era of technological progress and 
growth. This relates to Schumpeter’s view of innovation as creative destruction 
driving technological change and hence growth. 
 
Later the evolutionary view of the firm by Nelson & Winter (1982) which focused on 
path dependency led to the formulation of technological capability as routines, 
routinized patterns of behaviour which in turn are products of organizational 
learning and knowledge. According to Teece & Pisano (1994), organizational learning 
here is considered as a social and collective phenomenon that is cumulative and path 
dependent in nature and involves learning through problem solving. 
 
The focus on science and technology led to the formulation of the concept in terms of 
the ability to drive technological change in developing countries. The stock of 
knowledge required to generate productive capacity and was taken to be comprised 
of three distinct elements (i) embodied/disembodied, (ii) codified/tacit and (iii) 
generated/diffused (see Bell & Pavitt (1997) and Lall (1990)). 
 
There is no clear definition and description of technological and organizational 
capabilities in the literature; no one universal definition is accepted in the literature, 
the definition depends on the context, and according to Andreoni (2011) the reason 
for this is simply that technological capabilities are mostly industry specific, not to 
mention product and process specific. While it is true that a very basic level, one could 
argue that capabilities are generic or global and static in nature, but then, their 
development is a simple matter that seldom calls for intervention or pro-active 
actions. 
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3.2.3. MEASURES OF CAPABILITIES 
Various attempts have been made, and a number of synthetic measures of 
technological capabilities constructed keeping in mind the characteristics highlighted 
above. Commonly used measures include the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
Technology Index (see for example World Economic Forum (2001), World Economic 
Forum (2002), World Economic Forum (2003)), the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) Technology Achievement Index (Desai & Sagasti (2002)), the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Industrial Development 
Scoreboard (Lall & Albaladejo (2002) and UNIDO (2002)), RAND Corporation’s 
Science and Technology Capacity Index and Archibugi and Coco’s ArCo Index (in 
Archibugi & Coco (2004)); covered in an in-depth analysis by Archibugi & Coco 
(2005). 
 
The WEF report presents medium and short term indices of competitiveness based 
on macro level (for the medium term) and micro level (for the short term) indicators 
representing the level of technology, the quality of government policies and various 
macroeconomic conditions on the one hand, and business environment, strategy and 
organization at the firm level on the other hand. The index of interest with regard to 
technological capabilities of course is the WEF Technology Index which in turn is 
comprised of three technology components; namely: 
(i) Innovative capacity 
(ii) ICT diffusion, and  
(iii) Technology transfer 
 
Innovative capacity is measured by the number of patents granted by the US Patent 
Office, tertiary enrolment ratio and survey data, while ICT diffusion is represented by 
online (telephone, PC and internet) connectivity and survey data, and technology 
transfer by non-primary exports and survey data. However, it is not clear how much 
telephone and internet usage (for example) as measured by this indicator will be of 
any relevance to understanding or even measuring the technical and organizational 
capabilities required for effective technology absorption and adaptation in 
developing countries. 
 
The UNDP Technology Achievement Index (TAI) focuses on outcomes and 
achievements rather than the effort expended or inputs used, to assess how well a 
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country ranks in creating and using technology. A total of eight indicators are used to 
calculate the TAI (as an average of the measures looking at four aspects of technology; 
namely: 
(i) Technology creation 
(ii) Diffusion of recent innovations 
(iii) Diffusion of old innovations, and  
(iv) Human skills. 
 
The number of patents granted and royalty and license fees received per capita 
represent the creation of technology within the country, while the number of per 
capita internet hosts and the share of medium and high technology exports in total 
goods exports proxy for diffusion of recent innovations. Diffusion of old innovation is 
measured by number of telephone lines and electricity consumption per capita). 
Again, as in the case of the WEF Index described above, it is clearly an inadequate 
estimation of the experience developing countries have had in building competitive 
organizations), while human skills are represented by mean years of schooling and 
gross tertiary science enrolment ratios. The TAI is useful for policy formulation, but 
it does not represent a complete measure of domestic technological achievements. 
For one, the full range of technologies present in the economy, from agriculture to 
manufacturing to all the sub sectors in between, cannot be covered by the index, while 
the aspects of diffusion of innovations, both old and new, and the development of 
human capabilities and skills are hard to quantify and represent accurately (see Desai 
& Sagasti (2002) for further details).  
 
Archibugi & Coco (2004)’s Technological Capabilities Index considers three 
characteristics of technology to cover a broader scope of countries using more 
reliable data sources; namely: 
(i) Innovative activity 
(ii) Technology infrastructure, and  
(iii) Human capital 
 
Due to lack of available data, the index uses R & D expenditures to represent 
technology creation and innovative activity, rather than patents and research 
publications, but it is uncertain how this would be a better measure of capabilities. In 
any case patents and research publications are more appropriate approximations of 
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innovative activity in developed countries where the comparable data exists, rather 
than capabilities that represent ability to absorb foreign technology. Machinery and 
equipment is excluded from technology infrastructure in favour of internet and 
telephone connectivity and electricity to compensate for lack of comparable data. 
Technology infrastructure is more than just machinery and equipment too; it is the 
system supporting technology and that cannot be measured by telephone and 
electricity. 
 
UNIDO’s Industrial Development Scoreboard was based on the work done by Lall & 
Albaladejo (2002) and considers a host of components and drivers of industrial 
performance grouped into four categories, to represent technological capabilities; 
namely: 
(i) Technological effort, 
(ii) Industrial performance,  
(iii) Technology imports, and  
(iv) Skills and infrastructure 
 
Indices are created for each category, but no attempt is made to synthesize a 
combined index since meaningful compiling of such a wide variety of indicators is 
problematic at best (as also pointed out by Archibugi & Coco (2005)). While the 
inclusion of technological imports and skills and infrastructure could represent level 
of capabilities in a country, technological effort is a subjective assessment and will 
vary with the perception of effort being undertaken, and inclusion of industrial 
performance is unclear; it is what one is expecting to explain. 
 
From the discussion above and the analysis of commonly used indicators and indices 
of technological capabilities, the literature suggests that the main factors that 
determine technological capabilities include: 
(i) Patents 
(ii) R & D resources 
(iii) Scientific publications 
(iv) Royalties and license fees 
(v) Infrastructure 
(vi) Trade indicators 
(vii) Human resources 
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(viii) Economic indicators 
 
The relevance and applicability of these factors in the case of developing countries is 
unclear and given the lack of adequate data, problematic at best. While not an 
exhaustive list, one important factor is missing; the actual ownership of the 
technology being used, which is an important factor that can have an impact on 
development of capabilities in a developing country. The importance is even more so 
when one also considers the fact that industrialization progresses at a fairly rapid 
pace now and the advent of the WTO and IPRs impose constraints on how transferred 
technology can be utilized. As recalled from the earlier discussion, developing 
countries can opt for one two approaches to gain access to foreign technology and 
attempt to rapidly industrialize; late developers can either invite a foreign 
corporation to share only their technology (first path), or they can invite the foreign 
corporation to set up manufacturing (preferably) operations in the country (second 
path). Measures that include royalties and license fees can be indicative of foreign 
ownership to some extent but they do not represent any restrictions that are often 
placed on use of the acquired technology. The restrictions in place vary from case to 
case, and it would be a far greater challenge to devise a measure to represent this 
factor. 
 
3.3. MARKET FAILURES IN TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION 
3.3.1. LEARNING RENTS AND RENT SEEKING 
It is evident that the acquisition of technology and technological capabilities is crucial 
to the catching up strategies of developing countries. It is also clear that this 
acquisition is not a simple, clear-cut matter of acquiring codified knowledge, but also 
involves tacit knowledge that can only be gained by investing in the production 
process irrespective of any profit made and occurs with the passage of time. 
Furthermore, this period of learning by doing must be financed, and developing 
countries and developmental states opt to employ learning rents to provide domestic 
firms with the incentive to acquire tacit knowledge. The effective management of 
learning rents requires a great deal of capability and capacity on the part of the state 
to administer the learning rents and police their enforcement and ensure the rents 
achieve the intended goal of developing technological capabilities. Naturally, state 
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failure in any of these aspects of rent management will lead to rent seeking activity. 
Rent seeking activity on the part of firms and economic agents intent on capturing the 
rents for other purposes can have an adverse impact on rent management efforts by 
the state. A deeper understanding of the role of the state in the development process; 
the enforcement of institutions will shed light on areas where state failure can occur 
and the impact it can have on the management of learning rents and their outcome. 
 
Enforcement of institutions and rules in society is one of the key rules of the state in 
developing countries; including, but not limited to collection of taxes, redistribution 
of wealth and resources, enforcement of social cohesion, and the resolution of 
conflicts. This socially acceptable enforcement aids the state in maintaining a 
monopoly on legitimate violence that it can use to fulfil its responsibilities. 
 
The core institutions of note that are enforced by the state are: 
1. A system of property rights;  
2. Interventions that change incentive structures in the economy, usually to 
address market failures and these inevitably create rents; and 
3. Political institutions that allow the established rules to be changed.  
In the case of developing countries, states are also tasked with an additional 
responsibility; namely: 
4. Managing development and growth of the economy. 
 
All states have the responsibility of management of development and growth of the 
economy, but historical accounts show that many developing country states are very 
remiss in doing anything about it. 
 
Growth and development are complex processes that place great demands on the 
functioning of the state and increase the likelihood of failures occurring if capabilities 
are lacking or policies are not optimized for the task at hand. The capabilities of state 
agencies and institutions are different and not to be confused with the firm or even 
industry level organizational capabilities that are required for technology acquisition 
and achieving competitiveness. A necessary first step when dealing with state failures 
is an examination of the role of the state as it pertains to economic development and 
technology acquisition. It is appropriate to focus debate on role of the state along two 
distinct lines; one being the "Service Delivery Model" (SDM) and the other being the 
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"Social Transformation Model" (STM), as suggested by Khan (2002). The SDM lies at 
the heart of mainstream consensus view of the state, which appears to be a narrower 
view of the state that is better suited for looking at the case of developed countries 
where fundamental property right transformations have already occurred and the 
majority of firms have already attained a high capability level and become 
competitive, rather than developing countries where the state needs to play a range 
of ‘transformative’ roles in property rights and capability building to achieve 
sustainable growth and development. 
  
The services typically considered in the SDM are law and order, provision of public 
goods and infrastructure, social security, and market regulation. Many of these are 
important services even in developing countries, but the degree to which developing 
country states can actually deliver these services is typically low. Apart from 
providing adequate infrastructure and ensuring that markets function efficiently, 
economic development is left in the hands of the private sector and free market; the 
expectation being that the private sector will provide the impetus necessary for 
sustaining economic development.  
 
In this model, it is clear that the state only has a minimal role to play not only in 
economic development, but also in technology acquisition. Typical tasks the state 
focuses on include getting prices right, providing a level playing field to all economic 
agents, and letting the forces of supply and demand determine which industries are 
viable enough for firms in the domestic economy to specialize and compete in. 
 
Effective service delivery defined in this way can be a viable state strategy if the social 
transformation to a broad-based productive economy is largely complete. If however 
the transformation is incomplete and most firms have low organizational and 
technological capabilities and so have low competitiveness, this state strategy will be 
insufficient to achieve rapid development (Khan (2002)).  
 
More concretely, the SDM is based on the notion of efficient and well-functioning 
markets. It is a well-established perception that this is a fallacy in the context of 
developing countries; no such situation exists in the modern world, and attempting 
to achieve this stylized form of market takes precious resources away from other 
areas of interest with no real guarantee of success.  
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The key responsibilities of the state in the SDM are: 
1. Protecting stable property rights with strong contact enforcement, low 
expropriation risk and low corruption; 
2. Ensuring undistorted markets with low rents; and  
3. Ensuring democratic accountability and civil society participation.  
 
Even if we were to take the core assumption of the SDM as given and holding true, 
there is no evidence to support the claim that countries where the state has managed 
to, even partially, fulfil its service delivery obligations, have achieved a high and 
sustainable rate of growth. A more troubling assumption of the model concerns the 
role of the private sector; in the interest of pursuing their personal goals, which 
happen to coincide with the goals of society, entrepreneurs will automatically 
contribute to economic growth. The is no flexibility in the model to account for 
instances where individual and societal goals do not intersect or overlap, and no 
possibility of entrepreneurs being risk averse enough not to undertake the desired 
activities.  
 
Building on the core assumption with three theoretical pillars, the SDM attempts to 
explain how liberal market economies function. The first pillar theorizes markets are 
efficient if they are rent-free and have stable property rights. The second pillar relates 
rent creation by rent-seeking activity which de-stabilizes property rights. Finally, the 
third pillar concerns weak or absent democracy and weak bureaucracy allowing rent-
seeking to persist. Putting the three pillars together brings forth the interconnections 
as follows. Inefficient markets lead to rent-seeking and corruption when there is 
monopoly power over: 
1. Information; 
2. Right to supply a protected market; 
3. Right to a subsidy; or  
4. Access to, or ownership of, a natural resource income that is higher than their 
next-best earning opportunity which they are unable to get access to.  
 
While efficient markets would remove any imperfections and welfare reducing rents, 
inefficient markets allow those rents to persist and thereby damage property rights 
by encouraging rent-seeking activity. Finally, lack of democracy, as pointed out by 
118 
North (1990), Olson (1997), and Olson (2000), allows rent-seeking activity to persist 
while a weak bureaucracy (World Bank (1997)) lowers the opportunity cost of this 
activity. 
 
The East Asian Tigers were initially hailed as the poster-child of the consensus view 
and by extension the SDM. A number of studies emerged in support of the model; 
including Knack & Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Clague et al. (1997), World Bank 
(1997), Johnson, Kaufmann & Zoido-Lobatón (1998), Hall & Jones (1999) and 
Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón (1999). 
 
However there are several methodological issues with the evidence that call into 
question the validity of these results (Khan (2002)). Real world examples that 
support the three pillars are lacking for one, and there has been research done that 
contradicts the consensus view (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck (1994), Treisman (2000), 
Przeworski (2004) and Treisman (2007)). The East Asian Tigers have been shown to 
have followed a substantially different approach and model that took into account the 
specifics of their situation, while at the same time also incorporating key elements of 
the SDM. 
 
The Social Transformation Model (STM) on the other hand suggests that the state has 
a much larger and much more crucial role to play in the economic development and 
growth of economies than that promoted by the SDM. Developing countries are in the 
process of transforming their societies at a greatly accelerated rate and the role 
played by the state in welding its power to guide the prices will determine whether 
the process ultimately succeeds or fails.  
 
Several key differences between the political economy scene in developed and 
developing countries will highlight the reason why the SDM is ill-equipped to deal 
with the demands of a rapidly transforming society and where the STM comes in. The 
core dynamism of the economy of an advanced country is maintained by a political 
scene that revolves around a relatively narrow range of options, while differences are 
relegated to the fringe with regard to distribution. The capitalist sector is the source 
of the resources required to run the political system, and also the main source of 
livelihood and welfare for society.  
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In contrast, developing countries exhibit much greater variation in the political scene. 
The still evolving capitalist sector does not provide the resources necessary to run the 
political system, nor is it the main source of livelihood and welfare enhancement for 
society. As such, the state is an instrument for groups to channel resources for their 
own needs and steer social transformation in desirable directions.  
 
Under the STM, the state is deemed to possess the requisite institutional structure to 
manage state interventions in the economy and guide the social transformation 
process of society. According to Khan (2002), the role of the transformation state in 
this regard ranges from intervening in the property rights systems, to creating, 
managing and destroying rents, and organizing transfers. Service delivery objectives 
are subsumed under the overarching goal of transformation and serve to reinforce 
the transformation process.  
 
The notion of a transformation state is analogous to the idea of a developmental state 
first proposed by List (1909) and Gerschenkron (1962) to explain industrialization in 
Europe. Fritz & Menocal (2007) have argued that states and their political economy 
matter for development and it is political economy factors that explain how several 
states in East Asia were able to transform their societies from poor agrarian based in 
the 1960's to high-technology based in just 30 odd years. The widely acclaimed 
success of the East Asian Tigers has generated considerable debate and research 
(Haggard (1990), Bank (1993), Evans (1995) and Kohli (2004)). These countries are 
prime examples of a true developmental state, or a dynamic transformation state 
Khan (2002). On the other hand, the developing world is replete with examples of 
limited developmental states, such as Fritz & Menocal (2007), these include 
developing countries ranging from Brazil to India and even Mauritius (Evans (1996), 
Grindle (1996) and Menocal (2004)), South Africa and Pakistan. Khan (2002) 
provided a much more apt description for such examples (in the current context) of 
stagnating or failed transformation states. 
 
At the same time, beginning with North (1990), the importance of institutions was 
also brought into the limelight, . It was argued that effective institutions are an 
essential pre-condition for sustained economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson (2001) and Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002)). This line of research 
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has influenced the debate on the role of the state, with researchers arguing that states 
that are too weak or too oppressive will stifle investment flows. 
 
More recently, attention has shifted to developmental states being identified as 
possessing infrastructure powers and political commitment to control their territory, 
possessing a long-term vision and the capacity to design and deliver policies and 
being inclusive (Ghani, Lockhart & Callaghan (2005)). Based on Johnson (1982), Deyo 
(1987) and Evans (1995)’s interpretation, Fritz & Menocal (2007) has taken 
developmental state as being a successful example of a state that is able to use its 
vision, leadership and capacity to bring about a positive transformation in an 
accelerated time frame. This concept fails to explicitly incorporate the notion of social 
inclusion and public good. Moreover, while clearly of relevance to late developers, the 
acquisition of technology has not been addressed sufficiently in this literature. 
 
Leftwich (2000), pp.167–8 has provided a much more concise and appropriate 
interpretation; a developmental state having the wherewithal in the present context 
and the means to stimulate, direct, shape and cooperate with domestic entrepreneurs 
while engaging with foreign investors to secure beneficial deals. Naturally the state 
will have a commitment to promoting growth and development while providing 
public goods to society. The goals of the state can be influenced by domestic as well 
as foreign influences and this suggests that developmental states require a degree of 
autonomy that does not alienate it from the society it is transforming and seeking 
assistance from, while avoiding undue or detrimental influences from de-railing or 
hijacking the process/goals. 
 
The state elites in developmental states have the commitment to pursue the goal of 
development and the vision to persevere, often as a result of crisis; either perceived 
or real. According to Fritz & Menocal (2007), developmental states are identified with 
a specific set of capacities and capabilities, in addition to vision and ideologies. 
Capacity and capabilities by the developmental state to manage policies go hand in 
hand with the vision and ideology of development by the state elites. Leftwich (2000), 
Rotberg (2004) and Ghani, Lockhart & Callaghan (2005) have argued that successful 
developmental states also had the commitment which allowed them to give priority 
to national development over personal gain. When state elites are able to subvert 
state influence to further their own interests and/or extract rents away from other 
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potentially more productive economic actors, and thus taint the developmental 
vision, "state capture" will occur (Fritz & Menocal (2006)). 
 
Herbst (2000) and Lange & Rueschemeyer (2005) supported the notion of elites in 
South Korea designing an appropriate response to the perceived threat of Japanese 
antagonism to drive development. However, this move does not always succeed, as in 
the case of Pakistan, where the state elites have been able to use the threat of 
antagonism to secure resources for personal gain. Commitment to development by 
the state elites will not be effective unless society is engaged in the process as well; a 
shared "national project" Fritz & Menocal (2007), or a nation-wide public Ghani, 
Lockhart & Callaghan (2005). 
 
3.3.2. STATE FAILURES 
Against the backdrop of role of the state in enabling technology acquisition, and 
fostering economic development under the STM and developmental state paradigm, 
one can examine and identify reasons for state success and failures. This will shed 
light on the outcome of technology acquisition efforts that incorporate a learning-by-
doing component to build up domestic technological capabilities that is financed 
through learning rents. In the context of the developmental role of the state, the 
effectiveness of such a role will be determined by the difference between impact on 
growth and development of institutions and policies/interventions favoured by the 
state and the cost of enforcing such a growth trajectory. If policies and institutions are 
growth enhancing, (and effectively so at a low cost of enforcement), this will naturally 
yield higher rates of growth for the domestic economy. Thus, state failure is likely to 
occur during the period of social transformation in one of the following:  
1. policies and institutions in effect, or 
2. effectiveness of enforcement, or 
3. maintaining stability during the process of change, or 
4. cost of enforcement.  
 
Policies and Institutions to Manage Property Rights for Growth 
To drive the social transformation process, states need to make massive interventions 
in property rights to encourage growth. Developing countries that are beginning the 
transformation process tend to lack a dynamic capitalist class to see the process to 
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the end. To build this class, the state typically reassigns property rights from less or 
unproductive capitalists to more suitable candidates as and when the situation 
warrants. Such a reallocation is not possible if property rights are well defined or the 
reallocation is capable of being contested. Well defined property rights, as highlighted 
by the SDM will preclude the possibility of rapid transformation stemming from an 
efficient reallocation of rights. If the state has difficulty intervening from above and 
imposing the reallocation through any of the following mechanisms, it would amount 
to state failure: 
1. legal and illegal transfer of resources with state support, or  
2. nationalization or privatization, or  
3. fiscal and price incentives such as subsidies, discounts.  
 
When the resources are subverted by predatory economic agents, social waste will 
occur and the transformation process will be adversely affected and could stall.  
 
High growth economies are unusual as they have exhibited a commitment not to 
maintaining stable property rights, but to development of the economy and growth. 
Capitalists in these countries had the reassurance that as long as they were dynamic 
and committed to growth, their property rights would not be harmed. Furthermore, 
these capitalists were kept in line and discouraged from challenging the state by the 
promise of higher expected payoffs in the future (from the expected economic 
growth) in exchange for present day compliance and cooperation in helping achieve 
the state’s goal (Qian (2002) as quoted in Khan (2002)). By exerting greater control 
over property rights and thereby minimizing opposition to development plans, states 
in high growth economies have been able to push through development projects 
deemed necessary for national development. 
 
Effectiveness of Enforcement 
Encouraging and compelling capitalists to come forward and take part in productive 
economic activity is a necessary step towards generating competitiveness in an 
emerging dynamic capitalist society. To achieve this goal requires management of 
rents; creation and maintenance of growth-enhancing rents by the state along with 
removal of growth-retarding ones. 
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The intuition for using rents to influence economic activity stems from Stiglitz 
(1996)’s notion that a market system requires a whole range of information rents to 
function efficiently. Given the existence of these rents, a well-functioning market 
economy will play host to a number of institutions designed to effectively manage 
these rents. Given that developing countries are in the process of acquiring the 
technology and capability to become a capitalist economy; these countries will 
additionally require institutions to manage the rents for this purpose. 
 
The key point here is that developed countries have evolved to incorporate various 
information rents into their markets without adversely affecting overall social 
good/return. Developing countries on the other hand do not have this luxury. Proto-
capitalists in developing countries have to learn to compete while simultaneously 
acquiring the technology and also the required capabilities to learn and innovate, 
which is where Schumpeterian rents come in. 
 
Simply put, state-created Schumpeterian/learning rents are designed to accelerate 
the learning of entrepreneurial skills and the acquisition of technology by providing 
a means of financing the loss making period on the one hand and the capital outlay on 
the other Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), World Bank (1993), Page (1994), Rodrik 
(1995), Lall & Teubal (1998), Aoki, Kim & Okuno-Fujiwara (1998). While such 
activities are invariably high risks with high probability of low returns, developing 
countries are especially susceptible to low (and in some extreme cases even negative) 
returns when other, directly unproductive activities such as rent-seeking, take place 
(Bhagwati (1982) and Krueger (1974)). 
 
There are several issues related to learning rents that are of relevance to the case of 
developing countries and their quest to acquire technology: the duration for which 
the rents should be available, institutions and their capacities to choose between and 
manage various rents for the purpose of encouraging learning and thus generating 
growth, institutions and policies to ensure damaging rents and rent-seeking activity 
do not emerge. 
 
Clearly effective rent management is a necessary requirement for there to be a 
beneficial impact of rents on the local economy. Moreover, the state must have the 
capacity to monitor performance by capitalists and withdraw support where 
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necessary. East Asian high growth economies are classic example of situations where 
the state has effectively managed learning rents to reap their beneficial impact while 
minimizing the detrimental effects. That is not to say there were no drawbacks from 
the rent management efforts of the state, but in the balance the benefits far 
outweighed the costs. On the other hand, developing countries that are failing to take-
off, or are stalling in their efforts to grow, are invariably characterized by states that 
lack the institutional capabilities and capacity to manage the learning rents. 
 
(In)Effectiveness of Institutional Enforcement 
The state is characterized by its monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force and 
the rules of the game to compel stakeholders to undertake certain actions deemed in 
the interest of the public good in developed countries (Khan (2002) and Leftwich 
(2007)). Developed countries tend to lack the monopoly power and have issues with 
enforcement, which further compounds the problem. In fact, according to Bardhan 
(2000), enforcing institutions is not possible in the vacuum of monopoly power. 
 
North (1990) has argued that developing countries failing to enforce industrial policy 
but also any growth generating institutions, including property rights in the past can 
explain their lackluster performance. On the other hand, Stiglitz (1998), Bardhan 
(2000) and Bates (2001) believe that the effectiveness of enforcement is determined 
by the inability of the state to exhibit a credible commitment to subverting property 
rights and ex-post appropriation of the investment of capitalists in the pursuit of 
economic growth and development. The case of high growth economies of East Asia 
has demonstrated the fallacy of this notion in the context of property rights and rent 
management. The states in these economies were committed to disrupting property 
rights and creating and managing rents to foster economic development at an 
accelerated pace. 
 
Local Conditions and Effective Enforcement 
The policies used by states to enable transformation will not succeed if they are 
incompatible with the distribution of social groups and power within local society 
Khan (1999). In such cases there will be low compliance with the rules of the state 
caused by “state capture” (Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann (2000)), “pervasive 
patronage” (Kochanek (2003), pp.69–75 as cited in Leftwich (2007)), “neo-
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patrimonialism” (Walle (2001), pp.50–55) and “shadow states” (Reno (1995), 
Harriss-White (1997), Duffy (2000) and Funke & Solomon (2002)). Different 
developing countries had different local conditions giving rise to different processes, 
which in turn led to ineffective enforcement. The situation was compounded by the 
fact that many developing countries, as colonial states, had imperialist based 
institutions grafted over existing traditional ones, which distorted their compressed 
evolution and complicated the state formation and capacity building process. This is 
in stark contrast to the historical record of gradual endogenous formation of states in 
developed countries (Hoogenboom (1959), Asbury (1927), Neild (2002), and Delay & 
Moran (2003)). In this context Leftwich (2007) has put forward the case that effective 
state building is a political process; however, it can instead be argued that it is a multi-
faceted phenomenon that must take into account a myriad of factors. Failure to do so 
would undoubtedly lead to state failure in the social transformation process as 
history has shown. 
 
State Organized Transfer for Political Stability 
Patron-client networks have been proposed by anthropologists as a means to account 
for political action in Asia - particularly Southeast Asia - though they are also evident 
in other regions of the world, including Latin America, Africa and even in some areas 
of Europe. Clientelism can be defined as a political system at the heart of which is the 
exchange of goods and/or services for political support between patrons (who 
represent the political actors in the system) and clients. Patron-client transfers are 
used in developing countries in an attempt to maintain political stability while the 
goal of economic development is pursued. These transfers can have a harmful effect 
if any groups are focused on benefitting from the transfers by creating or capturing a 
large number of such value reducing rents. 
 
Sundaram & Gomez (2000) have argued that it is possible for the state to organize a 
significant number of transfers to ensure a high rate of growth if the transfers are 
adequately sand-boxed so (for example) distributive conditions cannot capture the 
rents designed for industrial learners. In the case of the Indian sub-continent. 
Bardhan (1998), Khan (2000a) and Khan (2000b) have shown that ineffective sand-
boxing led to or even encouraged sub-standard public goods provision and continued 
operation of ineffective sectors and firms when in fact those units should have been 
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terminated and reabsorbed into the economy. It should be noted that if not all firms 
are inefficient in a sector, removal of learning rents will harm the more efficient firms. 
The threat of an impending removal or revocation of access to the rent will divert 
attention, effort and resources of firms away from more productive resources as they 
seek to secure the rent. 
 
Stiglitz (1998) has argued against the pure liberal market view, while at the same time 
cautioning against government intervention in rent creation based on the poor 
performance of the majority of developing countries. Several of the propositions 
made by Stiglitz with regard to developing and enhancing the capabilities and 
capacities of governments appear fraught with issues that would severely hamper 
developmental efforts: 
(i) Government interventions should be restricted in areas which are subject to 
a significant and systematic influence of special interest groups; 
(ii) A crucial government role is to promote competition and to act as a referee in 
a market economy; 
(iii) In order to improve government performance, political decision-making 
processes need to become more open and less subject to secrecy; 
(iv) Governments need to encourage the provision of public goods by the private 
sector in order to discipline itself and to convey voice; and 
(v) Political authorities should aim to achieve a balance between the technical 
expertise of policy making on the one hand and accountability and democratic 
representation on the other hand. 
 
Discouraging government intervention in areas that are under the influence of 
interest groups to avoid potential “state capture” will not plug the leakage and will in 
fact send the wrong message to stake holders. The private sector will need to be 
regulated while being encouraged to provide certain public goods that are in the 
interest of the domestic economy. It is not clear how this will be a disciplining tool at 
the hands of the government. Rents are required for enabling an accelerated 
transformation and cannot exist or function as intended without government 
intervention, so clearly the capacities and capabilities of the state lie at the heart of 
the matter, and any deficiencies need to be identified and addressed. 
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Cost of Enforcement 
Enforcement cost is the aggregate rent-seeking cost of operating particular 
institutions Khan (2002). Going back to the definition of rent-seeking, we note that 
there is a whole host of activities that are traditionally considered to be rent-seeking 
activities. These include all types of costs to secure access to and exert control over 
institutions; ranging from the cost of engaging in corruption, to policing costs of the 
states to even the cost of lobbying. Rent-seeking activity will be of importance to those 
economic agents in society who stand to benefit from it, and the transaction cost of 
rent-seeking will be significant in all economies (Samuels & Mercuro (1984)). 
However this cost is typically off-set by higher returns in developed countries, but not 
so much in developing countries, as shown by Wallis & North (1986) for developed 
countries, and Khan (2000b) in the case of developing countries. 
 
Local Conditions and Enforcement Costs 
The free-markets and pro-democracy views in the literature are bolstered with the 
argument that the institutional structure of democracy reduces the cost of 
enforcement (North (1990), pp.107–117) and of maintaining efficient institutions. On 
the other hand, the argument of the developmental state school of thought is that a 
state that is able to take authoritarian decisions according to a development vision is 
less likely to be influenced by damaging rent-seeking activities of economic agents 
(Chang (1994)). Similarly, as in the case of effectiveness of enforcement, the cost of 
enforcement will be determined in large part by the pre-existing local conditions, and 
imposing a system that ignores, or even worse counters the local distribution of 
power without the means to contain the fallout will result in higher enforcement 
costs. 
 
Khan (2002) has shown that East Asian states enjoyed lower enforcement costs due 
to the presence of “atomized opposition”, in comparison to the South Asian states that 
ended up facing significant contestation from “well-organized opposition” groups. 
The latter arose when attempts were made to impose development agendas on 
insulated states and enforce the institutions required for development. We would 
argue that the South Asian states also experienced significant changes in regimes; 
often oscillating between military rule and democracy, while at the same time 
witnessing sea changes at the policy regime level as well. These factors combined to 
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make it easier for power groups to gain access to state and engage in rent-seeking 
activity. 
 
We now have a clearer understanding of the potential for state failure in developing 
countries when it comes to management and enforcement of learning rents. We now 
turn to a closer look at the nature of learning rents in developing countries. 
 
3.3.3. LEARNING RENTS 
In their quest to achieve dynamic transformation of society, the state in developing 
countries needs to nurture and compel proto-capitalists in their productive 
endeavours. These capitalists need to be encouraged to take the leap and forego 
primitive, unskilled modes of production in favour of more modern, high skilled and 
high technology modes of production that while risky, will yield significantly higher 
rates of return in the long run. This will allow the capitalists to make effective use of 
technology that has been acquired from external sources and for society to reap the 
benefits of scale economies (among other benefits) and complete the transformation 
process. 
 
As pointed out in the previous section, technology and the associated capabilities to 
use the technology productively in the market-consensus view, are exogenously 
derived and determined and with no costs associated with their acquisition. As such 
there is no need to account for the acquisition of technology and learning to make 
effective and productive use of it. More precisely, the early neoclassical model 
assumed there were no reasons for factor inputs not to enter any market or sector 
that could yield a profit and as such required no reward or incentive to encourage 
such activity. Whatever technology is required is freely and readily available for 
immediate and efficient use. Information is also freely available and symmetric, so no 
incentives are required to access and use necessary information. There are no 
conflicts in society and therefore no need to transfer any resources to maintain 
stability. Lastly, the classical model also assumes that as long as producers are paid 
the equivalent of the return from their next best activity, they will continue to produce 
what society demands. 
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Clearly then, any sort of payment over and above this return is considered a rent. 
These rents are considered to be inefficient, unnecessary and distortionary in a 
competitive and efficient market. However, the developmental state view 
acknowledges the presence of distortions in the economy and market failures that 
necessitate the need for the state to step in and guide the development process. 
 
Innovation, or the discovery of new technologies at the global production frontier, is 
a long, uncertain and arduous process that requires a great deal of risk-taking and 
investment on the part of capitalists (Nelson & Winter (1982)). Developed countries 
having already gained mastery over established production technology, offset the 
risks and cost outlays involved with R & D of new technologies through patents 
(Davies (1991) and Stiglitz (1996)). Developing countries on the other hand need to 
learn how to use the existing technology first, let alone innovate new technologies, 
given imperfect credit and insurance markets (Chang, Cheema & Mises (2002)) that 
can hinder the process. In this context the capitalists in developing countries require 
an incentive, or rent, to undertake the desired activity of learning. Given the public 
good nature of technology, imperfections and presence of asymmetric information in 
the financial sector, the private sector is unable to self-regulate and incentivize the 
process. It therefore becomes the responsibility of the state to step in and 
institutionalize the incentive structure in the form of subsidies and that eligible firms 
can utilize appropriately. 
 
Chang, Cheema & Mises (2002) have pointed out that property rights and patents are 
particularly weak, creating a disincentive for investment by capitalists. However, 
successful transformation requires state control over property rights to allocate and 
enforce patents effectively. 
 
To make effective use of new technology that has been acquired requires learning and 
nurturing certain capabilities that capitalists will need to invest in. With dynamic 
transformation occurring across the economy, it follows that the learning and 
capabilities to be invested in are not specific to the firm and thus involve externalities. 
According to Abramovitz (1986), technological change requires complementary 
investments in a myriad of interlocked areas, so replacing the capital stock in one 
industry will necessitate upgrading of technology and capital in related industries to 
keep pace with the changes taking place in the lead industry. Thus technology 
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acquisition in an industry requires investment in subsidiary and complementary 
industries, which the market-based view will undoubtedly have issues with. Taken 
together with the view that planned coordination is a prerequisite of technology 
acquisition efforts, we can assume that successful acquisition of technology requires 
a holistic view of the economy’s development path as well as successful coordination 
of investments and incentives to pursue this; something which only the state is ideally 
equipped to do. Against this backdrop, it is important to understand the nature of 
political settlements in developing countries. 
 
3.4. POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS 
For a country that has embarked on a chosen path to development of the economy 
and transformation of society, the question remains as to how do we ensure that 
economic agents behave in a manner that is consistent with the ultimate goal of 
development and growth, especially when there are market failures present in the 
system? Left to themselves, firms and entrepreneurs will seek out opportunities that 
offer the highest return for their investment, and those do not necessarily include 
(among other initiatives) long term and high risk technology acquisition efforts that 
lead to building up of dynamic technological capabilities. On the other hand, with the 
proper guidance and motivation from a state with a holistic view of the development 
process, arrangements can be made to ensure such initiatives are undertaken and the 
goals achieved. The relationship that the state and its allied institutions forge with 
economic agents; and in particular with entrepreneurs and firms, will determine the 
success or lack thereof of its developmental efforts. The state manages to maintain 
social order while organizing a political compromise between itself and groups within 
society. This social order has been termed as a “political settlement” in the literature 
and the concept can be used as lens through which we can assess the performance of 
institutions in a developing country such as Pakistan, which in turn will assist in an 
analysis of growth challenges in such countries. Towards this end, a closer look at the 
political economy background of institutions, and of the concept of political 
settlements is required to allow us to link the two together (an overview of the 
different thematic areas, key definitions and focus of the literature is provided in 
Table 3.1). 
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There are a number of definitions of political settlement as the term has been used on 
the literature on political economy of development till now, and the variation 
observed depends on the focus of the research (see Box 1 for a selection highlighting 
the core themes present in the more prominent definitions). The term was first 
introduced by Melling (1991) to describe political processes and their impact on 
welfare policies during the time of 19th century British industrial capitalism and the 
welfare state. The development studies context was provided as a means of looking 
at institutional performance and was later refined to represent "distribution of 
organizational and political power between competing groups and classes" in society 
(Khan (1995), p.71 and Khan (2004), p.168). Fritz & Menocal (2007) considered 
political settlements in the context of a binding agreement between the state and 
society; however they focused on the vertical context of such agreements while 
glossing over class conflict that arises within various groups in society. Indeed, a 
typical society is comprised of diverse elements and will not be homogeneous in 
nature, and the stratification is more pronounced for the marginalized groups. 
Consider the gender stratification; till the emancipation of women, men tended to 
receive preferential treatment, and this trend continued till women challenged the 
status quo and won the right to vote. Overlooking the diversity present in society, 
especially in the case of developing countries where large swathes of society can be 
marginalized, seriously undermines the validity of any model based on this treatment 
of the concept. On the other hand, Khan (1995) and Khan (2004) recognized the 
importance of exclusion of groups and the conflict which arises from divisions in 
society, making their interpretation more relevant for developing countries.  
 
Examples from developing countries around the world (in particular the case of South 
Africa as discussed in Laws (2012)) suggest that though sustainability of political 
settlements is important and requires that the settlements be responsive to the 
interests of society in general, the interactions between states and elites and their 
followers is also crucial. In other words the vertical as well as the horizontal context 
is relevant to the definition of political settlements. Whaites (2008) has looked at the 
horizontal interactions between elites in society and in addition has also considered 
1
3
2
 
T
a
b
le
 3
.1
: 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
S
e
tt
le
m
e
n
ts
 L
it
e
ra
tu
re
: 
T
h
e
m
a
ti
c 
A
re
a
s 
a
n
d
 F
o
cu
s 
T
h
e
m
a
ti
c 
A
re
a
 
K
e
y
 D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s 
F
o
cu
s 
O
n
 
R
o
le
 in
 d
ef
in
in
g 
st
at
e 
an
d
 s
o
ci
et
y
 r
el
at
io
n
s 
F
ri
tz
 &
 M
en
o
ca
l (
2
0
0
7
):
 n
eg
o
ti
at
ed
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
b
in
d
in
g
 s
ta
te
 a
n
d
 s
o
ci
et
y
 i
n
 a
n
 o
n
-g
o
in
g 
p
ro
ce
ss
, a
n
d
 
n
o
t 
a 
o
n
e-
o
ff
 e
v
en
t.
  
E
xp
la
in
in
g
 
v
er
ti
ca
l 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s 
Jo
h
n
 &
 P
u
tz
el
 (
2
0
0
9
):
 t
h
e 
o
u
tc
o
m
e 
o
f 
b
ar
ga
in
in
g 
an
d
 n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 e
li
te
s.
  
A
s 
an
 
o
u
tc
o
m
e 
o
f 
el
it
e 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s 
M
en
o
ca
l 
(2
0
0
9
):
 a
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 u
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g 
b
et
w
ee
n
 e
li
te
s 
ab
o
u
t 
h
o
w
 p
o
w
er
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e 
o
rg
an
is
ed
 
an
d
 e
xe
rc
is
ed
; i
n
cl
u
d
in
g 
fo
rm
al
 in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
a
n
d
 i
n
fo
rm
a
l a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
. 
E
xp
la
in
in
g
 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s 
D
fI
D
 (
2
0
1
0
a)
: o
n
go
in
g 
fo
rm
al
 a
n
d
 in
fo
rm
al
 b
ar
ga
in
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 e
li
te
s.
  
D
fI
D
 (
2
0
1
0
b
):
 a
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 u
n
d
er
st
a
n
d
in
g 
b
et
w
ee
n
 e
li
te
s 
ab
o
u
t 
h
o
w
 p
o
w
er
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e 
o
rg
an
iz
ed
 a
n
d
 
ex
er
ci
se
d
; i
n
cl
u
d
in
g 
fo
rm
al
 i
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
an
d
 i
n
fo
rm
al
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
.  
P
ar
k
s 
&
 C
o
le
 (
2
0
1
0
):
 a
rr
an
g
em
en
ts
 e
li
te
s 
ag
re
e 
to
 i
n
 o
rd
er
 t
o
 e
n
d
 v
io
le
n
t 
co
m
p
et
it
io
n
 o
v
er
 p
o
w
er
 
an
d
 
re
so
u
rc
es
. 
Se
tt
le
m
en
ts
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
se
d
 
b
y
 
el
it
e 
ac
to
rs
, 
p
u
rs
u
in
g
 
th
ei
r 
in
te
re
st
s,
 
th
er
eb
y
 
in
fl
u
en
ci
n
g
 t
h
e 
sh
ap
e 
o
f 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s.
  
G
le
as
o
n
 e
t 
al
. (
2
0
1
1
):
 d
y
n
am
ic
, o
n
-g
o
in
g 
n
eg
o
ti
at
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 e
li
te
s.
  
A
u
sA
ID
 (
2
0
1
1
):
 t
h
e 
fo
rm
al
 a
n
d
 i
n
fo
rm
al
 i
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s,
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
, 
an
d
 u
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
gs
, 
b
et
w
ee
n
 
el
it
es
 a
n
d
 b
et
w
ee
n
 e
li
te
s 
an
d
 t
h
e 
w
id
er
 s
o
ci
et
y
, t
h
at
 u
n
d
er
p
in
 a
 p
o
li
ti
ca
l 
sy
st
em
.  
R
ep
re
se
n
ti
n
g
 p
o
w
er
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
(b
al
an
ce
 
an
d
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
) 
in
 
so
ci
et
y
 
K
h
an
 (
1
9
9
5
):
 t
h
e 
o
v
er
al
l b
al
an
ce
 o
f 
p
o
w
er
 i
n
 s
o
ci
et
y
. 
E
xp
la
in
in
g
 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
K
h
an
 (
2
0
1
0
) 
an
d
 K
h
an
 (
2
0
0
9
):
 ‘s
o
ci
al
 o
rd
er
’; 
a 
co
m
p
at
ib
le
, v
ia
b
le
, s
u
st
ai
n
ab
le
 c
o
m
b
in
at
io
n
 o
f p
o
w
er
 
an
d
 in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s.
 
D
fI
D
 (
2
0
0
9
):
 s
ta
rt
s 
w
it
h
 a
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 u
n
d
er
st
a
n
d
in
g 
b
et
w
ee
n
 e
li
te
s 
th
en
 e
xp
an
d
s 
in
to
 a
 c
o
n
tr
ac
t 
b
et
w
ee
n
 s
ta
te
 a
n
d
 s
o
ci
et
y
. A
n
 a
d
ap
ta
b
le
 p
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ro
ce
ss
 t
h
at
 i
s 
fo
rm
al
is
ed
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
, o
r 
gr
o
u
n
d
ed
 
u
p
o
n
 o
n
e-
o
ff
 e
v
en
ts
 li
k
e 
p
ea
ce
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
. 
C
o
n
d
u
it
 
fo
r 
o
v
er
co
m
in
g 
v
io
le
n
ce
 
an
d
 
p
o
li
ti
ca
l 
in
st
ab
il
it
y
 
W
h
ai
te
s 
(2
0
0
8
):
 i
n
fo
rm
al
, u
n
ar
ti
cu
la
te
d
 u
n
d
er
st
a
n
d
in
gs
 b
et
w
ee
n
 e
li
te
s.
  
E
xp
la
in
in
g
 r
ad
ic
al
 c
h
an
ge
 
O
E
C
D
/D
A
C
 (
2
0
0
8
):
 T
h
e 
o
u
tc
o
m
e 
o
f 
p
ea
ce
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
. 
B
ar
n
es
 (
2
0
0
9
):
 a
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 u
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g
 b
et
w
ee
n
 e
li
te
s 
ab
o
u
t 
h
o
w
 p
o
w
er
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e 
o
rg
an
iz
ed
 a
n
d
 
ex
er
ci
se
d
. T
h
e 
o
u
tc
o
m
e 
o
f 
p
ea
ce
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 i
n
 w
ar
-t
o
-p
ea
ce
 t
ra
n
si
ti
o
n
s.
  
Sh
ar
an
 (
2
0
1
1
):
 a
 f
ra
m
ew
o
rk
 f
o
r 
en
d
in
g 
h
o
st
il
it
ie
s 
am
o
n
g
st
 c
o
m
p
et
in
g 
el
it
es
. 
So
u
rc
e:
 B
as
ed
 o
n
 L
aw
s 
(2
0
1
2
) 
 
133 
that elites have the ability to “organize, persuade, command or inspire” their social 
constituents; terming political settlements as a two-level game. 
 
DfID (2009) associated the spatial distinction (vertical and horizontal relationships 
between the state and society and within society itself) with the notion of state 
responsiveness; characterizing states as belonging to one of two categories; (i) 
unresponsive, and (ii) responsive. 
 
Political settlements in the former are characterized by informal rules, patronage, and 
friction between predatory elites. The latter on the other hand have progressed to the 
stage where there is little discord between groups and the state is responsible for 
providing basic needs that allow contract enforcement, such as security, rule of law 
and accountability. In this scenario, political settlements are taken to be adaptable in 
the responsive states, since these states are able to accommodate demands for 
political or even social change. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the 
adaptability and flexibility is not unrestricted in these states. Unresponsive states 
lack the flexibility and adaptability of responsive states and fundamental  changes 
in political or social needs tend to shatter the existing political settlement and lead to 
the genesis of a new settlement, as seen in the recent Arab Spring. 
 
Keeping in mind the fact that states in some developing countries tend not to have the 
power to organize compromises with society and within society due to conflicting 
demands on limited resources and capture by strong groups within society, we offer 
a characterization of states in developing countries that mirrors a distinction also 
found in the developmental state literature (i) weak, and (ii) strong. Strong states in 
developing countries such as the East Asian tigers will lean more towards DfID 
(2009)’s responsive state category, while the weak states of South Asia and Latin 
America will exhibit more traits of the unresponsive category. 
 
John & Putzel (2009) propose the notion that there is bargaining between elites and 
between the state and society with conflicting interests; an argument that is in 
opposition to the understandings between elites that have been highlighted in earlier 
definitions. Though certainly valid, the extent of the misunderstanding being 
suggested by the authors is deemed to have been overstated, as the definitions do 
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suggest that the understanding have to be reached a process of bargaining as 
suggested by Laws (2012). 
 
The sustainable and viable compatibility of the distribution of economic benefits that 
are supported by institutions, both formal as well as informal, and are coupled with 
the distribution of power in society will lead to the emergence of political settlements 
according to Khan (2010). This definition of political settlements is well suited for an 
analysis of the performance (or lack thereof) of institutions in developing countries 
as they pursue their developmental agenda. The focus here is on the compatibility of 
institutions with the distribution of power and economic benefits among groups and 
elites in society. The spatial components (horizontal as well as vertical relationships) 
of earlier definitions are accounted for in this definition, as is the fact that a number 
of institutions in developing countries are informal, and not just formal institutions 
and agreements as typical in developed countries.  
 
There are five key components of this particular definition of political settlements 
that bear mentioning. First, power refers to the holding power of elites in society, or 
the “capability of an individual or group to engage and survive in conflicts” (see Khan 
(2010), p.6). The distribution of this power is contingent on the presence of informal 
institutions, mainly patron-client networks that are employed for allocation of 
economic benefits rather than formal institutions that exemplify developed countries. 
Formal institutions that mirror the characteristics of those present in developed 
countries are unlikely to have much success at achieving their goals of accountability 
(for example) since the power of the elites is contingent not on formal institutions, as 
in developed countries, but on informal institutions, namely patron-client networks 
that characterize the majority of developing countries. 
 
Second, sustainable political settlement is one that leads to the creation of what Khan 
(2010) refers to as the “minimum levels of economic performance and political 
stability” that ensure that the settlement endures over time and does not collapse in 
on itself. As long as sufficient economic benefits are accruing to the elites, there will 
be no incentive to challenge the status quo and existing political settlement in hopes 
of receiving a better payoff and hence the settlement will be sustainable over time. 
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Third, compatibility of the settlement is in the context of sufficient number of 
powerful groups and elites in society receiving an adequate share of the economic 
benefits that accrue to comply with the existing order and forego any contestation 
and conflict with other groups, elites and even the state. 
 
Fourth, viability of the political settlement is in the context of being economically 
productive enough to forestall economic crisis, and politically stable enough that 
conflict and violence do not threaten to overthrow core institutional and political 
arrangements.  
 
Finally, institutions and the distribution of power in developing countries share a 
symbiotic relationship: institutions create economic benefits for groups and elites in 
society, while powerful groups and elites will attempt to influence the working of 
institutions to deliver more favourable economic benefits. Political settlements must 
be flexible and sufficiently dynamic to accommodate changes in power relations.  
 
Typically, holding power of a group in society is affected by two factors; the ability to 
impose costs on other groups, and the ability to absorb costs that have been imposed 
by the state and other groups in society. The greater or stronger these abilities, the 
more likely it is that the group will prevail in any conflict it engages in. A group with 
sufficient holding power will be able to contest the enforcement of benefits by an 
institution and thereby affect its (the institution’s) effectiveness in influencing 
activity. The ability to absorb and inflict costs is in turn determined by economic 
power, on the extent of resources (wealth) that groups can draw on, for their survival. 
However, there is a trade-off in terms of greater expectations being associated with 
the higher level of resources being utilized, meaning that it is not certain that richer 
groups will prevail in every conflict. If poorer groups have a greater political ability 
to organize, mobilize a greater number of people for support, or a greater claim to 
legitimacy (for example) than more powerful groups it is conceivable for these groups 
to survive in conflict with richer groups. These latter abilities, in contrast to economic 
power, are harder to quantify and assess, and this uncertainty and lack of 
predictability is what creates conditions for conflicts to arise between groups in 
society. 
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When a social order emerges, the distribution of power is embedded in an 
institutional arrangement, formal as well as informal, that sustains it. Khan (2010) 
has argued that political settlements in developing countries can be characterized as 
“clientelist political settlements” where the informal productive sector rather than the 
formal productive sector dominates the economy. 
 
Understanding and accounting for the fact that the informal sector in developing 
countries overshadows the formal sector is the key to understanding the role of formal 
institutions in technology acquisition efforts. Informal institutions and the 
mechanisms through which they sustain distributions of benefits and powers can 
significantly affect the operation of particular formal institutions. Thus formal 
institutions can be expected to operate in such countries in a manner that is 
distinctly different compared to what one would expect based on transaction cost 
analysis of New Institutional Economics (NIE). 
 
3.5. PRICE MARK UP MODEL 
Developing countries can find it a daunting task to catch up with developed countries 
in terms of industrial production, despite having significantly lower wages, and a 
labour force that often has an excess supply of workers with the required levels of 
formal education. The simple reason for this is inability to catch up is the level of 
productivity of labour, which depends not only on access to formal education (which 
developing countries are able to provide to a large extent) but also on tacit knowledge 
(based on learning by doing) and technological capabilities. If time is not available for 
acquiring this knowledge and capabilities, developing countries will be hard pressed 
to effectively compete with developed countries in the global market. 
 
The measures of technological capability discussed in Section 3.2.3 have a number of 
shortcomings in the present context that are worth mentioning. One, the indices are 
primarily designed to assess capabilities at the national level and at most the industry 
level, and not the firm level. These measures aggregate levels of capabilities and do not 
necessarily represent capabilities that have emerged in developing countries at the micro 
level, where there will be certain firms that are performing well while others are 
struggling to acquire capabilities. The case studies that follow in Chapters 6 and 7 are 
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examples of instances where technological capabilities exist at the micro (firm) level 
despite macro level indication of weak capabilities. 
 
Two, the variables selected to represent capabilities development are more applicable for 
the case of developed countries where the process of learning has been learned and firms 
are now innovating at the frontier. This is in contrast to the case of firms in developing 
countries that are primarily concerned with learning how to learn and attempting to 
become competitive in already established products and technologies, rather than 
innovating new products. 
 
Three, even if the variables considered to represent capabilities were assumed to apply 
in the case of developing countries, data at the national or even sector level, of 
manufacturing sector performance is not readily available for such countries, which 
necessitates the use of proxies that will naturally not be a true representation of the level 
of capabilities present in the country and the reality on the ground. 
 
Given the limitations of various capabilities measures traditionally used to assess the level 
of technological capabilities in a country, especially in the context of developing country, 
and industries comprised of firms that are at various stages of technological development. 
Thus, applicability of these measures is constrained. On the other hand, a firm level price 
mark-up model (such as the one developed by Khan (2013a), detailed in Section 3.5 and 
applied to the two case studies in Chapters 6 and 7) allows for a more nuanced analysis 
of capabilities development at the firm level by looking at individual firm competitiveness. 
The model uses firm level pricing and cost data that is more readily available for firms in 
developing countries and for this reason is more appropriate. 
 
Following Khan (2013b), we will use a simple price mark-up model to examine the 
variables that are instrumental in determining an economy’s ability to produce 
competitive goods. This model allows us to focus on the ‘competitiveness gap’ that 
developing countries face in making goods of particular qualities, and therefore the 
implicit subsidy that is required to begin the learning-by-doing process. The political 
economy analysis then focuses on the factors that allow or prevent the subsidy being 
delivered with the appropriate incentives to maximize effort during the learning 
process. The hypothesis is that in the absence of sufficient compulsions the subsidy 
will be wasted and the institutional arrangements supporting learning will become 
unviable. This model is based on the following assumptions: 
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(i) A range of products and qualities exist 
(ii) There is a positive relationship between price and quality of a product 
(iii) There are no information asymmetries in the model 
(iv) The economy produces higher quality products whenever possible to be 
able to benefit from the higher prices 
(v) To make notation easy, the economy produces only a single product with 
its quality indexed by “Q” 
(vi) “i” other inputs are used in the production process, traded globally with a 
price 𝑃𝑄𝑖 
(vii) The mark-up required for each product quality is the same in the 
developing country as it is in the global leader 
 
Given these assumptions, the global price of product Q is set by the cost of production 
of the global production leader: 
 
𝑃𝑄
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 = [
𝑊𝑄
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟
Π𝑄
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 +∑
𝑃𝑄𝑖
𝛼𝑄𝑖
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟
𝑖
] (1 +𝑚𝑄) (1) 
Where: 
𝑃𝑄
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 = Global price of the product of quality Q 
𝑊𝑄
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = Wage level in the global production leader 
Π𝑄
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = Productivity of labour (output per person) in the global 
production leader 
𝑃𝑄𝑖 = Global price of input i 
𝛼𝑄𝑖
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = Productivity of input use (output per unit of input used) in the 
global production leader 
𝑚𝑄 = Mark-up associated with product of quality Q 
 
The developing country catching up through imitation will attempt to imitate the 
highest possible quality that can be competitively produced. The domestic cost of 
production for the follower will then be: 
 
𝐶𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = [
𝑊𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
Π𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
+∑
𝑃𝑄𝑖
𝛼𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑖
] (1 + 𝑚𝑄) (2) 
Where: 
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𝐶𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = Domestic cost of production of the product of quality Q in follower 
country 
𝑊𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = Wage level in the follower country 
Π𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = Productivity of labour (output per person) in domestic/follower 
country 
𝛼𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = Productivity of input use (output per unit of input used) in the 
domestic/follower country 
 
The domestic economy will produce only if its cost of production is less than or equal 
to the global price of the product; i.e. 𝐶𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 ≤ 𝑃𝑄
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙. This appears evident since 
developing countries by and large have lower wages; i.e. 𝑊𝑄
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 > 𝑊𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐. 
However, output per worker is much lower in the domestic economy [Π𝑄
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 >
Π𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐], so much so that in theory it could offset any beneficial impact of lower 
wages. 
 
In reality, the developing country also has a lower input productivity of input use, so 
if 𝛼𝑄𝑖
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 > 𝛼𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐, while price of input is 𝑃𝑄𝑖 , then the developing country will 
have lower efficiency of each input use. When combined with lower output per 
worker, this suggests that wages may need to be non-existent for the developing 
country to even be able to begin to compete effectively with the developed country. 
 
It is a well-known fact that productivity, or output per person, depends on both 
macro-economic (economy wide) and micro-economic (firm-level) factors. The 
productivity of a firm is determined by the availability of infrastructure, education, 
infrastructure and the quality of the available infrastructure. Firm productivity is also 
affected by firm-level factors such as the capital equipment used by labour, and the 
skill and experience of labour and management. All these factors affect the 
productivity of the firm or its technological capability. Naturally this also translates 
to the effectiveness of technology acquisition and implementation within the firm. 
The efficiency of input use within the firm also depends on these factors, and been 
identified in the literature as necessary to achieve productivity enhancements. A 
deeper understanding of the factors affecting this technological capability will shed 
light on the catching up problem facing developing countries. 
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Early development theory and practice put a great deal of emphasis on the purchase 
of appropriate capital equipment and provision of adequate infrastructure, but these 
have been shown to be inadequate to account for differences in productivity between 
developed and developing countries Clark & Wolcott (2002). According to Khan 
(2009), while infrastructure constraints are widely recognized, technological 
capabilities are more important in explaining variations in productivity for the 
following reasons: 
(i) Tacit knowledge is an important part of the skills and organizational 
capabilities that are necessary for success of firms 
(ii) Learning-by-doing is critically important for acquiring tacit knowledge 
(iii) Learning-by-doing requires a period of loss financing and this is likely to 
be constrained by market failures 
 
When the developing country faces a domestic cost of production for a good of quality 
Q that is higher than the global price of the product; i.e. 𝐶𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 > 𝑃𝑄
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙, to be able 
to compete effectively, a per unit subsidy, 𝑆𝑄, will be required by the firm to bring 
domestic costs in line with the global price. This translates to a period of loss making 
for private investors and/or the state to allow the firm the space and time it needs to 
learn the production process sufficiently to innovate and adapt it to local conditions 
and bring costs in line with global prices. Without recourse to this subsidy and the 
financing it embodies, the firm will have less tacit knowledge at its disposal and hence 
lower productivity, thereby compromising its ability to compete globally. Given the 
earlier discussion on rents, we see that this qualifies as a “learning rent”. Now the 
required rate of subsidy, 𝑆𝑄 , can be determined as follows: 
 𝐶𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐(1 − 𝑆𝑄) = 𝑃𝑄
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 (3) 
  
Substituting the expression for 𝐶𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 from Equation (2) in Equation (3), we have 
an expression for the subsidy: 
 
𝑆𝑄 = 1 −
𝑃𝑄
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙
(1 + 𝑚𝑄)
[
𝑊𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
ΠQ
Domestic
+∑
𝑃𝑄𝑖
𝛼𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
]
−1
 (4) 
 
From where we see: 
𝛿𝑆𝑄
𝛿𝑃𝑄
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 ,
𝛿𝑆𝑄
𝛿ΠQ
Domestic
,
𝛿𝑆𝑄
𝛿𝛼𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
< 0 
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Naturally, the faster labour and/or input productivity rises, the sooner the subsidy 
can be withdrawn. Lower quality products are bound to require less subsidy and for 
less duration than higher quality products to achieve global competitiveness. Labour 
productivity and input productivity gaps are bound to be greater between higher and 
lower quality products as well as between developed and developing countries. 
Moreover, the cost of production is inversely proportional to the labour and input 
productivities, so the cost of production relative to global price will be greater for 
higher quality products as compared to lower quality products in the developing 
country and a higher subsidy will undoubtedly be required for a higher quality 
product as compared to a lower quality product: 
 𝑃𝑄+1
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑄+1
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
<
𝑃𝑄
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
 (5) 
 
As opposed to traditional measures of competitiveness and technological capabilities, 
discussed earlier in Section 3.2.3, Khan (2013a)’s price mark-up model allows for an 
analysis of firm level competitiveness based on the efficiency of major input (raw 
material, labour and capital) use by the firm. Here competitiveness is a good 
indication of the level of technological capabilities possessed by the firm, since 
performance of the domestic firm is being compared to the global leader (usually a 
firm in a developed country) of that product as well as within the domestic industry 
(as in the case of the comparison between Millat Tractors and Al-Ghazi Tractors in 
Chapter 6). The case studies selected for the analysis are firms that have shown 
performance comparable to the global leaders of their products, and are performing 
well, despite domestic competitors and a variable economic environment. 
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
Despite concerted efforts to the contrary, developing countries continue to lag behind 
the mature, developed countries of the world, and the gap between the two persists 
and in some cases is slowly expanding. The catching up model accounts for developing 
country efforts to close the gap, and acquisition of technology and learning by doing 
to increase competitiveness of firms is the key to catching up. How the state 
encourages the acquisition of technology and development of local technological 
capabilities determines the competitiveness of firms. State failures and the nature of 
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political settlements in the domestic economy play a crucial role in determining the 
outcome of technology acquisition efforts in these countries.  
 
The management of rents, and in particular learning rents, has profound implications 
for the efforts of developing countries to close the gap in growth with developed 
countries. The catching up strategies typically employed by developing countries 
hinge on acquisition of technology (not just the actual physical capital, but the know-
how or learning by doing and the capability to be competitive in the global market) 
from developed countries. Procurement of the physical capital has generally not been 
problematic for developing countries in the past; in fact in many cases has been 
facilitated by MNCs from developed countries to further their own goals. Rather, 
building up the domestic technological capabilities to effectively use the technology 
and compete with developed countries on a near equal footing has been the challenge. 
The state in developing countries has historically opted to use learning rents to 
motivate and guide the development of capabilities and the learning-by-doing 
process. However, the effectiveness of these rents has been determined by the 
capability and capacity of the state to monitor and enforce the rents for their intended 
purpose on the one hand, and by the nature of the relationship between the state and 
various economic agents and stakeholders on the other. A closer look at the nature of 
political settlement in developing countries will yield more insight into the 
experience of these countries with allocation and impact of learning rents. 
 
South Korea is a prime example of a developing country that used learning rents to 
drive its’ efforts to successfully acquire technology from abroad and develop domestic 
technological capabilities that could easily surpass those of other developing 
countries and rival those of developed countries. The state offered domestic chaebols 
various incentives or rents in the form of preferential access to credit markets and 
financing (to name a few) in exchange for meeting export performance criteria. 
Chaebols were chosen at the discretion of the state planners and the nature of political 
settlements at the time meant that the chaebols that were disciplined for not meeting 
their performance criteria lacked the staying power to win against the state. The 
result was that South Korean chaebols were able to go the last mile and develop their 
technological capabilities and global competitiveness to be able to survive when the 
learning rent was withdrawn. India attempted a similar approach to develop its 
domestic technological capability, but the nature of political settlements meant that 
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the state was not as universally effective in managing rents and enforcing compliance 
of domestic firms. In several instances firms were able to successfully pursue rent 
seeking activity that subverted the goals of the learning rents. However, in one well 
documented instance, the Indian state was able to manage learning rents to compel a 
foreign MNC, Suzuki, to successfully upgrade local suppliers to international 
standards in exchange for preferential access to the protected domestic market. 
Pakistan has not had even that measure of success when it comes to management of 
learning rents designed to develop local technological capability. As argued earlier in 
Chapter 2, to understand why Pakistan has not been able to go the extra mile and 
successfully develop industry-wide technological capabilities, requires a closer look 
at political settlements in the country. This political settlement discussion will be 
linked to two case studies of the manufacturing sector in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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CHAPTER 4. CHANGING GEARS: AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the time of Alfred Marshall and the dominance of neo-classical approach in 
economic thinking, economic analysis has relegated technology to a mere footnote; 
an exogenous, external factor to economic growth and development. However, 
history has shown that technology and technological change have played key roles in 
economic development and the transition of economies into dynamic capitalist 
societies. 
 
Two major catalysts for the foundation of the British Empire were the First Industrial 
Revolution and the invention of the steam engine. In the aftermath of World War I, 
the United States economy benefitted immensely from a tremendous surge in the 
growth of manufacturing as well as agriculture, which was brought about by a surge 
in the demand for goods, and fulfilled by technological progress that allowed the 
economy to meet this demand. The technological progress was mechanization of the 
moving assembly line that was introduced by Eli Whitney and found its first 
successful adoption and implementation in the automobile industry at the hands of 
Charles Sorensen and Henry Ford. The assembly line was incorporated with a moving 
conveyor belt that allowed the production of a standardized model at low cost due to 
the high per worker productivity that resulted from specialization of production 
tasks. Japan was able to rise from the ashes of its previous empire after World War II 
with the introduction of ‘just-in-time’ production networks that allowed a significant 
increase in productivity while reducing production costs. The Asian Tigers, and in 
particular South Korea, were able to increase productivity and accelerate growth 
through the judicious use of foreign investment, and the acquisition, replication and 
adaptation of foreign technology. Whereas the first case cited is an ideal example of a 
pure technological innovation that transformed the society, the latter two are along 
the lines of organizational and operational innovations, and in fact the last one is 
generally characterised as a learning innovation. Based on the examples cited, it is 
clear that innovation is not simply the invention of new products, but also includes 
services, markets, processes, paradigms and positions as well and this will have 
implications for the impact of the transformations on society. Furthermore, in two 
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instances, innovations made in the automobile industry not only helped shape the 
industry itself, but they also allowed those countries to break free of the shackles of 
underdevelopment and embark on their journey to achieving vibrant capitalist 
economies. 
 
There are two crucial characteristics of the automobile industry that will prove most 
beneficial to developing countries. The first characteristic is the widespread linkages 
that the automobile industry has at all levels with the rest of the economy, linkages 
that were present since the beginning and are spreading further and further as 
technology and the industry evolves. These linkages are on account of the complexity 
of modern day automobiles, ranging from simple raw materials, to manufacturing 
processes, metallurgy, ceramics and glass, electronics, rubber, textiles, finance and 
even infrastructure. Spillovers from the automobile industry can be expected to 
spread to the rest of the economy and thus have a multiplier effect on economic 
activity. On the flip side of the coin, technology is an integral part of the industry, now 
more than ever, and its successful adoption and use will play a vital role in 
determining whether the industry reaches its full potential or not. Developing 
countries that are able to make effective use of technology and ensure the benefits 
indeed spill over to the rest of the economy will be ideally placed for a transformation 
into a dynamic capitalist society. 
 
Against the backdrop of these two characteristics and the key role played by 
technology and innovation in growth and development of an economy, a closer look 
at the issues surrounding technology in the automobile industry and its development 
is warranted, in particular in the context of developing countries. The aim of this 
chapter is to take a closer look at the developments in the global automobile industry 
in the context of adoption and use of technology in production processes as the 
industry develops and matures and review policy side changes aimed at achieving 
this goal. Section 2 provides an overview of key developments in the global 
automobile industry, while Section 3 delves into the intricacies of technology and the 
industry supply chain. Policy developments in developing countries are explored 
further in Section 4, while Section 5 covers key trends and characteristics in the 
industry focussing on the developing countries. 
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4.2. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GLOBAL AUTOMOBILE 
INDUSTRY 
4.2.1. HISTORY/EVOLUTION OF THE INDUSTRY OF ALL INDUSTRIES 
The invention of the steam engine in the First Industrial Revolution led to the birth of 
the steam powered automobile in the eighteenth century. The subsequent 
introduction of the automobile powered by a gas fuelled internal combustion engine 
was achieved fairly rapidly in the early nineteenth century. The first gasoline powered 
automobile followed at the end of the nineteenth century, proof of the dynamic and 
constantly evolving nature of a nascent industry and potential for future growth. 
Innovations and developments maintained a brisk pace in the industry and in sectors 
related to the automobile as well. While the core mechanical technology at the heart 
of the automobile was primarily invented by the 1930s, countless refinements and 
innovations continued to be made in the design and manufacture of automobiles in 
the decades to come. 
 
The automobile industry today is the largest manufacturing activity in the world and 
is credited with providing employment for one in eleven individuals. Not to mention 
the fact that on the supply side the automobile has advanced our knowledge of the 
most efficient methods of manufacturing complex pieces of technology. More 
specifically, three major transformations occurred in the history of the automobile 
industry that have shaped our understanding and impacted on manufacturing 
techniques in industries throughout the economy. On the demand side, automobiles 
are the second largest household expenditure item in developed countries. 
 
The manufacture of “horseless carriages”, as automobiles were called in the late 
1890s, was a craft initially, carried out in metal and machine shops by craftsmen. 
Automobiles at the time were considered to be novelty items on account of their 
relative scarcity and unique construction of each unit. This construction was at the 
hands of craftsmen who had a very firm grasp of the intricacies involved in building 
their automobiles and familiarity with the working of each part. Naturally this was a 
very labour and time intensive production process that was inefficient and had 
drastically limited options for expansion of output. 
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By the time the Ford Motor Company began successfully manufacturing automobiles 
in bulk in a factory in the early 20th century, the production process no longer 
required expert craftsmen to assemble each unit by hand and automobiles were much 
more common place and in higher demand. A push and move system was utilized 
where labourers would bring the parts required to the factory floor from the stock 
room. This method was less time consuming than simple craft production but was 
labour intensive, relatively inefficient and subject to a number of shortcomings. The 
bare frame of each automobile was hauled up on two wooden blocks and bands of 
workers moved from workstation to workstation completing their tasks. Over 100 
part fetchers would hand deliver parts and components to each chassis assembly 
workstation; essentially bringing the stockroom to each and every chassis assembly 
point. This was still a labour and time intensive process, and due to the use of labour 
for moving parts, unreliable. In an effort to streamline the production process and 
boost productivity and output levels, Charles Sorensen, the production chief of Ford 
Motor Company experimented with various ideas. After much trial and error and 
learning by doing, Sorensen pioneered the moving assembly line featuring practical 
implementation of Adam Smith’s idea of increasing productivity through 
specialization. The idea of an assembly line sped up the process by removing the role 
of fetchers and hence a major source of friction in the assembly process. The assembly 
process was divided into simple sequential action which would be performed by a 
single assembler at each stage. 
 
Instead of bringing the man to the work, the work would be brought to the man. This 
process of experimentation and learning by doing led to the adoption of the ideal 
specification for operating the assembly line. These developments were initially met 
by scepticism by company management but their eventual implementation allowed 
Ford Motor Company to meet surging demand for their Model T automobile. The 
developments at the Ford Motor Company were also the successful outcome of 
learning-by-doing and resulted in spillovers to the rest of the industry and the 
economy eventually when manufacturers adopted the moving assembly line and 
best-use practices to boost productivity levels. On the heels of this development, 
General Motors adopted a different approach to Ford’s single model not by producing 
cheaper cars but quality automobiles in greater variety to appeal to a wider 
demographic. Better quality in this case was determined by General Motor engineers 
to be improved performance and economy. The focus was not on innovating, but on 
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offering better looking cars with more variety in the market. General Motors was able 
to pursue a strategy of following the leader to avoid the expense and unpredictability 
of innovation while capitalizing on aesthetic innovation which was cheaper and more 
predictable. General Motors rise to the top is an early example of how late comer firms 
can thrive in the market. 
 
The moving assembly line was the first of three major transformations in the 
automobile industry that had a profound impact not just on the nature of competition 
within the industry but in the manufacturing sector at large (Jones & Womack 
(1985)). Mass production and the moving assembly line allowed the United States to 
dominate the global automobile market through enormous growth in productivity 
coupled with simplified assembly and low prices. 
 
The second transformation in the automobile industry was European in origin that 
further advanced the use of technology in manufacturing and was borne of the desire 
to compete with, and eventually surpass the then world leaders in mass production 
of automobiles. After adoption of mass production, the top three US automobile 
manufacturers were able to dominate the market and did not fear competition from 
any other manufacturers, either domestic or foreign. Unable to compete with the US 
in terms of volume, the European manufacturers turned to the manufacture of small 
and unpretentious automobiles that stood in stark contrast to the gaudy, gargantuan 
sedans produced by the US Big Three (Ford, General Motors, Chrysler) as a way of 
challenging the status quo. 
 
The third transformation had its roots in the skyrocketing oil prices in the first half of 
the 1970s and again at the tail end of the decade negatively impacted demand for the 
fuel inefficient automobiles manufactured by the Big Three in the US in favour of 
smaller, more efficient automobiles from Europe and Japan. Automobile 
manufacturers from Japan studied US production methods; in particular those of 
Ford, as well as Statistical Quality Control practices after World War II to help rebuild 
their economy. Faced with a number of constraints, Japanese manufacturers had a 
strong imperative to develop a more efficient manufacturing technique. Cheng & 
Podolsky (1996) pointed out that such a system would build on the society’s strengths 
of a strong work ethic revolving around work and not leisure, desire for seeking 
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continuous improvement, a life commitment to work, group conscious rather than 
individualism and striving to achieve a common goal. 
 
With each transformation, the production process underwent changes and 
refinements that permeated not only the automobile industry but the manufacturing 
sector as a whole. Firms attempted to adopt the manufacturing processes that each 
transformation brought about and reap the benefits of the changes; though not always 
successfully. Compared with craft production, mass production offered a number of 
benefits: 
1. Manufacture of several, standardized products simultaneously, allowing the 
factory to achieve economies of scale, 
2. Use of inter-changeable parts, 
3. Large buffers (stock) of parts to ensure uninterrupted production flows, and  
4. Strong hierarchical control and coordination of all aspects of production, from 
design to assembly. 
 
Japanese manufacturers, led by Toyota, recognized the inherent contradictions and 
shortcomings in the simple mass production system, while also acknowledging the 
central role played by workers and inventory. The deficiencies identified by Toyota 
included: 
(i) Inventory problems 
(ii) High rate of product defects 
(iii) High costs 
(iv) Large lot production 
(v) Delivery delays 
 
The Just-In-Time system designed by Ohno was based on the pull system used in US 
supermarkets to keep shelves stocked. Items that were pulled from the shelves to fill 
shopping carts created empty spaces on the shelf, which was used as a signal by the 
stocker to restock the item on the shelf. If quantities fell below a certain threshold, it 
was a signal to the store manager to order more units of the product(s) from their 
suppliers. Excess inventories were avoided and waste was minimized. This feature 
also appealed to the precise and efficient nature of the Japanese who were able to 
devise a pull system at each step of the assembly process; materials would be pulled 
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through the factory by the usage of parts in the final assembly, and excessive 
inventories would be minimized. 
 
On the labour side, as a result of the simplification and standardization of tasks and 
parts the demand for expert craftsmen declined, while there was a surge in demand 
for semi-skilled workers who could perform simple and repetitive tasks. Developing 
technological capabilities and innovating was taken out of the hands of factory 
workers and relegated to qualified engineers who were removed from the production 
process itself. While it is true that given the limited development of human capital in 
developing countries and stunted technological development that mass production 
would easier to implement than Just In Time, there is a limit to the productivity 
increase that can be achieved, while the technique would also place considerable 
pressure on the labour market (in the form of worker discontent) and create further 
disharmony in an already fragile system, as happened in the case of the US. 
 
The mass production system of the US and developments subsequently were driven 
by the notion that labour was “the problem” to achieving higher productivity and 
therefore higher profits. Graves (1993) suggested that the production philosophy that 
evolved was designed to eliminate this “problem” throughout the system. In doing so, 
the mass production system created a dehumanizing effect on workers which would 
be unworkable in developing countries and such a view would be inconsistent with 
the goals of developing countries, where labour employment is a key concern of 
industrialization efforts. In contrast, Taichii Ohno and Shigeo Shingo at Toyota were 
of the view that workers could also contribute more to the production process than 
simply assembling the components, as believed by Ford. The strong Japanese work 
ethic encourages highly motivated workers to constantly improve tasks and 
processes. Quality circle implementation provides managers with feedback from the 
factory workers and could be used to streamline production processes at the shop 
floor level by helping solve work-related problems and thus improve productivity 
levels. Thus the Japanese model gives importance to labour by seeing them as “the 
solution” to problems and thus prioritize social context more, and take care to ensure 
the political and economic environment of the host country is conducive to a lean 
production system setup (fundamental differences between the two production 
systems are highlighted in Table 4.1). Given these facts, one can conclude that 
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countries where Japanese automobile manufacturers have established Joint Ventures 
or production facilities are conducive to lean production setups. 
 
Table 4.1: Fundamental Differences between Just-In-Time and Mass Production Systems 
 Just In Time Mass Production 
1 Jidoka (workers are allowed to identify 
and correct defects as they occur) and 
just-in-time are two basic pillars of 
system driven by market and customer 
demand 
Based on highly specialized division of 
tasks 
2 Pull system based on products already 
sold 
Push system based on ex ante anticipated 
sale 
3 Production in small lots of differentiated 
products 
Production on large scale of standardized 
product 
4 Rapid retooling (up to roughly 10 
minutes) for frequent changing of 
production batches 
Shutdown of production line for major 
retooling with long production runs 
5 Use Kanban and Just In Time principles to 
reduce intermediate input stocks to 
minimum or zero and production flows 
Significant quantities of intermediate 
stocks at each workstation. Production is 
pushed, not flowing 
6 Multifunctional workers Specialized workers task by task 
7 Every worker on the line has the right to 
stop the line to ensure proper quality 
No worker can stop the line to ensure 
proper quality. Production continues even 
in presence of significant defects 
8 Quantity produced is equal to quantity 
sold or demanded 
Quantity produced is determined by 
production engineers based on future 
expected market demand 
9 Information dissemination from markets 
to production lines using kanbans 
Information dissemination is hierarchical 
Source: based on Ohno & Mito (1992) and Dosi, Nelson & Winter (2002) 
 
Ohno also made effective use of the Japanese focus on groups, teams and collective 
goals by creating manufacturing cells on the work floor, rather than an assembly line. 
Compared to the Ford assembly line, the manufacturing or work cells are significantly 
different in their organization and offer a number of benefits/advantages (see Table 
4.2 for key differences between the two approaches).  
 
152 
 
Table 4.2: Key differences Between Assembly Line and Work Cell Organization 
Assembly Line Workcell 
Profligate use of floor space Optimized use of floor space 
Operators are separated from each other Operators work together 
Production runs of large batch sizes Production runs of small batch sizes 
Work is spread out along the factory floor Work is condensed 
Non flexible crew size Flexible crew size 
Unskilled specialized operators Multi-skilled operators 
Source: AIDT (2006), p.33 
 
Japanese manufacturers also acknowledged the benefit of having low priced product 
variety (not restricted to the aesthetic variety of General Motors) to satisfy customer 
demands following the example set by European manufacturers and as a consequence 
designed production systems to accommodate smaller lot production of different 
models. Effectively combining the best features of mass production and quality 
product variety within the existing domestic cultural framework allowed Japanese 
automobile manufacturers to upset the world order and surpass Europe and even the 
US as global leaders in the 1980s. 
 
According to Jones & Womack (1985), the fourth major transformation in the 
automobile industry came with the diffusion of microelectronics in the industry. This 
particular transformation is noteworthy for the fact that in contrast to the first three 
transformations, there was a change brought about not just in the production 
methods used, but also in the design and manufacture of tooling equipment and more 
importantly, in the design of automobiles themselves. The nature of these changes is 
such that developing countries can also benefit immensely from the transformation 
(see Table 4.3 for a comparison of key characteristics of the major transformations). 
 
In the wake of mass production techniques spreading across the globe and the move 
towards dedicated lines of machines with high volume output of a standardized 
product, this meant that there was limited flexibility in the production process for 
switching to a new model or new engine design. However, now owing to widespread 
use of microelectronics, production lines began to switch over to computer-control 
and robot assembly, meaning plants were able to accommodate model and design 
changes with more flexibility than before. Automation has also resulted in more rapid 
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die changes for stamping allowing production runs to be much shorter than 
previously possible. Since automated machining and welding machines can be easily 
reprogrammed to accommodate new models, automobile production is becoming 
more flexible, and thus able to accommodate changes and advances in technology 
more readily. Production line robots can be replaced as and when needed, which is 
more cost effective than having to scrap and rebuild the entire production line. This 
flexible and modular approach to production means subsequent modules can be 
incorporated into the production line relatively easily. Theoretically speaking, it 
should be easier for firms to move up the value chain once they have incorporated 
this new flexible lean production process. 
 
Table 4.3: Key Characteristics of Major Transformations 
 
Characteristic 
Major Transformation 
Lean Production Mass Production Craft Production 
1. Labour Variable skilled Unskilled and semi-
skilled 
Highly skilled 
2. Labour Tasks Variable within 
cell 
Limited, fixed Variable 
3. Material Stock Small Large Large 
4. Lot Size Small Large N/A 
5. Hierarchy Decentralized Central, top down N/A 
6. Capital Equipment General purpose General purpose Specialized 
7. Product Design Simple but 
customizable 
Simplified and 
standardized 
Complex and one 
of a kind 
8. Manufacturing Focus Quality Quantity N/A 
Source: Compiled by author from various sources 
 
Production line automation and Just-In-Time manufacturing have reduced economies 
of scale for firms in the industry. No longer do firms have to produce a minimum of 2 
million units output, meaning the fortunes of smaller sized producers (even those 
from developing countries) are more promising. Japanese firms have shown the 
ability to compete in the market with models that have an average age of 2 years (as 
opposed to the 4 years for US and European firms), and production runs (per model) 
of 500,000 vehicles (as opposed to the 2 million for US and European firms). Having 
smaller production runs lowers the cost of market entry for the firm, which naturally 
opens the doors for firms from developing countries to enter the global market and 
compete with larger producers such as GM, Ford and Volkswagen. 
 
The next transformation that will come about in the industry as it matures will surely 
be the resurgence of green technologies, and in particular hybrid and electrical 
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propulsion systems for all manner of automobiles. There has also been a trend in 
recent years of the acquisition of several niche-market developed country automobile 
manufacturers by developing country firms. 
 
4.2.2. TECHNOLOGY AND THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SUPPLY CHAIN 
It is clear that whereas focus of the mass manufacturing transformation was on 
integrating and streamlining the entire manufacturing process under one roof to gain 
more control over production and increase productivity per worker. On the other 
hand, the Japanese Just-In-Time transformation eschewed this in favour of 
establishing close-knit, mutually beneficial relationships with suppliers for 
minimizing waste and improving quality, while also affording labour a more central 
and positive role in the manufacturing process. Taken together, these three 
transformations represent significant changes in key characteristics related to 
production, labour, and organization, and in each instance enabled a profound 
transformation of society. 
 
Decisions in the automobile industry surrounding current styles, reliability of the 
vehicle and performance, or R & D activity in the industry and manufacturing process 
innovations, or product modernization and design changes are determined by one of 
three factors. The demand for new cars and consumer preference is one of the major 
factors that determine firm activities and direction of industrial development; 
demand in the developed countries has been stagnant in recent years, while 
developing countries are experiencing growth. According to Veloso & Kumar (2002), 
Europe, United States and Japan have been registering barely 1 percent growth at the 
start of the 21st century, while sales growth in South America, India, China and Eastern 
Europe has exceeded 24 percent for the same period. In the post 2005 period, share 
of Europe in automobile sales exhibited a negative trend, dropping to -12 percent in 
2010, and mirrored by the US (peaking at -17 percent in 2009). On the other hand, 
there was a general positive trend in growth rate of automobile sales in Central and 
South America, Asia and the Middle East and Africa regions. It is for this reason that 
these new markets are being targeted by OEMs now (see Table 4.4). 
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Decade-wise production shares also show a similar situation developing; with the 
declining trend in the share of the Triad region clearly visible and accelerating since 
the 1980s, as evident from Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.4: Growth Rates of Regional Sales Shares of Automobile Industry (2006 – 2012) 
Region 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Europe 0 0 -1 -11 -12 1 -10 
Russia, Turkey and Other 
Europe 13 16 13 -44 12 24 0 
America -4 -3 -7 -13 -2 5 5 
NAFTA -5 -7 -12 -17 -3 5 7 
Central and South 
America 8 20 14 4 3 4 -2 
Asia/Oceania/Middle 
East 4 4 8 22 9 -3 3 
Africa 13 -4 0 -4 -6 4 0 
Source: Veloso & Kumar (2002) 
 
Figure 4.1: Production Shares by Major Manufacturing Regions (1960 - 2010) 
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generally able to afford multiple vehicles and OEMs have capitalized on this feature 
by producing a large variety of vehicles that suited to different needs, thereby 
allowing them to maximise a slim market share. On the other hand, households in 
developing countries have lower income levels and tend to prefer vehicles that are 
cheap and can fulfil a variety of roles, such as pick-up trucks and mini vans or more 
fuel efficient vehicles. To capture this segment of a growing market, OEMs are 
focussing on producing more inexpensive, no-frills, fuel efficient vehicles. Again, 
developing countries with young automobile industries can capitalize on this 
development and use it to accelerate their development trajectories. Coupled with the 
fact that mass manufacturing techniques that are still prevalent in developed 
countries, especially the US, and are ill-suited to fast switching between different 
models, means there is a window of opportunity for developing countries to develop 
their capabilities from scratch, adopt lean production techniques and successfully 
enter the market. 
 
Veloso & Kumar (2002) have argued that technology is a major factor in determining 
the course of evolution of the industry. The driving force behind technological 
advances in recent years has been efficiency, performance and reliability of vehicles 
(Figure 4.2). Ford pioneered the design of automobiles that could be easily repaired 
by the customer, while Toyota strove to be the first to improve the quality of the 
vehicle and so minimize the need for vehicles needing repair. Each of these 
improvements was part of the strategy to increase market penetration through 
introduction of technological innovations – the first mover advantage that firms covet 
for windfall gains. The structural design of automobiles has also evolved in response 
to the desire for safety, from full frame design initially to unibody construction after 
the 1970s, and subsequent introduction of spaceframe design and modular 
construction in recent years. Miniaturisation of electronics has allowed automobile 
design to incorporate complex sensors and systems that in turn contribute to the 
overall complexity and cost of the vehicle and strengthen the linkages across 
manufacturing sectors. 
 
Along with Computer Aided Manufacture (CAM), Computer Aided Design (CAD) and 
Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) are finding more widespread application in the 
industry. Again, these developments mean that the established large firms are no 
longer assured dominance of the industry; as long as the new entrant can keep costs 
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down, make effective use of new technologies and maintain a lean and flexible 
production system, they can provide credible competition to the market incumbents. 
 
Figure 4.2: Determinants of major decisions in the automobile industry 
 
Source: based on Veloso & Kumar (2002) 
 
Research on transferability of lean production techniques by Krafcik (1988) opened 
the debate when he argued, based on his global quantitative analysis of plant 
productivity and management efficiency, that the existence of highly competitive 
leading producers in the US - both Japanese transplants and new US manufacturing 
facilities - attest to the transferability of Japanese methods of lean production outside 
of the cultural context in which they originated. 
 
However, Dankbaar (1990) argues that in reality the situation is more complex and 
that Krafcik's isolated examples of success in the UK and US can be explained by the 
fact that they are greenfield sites, with hand-picked personnel and a unique 
management team aware of new procedures and how to implement them. Efforts to 
introduce the Japanese model into other countries will at best meet only limited 
success as long as management fails to take account of the social context in which the 
plants are operating. Dankbaar cites evidence of a range of factors in the Japanese 
case which cannot be reproduced easily in the European environment. These include: 
in-firm vocational training, reduced labour mobility and short-cycled, machine-paced 
labour on a continuously moving assembly line. 
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According to Graves (1993), Japanese firms have therefore created with their new 
investments their own special social contexts and, where successful, are often located 
in areas of high unemployment with specific economic and political incentives. 
However, once production gets fully established, and workers gain greater 
employment security then antagonisms with management (which have largely been 
suppressed) may well reappear. 
 
With major transformations occurring in the automobile industry, and in particular 
the production technologies used, the industry supply chain has evolved alongside. 
Prior to an automobile’s assembly, there are a number of stages that occur in a typical 
automobile manufacturer’s production process (see Figure 4.3). Broadly speaking, 
there are three processes that run simultaneously; one is the preparation of the 
vehicle body, which involves stamping of body parts, then their assembly, and finally 
their painting and finishing. Another is the manufacture and assembly of the vehicle 
engine and the third is the manufacture of other vehicle components and their 
assembly. Though interlinked, these processes run simultaneously and led to a fair 
measure of vertical integration under craft and even mass production. To stay ahead 
of the competition, OEMs are pursuing tighter collaborations with their component 
manufacturers to bring innovations to the market that would help keep product 
prices in check. 
 
At the time of craft production, the master craftsmen manufactured and assembled 
the unique parts and components required in-house. Due to the nature of this 
production process, output in the industry was low and the industry maintained this 
structure in the move to mass production under Ford. Manufacturers were heavy 
handed in their relentless pursuits for profits; holding down prices while imposing 
cost reductions that squeezed suppliers’ margins. The moving assembly line allowed 
Ford to increase factory output by leaps and bounds. However, the ultimate goal of 
Ford was to attain total self-sufficiency of the production process by controlling 
(owning, operating and coordinating) all resources needed to produce automobiles. 
The massive River Rouge facility epitomized this goal of vertical integration of 
production within a firm. Japanese firms eschewed this form of integration in favour 
of forming closer ties with their suppliers and evolution of a tiered supply chain. 
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The structure of the supply chain at the time was designed to allow OEM the greatest 
amount of control over the design and manufacture of components. Parts would be 
designed by OEMs and exact specifications or blueprints would be handed over 
component suppliers who were expected to follow the blueprints precisely. There 
was little need or even room for development of technological capabilities by 
suppliers for design changes to be adapted with production. There was little need for 
any transparency along the supply chain and component suppliers typically had little 
knowledge of what the final product they were producing components for, would 
be. In-house and external suppliers would bid against each other for award of 
contracts and the focus would be on meeting the demands of the OEMs and little 
margin for much else (see Figure 4.4). 
 
Just-In-Time (Figure 4.5) brought about a change in this philosophy with OEMs 
forming closer, more enduring ties with their suppliers and calling on their design 
and technological capabilities to solve problems that arose during production. 
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Figure 4.3: Modular Nature of Automotive Production 
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Bringing the final product to the market required the cooperation of all levels of supply chain and 
tied their fortunes together; requiring greater transparency and exchange of information along 
the supply chain. 
 
To streamline the supply chain, a tiered structure evolved under JiT manufacturing, which has far 
greater scope of helping technological capabilities develop and diffuse in developing countries as 
compared to mass production (see Box 4.1 for details of the tiered supply chain in the automotive  
 
 
Box 4.1: Automotive OEMs and the Three Tier Suppliers 
An automobile manufacturer such as Ford or Toyota is characterised as an Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) and focuses on manufacturing and/or final assembly of an automobile. 
A vehicle is made of many different components, which have been produced by various 
companies specialised in the production of those components e.g. glass, tires, electronics, 
telematics. Suppliers then deliver the components to the OEM. The OEM is responsible for final 
assembly and sells the final vehicle under its brand name. 
A first tier supplier is a component manufacturer delivering directly to final vehicle assemblers. 
First tier suppliers work hand-in-hand with automobile manufacturers to design, manufacture 
and deliver complex automobile systems and modules, such as significant interior, exterior or 
drive train units. First tier suppliers in turn purchase from second tier and third tier suppliers. 
A second tier supplier produces value adding parts in the minor sub-assembly phase. Second 
tier suppliers buy from third tier and deliver to first tier. 
A third tier supplier supplies engineered materials and special services, such as rolls of sheet 
steel, bars and heat and surface treatments. Third tier suppliers rank below second tier and first 
tier suppliers in terms of the complexity of the products that they provide. 
 
Source: OECD (2009) 
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industry). Since mass production techniques are less firmly entrenched in developing countries 
than they are in the US or Europe, the potential reward from successful implementation of Just-
In-Time production will be far greater for those countries. 
 
4.3. TRENDS IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
Since its’ humble beginnings in the late 1800s with craft production in US and Europe, the global 
automobile industry experienced substantial growth in later years. The industry has been 
transformed into a highly competitive market in recent years and become established as one of 
the leading subsectors contributing to manufacturing output, and providing employment to one 
in seven individuals (directly or indirectly) in developed countries. The first surge in production 
was the result of the first transformation in the industry; the introduction of mass production 
techniques by Ford in the early 1900s (see Figure 4.6). Post-war recovery efforts led to the second 
surge in the late 1940s, followed closely by growth in the 1950s and 1960s from sales of “muscle 
car” automobiles of Ford, GM and Chrysler and from low fuel prices. The oil price shocks of 1970s 
led to a declining share of the Big Three on the heels of the sale of fuel efficient cars from Japan 
and inability of US manufacturers to adapt adequately to the changing environment. Nag, 
Banerjee & Chatterjee (2007) have argued that coupled with the implementation of lean 
production technology, this allowed Japan to ease out the US as the market leader in the early 
1980s. 
 
Global automobile production surged between 2000 and 2007, and reached 73.3 million 
automobiles in 2007. Developing countries made their presence felt in the automobile industry 
in the 1970s; yet only managed to account for 17 percent of global production levels by 1980; 
however the share increased to 31 percent in the 2000s. New growth is being driven by firms in 
the Asia region now, and a number of developing countries have managed to leave a mark on 
global automobile production trends over the years. (see Figure 4.7- Figure 4.10 for production 
shares by country in key decades from 1900s to 2000s). Notable among these is the case of South 
Korea, that entered the US import car market with a single model, the Excel, that was “hot, and 
hard to find” according to Green (1992), within two months of its introduction in early 1986. In 
the span of one year, two additional South Korean firms successfully penetrated the US market 
and total South Korean car exports to the US rose to 346,582. By the end of 1988, Hyundai was 
the fourth leading exporter to the US, competing with established domestic and foreign firms. 
Also worthy of note are China and India, two developing countries that are fast emerging as 
powerhouses of automobile production. In 2009, India was ranked as the fourth (after Japan, 
South Korea and Thailand) largest exporter of automobiles in Asia, though lower growth rate in  
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Figure 4.7: Automobile Production Shares by Country - 1900s 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Automobile Production Shares by Country - 1940s 
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Figure.4.9: Automobile Production Shares by Country - 1980s 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Automobile Production Shares by Country - 2000s 
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recent years have left the door open for other developing countries to gain a foothold 
in the global market. China recovered its market share in 2012 (4.6 percent growth) 
after lower growth (0.8 percent growth) the previous year. 
 
The US automobile industry has been dominated by the Big Three (Ford, General 
Motors and Chrysler) since the introduction of mass production technology. Ford 
Motor Corporation, General Motors Corporation and DaimlerChrysler experienced 
declining shares in the US market from mid-1990s to mid-2000s. Growth in the US 
market was tempered by union activity; domestic manufacturers in the US had to 
contend with a heavy burden of costs negotiated as part of the settlement with United 
Auto Workers (UAW) union and lost their lead in market shares to new entrants. 
Foreign manufacturers were unfettered by such arrangements with the UAW union 
and could undercut domestic manufacturers. According to McLaughlin (2006), the Big 
Three in the US were superseded by the New Six comprised of a mix of domestic and 
foreign manufacturers (Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Ford, GM and DC), and Toyota became 
the market leader in 2006 (see Ulrich (2006)). 
 
The European Union industry on the other hand was dominated by German firms 
from early 1950s, followed by France and Spain, and though domestic demand was 
sluggish, export demand remained strong. The region accounted for a third of global 
production by the turn of the century, making way since then for the new rising stars; 
the developing countries. 
 
In the Asian region, Japan accounted for 16.7 percent of global automobile production 
in 2004. China has now emerged as a major producer of automobiles rivalling 
Germany by providing companies with a cost effective export base with which to 
penetrate the Asian market. China accounted for 3 percent of global automobile 
production in 1988, and this share increased to 7 percent in 2004, fuelled by growth 
of domestic manufacturers that were successfully able to  dominate the local 
market. Since 2004, India has been considered another emerging producer of 
automobiles with a Japanese owned (majority ownership) subsidiary dominating the 
domestic market. In both cases, the domestic industry is backed by sound domestic 
technological capabilities that have been developed by the state as part of its 
development agenda, in the form of national companies, champions that produce 
locally designed and manufactured automobiles. Pakistan has the potential to be 
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another emerging producer, however, the local industry has not been able to 
successfully design and produce automobiles. 
 
The new emerging player is China, with vehicle production levels of 7.9 million in 
2009 as compared to 4.1 million for Japan (see Figure 4.11 for regional trends in 
automobile production from 2000 to 2012). This downturn of activity has resulted in 
Japanese firms curtailing foreign investment levels for market expansion. The Chinese 
expansion (doubling of production levels between 2003 and 2008 while US levels 
decreased by half) in the automobile industry is the result of government focus on 
developing the local industry through infrastructure provision and subsidy allocation. 
Automobile manufacturing growth and demand is expected to be generated in the 
Asia Pacific region (China and India mostly) with static demand in the developed 
regions of EU and the US due to market saturation and rising unemployment levels. 
 
Figure 4.11: Regional Trends in Automobile Production (2000-12) 
 
 
In the ASEAN region, Thailand and Vietnam experienced staggering growth of 280 
and 202 percent during this time, while Malaysia and Indonesia grew at a 
comparatively sedate pace of 45 and 43 percent respectively. Production share of 
passenger cars declined in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, but the slack appears to 
have been taken by The Philippines and Vietnam. Doner, Noble & Ravenhill (2006) 
found that Thailand has managed to successfully specialize in the production of 1 ton 
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pickup trucks produced by foreign OEMs and become the top hub for their production 
outside the US. In the Philippines, production declined in 2004, while sales rose, and 
import of second-hand cars exceeded local production in 2000-02 according to 
Ofreneo (2008), p.74. 
 
The recent global economic slowdown in recent years has had a profound effect on 
automobile industry production levels and firm operations. In particular, of the Big 
Three firms in the US (Ford, GM and Chrysler) representing over half the automobile 
production in the US, two collapsed, opening the door for existing and new emerging 
firms to establish themselves in the vacuum created. The Asia-Pacific region is making 
its presence felt and becoming the new hub for automobile production, with Japanese 
firms again surpassing US firms as world leaders in automobile production in 2008.  
 
Hybrid vehicles are the new area of growth in automobile technology, but there is 
limited volume production and an absence of standardized technology means that the 
core components of these new vehicles are not outsourced to component 
manufacturers. To tap into this new area, component and vehicle manufacturers need 
to have appropriate grasp of the requirements involved, and the technological 
capabilities required to operationalize the knowledge acquired. Till such capabilities 
are acquired there is likely to be a trend towards captive, in-house parts 
manufacturing operations much as in the early days of the industry. 
 
The emerging markets of Asia and the Middle East are ideally suited for low cost-no 
frills automobiles that would be within the grasp of population of those countries to 
purchase, not to mention requiring a certain level of technological capabilities 
development that developing countries can realistically access. According to IMAP 
(2010), though per unit profit margins on these vehicles would naturally be razor 
thin, the volume potential of production is very significant (see Kearney (2008)). 
Interestingly, with disposable incomes rising in China demand for this segment has 
fallen in recent years, so growth for these vehicles will be generated in other Asian 
countries. 
 
In terms of the structure of the industry, until the 1970s, the global automobile 
industry was dominated by a limited number of massive Multi-National Corporations 
(MNCs) with a significant degree of vertical integration within these firms. As such 
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the industry was classified as having a producer-driven global value chain32. In the 
1990s, the global automobile industry underwent significant consolidation for the 
first time since the 1920s. A wave of mergers and acquisitions saw Saab, Volvo, Jaguar, 
Rolls Royce, Land Rover, Audi, Skoda, companies that were once hailed as national 
champions, merged with industry leaders from the US or Germany, General Motors, 
Ford and VW. With these mergers and acquisitions, the supply chain has also 
undergone a metamorphosis into a supplier-driven value chain (for details see Barnes 
& Morris (2008); Dicken (2007); Sturgeon, Biesebroeck & Gereffi (2008); Wad 
(2009), (2008)). Developing countries are using industrial policy to guide and nurture 
the development of the industry to avoid stagnation and more quickly achieve the 
economies of scale and spillover benefits associated with automobile production. 
 
4.4. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
The automobile industry has undergone a wave of concentration in recent years and 
automobile OEMs are also collaborating on a number of Joint Ventures for vehicle 
development, production, distribution, financing etc. – all levels of automobile 
production. Thanks to the advent of lean production technologies and rapid die-cast 
changes, the key to having a successful automobile industry is now considered to be 
offering of a desirable choice of vehicles in as many markets as possible. Automobile 
markets are still primarily regional rather than global, so production activities prior 
to distribution are mostly located in the region, if not the country, where the final 
assembly takes place. The assembly process itself represents only a small part of the 
value added in the supply chain so sourcing of automobile components is important. 
Plant location and sourcing of components is determined by a host of factors; 
including exchange rate, investment incentives, government policies and regulations, 
and domestic wage levels.  
 
The structure of the automobile industry has also undergone a transformation since 
its early days. Till the 1970s, the industry was classified as having a Producer or OEM 
Driven Global Value Chain, but the absence of industry-wide standards, parts and sub-
component specifications by vehicle models has brought about a significant shift in 
the structure; becoming a Supplier Driven Global Value Chain (as numerous authors 
including Dicken (2007), Barnes & Morris (2008), Sturgeon, Biesebroeck & Gereffi 
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(2008), Wad (2008), Wad (2009) have pointed out). OEMs are now leaning more 
towards forming lasting and significant relationships with key component and parts 
suppliers which limits their production economies of scale possibilities and also 
limiting design economies of scope (Sturgeon et al. (2009)). A defining characteristic 
of the industry is the high degree of capital and R & D intensity, which has led to the 
perception by researchers (including Humphrey & Salerno (2000) and Humphrey & 
Memedovic (2003)) subscribing to the Global Value Chain literature maintaining that 
national automobile projects in Asia will fail due to the lack of, and underdeveloped 
nature of, domestic capital and R & D. These researchers have gone so far as to 
characterize such endeavours as futile and a waste of precious resources which these 
countries can ill-afford to spend so wastefully. However, these views are limited as 
they do not account for the role of intervention by state policy that is geared towards 
helping the local industry develop indigenous technological capabilities and cope 
with pressures of international competition. 
 
In their quest to transform and develop, a number of developing countries have used 
the national manufacturing sector as a conduit for this purpose; designing and 
implementing a variety of policies aimed at supporting the sector. The automobile 
industry in particular has been pegged as a strategic industry and singled out for 
preferential treatment on a number of occasions, despite the fact that academic 
support for such endeavours has generally not been positive or optimistic of the 
outcome. Automobile industry policies of the domestic government provide the 
institutional environment automobile business operate in and suitably crafted 
policies can nurture and guide the industry in the desired direction.  
 
The ability of developing countries to succeed in their industrial development efforts 
depends critically on the mastery, adaptation and adjustments made to existing 
production technologies by firms in these countries. Simply using the technology does 
not translate to an immediate and costless mastery of such technology; rather it is an 
uncertain and arduous endeavour. A number of externalities can affect the process, 
and additional inputs are required at various levels to ensure the process has a 
measure of success. Development of this capability is naturally fraught with market 
failures, and as such, requires support – functional as well as selective. Clearly, it 
needs to be recognized first that firms are at the heart of any industrial development 
process Thun (2006), though there are a number of economic agents involved in this 
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process, ranging from international institutions, governments, industry associations, 
but their actions revolve around operations of firms and the ability of these firms to 
compete in the global marketplace. 
 
Developing countries have used a variety of approaches to boost growth in specific 
sectors and different policies have been used to achieve these goals. Import 
substitution and export promotion are two such approaches, and sector/industry 
specific policies such as Automobile Industry Promotion Policy (South Korea), MIDP 
and APDP (South Africa), and deletion policy and AIDP (Pakistan) are some of the 
sector specific strategies and policies pursued by developing countries that met with 
varying levels of success. Since the efficacy and outcomes of the policies used have 
varied across countries and time periods, it makes sense to review some of the more 
visible cases that pertain to the automobile industry. 
 
4.4.1. BRAZIL 
Brazil has had a weak industrialization experience when the automobile industry was 
selected as a core industry by President Jucelino Kubitschek in 1956. A policy mix of 
import tariffs, exchange rate adjustments and various protectionist policies, coupled 
with a number of FDI incentives, were used to attract the necessary foreign resources 
(both financial and technological) . By the 1970s, when the oil price shock hit, large 
scale operations had been established and the government undertook measures to 
further protect the local industry by opting for export promotion and import 
restrictions. Exports were subsidized to the tune of 26-36 percent and further 
supported by preferential loans, while exporting firms could import items valued at 
up to a third of their exports. 
 
The local industry was suffering from a small domestic market size, poor industrial 
development and lack of resources, and foreign automobile firms were afforded tax 
exemptions and given preferential loans, and more importantly, allowed to retain 
complete ownership of companies established, to attract FDI. Lai (2001) observed 
that local content requirements were imposed on these foreign firms, starting with 
35 to 50 percent and rising to 90 percent over a period of three years. Failure to 
comply with these content requirements meant the firm would be barred from 
further operations. Imports were to be restricted and capital for plant expansion was 
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to be locally produced when the firm was able to achieve scale economies of 
production. Though government policies in Brazil have succeeded in rapid industrial 
development, local technological development is still lagging behind. Majority of 
automobiles in the domestic market are produced using foreign technology and 
indigenous manufacturers are struggling to cope with limited production using dated 
technology and as a result are lacking in capabilities to compete at a global level. 
According to Luo (2006), control of virtually all assets (95 percent) of the industry 
resides with foreign firm, and though the industrialization process is considered to 
have been successful, the fact that ownership is essentially foreign does not bode well 
for domestic technological capability and would limit the spillovers from the industry. 
 
4.4.2. MALAYSIA AND THAILAND 
Among the East Asian countries, Malaysia followed a state-driven national 
automobile industry development initiative much like South Korea and Japan, while 
Thailand opted for an MNC-driven initiative. Malaysia remained dedicated to a 
National Auto Programme, which was aimed at developing a domestic automobile 
industry manufacturing a full range of automobiles and components, and the 
dedication paid off with national automakers holding 90 percent of the market share. 
However, lack of enforcement of any performance criteria, as opposed to the South 
Korean case, meant that Malaysian manufacturers were unprepared to compete in the 
global market. To achieve the almost universal market share, Malaysian firms were 
provided assembly licenses with no regard to localizing production of parts and 
components. Lacking the necessary capability and financing to achieve scale 
economies in automobile production, a Joint Venture (Proton) was formed with 
Mitsubishi Motors (Jomo (1994) and Machado (1994)) in the 1980s. The government 
was able to position Proton as the market leader by the end of the 1980s through the 
use of subsidies, but was unable to compel the Joint Venture partner, Mitsubishi, to 
upgrade production facilities and exports based on Malaysian designs and brands, 
forcing Proton to turn to Lotus Corporation and pay high royalty fees for engine 
design capabilities. By the end of the 1990s Proton was able to launch a locally 
designed model and a few years later incorporated its own engine design into the 
technology. According to Chee (1994), Proton was able to achieve a measure of 
success despite the high cost of the project. 
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The Malaysian government chose to exclude existing Chinese entrepreneurs in favour 
of new Malaysian industrialists. This decision seems questionable considering how 
limited the pool of capable entrepreneurs was, when compared to the case of Korea 
and its chaebols. Furthermore, South Korea focused on imitation, learning and 
innovation virtually across the board to foster automobile industry development, 
while Kim & Ma (1997) and Rasiah (1999) found that Malaysia did not have a similar 
system. 
 
Thailand’s government underwent a change in 2001 and an over-arching industrial 
plan was launched in that same year to turn Thailand’s automobile industry into the 
“Detroit of the East”33 .Abdulsomad (1999) observed that the new plan included 
several initiatives specifically targeting the automobile industry for MNC led growth; 
the Thailand Automotive Institute was established to encourage public private 
cooperation in the industry, and also link industry support to export performance. 
Overall, foreign multinational enterprise (MNE) auto suppliers have taken over the 
auto supplier market of Thailand, increasing their numbers from around 30 
companies in 1971–1985 and adding 300 foreign suppliers over the following period 
of 1987–2005. Thailand is now considered to have some of the most highly 
competitive and advanced automotive clusters in Southeast Asia. 
 
Hewison (1997) pointed out that Thai elites had economic strongholds in agro-
industrial complex and areas such as tourism (among others). As opposed to 
Malaysia, Thailand did not pursue “ethno-economic nationalism”34 or accord the 
industry a higher priority over others in its development agenda, rather opted for a 
liberal, market oriented and MNC-driven strategy to develop the industry. It was not 
until the financial crisis of 1997 that MNCs were provided with a sufficiently 
appealing catalyst to exploit Thailand’s comparative advantage with favourable 
exchange rates, liberal trade policy and non-confrontational trade unions, and 
develop the commercial vehicle production component of the local industry. Though 
the Thai government launched a plan to make the local industry the Detroit of the 
East, due to a conflict of interest between the government’s desires and the MNCs 
goals, the plan met with only limited success. Still, Intarakumnerd (2006) contends 
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that the Thaksin government did partly succeed transforming a ‘weak, fragmented 
and slow-learning’ innovation system ‘into one that can become stronger, more 
coherent and faster-learning’35, but a military coup overturned the Thaksin 
government in 2006. Kohpaiboon (2008) observed that over time the niche 
production of pickup trucks delivered volume and a platform for the whole industry 
to grow and the concentration on pickup trucks decreased over time (see Table 4.5 
for key highlights of the automotive development policies of Thailand and Malaysia). 
The price to be paid was the relegation of Thai suppliers to lower tier status, while 
foreign MNC suppliers entered the Thai market and gained first tier status. The 
autoworkers unions have been fragmented and unable to effectively coordinate their 
efforts to collectively bargain and pursue common goals (see Wad (2004a) and Wad 
(2004b)). 
 
Table 4.5: Automotive Development Policy in Thailand and Malaysia  
Thailand Malaysia 
Open door policy State-driven national automobile 
development policy 
Exporting after East Asian financial crisis of 
1997 met with success though domestic-
owned parts and components companies 
were marginalized 
National champions formed in JVs with 
Japanese OEMs were built up behind wall of 
protection and not led to success due to 
weak technological capabilities and 
targeting wrong markets 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
4.4.3. SOUTH AFRICA 
Recognizing the importance of the automobile industry in enhancing the country’s 
global economic standing, the South African government expended considerable 
resources and revenue to bolster the sector. Decades of protection allowed the South 
African automobile industry to significantly expand and diversify till the 1980s. 
Assembled vehicles were afforded prohibitive rates of protection while development 
of the components sector was encouraged through a local content requirement (60 
percent of the mass of the automobile was to be locally produced). This initial support 
resulted in an inefficient and inward oriented production set up with a large number 
of makes and models produced in low volume at high cost. Poor quality, outdated 
design specifications, and inefficient supplier chains plagued performance of the 
sector, and there was limited effort to switch locally made parts for imported 
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components (Black & Mitchell (2002) and Bronkhorst (2010)) while on the demand 
side, consumers were limited to high prices and limited choices.  
 
Industrial policy in South Africa was subsequently altered to address the issue of 
shortage of foreign exchange by imposition of local content programme phases (Table 
4.6 details the implementation of various phases since the early 1960s).. To compel 
local firms to develop the domestic vendor industry, a penalty for non-compliance of 
local content requirements was imposed of exorbitant import tariffs on components. 
 
Table 4.6: Implementation Phases for South Africa Local Content Programme 
Local Content Programme Phase Years 
Phase I 1961 – 1969 
Phase II 1970 – 1975 
Phase III 1976 – 1977 
Phase V 1978 – 1988 
Phase VI 1989 -  
Source: Bronkhorst (2010)  
 
4.4.4. PAKISTAN 
Due to the lack of the necessary skilled people Pakistan has initiated the process of 
developing the capital-goods industries through vehicle assembly in the early 
Eighties by encouraging assembly of automobiles, consumer durables and capital-
goods industries. These industries were encouraged by allowing concessional rates 
of duty ranging between zero and 60 percent on the import of components as 
compared to an average rate of about 100 percent import duties on the finished 
goods. The incentives had been provided in the hope that over a period of five years 
almost three-fourths of the components would be produced in the country. 
 
The objective of the deletion policy was to encourage local assembly and progressive 
manufacture of consumer goods to aid in reduction of the country’s import bill. The 
programme was designed in terms of percentage of Completely Built Units (CBU), 
rather than Completely Knocked-down Units (CKD), which led to exaggeration of 
indigenization of components that were relatively easy to produce with the given 
technology and capabilities present in the country. Firms were found to concentrate 
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production on the lower end of the manufacturing tier, with no incentive to make 
progress up the value chain.  
 
In the policy framework at the time, where the duty on the finished product is about 
100 percent, and the concessional import duties on components are 20 percent, huge 
profit margins were created at the assembly stage. Kemal (1988) found that these 
profits tended to decline with progressive parts manufacture; clearly a system which 
envisages the declining profit rates with indigenization does not have much prospect 
of success. Though producers were threatened with penalties to force indigenization, 
failure to carry through on the threats on the part of the government led to weak 
performance by the deletion programme.  
 
It was also observed that measuring the deletion rates in terms of CBU rather than 
CKD exaggerated the rates/levels realised by firms. Neither would crucial and 
relatively complex components that could contribute to technological capability 
development be produced locally, nor were they included in the list of components 
scheduled for deletion. Moreover, coverage of indigenization programmes was 
restricted to manufacturing of components for the industry; severely compromising 
the backward linkages of the industry with the rest of the economy.  
 
These failures led to review of the policy in late 1980s. Penalties were increased 
through withdrawal of total/partial concession in import duties of components rather 
than through capacity constraints. No rewards for indigenization were given, only 
penalties imposed for not meeting targets. Defaulters were always able to find an 
excuse for failure to meet targets and in fact, according to Kemal (1988), past 
experience suggested sponsors were always successful in extending deadline for 
deletion targets without any penalty. 
 
Of the four firms manufacturing trucks in the economy, none achieved the targeted 
rate of deletion/localization; but the firms manufacturing buses locally fared slightly 
better and achieved higher deletion rates (Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.7: Deletion Policy Targets and Achievements in the Truck and Bus Segments 
Market Segment Targets Achievements 
I Trucks 1988 1991 1988 
Firm 1 40.9 81.2 17.3 
Firm 2 38.2 82.0 27.0 
Firm 3 36.7 81.3 18.2 
Firm 4 71.5 74.2 53.9 
II Buses 1988 1991 1988 
Firm 1 40.9 81.2 17.3 
Firm 2 28.2 82.0 23.4 
Firm 3 51.4 74.9 32.0 
Firm 4 37.7 75.1 22.9 
Source: Kemal (1988) 
 
Passenger vehicles firms (cars, LCVs, pickups, jeeps) achievement also lagged far 
behind their intended targets for the year, though the progress was better for jeeps 
than cars and pickups while least amount of progress was made by van manufacturers 
(Table 4.8). 
 
Table 4.8: Deletion Targets and Achievement in the Passenger Car Segment 
Market Segment Targets Achievements 
III Passenger Vehicles 1987 1989 1987 
Cars 53.5 80.8 31.2 
Vans 55.3 73.9 23.4 
Pickups 57.4 82.9 31.1 
Jeep 55.0 81.0 45.8 
Source: Kemal (1988) 
 
The most promising progress was made in the tractors segment of the industry. Two 
tractor manufacturers made significant progress in their attempts to localize the 
production process and achieve the deletion targets that had been set. The remaining 
three did not achieve the targets set, but still made some headway (Table 4.9). 
 
The motorcycle segment also made progress in achieving the deletion targets; in 
particular the scooter rickshaw manufacturers performed really well (Table 4.10). 
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Table 4.9: Deletion Targets and Achievement in the Tractor Segment 
Segment Targets Achievements 
IV Tractors 1985 1987-88 1986 
Firm 1, Model A 64.7 81.8 66.3 
Firm 1, Model B 19.9 53.6 20.0 
Firm 2, Model A 59.9 82.4 47.3 
Firm 2, Model B 25.2 60.8 36.1 
Firm 3 60.8 87.1 48.5 
Firm 4 52.6 72.0 46.4 
Firm 5, Model A 64.9 85.6 49.8 
Firm 5, Model B 62.9 85.6 47.8 
Source: Kemal (1988) 
 
Table 4.10: Deletion Targets and Achievement in the Two Wheeler Segment 
Segment Targets Achievements 
V Two and Three Wheelers 1985 1989 1987 
Motorcycles 73.6 73.6 50.6 
Scooters 75 75 57.6 
Scooter Rickshaws 52.8 62 58.9 
Source: Kemal (1988) 
 
The industry switched over to Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
compliant Tariff Based System (TBS) in 2006. Preliminary analysis suggests that 
assemblers are adjusting to the new system with relatively more ease than 
component manufacturers with outdated production technologies and poor 
capabilities development. The government has shifted focus now towards facilitating 
the local industry through infrastructure provision, human resource development, 
technology acquisition, investment in productive assets, cluster development and 
development of standards on safety, quality and environment through a well-
structured and deliberate approach as embodied in the Automobile Industry 
Development Program (AIDP). The AIDP was originally designed to help the industry 
achieve a critical mass of production, double the contribution of auto industry to GDP 
from the existing 2.8 percent, by the year 2011-12 with high focus on investment, 
technology up gradation, increasing its exports to USD 650 million, enhancement in 
jobs alongside the development of critical components to further increase the 
competitiveness of domestically produced vehicles. However, based on the weak 
global economic environment in recent years and limited export base, local 
manufacturers are in the process of revising the AIDP targets and goals. 
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4.5. CONCLUSION 
The automobile industry has been hailed as the mother of all industries, on account 
of its intricate backward and forward linkages with the rest of the manufacturing 
sector and the economy at large. This chapter highlights the major advances that have 
been made in the automobile industry, their relevance for developing countries, the 
recent trends in the industry and the policies that have been used to shape and direct 
the development of the industry. 
 
Advances and developments in the automobile industry have wrought changes in 
society for various countries and been transferred to the rest of the world over time. 
As the discussion above has shown, there is every reason to assume that any future 
transformation in the industry will also bring about changes in countries, and 
developing countries are now ideally poised to benefit from such a transformation 
and bootstrap their development process. The supply chain of the automobile 
industry has evolved alongside the transformations taking place, allowing countries 
to realise the full benefit of the advances being made. The structure of the industry 
has also undergone change, and is now marked by a rising number of mergers and 
acquisitions and growing dominance of developing countries in emerging 
technologies.  
 
Developing countries have used policies to shape and guide the development of their 
automobile industries with varying levels of success. A comparative look at the main 
characteristics of these policies yields valuable lessons for developing countries.  
 
Much as Pakistan began with a weak industrial base, so too did Brazil, but the policies 
that evolved in the latter favoured the MNC-led approach to development and 
research suggests that the result has been limited development of domestic industry 
technological capabilities and spillovers. Malaysia on the hand, opted for the domestic 
industry led approach under the umbrella of a national industry development plan 
and have managed to achieve limited success with their domestic brands. Again, 
Thailand opted for an MNC-led approach and while achieving some success, now have 
a domestic parts industry that is underdeveloped with weak technological 
capabilities, which suggests that the domestic industry will face difficulty in the 
absence of MNC presence. The South African automotive industry in the early years 
was plagued by a number of inefficiencies that were rectified in later years, however, 
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the industry did not achieve sufficient capacity or a critical mass till the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis and remained vulnerable. 
 
The discussion that follows will look at the experience of Pakistan’s automotive 
industry in the context of the evolution and developments that have taken place in the 
industry as a whole (as covered in Section 4.2 above). The case studies will bring to 
light the changes that particular firms have been able to benefit from as they 
themselves have evolved. 
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CHAPTER 5. PAKISTAN’S AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: A 
CASE OF STALLED DEVELOPMENT 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the first time mass production was successfully introduced in the automobile 
factories of the US and the invention revolutionized not just the industry, but the 
country and eventually the world, the automotive industry has demonstrated time 
and again that it can serve as a conduit to channel and accelerate the development 
agenda of developing countries. The key characteristics of the industry highlighted 
earlier make it ideally suited to this task. Considering the state of the industrial sector 
that Pakistan inherited at the time of independence, the automobile industry has 
grown by leaps and bounds in more than half a century. Considerable growth and 
capacity was developed in the infant stages when the industry was first set up under 
government guidance and support, but technological prowess and competitiveness 
has eluded the industry for the most part though a handful of firms have managed to 
achieve a measure of global competitiveness (in terms of establishing export 
markets) and developing local technological capabilities (locally designed and 
produced components and parts). 
 
Against this backdrop, the aim of this chapter is to review the current state of affairs 
of the automotive industry in Pakistan. Towards that end, 5.2 assess where the 
industry stands at present, the key developments that have taken place are reviewed 
in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 recounts the major historical developments in the industry 
since independence, while institutional framework is covered in Section 5.5 and the 
policy framework is discussed in Section 5.6. The trends in Pakistan’s automotive 
industry are explored in Section 5.7, and an in-depth look at the development of the 
component manufacturing industry based on the results of a survey conducted in 
2010 is covered in Section 5.8, while Section 5.9 recounts the technological 
capabilities development of the component manufacturers backed by the major 
automobile OEMs. The financing of technology acquisition efforts is covered in 
Section 5.10 and Section 5.11 concludes the discussion on the state of the automotive 
industry in Pakistan. 
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5.2. STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY 
The automobile industry of Pakistan does not have a major share in total value added 
in the manufacturing sector (see Table 5.1); that distinction belongs to the two 
categories of textiles and food, beverages and tobacco, both of which are heavily 
dependent on the agricultural sector for raw materials, and which still account for 
over 50 percent of valued added in manufacturing (in 2009-10). 
 
Table 5.1: Component Ratio of Value Added in Manufacturing (2009-10) 
 (%) 
Manufacturing Group Ratio 
Textile & Apparel 35.16 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 19.11 
Petroleum 6.96 
Pharmaceutical 6.69 
Non-Metallic Minerals 5.58 
Automobile 5.27 
Fertilizers 4.50 
Chemicals 3.84 
Electronic 3.31 
Leather 3.02 
Paper & Paper Board 0.79 
Engineering 0.59 
Tyres & Tubes 0.40 
All Manufacturing 100.00 
Source: Government of Pakistan (2009) 
 
The automotive sector still manages to make an important contribution to the 
domestic economy in terms of employment, revenue and foreign exchange 
generation, not to mention human resource development (as shown in Table 5.2). The 
annual turnover for the industry is in excess of PKR 30 billion, while it contributes 
less than 3 percent to GDP. 
 
The automobile industry in Pakistan today consists primarily of several units 
producing original components for assembly (under license) under the deletion 
program [which was phased out by July 2006 under the WTO regime and replaced by 
the Tariff Based System] and other units producing reconditioned and original 
components for local use. The various units in operation can be categorized in one of 
three categories: 
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1. Big brand Original Equipment Manufacturers,  
2. Independent manufacturers, and  
3. Ancillary industry (Tier 1-3 firms producing small parts and non-automotive 
items)  
 
Table 5.2: Key Statistics of the Automotive Industry of Pakistan 
Key Statistic Value 
Economic Multiplier 1.3 
Annual Turnover PKR 30 Billion 
Investment USD 1.09 Billion 
Contribution to GDP 2.8 % (USD 3.6 Billion) 
Contribution to Revenue USD 0.82 billion (indirect taxes) 
Direct Employment 215,000 
Job Multiplier 1.8 
Vendor Base 2,200 units 
Organized and Tier One 450 
Tier Two 425 
Unorganized and after-market suppliers 1325 
Source: Author’s estimates based on data provided by PAMA, PAAPAM, EDB 
 
There are 2,000 vendors in the country with a total investment of over USD 1.09 
billion; that are engaged in the manufacturing of original components for the 
assembly operation under the deletion program (before it was replaced by the TBS 
system) as well as producing reconditioned and original components for sale in the 
local market. The parts being manufactured for local supply include pistons, engine 
valves, gaskets, camshafts, shock-absorbers, struts, steering mechanism, cylinder 
head, wheel hubs, brake drums, wheels, bumpers, instruments and instrument 
panels, gears of all types, radiators, cylinder liners, blinkers, lights, doors and door 
locks as well as auto air conditioners. In terms of the global automobile industry 
tiered supply chain, Pakistan entered the market at the Tier 3, and the ancillary 
industry has been able to make limited progress up the value chain, with a number of 
units reaching a Tier 1 status. In fact, the automotive industry of the country can be 
classified as full-line production of the major automotive vehicles (including buses, 
tractors, trucks, 3 wheeler rickshaws and motorcycles). The industry has not 
managed to significantly increase the purchase and use of domestically manufactured 
components and is regarded as labour intensive assembly shops rather than modern 
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production lines. Local component manufacturers by and large have not yet managed 
to reach international levels of operation, though a small number do manage to 
export. The majority of these manufacturers have the capability to supply only one 
component, and not an assembly of components as Tier I manufacturers do in other 
countries. The Tier I function traditionally undertaken by component manufacturers 
that have achieved sufficient technological capabilities to provide complex assemblies 
and collection of components preassembled to OEMs is currently being managed by 
the OEMs themselves in Pakistan. Moreover, component manufacturers can be 
classified as OEM suppliers/vendors or aftermarket parts suppliers. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the domestic automobile industry is comprised of a number of 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) firms manufacturing a variety of products 
in the industry, ranging from two and three wheelers to passenger cars, commercial 
vehicles and even buses and trucks. The distribution of these manufacturers is 
skewed in favour of two and three wheelers (motorcycles and autorickshaws) and 
there is a high degree of concentration in the remaining segments of the industry, as 
shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: OEM Assembling Units in Pakistan 
Sector OEM Assembling Units 
Motorcycles 57 
Auto-rickshaw 17 
Trucks and Buses 7 
Cars 6 
Tractors 6 
Pickup Truck/Van 1 
Source: Pakistan Association of Automotive Parts Accessories Manufacturers (2014) 
 
The distribution of installed capacity of the various OEM firms in the industry is given 
in Table 5.4 below and it can be seen that the majority of OEM plants for four wheel 
vehicles have been established in Karachi, while two and three wheel vehicle OEMs 
are concentrated in Lahore. There are two major OEMs for tractor production, of 
which only one is a member of PAMA, though both operate in the city of Lahore. This 
clustering of assemblers/manufacturers in two major cities has prompted the growth 
of clusters of component manufacturing industries to support their operations, a 
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trend the state is intending to capitalize on by setting up industrial parks or clusters 
in those cities to support the component manufacturing industry under the AIDP. 
 
Table 5.4: Installed Capacity at PAMA Members OEM Plants 
 Company Name City Year of 
Establish-
ment 
Installed 
Capacity 
Primary 
Automotive 
Category 
Produced 
1 Pak Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd. Karachi 1983 150,000 Passenger 
Cars 
2 Indus Motor Co. Ltd. Karachi 1989 54,800 Passenger 
Cars 
3 Honda Atlas Cars (Pakistan) 
Ltd. 
Lahore 1993 50,000 Passenger 
Cars 
4 Dewan Farooque Motors 
Ltd. 
Sajawal 1998 20,000 Passenger 
Cars 
5 Millat Tractors Ltd. Lahore 1964 45,000 Tractors 
6 Ghandhara Nissan Ltd. Karachi 1981 8,500 Buses 
7 Hinopak Motors Ltd. Karachi 1986 7,800 Buses 
8 Master Motor Corporation 
Ltd. 
Karachi 2002 Unknown Buses 
9 Sigma Motors Ltd. Karachi 1994 1,320 Jeeps 
10 Atlas Honda Ltd. Karachi 1963 750,000 Motorcycles 
11 Sazgar Engineering Works 
Ltd. 
Lahore 1991 20,000 Motorcycles 
12 Plum Qingqi Motors Ltd. Lahore 1994 Unknown Motorcycles 
13 Ravi Automobile Pvt. Ltd. Lahore 2004 75,000 Motorcycles 
14 Fateh Motors Ltd.  Hyderabad unknown Unknown Motorcycles 
15 Habib Motorcycles Pvt. Ltd. Karachi unknown Unknown Motorcycles 
16 Pakistan Cycle Industrial 
Cooperative Society Ltd. 
(Sohrab) 
Lahore 1953 Unknown Motorcycles 
17 Ghandhara Industries Ltd.  Karachi 1953 Unknown Passenger 
Cars 
18 DYL Motorcycles Ltd. Karachi 1976 200,000 Motorcycles 
Source: Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Association (PAMA) 
 
Not having the indigenous capability and production facilities to manufacture 
automobiles, the state undertook numerous joint venture agreements with firms in 
various developed countries to acquire the requisite technology and production 
know-how when development efforts in the industry got underway (as detailed in 
Table 5.5). The majority of the agreements have been formed with Japanese 
companies, though not for three-wheel production (China and Italy) or tractors (USA 
and Italy). 
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Table 5.5: Joint Venture Agreements by OEMs 
 Domestic Company OEM Affiliation 
Company Country 
1 Pakistan Cycle Industrial Cooperative 
Society Ltd. (Sohrab) 
Jincheng China 
2 Ghandhara Industries Ltd. Isuzu Japan 
3 Atlas Honda Ltd. Honda Japan 
4 Millat Tractors Ltd. Massey-Ferguson USA 
5 DYL Motorcycles Ltd. Yamaha Japan 
6 Ghandhara Nissan Ltd. Nissan Japan 
7 Master Motor Corporation Ltd. Mitsubishi Japan 
8 Pak Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd. Suzuki Japan 
9 Hinopak Motors Ltd. Hino Japan 
10 Indus Motor Co. Ltd.  Toyota Japan 
11 Sazgar Engineering Works Ltd. n/a n/a 
12 Honda Atlas Cars (Pakistan) Ltd.  Honda Japan 
13 Sigma Motors Ltd.  Land Rover UK/India 
14 Plum Qingqi Motors Ltd. Qingqi China 
15 Fateh Motors Ltd. Belarus MTZ Belarus 
16 Dewan Farooque Motors Ltd. Hyundai South Korea 
17 Ravi Automobile Pvt. Ltd. Piaggio Italy 
18 Habib Motorcycles Pvt. Ltd.   
19 Daewoo Pakistan Motors Ltd. Daewoo South Korea 
20 Raja Motors Vespa/Fiat Italy 
Source: Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Association (PAMA) 
 
This trend is reflected in the market share of the companies in the domestic economy. 
Japanese companies have managed to dominate the truck and buses subsector by 
taking 100 percent of the market share, and the majority (90 percent each) of 
passenger cars and motorcycle market in Pakistan, while non-Japanese brands; 
namely Massey Ferguson and Fiat dominate the tractor market. The market for light 
commercial vehicles is evenly split between two Japanese firms and a South Korean 
firm (see Table 5.6). 
 
Among the four-wheel vehicle Japanese OEMs, Pak Suzuki Co. has secured 40 percent 
of the market (Table 5.7) due to the popularity of its 800-1,000cc passenger cars. 
Indus Motor’s Toyota sedan is popular due to easy availability of spare parts in the 
domestic market and accounts for almost 30 percent of the market. 
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Table 5.6: Market Share by Sector and Company 
OEM 
Affiliation 
Passenger 
Cars 
Motorcycles Trucks/Buses Tractors LCVs 
Japan 90% 90% 100% 0% 50% 
 Suzuki Suzuki Nissan  Suzuki 
 Toyota Yamaha Hino  Toyota 
 Honda Honda Mazda   
 Nissan     
 Daihatsu     
      
Others 10% 10% 0% 100% 50% 
 Hyundai Various 
Chinese Firms 
 Massey 
Ferguson 
Hyundai 
 Fiat   Fiat  
 Kia     
Source: Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Association (PAMA) 
 
Table 5.7: Passenger Cars Market Shares by OEMs 
  (%) 
Brand Domestic Company Market Share 
Suzuki Pak Suzuki Co. 40.20 
   
Toyota Indus Motors 29.80 
   
Honda Honda Atlas 14.70 
   
Kia-Hyundai Dewan Farooq Motors 14.50 
   
Nissan Ghandhara Nissan 0.80 
Source: Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Association (PAMA) 
 
In the market for two wheeler vehicles, Atlas Honda has maintained its dominance, 
though it is facing increasing competition from other Japanese brands and various 
Chinese brands that are beginning to establish themselves in the domestic market on 
account of lower prices (see Table 5.8). However, due to a better after sale support 
network and warranty service, Honda is managing to maintain its lead over the other 
companies, and a state of the art assembly plant at the Skeikhpura site that is capable 
of turning out a motorcycle every 30 seconds is expected to ensure the maintains its 
position in the future as well. 
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Table 5.8: Motorcycle Market Shares by OEMs 
 (%) 
Brand Domestic Company Market Share 
Honda Atlas Honda 65.70 
   
Rustam and Sohrab Chinese brands 2.90 
   
Chinese brand Saigol Qingqi 3.70 
   
Yamaha Dawood Yahama 19.30 
   
Suzuki Pak Suzuki Motorcycle 6.20 
   
Hero Fateh Motors 2.20 
Source: Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Association (PAMA) 
 
Pak Suzuki has also managed to establish itself in the market for LCVs by capturing 
50 percent of total shares, while Indus Motor Co. and Dewan Farooq Motors account 
for the other 50 percent (Table 5.9). 
 
Table 5.9: LCV Market Share by OEMs 
    (%) 
Brand Domestic Company Market Share 
Suzuki Pick-up/Van Pak Suzuki 50.00 
   
Kia Pick-up Dewan Farooq Motors 37.50 
   
Toyota Hilux Indus Motors Co. 12.50 
Source: Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Association (PAMA) 
 
The bulk of agricultural tractors used in the country are manufactured by two 
companies; Millat Tractors and Al-Ghazi Tractors. Rebranded Fiat tractors under the 
name of Universal Tractors are also manufactured by a local firm, G. M. Tractors, but 
accounts for only 1 percent of the market, thus not offering much competition to 
Millat or Al-Ghazi Tractors (Table 5.10). 
 
Pakistan is one of the few countries in the world that implemented a local content 
requirement program when the industry was first set up to encourage import 
substitution of foreign manufactured components in the automotive manufacturing 
process. The tractor firms have managed to achieve the greatest measure of local 
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content of all the other firms in the industry (in excess of 96 percent as shown in Table 
5.11, with the passenger car manufacturers having the lowest level of local content 
level, at roughly 70 percent. The key components required in the design and 
manufacture of an automobile are being imported from abroad and incorporated with 
the remaining components manufactured locally, decreasing the chances of 
manufacturing those components locally. Foreign firms will be averse to local firms 
manufacturing the components since quality control will be difficult to maintain, and 
they will be in danger of losing their bargaining power and market position. This does 
not bode well for the industry in terms of developing the level of local technological 
capabilities and thereby having the capacity to successfully develop and produce a 
local brand that is capable of competing with the other established brands being 
assembled. The high degree of local content achieved in tractors and motorcycles 
means that only small components such as timing belts, bearings, springs and screws 
etc. are being imported from abroad, while the bulk of the vehicle is being 
manufactured locally. 
 
Table 5.10: Tractor Market Shares by OEMs 
  (%) 
Brand Company Market Share 
Fiat Al-Ghazi Tractors 50.90 
   
Massey Ferguson Millat Tractors 48.10 
   
Universal G. M. Tractors Ltd. 1.00 
Source: Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Association (PAMA) 
 
Table 5.11: Local Content Level Achievement by Sector (2012) 
 (%) 
Sector Local Components Used 
Cars Up to 70 
Tractors 96 
Motorcycles 95 
Three Wheelers 80 
Source: Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Association (PAMA) 
 
The Auto Industry Development Policy (AIDP) was formulated by the state to 
transform the domestic automobile industry into a globally competitive player 
through expansion of production and contribution to GDP of 5.6 percent by 2012. The 
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targeted increase in production rates has not been realized since the policy was first 
implemented (see Table 5.12) and as a result the planned contribution to GDP has 
also not been achieved. 
 
Table 5.12: AIDP Targets versus Actual Production Rates 
(‘000 Units) 
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
AIDP 
Production 
Target 
200 250 310 380 440 560 
Actual 
Production 
203 194 112 143 154 179 
Shortfall 
(Excess) 
(3) 56 198 237 286 381 
Source: JICA (2011) and author’s calculations 
 
Comparison of actual production of four wheel vehicles versus AIDP targets shows 
actual production exceeded the target only in the first year of implementation of AIDP. 
Since then the shortfall has grown by leaps and bounds and without expansion of 
installed capacity it is unlikely the future targets can be realised by the domestic 
industry. 
 
5.3. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE 
MARKET 
There are several key characteristics of the Pakistan automotive market that sets the 
country apart from other developing countries and that should be borne in mind. 
 
5.3.1. SKEWED MARKET SHARE 
The domestic automotive market for four wheel (except tractors) and two wheel 
vehicles (till recently) was heavily skewed towards Japanese companies that had 
managed to maintain their market shares even in difficult economic circumstances. 
For example, Suzuki had a 73 percent market share in LCV, vans and jeeps, but when 
Master entered the market with low cost vehicles, Suzuki adjusted its production 
patterns and withdrew from the market and concentrated on the remaining vehicle 
types in production. The market share of Suzuki in pickup trucks for example 
increased from 20 percent in 2004-05 to 80 percent in 2009-10. However, this 
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allowed Master to attain a virtual monopoly in the LCV, van and jeep segment (JICA 
(2011)). A similar situation occurred in the motorcycle market with the introduction 
of low-cost Chinese clones of the popular Honda CD-70 brand motorcycle, with 
Japanese firm’s market share dropping from 97 percent in 1999-2000 to 37 percent 
in 2009-10. 
 
5.3.2. DEMAND PREFERENCES OF DOMESTIC CONSUMERS 
In contrast to other developing countries, the high income group in Pakistan 
dominates demand in the market for large passenger cars, which means that market 
expansion is limited since the high income group accounts for the smallest percentage 
of the country’s population. On the other hand, the markets in India and China (for 
example) are dominated by smaller, lower priced passenger cars being demanded by 
the low and middle income groups of the population. Small business owners and 
individuals dominate the market for buses and trucks in Pakistan, rather than 
companies and the state, as is the case in other developing countries. 
 
5.3.3. POPULARITY OF SPECIFIC BRANDS 
Consumer preferences are skewed in favour of specific brands in each category of the 
industry, with the result that companies that manufacture the popular brands tend to 
operate at capacity in peak demand season. With demand exceeding supply 
consumers are left waiting extended periods of time before receiving delivery of their 
vehicles, and this creates an unhealthy attraction towards paying a fee or bribe to 
expedite delivery of the vehicle. 
 
5.4. HISTORY OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
To overcome the initial difficulties faced by the country in first setting up a 
manufacturing sector, the government focused its efforts on developing 
infrastructural facilities and establishing the Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation (PIDC) in 1950. The main objective of PIDC was to play the pioneering 
role of establishing such industries which the private enterprise was unable to 
undertake either because they were technologically complex, needed large capital or 
were less profitable. Genesis of the domestic automobile industry can be traced to the 
early 1950s, when PIDC helped establish National Motors in collaboration with 
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General Motors (US) Overseas Distribution Company for the assembly of Bedford 
trucks. Subsequently buses, light trucks and cars were assembled in the same plant 
and the industry has matured with time (as evident from the timeline of 
manufacturing operations evolution by decade given in Table 5.13). 
 
Table 5.13: Period-wise Manufacturing Operations Breakdown in the Automotive Industry 
Sector Period Manufacturing Operations Vehicles Produced 
Private 1950’s SKD Assembly Trucks 
Buses 
Private 1960’s SKD/CKD Assembly with indigenization in: Trucks 
Buses 
  i) Bedford trucks / buses: ~ 40% Ford vans 
  ii)Cars: 20% Vauxhall, Ford 
Prefect, Ford Cortina 
and Dodge Dart cars 
Public 1970’s SKD/CKD Assembly  
Indigenization process accelerated and 
achieved 80% deletion in Bedford 
trucks/buses by 1976. 
Trucks 
Buses 
cars (up to 1972) 
Private 1980 -
2005 
Progressive manufacturing of automobiles 
under Deletion Programme 
Suzuki, Toyota, 
Honda, Hyundai, 
Santro, Kia, Cuore, 
Revo and Chevrolet 
cars. 
Private 2006 
onwards 
Progressive manufacturing of automobiles 
under Tariff Based System 
(as above) 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
The push towards achieving a degree of independence in automobile production 
began in earnest in the mid-1960s, with National Motors, being taken over by a local 
entrepreneur and now known as Ghandhara Industries, and Mack Trucks began local 
manufacturing of simple and non-functional parts and allowed for the phased 
addition of more and more complicated parts. According to 100% local manufacture 
or “deletion”36 was expected to be achieved in the relatively short span of seven to ten 
                                                             
36 Kemal (1988) 
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years, but this proved to be overly optimistic, and the program failed to achieve its 
targets; achieving only 40% indigenization for trucks and a mere 20% for cars. 
 
In early 1972 under Martial Law Regulation, the Government took over the control of 
32 industrial units, including eight automobile plants, under the officially appointed 
Board of Industrial Management with the Minister for Production as its Chairman. 
Initially, the management of these industries was taken over by the government itself, 
but in August 1973, the President promulgated the Economic Reforms (Amendment) 
Ordinance after which the Federal Government acquired majority ownership of 
shares of these industrial units. After nationalization, these units were renamed (see 
Table 5.14 for a list of automotive industry units that were taken over by the state), 
their functions were redefined and Pakistan Automobile Corporation (PACO) was 
created in 1973 as a holding corporation under the administrative control of the 
federal Ministry of Production. 
 
Table 5.14: Nationalization of Automotive OEMs in 1970s 
Pre 1973 Title Post Nationalized Title 
Wazir Ali Engineering Sindh Engineering 
Ali Autos Awami Autos 
Haroon Autos / Karachi Autos Republic Motors 
Gandhara Industries National Motors 
Hyesons Mack Trucks 
Rana Tractors Millat Tractors 
Jaffer Trailer Development Corporation 
Kandawala Industries Naya Daur 
Source: Compiled by Author  
 
PACO was a major public industrial conglomerate of 15 companies including four 
joint ventures. Emphasis was on developing the nationalized units of local 
manufacturing units in an organized manner and a system of standardization, 
regulations and monitoring was established. This required the industry to assemble 
Complete Knock-Down (CKD) kits and then proceed to manufacture components and 
also achieve a local content of 75 percent over a five year period. A number of small 
and large industrial units that were mostly functioning in the unorganized sector 
were thus organized into a more formal pattern of production management under 
control of PACO. The direction for achieving quality standards as laid down by the 
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"Principals" (another term for the foreign Joint Venture partner used by EDB officials) 
was also established. The Ministry of Industries in conjunction with the Central Board 
of Revenue (CBR) was entrusted with the responsibility of allowing any waiver for 
non-performance. 
 
The distinctive feature of this nationalization period was the assembly of Suzuki range 
of vehicles and Isuzu Trucks and Buses in the public sector. Awami Autos signed a 
Joint Venture Agreement with Suzuki Motor Co. of Japan and a new company by the 
name of Pak Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd was established in 1982 to produce Suzuki range 
of vehicles at the existing facilities of Awami Autos. 
 
In the late 1980s, nationalization of key sectors of the economy was reversed as the 
government sought to liberalize in the aftermath of lukewarm performance by 
nationalized industries. Control of industries was relinquished to the private sector 
and a number of new joint ventures were encouraged to develop the industry further; 
most notable among these being Atlas Motors with Honda, Japan and Indus Motor 
with Toyota, Japan. 
 
5.4.1. THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD (1947 - 1972) 
The first automobile plant in the country was set up in May 1949 by General Motor & 
Sales Co. and commenced production on an experimental basis, but it rapidly grew 
into an assembly plant for Bedford trucks and Vauxhall cars. Witnessing this progress, 
three leading US auto-makers also started collaboration with Pakistani entrepreneurs 
to set up: 
1. Ali Automobiles to assemble Ford products in 1955, 
2. Haroon Industries to assemble Chrysler's Dodge cars in 1956, and 
3. Kandawalla Industries to assemble American Motor products in 1962. 
4. In addition, Hyesons established the Mack Trucks plant in 1963. 
 
All the plants were restricted to semi-knocked down (SKD) assembly operations only. 
In 1963 the General Motors plant was sold to Ghandhara Industries Limited and in 
1966 it was granted permission to undertake the progressive manufacture of Bedford 
trucks and buses. This is generally accepted as the beginning of the automotive sector 
in Pakistan. 
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The absence of organised components' manufacturing facilities, lack of technical 
know-how and non-existence of proper ancillary facilities for the design and 
development of tools, jigs and fixtures retarded the pace of indigenization at this 
stage, while only half-hearted efforts appear to have been made for technology 
acquisition and the training and development of personnel in the industry. 
 
5.4.2. PERIOD OF PROGRESSIVE MANUFACTURING (1964-72) 
The promising potential of industry and high demand of the products attracted new 
entrants was evident in the first half of the 1960s, whereas existing manufacturers 
started producing in mass quantities. The mass production that started in 1964 
resulted in the first ever period of progressive manufacturing in the history of 
Pakistan. The idea of progressive manufacturing was first mooted by the Ghandhara 
Industries and Mack Trucks. The idea was to start local manufacturing with simple 
and non-functional parts and to add more and more complicated parts in small steps. 
According to planning at the time, 100 percent local manufacturing was to be 
achieved in seven to ten years. However, this period did not last long as the projects 
undertaken proved to be over ambitious and eventually failed without achieving their 
goals. 
 
Clearly the concept of progressive manufacturing did not add much to technology, 
self-reliance or economy. For example, as against the targets set of manufacturing 100 
percent of local content in 10 years (maximum), actually achieved deletion in 18 years 
was 45.78 percent for trucks and buses, 43.17 percent for trucks & buses engines, 
16.50 percent for 4x4 jeeps and 0 percent for cars. Furthermore, no new units for 
manufacturing passenger cars, 4x4 vehicles, LCVs, buses and trucks were established 
under this concept, but still few new units for producing tractors, jeeps and 
specialized vehicle were established. New units established were Atlas Honda, 
Khawaja Autos, Rana Tractors, Jaffar Industries, and Bela Engineers. A more market 
oriented approach was observed by Honda motorcycles and Vespa scooters during 
this period, as they introduced light motorcycles for the first time in a market 
dominated by heavy motor bikes like BSA, Triumph and Lamberetta scooters. 
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5.4.3. NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIES (1973-87) 
The nationalisation of key industries, including automobile manufacturing units, 
through the Economic Reform Order of 1972 is stated to have brought about some 
rationalisation in the role of the then existing automobile companies. The units were 
renamed and their functions redefined: A Board of Industrial Management was 
constituted to formulate a national policy for industrialisation and also to oversee and 
coordinate the functions of the newly-nationalised units. This was a gigantic task and 
later various corporations were established to look after each major industrial sector, 
such as, automobiles, cement, fertilisers and engineering. 
 
From accounts of the time, the step to formulate a national policy on industrialisation 
demonstrated lack of the required conviction. The objective of the corporations 
appeared to show that the public sector could run industries better only if it earned 
higher profits, however the desired national approach was missing and the targets 
remained undefined or obscure. Strategies and future plans were not made during the 
whole decade of the 70s and even the early part of the 80s. 
 
This coincided with model changes by the principals and also shifting of consumers' 
preference towards updated and more reliable products as well as a time when the 
Japanese manufacturing industry gained a sure and significant foothold in the global 
market. Finally, it was realised that the integration of the public and the private 
sectors was absolutely necessary to achieve national objectives and that without 
healthy competition consumers and the national economy would continue to suffer. 
This realisation led to the reorganisation of several existing units along with the 
addition of a few new undertakings in the public and private sectors. Awami Autos 
was turned into Pak-Suzuki Motor Company Ltd. and commenced progressive 
manufacture of Suzuki vehicles, including 800 cc passenger cars. Progressive 
manufacturing of Fiat tractors was assigned to a new joint venture company, "Al-
Ghazi Tractors Ltd.," under the management of the Habib Group. Republic Motors Co. 
was renamed as Hino-Pak and became a joint venture company under private sector 
management. One more plant, Ghandhara-Nissan, was sanctioned in the private 
sector to undertake the progressive manufacture of trucks. Three new tractor plants 
were also set up in the private sector. Side by side, two units were established under 
PACO to manufacture automotive castings and wheels. 
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The requirement for another car manufacturing plant was also felt in the mid-eighties, 
but the Government was not able to take a firm decision until April 1989 when a 
sanction was granted to the House of Habib and the Toyota Motor Corporation of 
Japan to set up a modern plant to progressively manufacture Toyota's best-selling 
automobile, the Corolla passenger cars, as well as other popular vehicles. 
 
5.4.4. PRIVATIZATION OF INDUSTRIES (1987-95) 
The policy of de-nationalizing public sector units was adopted once the change in 
government took place. Privatization brings in foreign companies. This results in a 
number of joint ventures. Due to these ventures, Pakistan auto industry entered into 
assembly/progressive manufacture of passenger cars, commercial vehicles and 
motorcycles. Once the new management of cars and motorcycle assemblers took over 
the control they entered into joint ventures with foreign companies, mostly Japanese, 
for further development. The most significant joint ventures at the time were those of 
Atlas with Honda and Indus Motor with Toyota. 
 
Subsequent to the discontinuation of the AMC-Jeep franchise, the Naya Daur 
Company, which become a mere vendor to Pak Suzuki (assembling Suzuki Jeeps), was 
sold to Tawakal group. Under the Government de-nationalization policy, Naya Daur 
entered into a joint venture with Kia Motors of Korea and started assembling Kia 
Ceres Pickups and Kia Pride Cars. The government has persisted with the 
privatisation of companies, but the process is far from transparent, riddled with 
short-comings and the benefits unsure. 
 
5.5. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The institutional framework surrounding the automotive industry is comprised of 
numerous associations representing stakeholders in the industry and state 
institutions set up for the purpose of guiding and nurturing the industry as it grows. 
 
5.5.1. INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS 
There are a number of entrepreneurial associations established in the country to 
represent the interests of various different groups in dealings with the state and 
promote their goals and objective in policy formulation and implementation. 
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Pakistan Automotive Manufacturers Association (PAMA) 
PAMA is a politically strong group established in 1994 to safeguard the interests of its 
members by playing a role in policy making process and also lobbying the state. The 
major automotive manufacturers operating in all segments of the industry are 
members of PAMA. In the case of four wheel vehicles, PAMA members combined 
account for 99.9 percent of the domestic market share. 
 
Association of Pakistan Motorcycle Assemblers (APMA) 
Motorcycle assemblers/manufacturers that are collaborating with Chinese brand 
manufacturers and entered the domestic market in the 1990s have opted not to join 
PAMA and have instead formed an informal association amongst themselves; the 
Association of Pakistan Motorcycle Assemblers. 
 
Pakistan Association of Automotive Parts and Accessories Manufacturers 
(PAAPAM) 
PAAPAM was formed by the organized segment of the automotive parts 
manufacturers, all supplying parts to OEMs, in 1988 to represent component 
manufacturers’ interests at state level and provide technical and management 
support to its members. PAAPAM was the result of continued dissatisfaction with 
implementation and weak enforcement of the deletion/localization policy and the 
core demand of the association has continued to be greater transparency in 
government policy (deletion earlier and now in the TBS and AIDP). 
 
Regional Chambers of Commerce and Industries (CCI) 
There are Chambers of Commerce and Industries (CCI) in the major cities of the 
country representing the interests of all manufacturing sector enterprises, including 
automotive manufacturers and component manufacturers alike. 
 
All Pakistan Motor Dealers Association (APMDA) 
Automotive sales representatives and dealers have formed the All Pakistan Motor 
Dealers Association to represent their interests in dealings with the state. 
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5.5.2. STATE INSTITUTIONS 
Ministry of Industry and Production (MoIP) 
It was highlighted earlier that at the time of Independence Pakistan did not possess a 
meaningful industrial base that could be used to drive the growth and development 
of the new born economy. The task of formulating the appropriate policy and serving 
as the focal point for developing the industrial sector of the economy was entrusted 
to the Ministry of Industry (MoI) established in the early 1950s. The Ministry of 
Production (MoP) was set up in the aftermath of the wave of nationalization that took 
place in early 1970s to supervise and manage the new public sector industrial units 
created. When state emphasis shifted back to private sector led growth in the 1990s, 
the management role of the two ministries in public sector enterprises was curtailed 
and remaining operations were merged into a single institution, the Ministry of 
Industries and Production (MoIP), now tasked with leading the formulation and 
implementation of a comprehensive strategy of industrialization of the economy. A 
total of eighteen organizations fall under the purview of the MoIP (core functions for 
nine organizations most relevant to the automotive industry are given in Table 5.15 
below,37). It is clear that combined the organizations cover a wide spectrum of activity 
related to the development of the industrial sector, however, they appear to have 
overlapping functions at times and coordinating and communicating among the 
organizations is problematic at best which will create difficulty in implementing 
policies. 
 
To complicate the matter further, it appears that the view of the state on how best to 
proceed with the industrial development of the country has again undergone change, 
with the Ministry being bifurcated into two independent Ministries; MoP and MoI. 
These changes do not send a promising signal to potential investors or inspire 
confidence in the plans of the state for guiding the growth and development of the 
sector. 
 
 
                                                             
37 The list of other attached organizations is presented in Appendix A 
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Table 5.15: Organizations of MoIP and their Core Functions 
 Name of Organization Core Function 
1 Export Processing Zone Authority 
(EPZA) 
Export promotion  
2 Engineering Development Board 
(EDB) 
Promote industrial development in 19 
subsectors 
3 National Industrial Parks 
Development and Management 
Company (NIPDM) 
Develop and manage infrastructure and 
industrial sites and clusters 
4 National Productivity Organization 
(NPO) 
Promote improvement of productivity and 
competition in industrial sector 
5 Pakistan Industrial Technical 
Assistance Center (PITAC) 
Provide technical advice and training related to 
engineering sector 
6 Pakistan Institute of Management 
(PIM) 
Provide training for managers 
7 Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development Authority (SMEDA) 
Provide support to SME 
8 Technology Upgrading and Skill 
Development Company (TUSDEC) 
To establish Common Facility and Skill 
Development Centres for engineering sector 
9 Pakistan Automotive Corporation 
(PACO)  
Source: Ministry of Industries & Production (MoIP) 
 
Engineering Development Board (EDB) 
The EDB is currently responsible for strengthening the engineering sector of the 
economy and integrating it in the global marketplace for the purpose of driving 
economic growth and accomplishes this goal through policy formulation and 
implementation. However, the Board was initially set up in 1995 to deliberate and 
recommend tariff adjustments to MoIP for the purpose of developing domestic 
industries and also coordinate and cooperate with industries in this regard. Thus, EDB 
has taken over a ministry level role while not being afforded the full powers that 
would normally go along with that role. 
 
National Industrial Parks Development and Management Company (NIPDMC) 
NIPDMC was established as special public – private partnership initiative of MoIP to 
encourage industrial growth in the country by developing industrial parks across the 
country, and has yet to yield any tangible benefits to the automotive industry. 
 
Pakistan Industrial Technical Assistance Center (PITAC) 
PITAC was established in 1962 with the merger of Industrial Research and 
Development Centre (IRDC) and Industrial Productivity Centre (IPC) under MoIP for 
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the purpose of rendering assistance in a number of activities related to industrial 
production, ranging from the design and manufacture of production tooling 
equipment, prototyping and training workers in various industries. It should be noted 
that the automotive OEMs have independent facilities and sources for such activities, 
and it is not clear to what extent the component manufacturers in the country are 
managing to avail the services offered. 
 
Technology Upgradation and Skill Development Company (TUSDEC) 
TUSDEC was established in 2005 for the express purpose of assisting key industries 
in upgrading their production technology and has completed a number of projects to 
accomplish this goal in various industries, some of which naturally have links with 
the automotive industry. Again, the major automotive OEMs have upgraded 
technology on their own initiative rather than relying on TUSDEC. 
 
5.6. POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Industry stakeholders firmly believe that inconsistent policies formulated and 
implemented by the state have led to the difficulties the industry currently finds itself 
facing. The automobile industry has in fact been the subject of state policy and 
attention since the time of independence, and this could account for the 
inconsistencies that have been observed by the industry as the state attempts to 
reconcile demands on limited resources and the desire to promote industrial 
development. Private sector support by the state in the years after Independence gave 
way to asserting control of industrial activity under nationalization in the 1970s. A 
state corporation was set up under a joint venture agreement with Suzuki Motor 
Corporation (SMC) of Japan at this time, and state involvement continued till there 
was a renewed interest in privatization and promoting the role of the private sector. 
This move towards the open economy after 1977 led to the entry of several foreign 
assembly OEMs in the industry for CKD production of various automotive brands. 
Policy focus then shifted to localization of parts under deletion/localization 
programme promoting local component production. The need to comply with WTO 
guidelines led to replacement of the deletion programme with the Tariff Based System 
(TBS) which continued to support local production of components under the tariff 
system. Promising growth by the industry led to the formulation of the Auto Industry 
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Development Program (AIDP) that included the TBS as one of its components. These 
developments have been interspersed with policy changes relating to the import of 
various automotive components, and CBUs to satisfy domestic demands (such as 
mounting public pressure on the state to counter price increases or long delivery 
delays imposed by local OEMs). It has been observed that the clientelist nature of 
political settlements in the country is such that the state invariably attempts to 
accommodate the demands by various groups that have conflicting interests which 
leads to inconsistency at the policy level (see Figure 5.1 for the trade-offs between 
impact of state policies and interests on industrial performance). 
 
Figure 5.1: Impact of State Policies and Interests on Industrial Performance 
 
Source: JICA (2011), author 
 
Under the umbrella of national economic development guided by five year 
development plans that cover virtually the entire history of the country since 
Independence (see Table 5.16 for years covered), MoIP has been mandated with 
developing the industrial sector of the country to become competitive in a global 
environment. To achieve this goal MoIP formulated a number of policies; and the key 
features of the more notable ones in recent years are briefly covered here. 
 
The policy of 2005 (see Box 5.1) covered a wide range of areas, however due to an 
unfavourable external environment, poor law and order situation within the country 
and natural calamities, the policy goals were not achieved. Whereas the state in 
countries such as South Korea was able to use crises to motivate the desired economic 
activity and achieve development goals, the state in Pakistan lacked the strength and 
Inconsistent policies dampen economic activity and 
investment prospects
•Frequent attempts at nationalization
•Import of automotive components and new CBU allowed 
under special circumstances (SROs)
•Import of used cars
Long term interest in the development of the industry 
provides an enabling environment
•Joint ventures setup with numerous foreign OEMs
•Establishment of government agencies to assist the industry 
- EDB
•AIDP formulated with stakeholder input/consultation
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leadership to guide economic activity in a similar fashion. Given the wide coverage of 
the policy the likelihood is that the demands placed on the state by the interested 
parties were considerable and conflicting and it was unable to allocate the resources 
effectively to achieve policy objectives. 
 
Table 5.16: Coverage of Pakistan's Five Year Plans 
Title of Plan Years Covered 
First Five-Year Plan(s) 1948 – 1955; 1955 - 1960 
Second Five Year Plan 1960 – 1965 
Third Five Year Plan 1965 – 1970 
Fourth Five Year Plan 1970 – 1975 
Fifth Five Year Plan 1978 – 1983 
Sixth Five Year Plan 1983 – 1988 
Seventh Five Year Plan 1988 – 1993 
Eighth Five Year Plan 1993 – 1998 
Medium Term Development Framework 2005 – 2010 
Tenth Five Year Plan 2010 - 2015 
Source: JICA (2011) 
 
Box 5.1: Highlights of Industrial Growth Policy 2005 
 
Source: JICA (2011) 
 
 
 
Source: JICA (2011) 
Vision 2030 (2006) 
Goals include: increasing Per Capita Income to USD 4,000 by the year 2030 
Focus on: 
 Promotion of high value added industries (including automobile industry) 
 Effectiveness of industrial policies 
Towards A Prosperous Pakistan: A Strategy for Rapid Industrial Growth (2005) 
Goal:  
 To encourage industrial growth  
Focus on: 
 Deregulation of factor input markets for capital, land and labour force 
 Proper execution of contracts 
 Simplification of tariff and tax systems 
 Export promotion (as well as trade with Central Asia) 
 Human resource development 
 Infrastructure development (including power, transportation and industrial parks) 
 SME promotion 
Box 5.2: Highlights of Vision 2030 (2006) 
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Source: JICA (2011) 
 
5.7. TRENDS IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
Over the decades, the automobile industry has exhibited mediocre performance in 
terms of sustainable and persistent growth (see Table 5.17). Data on production in 
the automobile industry is available for the period from 1974-75 to date, and shows 
that the industry’s performance has been the highest during the 1970s and then again 
during the 2000s. Performance declined in the 1980s, and fell further in the 1990s to 
less than 4% during the 1990s. The high growth registered in the last four or five 
years has generally been attributed to the country's business friendly policies along 
with lower tariff rates, persistent growth in GDP, and per capita income, while the 
initial increase is most likely on account of the massive investment undertaken during 
the formative years when the country’s industrial base was being established from 
scratch. 
 
Table 5.17: Decade-wise Automobile Industry Growth Performance  
 (%) 
Growth Rates 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Industry Total 22.7 8.4 3.6 30.6 
 Cars  20.3 4.1 24.4 
 Trucks 7.8 -8.4 18.7 25.3 
 Buses 7.1 5.3 23.3 0.8 
 Jeeps -5.9 3.9 -1.6 32.5 
 Light Commercial Vehicles 108.4 8.0 -1.5 19.2 
 Tractors 6.8 13.6 13.4 7.0 
 Motorcycles 31.6 9.7 4.2 37.3 
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics n.d. 
 
National Industrial Policy 2010: Rebuilding Pakistan’s Manufacturing Base (2010-
11) 
Goal: Turn Pakistan into a factory for the world rather than a shop by doubling labour 
productivity in ten years  
Focus on: 
 Macroeconomic stabilization 
 Bringing provincial development into parity 
 Priority given to development of various high value-added industries (including 
the automobile industry) and engineering industries 
 Reorganization of EDB as Industrial Development Board (IDB) 
Box 5.3: Highlights of Industrial Policy 2010 
205 
Since 2001-02, the automobile market has grown by over 40 per cent per annum and 
if an average growth of 30 per cent is maintained during the coming years, the 
country's auto market was expected to cross the milestone of 500,000 units by the 
year 2010. 
 
The tremendous rise in automobile production has resulted from increased domestic 
demand, giving a healthy impetus to the industrial output and generating over 
150,000 direct employment opportunities besides contributing substantially in 
duties and tax revenues to the national exchequer. 
 
Pakistan has made its debut in the vehicle export market by exporting its first batch 
of Land Rover Defenders to Sri Lanka. M/s Sigma Motors - the sole distributor and 
assembler of Land Rovers in the country - holds the distinction of being the first 
exporter of these diesel engine vehicles. Since starting assembly operations in May 
2002, Sigma motors have assembled over 3,000 Land Rover Defenders, which are in 
use all over the country. Now, the company is geared to assemble 2,000 vehicles per 
annum. In addition to looking after the needs of fleet customers, the company is also 
pursuing export opportunities in the regional countries. 
 
As far as the production of cars in the country is concerned, against 33,419 cars in 
1995-96, production stood at 165,965 units in 2005-06, showing an increase of 430 
per cent during the last 10 years. Local carmakers manufactured 176,016 cars in 
2006-07, but production levels have since fallen as the country has fallen in the grips 
of a severe global and domestic economic crisis with 164,710 cars being produced in 
2007-08. Projections were made for the domestic industry to have achieved an annual 
production target of 500,000 cars by the year 2010. 
 
Similarly, the indigenous production of motorcycles increased by 25 per cent during 
2005-06, reaching to an all-time high of 520,124 as compared to 106,797 units in 
1996-97, which accounts for around 380 per cent increase in motorcycle production 
during the last nine years. Pakistan aimed at producing 700,000 units of motorcycles 
during the year 2006-07. Having matched the local demand for motorcycles, the 
country has started exporting the units over and above its national requirements to a 
number of foreign markets. 
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The production of trucks as well as that of buses has also shown promising growth 
during the last 10 years. Some 2,994 units of trucks were being produced in the 
country in 1995-96 which, over the years, have increased to 4,518 units, showing a 
rise of 51 per cent. In the case of buses, the rise in production is more pronounced as 
compared to that of trucks as their production augmented by around 74 per cent 
during the last decade or so. 
 
One hopes that the cycle of rise in demand and supply in the auto sector would have 
a healthy effect on the national economy as a whole, ensuring continuity in its growth. 
It has already led to the growth of a fairly strong auto-parts manufacturing/ vending 
industry, which is not only meeting the demand of the local assemblers in a sizeable 
number of auto-parts, but some firms are also competing for a share in the global 
auto-parts market. 
 
5.8. STATE OF AUTOMOTIVE PARTS MANUFACTURERS IN 
PAKISTAN 
In Chapter 4 we discussed the changing nature of the automotive industry as it has 
evolved, moving from craft production to mass production to Just-In-Time and most 
recently to lean and agile production systems. Along the way the industry has 
developed deep linkages with a number of other industries and also seen the birth of 
a supporting industry to produce the parts and components used in the manufacture 
of automotive vehicles. Thus this supporting industry, the automotive parts 
manufacturing industry, plays a vital role in determining the competitiveness of the 
domestic automotive industry since the OEMs productivity depends on the efficiency 
of the components they are supplied. In Pakistan the majority of automotive parts 
manufacturers are in the unorganized sector and of approximately 2,200 (mostly 
small and medium-size) enterprise units, 450 units supply OEM manufacturers with 
parts. The remaining units are catering to the local repair parts market, forming the 
unorganized sector of the industry. Compared to the automotive parts industry that 
generally emerges in developed and developing countries, in Pakistan components 
and parts vendors manufacture single unit products rather than complex parts, 
though they supply OEMs directly. 
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Location on the supply chain of these firms is Tier I, but the complexity of the products 
manufactured is rather simple, which would put them in Tier II category. This 
suggests that Tier I vendors as they are known are not present in Pakistan, and the 
reason is likely due to the stunted development of the parts industry since the 1970s. 
The industry itself at the time was lacking in several key respects; most notably in the 
development of technical know-how, presence of organized manufacturing facilities 
and also R & D facilities. Working with what was available, the parts industry initially 
brought in production technology from abroad to produce castings, gears and 
cylinder blocks. Production was later expanded when the industry underwent a phase 
of privatization and LCP was accorded priority in the 1990s. In 1995, the state 
launched Product Specific Deletion Program (PSDP) to nurture the industry in its 
infancy and support its growth by requiring OEMs to achieve local content levels of at 
least 70 percent. Production volumes increased as a result and the industry prospered 
in terms of the number of operating units; however, the international competitiveness 
of the industry is lacking especially in quality levels. The PSDP was discontinued in 
2006 when the Tariff Based System (TBS) was launched which allowed imports of 
components manufactured locally as long as customs duty has been paid. This has put 
strong pressure on domestic component manufacturers to match the international 
quality levels of foreign manufacturers, and it is not clear the industry is up to the 
challenge given its weak base. It also needs to be highlighted that raw materials and 
structural members required for the manufacture of most automotive parts tend to 
be imported into the country, suggesting that the lowest tier in the automotive supply 
chain is another weak link that would need to be strengthened if the industry is attain 
global competitiveness. 
 
In light of the issues highlighted above, a survey designed to assess the level of 
production technology of automotive vendors, quality and safety standards and 
management was carried out by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 
2011. A total of 140 firms in the organized segment of the automotive components 
industry, all members of PAAPAM, were interviewed to analyse the state of the 
industry.  
 
An appropriately weighted sample selection was determined by classifying the 
industry according to 11 categories of components produced, and the sample of firms 
was selected to represent the population of 253 manufacturers. Sheet metal 
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manufacturers are the most prevalent in the domestic industry, followed by casting, 
machining, resin, forging and electrical subsystems. The noteworthy trend that is 
evident from the distribution is that the component manufacturers are concentrated 
in the lower value added segment of the industry as evident from Table 5.18, and 
relatively few firms are operating in the high value added segment. To be globally 
competitive, the component manufacturers will have to ramp up production rates 
which may be problematic since the majority are small and medium enterprises.  
 
Table 5.18: Distribution of Manufacturers Surveyed According to Component Category 
Component Category Number of Vendors in 
Population Sample Selected 
Sheet Metal 110 63 
Casting 26 17 
Machining 31 15 
Resin 20 10 
Forging 19 7 
Electrical Subsystem 13 5 
Rubber 6 4 
Springs 5 3 
Radiator 2 2 
Tyre 1 1 
Other 20 13 
Total 253 140 
Source: JICA (2011) 
 
The majority of the manufacturers cater to the domestic market, though it was found 
that of a total of 31 manufacturers38 that reported exporting their products abroad in 
2011, 21 manufacturers successfully exported their products and in addition supplied 
products to the domestic market, while 10 only catered to the international market. 
Thus, with only a small minority of component manufacturers in the industry 
supplying to the global market, the industry is clearly not considered to be export-
oriented in nature. The question then is whether the firms capable of meeting the 
quantity, quality and cost requirements of the global market in a timely manner, or 
do they lack the technology and/or capabilities to compete? 
 
                                                             
38 This figure increased to 34 manufacturers in 2013. 
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The JICA study reviewed the production processes used by the component 
manufacturers and found that the majority of them are using simple and relatively 
more labour rather than capital intensive technology (for example, welding by hand 
is employed in 40 companies while castings and forging are done in 32 and 21 
companies respectively, as shown below in Figure 5.2). In fact, processes requiring 
specialized equipment, such as heat treatment and surface treatment, are carried out 
by only a dozen companies in the industry, which limits the choice of suppliers of 
these products for OEMs. If quality standards are not met, OEMs have no choice but 
to either internalize production of the component or procure it from abroad at higher 
cost. 
 
Figure 5.2: Production Processes Employed by Component Manufacturers 
 
 
Furthermore, a large number of manufacturers use more than one production process 
on the shop floor and have not yet specialized in a product type, possibly because 
domestic demand is not sufficient to warrant the change and quality problems 
preclude the possibility of export expansion. No doubt the labour intensive processes 
will be less costly for the manufacturers to finance, but productivity will low, not to 
mention quality level and standardization of parts. To be competitive in the global 
market, it is painfully evident that component manufacturers will need to improve 
their production processes. The fact that not many manufacturers have improved 
their processes suggests that there are market failures constraining their ability to do 
so; the manufacturer may not be so inclined, or there may be financing issues. 
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The JICA survey team observed that the production technology used in a many of the 
plants and shops was manufactured in the 1980s and has not been updated with the 
passage of time. Interestingly, the general view among the survey respondents (74 
percent) has been that the production technology is sufficiently modern to not require 
updating. This suggests that the manufacturers have had limited exposure to the 
recent advances made in production technology or feel that they can manage to be 
competitive even with outdated technology. Clearly an incentive will need to be 
provided by the state to compel the component manufacturers to update their 
production technology or risk going out of business.  
 
It emerged that there are several reasons why survey respondents are averse to the 
idea of updating their production technology; the most common reason being 
difficulties in securing the financing required to purchase the new technology (42 
manufacturers out of the total of 115, as shown in Figure 5.3). More specifically, it 
emerges that the small and medium size enterprises are unable to offer collateral or 
mortgage that satisfies the strict guidelines that financial institutions impose for 
access to the loan amount. The cost of securing the loan, in terms of the interest rate 
they are charged, is also another impediment for component manufacturers (40 
manufacturers expressed their dissatisfaction with the interest rate). For example, 
the interest rate rose between 2007-08 and 2009-10, to an average of 17.25 percent. 
Then there is also the issue of lack of adequate domestic capabilities to operate the 
new machinery in addition to the already higher price charged for the new machinery, 
which together impede the process of acquiring new technology. As a result of these 
difficulties, a major proportion of respondents (79 percent) prefer to purchase less 
costly, second hand machinery, rather than newer more expensive machinery. 
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Figure 5.3: Factors Constraining Purchase of New Technology 
 
 
Technological capabilities of employees are reflected in the quality of products 
produced by a firm. Quality standards in the automotive components industry are 
another area that deserve closer attention, especially since the level of quality, as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 4, has a direct bearing on the competitiveness of 
automotive firms. The JICA study found that the quality of steel plates produced in the 
country was of a poor standard, necessitating the import of steel from abroad to meet 
domestic needs. According to the respondents of the JICA survey, only 75 percent 
were satisfied with the quality of steel, while 25 percent expressed their 
dissatisfaction (the variation in satisfaction levels is evident from Figure 5.4). The 
quality of plastic resin raw materials was perceived to be marginally better, with 78 
percent of respondents satisfied with the quality while only 22 percent were 
dissatisfied (see Figure 5.4). 
 
Component manufacturers themselves have to comply with different sets of quality 
standards for their products (see Figure 5.5). Some firms opt to simply follow the 
standards set by customers and OEMs, while others have their own internal standards 
in addition to those of the customer and OEMs. The majority of manufacturers (94) 
report following the standards set by OEMs, then the customer (36), while only 11 
have established their own quality standards. 
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Figure 5.4: Component Manufacturers Satisfaction with Raw Material Quality by Material Type 
  
Source: JICA (2011) 
 
Figure 5.5: Quality Standards Followed in Component Manufacturing Firms 
 
 
Quality control practiced in component manufacturing firms is varied and 
implementation is far from universal, suggesting that these firms are aware of quality 
control measures and the attendant benefits, but only a small proportion actually take 
steps towards implementing them. The most common approach employed by firms 
to improve product quality through quality control is establishment of a Quality 
Control Department. A total of 76 firms (out of the 115 surveyed) reported a QC 
Department had been established for quality improvement purposes, while 22 firms 
have implemented a kaizen system of continuous improvement of production 
processes, and 13 now benefit from Quality Control Circles for identifying, analysing 
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and resolving work problems that impede the firm’s performance (see Figure 5.6 for 
the distribution of firms). 
 
Early discovery of defective products also prompted firms to implement quality 
control practices in the form of inspections by operators (57 firms) or full time 
operators (50 firms). A number of firms also inspected goods in semi-finished 
condition (31 firms) or finished condition (50 firms) as evident from Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6: Quality Control Measures Implementation by Objective 
 
 
Source: JICA (2011) 
 
Implementation of quality control measures in this manner is bound to have 
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components, OEMs proceed with procuring the products manufactured locally, but 
the benefit of lower costs is offset by the cost of conducting total inspection of the 
products and making any adjustments necessary before assembly. Second, OEMs have 
to adjust their own production schedules and operations to account for the increased 
quality inspections taking place both at the component manufacturer and at the OEM 
assembly facility as well. On the other hand, from the perspective of the component 
manufacturers, customer quality standards are easy to meet (109 firms) while only 2 
firms believe the standards are hard to meet. 
 
Not all component manufacturers expressed a desire to acquire financing for their 
operations. Of the 78 firms that were interested in financing their operations, 29 
required it for purchasing new equipment, while 14 intended to use it as working 
capital. The low demand for financing is due in part to the downturn of the economy 
after 2008-09 that saw automobile sales fall to 2004-05 levels of 123,000 units sold, 
and in part to the difficulty in securing the loan amount (as highlighted earlier). The 
loan application procedure is considered to be complicated by 19 firms, involving the 
submission of business plans detailing future profits. The firms that lack employees 
or access to such knowledge will undoubtedly be unable to successfully apply for a 
loan. 13 firms viewed the attitude of banks towards themselves as non-conducive and 
passive at best, which hinders the application process, while 9 firms were dissatisfied 
with the amount they could secure as loan. From the perspective of the banks 
however, lending finances to small and medium enterprises is a risky venture with 
uncertain prospects for repayment. 
 
Unlike the case of Japan, where keiretsu or informal business groups of companies are 
prevalent, component manufacturers in Pakistan supply competing customers and 
tend not to have captive relationships with them and this constrains the linkages that 
form between the two parties. Thus for example, only a handful (numbering 8) of 
component manufacturers receive “advisory service in production” from OEMs that 
target production technology and are designed to improve product quality by 
streamlining production processes, reduce waste and suggest ways to improve 
energy efficiency. However, a large number of component manufacturers (a total of 
66) receive technical support from customers in the form of drawing design that aid 
in product development. Of the manufacturers surveyed, 30 reported receiving 
training within Pakistan for human resource development purposes, while only 7 
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manufacturers received training abroad due to financial and logistical constraints. To 
assist in the acquisition of new technology, 17 companies received credit from 
customers, while 17 manufacturers received assistance in management related to 
kaizen and 5S (see Figure 5.7 for the distribution of type of assistance rendered by 
OEMs to component manufacturers in recent years). 
 
Figure 5.7: Assistance Received From OEMs by Type 
 
 
One noteworthy trend that emerged was that in connection with securing new 
customers and exporting their products, only a small number of components 
manufacturers view their internal technological capabilities as lacking, more than 
100 of the manufacturers surveyed expressed satisfaction with their internal level of 
technological capabilities. A total of 10 firms reported lack of productive capacity as 
limiting their operations, while only 7 firms felt their products lacked the necessary 
competitiveness.  
 
Component manufacturers by and large did express a desire to export their products, 
but cited a number of difficulties that were preventing them from doing so. The most 
commonly reported difficulty is with regard to marketing of their products abroad 
(23 manufacturers) and a lack of information about potential markets and customers. 
This we believe reflects poorly on the working of the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB), 
now known as the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP), which was set 
up by the state in 1963 under the Ministry of Commerce (MoC) to promote and 
encourage growth in the country’s exports. 
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Figure 5.8: Component Manufacturer Interest in Joint Ventures 
 
 
Quality of the products is of a concern to 12 manufacturers (see Figure 5.9) wishing 
to export; we believe these manufacturers realize their products are not of 
international standard but adequate for the domestic market only. Again, securing the 
financing need to expand operations and meet international standards impedes 
export efforts for 12 manufacturers. Related to financing difficulties, insufficient 
production capacity is viewed as a hurdle by only 5 firms. Lastly, export contracts and 
the procedures related to external trade are viewed as hurdles by 10 firms each. 
 
The Automobile Industry Development Programme (Ministry of Industries & 
Production (2008)) was launched by the state in 2007 with the vision of transforming 
the domestic automotive industry into a “global player”, expanding production to 
achieve competitiveness and contributing by 5.6 percent to GDP while strengthening 
development of technological and human resources. To achieve this vision, the state 
planned to integrate Pakistan’s automotive industry into the global value chain by 
targeting six policy areas through the AIDP; tariff plan, human resource development, 
investment incentive, technology acquisition, cluster development, and industry 
specific investment policy (a brief outline of the components is presented in Box 5.4). 
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Figure 5.9: Factors Impeding Export Expansion by Component Manufacturers 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Industries & Production (2008) 
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Six Components of the AIDP (2007-12) 
The five year tariff plan (details in Appendices C-F) was formulated by the state in 
consultation with industry stakeholders for the purpose of providing the bare minimum 
protection, and a stable and predictable tariff environment to stimulate investments in the 
automotive industry requiring long gestation periods. 
Human resource development (HRD) component focused on addressing the deficiencies of 
skilled labour in the industry; low educational background and a fixed mindset. The 
Programme realizes changing the mindset is long term prospect and instead called for the 
prompt setting up of Centres of Excellence to train manpower and management in the 
sector. 
Productive asset investment incentive (PAII) component was designed to stimulate 
investment in productive capacities of component manufacturers and encourage 
localization of components by offsetting the duty on import of CKD kits. 
The Technology acquisition support scheme (TASS) component provides grants to 
component manufacturers for enhancing their technology levels and encouraging 
localization to assist those manufacturers cope with the high cost of technology acquisition. 
Cluster development component is designed to encourage knowledge transfer, supply chain 
management, process and product development by locating component manufacturers 
close to vehicle assemblers; namely in two clusters, one in Karachi and one in Lahore. 
Auto Industry Investment Policy (AIIP) component covers the rules and procedures 
applicable to new foreign investors entering the automotive sector focusing on production 
of high technology products catering to current consumer demands. The policy allows 
import of complete CKD kits for a period of three years to facilitate assembly operations. 
Box 5.4: Six Components of the AIDP (2007-12) 
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The mixed performance of the Programme has been highlighted earlier and the JICA 
survey covered the component manufacturer’s perceptions regarding the AIDP. First, 
it was determined whether the manufacturers were aware of the AIDP and its role in 
the industry’s development path or not and second, an assessment was made of its 
impact in terms of how many manufacturers received support from the Programme. 
 
It emerged that the majority of component manufacturers (71) did not have any 
knowledge of the AIDP, its components or aims, while 19 had some knowledge and 
only 20 manufacturers were well versed in the aims and intricacies of the AIDP 
(Figure 5.10). If this trend is indeed representative of the entire population of 
component manufacturers in the industry, it is very worrisome and suggests that on 
paper the AIDP is formulated well enough, but awareness of the Programme is far 
from ideal and this will adversely affect its impact. 
 
Figure 5.10: Component Manufacturers Extent of Knowledge of AIDP 
 
 
On further examination, it emerged that 76 manufacturers reported receiving “no 
benefit” from the Programme, while 13 manufacturers highlighted benefitting from 
the Tariff Plan component (Figure 5.11). The Productive Asset Investment Initiative 
was known to only 3 manufacturers, while 1 manufacturer reported having any 
knowledge of Technology Acquisition Support Scheme. Considering the fact that the 
AIDP was formulated with input from all stakeholders, including component 
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manufacturers and OEM assemblers/manufacturers in the industry, it is indeed very 
surprising to see how little awareness there is of the programme among the intended 
beneficiaries. A similar response was observed when component manufacturers were 
questioned about the USAID funded Competitiveness Support Fund (CSF) that was 
intended to boost competitiveness of domestic manufacturers in various industries 
of the economy. 
 
Figure 5.11: Perceived Benefit of AIDP to Component Manufacturers - By Module 
 
 
The processing technology employed by 40 large component manufacturers was 
reviewed by a JICA team as part of the study and the effort yielded some very 
interesting results. More specifically the press stamping, metalworking, machining, 
and casting processes were examined. It was found that the press stamping 
manufacturers do not specialize in the process and manufacture products made by 
reverse engineering the physical samples provided by the OEMs. A high degree of 
manual labour work is involved in this process for several manufacturers who cannot 
make the die necessary; reminiscent of craft production before the advent of mass 
production, and placing a great deal of emphasis on worker’s skill level. Press 
stamping is done by a hydraulic press or a small power press, consists of many steps 
that breed inefficiencies. Pak Suzuki has the only press stamping lines capable of high 
volume production, while Honda Atlas and Indus Motors have second hand 40 year 
old presses imported from Japan. High quality production runs using this equipment 
are not possible. The study found that there is no manufacturer in Pakistan capable 
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of producing dies of a sufficiently high quality to meet OEM assembler demands. Press 
die technology is required to make sheet metal parts and plastic moulds but has been 
lacking in Pakistan. The global automobile industry is making strides in incorporating 
the latest technology and advances in its production process and CAD/CAM is one of 
them. OEM assembler and manufacturers will expect component manufacturers to be 
able to use specifications provided in such a format. Though CAD/CAM systems have 
been introduced by a number of manufacturers, they are not utilized fully in Pakistan. 
Also, these systems are used for die making, but lacking the proper facilities for 
creating dies using Full Mold Casting, manufacturers resort to welding the dies, which 
introduces imperfections in the finish of the product being manufactured and thus 
reduces their quality level. 
 
The level of precision required in the manufacture of transmissions and parts for 
motorcycles and tractors is less than that required for passenger cars since the latter 
have an added requirement of comfort. Component manufacturers are under the 
mistaken impression that by successfully manufacturing and exporting machined 
parts and transmissions for tractors and motorcycles means they will be successful in 
producing the same for cars. Component manufacturers have the facilities to test 
individual products produced but not an assembled component which means that 
they are not able to meet the stringent requirements set by passenger car OEMs. 
 
5.9. TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT OF 
AUTOMOTIVE PARTS MANUFACTURERS 
It has been observed that the technological capabilities and level of production 
technology in use by automotive parts manufacturers are not uniform in the industry 
(in the case of capabilities) or the most modern (in the case of technology). To achieve 
economies of scale and be competitive, assemblers require the timely provision of 
parts of suitable quality that the parts manufacturers can be hard pressed to provide 
in the absence of new technology and the capabilities to make maximum use of it. 
Since the state in Pakistan has not been proactive in this area (as compared to the 
efforts of other developing countries), the major assemblers in each segment, and 
even the three passenger-car assemblers in Pakistan have stepped in to compensate 
for these deficiencies some extent. The response of each manufacturer has been 
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different and likely reflects the company policy and preference regarding 
dissemination of knowledge and technology to outsiders.  
 
The passenger-car segment of Pakistan’s automotive industry is dominated by three 
assemblers; Indus Motor Company Ltd. (IMC), Pak Suzuki Motor Company Ltd. 
(PSMC), and Honda Atlas Cars (Pakistan) Ltd. (HAC), as evident from the trends in 
Figure 5.12. Initially PSMC was the sole assembler of passenger cars for the domestic 
market and had no trouble establishing its brand name and market dominance after 
0000 on account of its product (the Suzuki FX 800cc) being priced lower than the 
imported passenger cars available in the market. However, when IMC entered the 
market in 1990, PSMC was faced with some competition in the mid-range of 
passenger cars (1,000cc and above). To retain its market dominance, PSMC 
introduced the Margalla brand and offered a lower priced alternative to IMC’s Corolla 
brand. Naturally, both companies were subject to the ISDP and used lower priced 
domestic products to drive down prices. However, the approach taken by the two 
towards component manufacturers differed significantly. 
 
Figure 5.12: Breakdown of Passenger Car Sales by OEM (1998-2012) 
 
Source: PAMA n.d. 
 
In the case of IMC, not only the manufacturing facility, but the infrastructure available 
to the component manufacturer is monitored before product samples are provided 
for testing and approval. The samples are tested locally by TMC experts before being 
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sent to Japan for extensive testing and trials. By 2011, only 45 percent of the 
components produced locally for various models had been approved for use by TMC 
(see Figure 5.13 for a comparison of indigenization rates achieved by the three local 
competitors). The technical assistance provided to component manufacturers is 
contingent upon the latter possessing the requisite skills and adequate infrastructure 
without which the technology transfer of parts, drawing and process sheets is bound 
to fail. TMC retains ownership of technology by limiting transfer of manufacturing 
knowhow to component manufacturers and transferring assembly and operational 
knowhow to IMC. 
 
Figure 5.13: Deletion (Indigenization) Rates Achieved by Passenger Car Manufacturers (2011) 
 
Source: PAMA n.d. 
 
Industry perception is that PSMC has allowed quality control to fall by the wayside in 
its quest to lower costs and increase profits. A similar procedure is adopted for 
selecting component manufacturers to supply the factory; the level of existing 
infrastructure and manufacturing facility present in addition to the potential to meet 
firm’s demand schedule determine whether a sample is tested for approval. However, 
no strict quality control standards are enforced, which has resulted in deteriorating 
quality of the finished product, especially at the lower end of the product range. 
 
The third entrant in the passenger car assembly segment; HAC, has achieved the 
lowest deletion rate among the three manufacturers on account of an unwillingness 
on the part of the company (according to HAC employees) to compromise on quality 
of the components supplied for the final product. 
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5.10. FINANCING OF TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION 
The initial round of technology acquisition in the automotive industry under the 
guidance of MoIP and PACO was naturally financed by the state and the 
manufacturing concerns that were set up were managed by the state. The state 
pioneered and also set up the manufacturing concerns in areas where the need for 
domestic capabilities was required and the private sector was hesitant to invest. The 
public sector entities were divested and put under private sector control when the 
state took a renewed interest in private sector led growth. The majority of larger 
manufacturing concerns were taken over by conglomerates that had the political and 
financial resources required for profiting from these endeavours. Once this initial 
round of investments in technology acquisition was complete the state took a less 
active role, and the private sector stepped in to fill the vacuum to gain access to 
technology from abroad. 
 
Firms turned to the financial sector to secure the financing required for gaining access 
to technology. Banks in the financial sector provided the loans needed in exchange for 
collateral in the form of property ownership documents or personal wealth in most 
cases. However, the easy terms of the loans resulted in misuse of loans and non-
performing loans (firms unable to make a profit in the allotted time). Firms and 
entrepreneurs with political connections were able to avoid consequences of 
defaulting on their loans while smaller firms were mired in difficulties. Banks 
tightened their requirements and increased the amount of collateral required to 
secure a loan. The large conglomerates did not have difficulty in securing loans that 
they needed. By and large smaller firms (component manufacturers) could not satisfy 
the bank requirements and were unable to invest in technology acquisition. OEM 
assemblers still required components of a certain quality and quantity that could not 
be produced without enhancing the productive capacity of component 
manufacturers. They responded to the loan constraint by providing the loan 
themselves on easy terms or serving as guarantors to the bank for the component 
manufacturers. In exchange the OEMs tied the component manufacturer in a binding 
agreement to provide the components needed for a specified period of time or 
quantity. The AIDP was formulated to facilitate the financing of technology 
acquisition by component manufacturers; however, the requirements for securing 
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financing are so strict, few if any firms have been able to avail the facility on account 
of the strict conditionalities imposed by the EDB. 
 
5.11. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an introduction to the state of the automotive 
industry in Pakistan; the genesis of the industry since the time of independence and 
the current status. The major stakeholders in the industry have been identified and 
the current level of capabilities of component manufacturers has been assessed based 
on recent survey data. The industry was set up with the assistance of foreign firms by 
forming Joint Venture agreements to facilitate the transfer of technology and know-
how for manufacturing automotive vehicles of all types. The homegrown, domestic 
industry has yet to take off and the foreign affiliated firms continue to command the 
market share in virtually every sector. Income levels in the country have influenced 
growth of the sectors of the industry; the motorcycle and small automobiles have 
become the workhorses of the low and lower-middle income groups of the economy, 
while high powered luxury sedans are the preferred choice for the higher income 
bracket in the economy. In the motorcycle industry, the established OEMs are facing 
stiff competition from the new incumbents from China, but recent trends indicate 
they are managing to hold their own, no doubt capitalizing on brand name, quality 
and after sale service while the Chinese brands are focusing on undercutting the price. 
 
The industry has had to face its fair share of growing pains and issues; ranging from 
political uncertainty, security, a weak infrastructure to unstable policy environment. 
Recognizing its importance in recent years, the state has attempted to nurture the 
industry by formulating the five year AIDP in consultation with various institutions 
involved and industry stakeholders. The outcome of the Programme, while initially 
promising has stalled and the industry has fallen way behind in achieving the targets 
set for achieving production as well as localization of parts. 
 
The component manufacturing industry has established itself in clusters to support 
the major OEMs, based primarily on small and medium size enterprises with a 
number of large enterprises also operating in the mix, and contributed to the national 
economy over the years. However, performance of the industry has been plagued with 
low levels of productivity and quality; stemming primarily from a lack of new 
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production technology, low quality of raw materials and inadequate training. A 
number of possible reasons have been identified to account for this inability to 
upgrade technology and improve production levels including but not limited to an 
inability to secure the financing required to complete the upgrade process and lack of 
information on current state of the global automotive components industry and 
export opportunities. The worrying trends that have emerged are centred on one 
hand on the uphill task associated with securing funding which serves as a major 
deterrent to acquire new technology, and on the other hand on the risk-averse nature 
of manufacturers who appear to be content to manufacture and supply to the local 
market with their existing outdated production technology. These issues have been 
compounded with the issue of quality control of not just components, but of the 
supply of raw materials as well. The state on the other hand appears to have taken a 
mostly passive stance and appears content to focus on providing a level playing field 
and letting the free hand of the market reign. The low quality of Pakistani steel has 
been acknowledged by the MoIP and EDB, but it apparently up to the manufacturers 
and the OEMs to improve quality standards. 
 
The AIDP was designed to offset these hurdles, but to all accounts it does not appear 
to have succeeded, especially considering the fact that most of the component 
manufacturers were unaware of the benefits of the programme. Or perhaps they are 
aware, but a lack of trust in the actions of the state that has been further exacerbated 
by the unstable policy framework appears to have tainted their views and hence 
diluted the intended impact of the programme. 
 
This chapter has also shed light on the institutional and policy frameworks operating 
in the country that relate to the automotive industry. It is evident that there are a 
number of interest groups that impose often times conflicting demands on the state 
with regard to policy formulation and even implementation. Case in point is the 
representation of PAMA and PAAPAM in the Automotive Industry Development 
Committee formed under AIDP. The AIDC is the decision making body for determining 
entry of new assemblers/manufacturers in the industry. It is felt that the terms and 
conditions that apply to potential entrants are less stringent than what the incumbent 
firms had to face; particularly with respect to timeline for achieving localization and 
applicable rates. It has been argued that the same conditions should apply to new 
entrants to put them on an equal footing with the incumbent firms. Technically the 
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incumbent firms should not be afraid of the increased competition as it will force 
them to be more competitive, but the fact of the matter is that no new passenger car 
manufacturers have entered the industry since the AIDP was implemented. Or there 
is the decision of the state to allow the import of old second hand cars from abroad; a 
decision that has the support of APMDA but is vehemently opposed by PAMA and 
PAAPAM who argue that the easy availability of imported passenger vehicles will 
drive down demand for locally manufactured vehicles and adversely affect operations 
of domestic firms and labour employment as well. On the flip side of the coin, the 
quality of the locally manufactured vehicles is below international standards and long 
wait times for orders to be fulfilled suggests the state has been ineffective in raising 
the efficiency of the local manufacturers. The strong bargaining position of PAMA has 
allowed them to successfully oppose the state policy for some time at least. 
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CHAPTER 6. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND MATURITY 
WITH GROWTH – THE CASE OF MILLAT TRACTORS 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Our earlier discussion has established that industrial growth and the economic 
development of nations was driven by technical change and progress, and technical 
change and progress were key determinants in this respect. As first movers, 
developed countries were faced with the prospect of innovating to retain 
competitiveness. In the case of late developer countries, effective acquisition of 
technology and the capabilities to benefit from such technology are the means to 
achieve industrialization and attain competitiveness in mature product markets In 
Chapter 2 it was established that ownership of technology and role of the state are 
determine the success of efforts to acquire and absorb technology in late developer 
countries. In the context of developing countries, industrialization as a means to 
achieve economic development is an intensive process involving technology 
acquisition, learning and the development of technological capabilities for the 
purpose of gaining competitiveness in the face of ever changing and evolving 
technological change in the global market. Technology acquisition itself is a two-step 
process, first involving learning to absorb the technology and second assimilating and 
adapting the acquired technological capabilities to develop competitiveness in 
mature markets by bringing differentiated products to market. The question to ask is 
what factors could be responsible for enhancing or slowing down the pace of 
technology acquisition at the firm or microeconomic level, which would impact on the 
firm’s competitiveness in the global economy. Developing countries, save for a few 
have had only limited success in their technology acquisition and learning efforts. The 
latter appear to be the exception to the rule, as exemplified by the meteoric rise of the 
East Asian Tigers in recent years have managed to move beyond pure “learning by 
doing” to what Kim (1999) has termed as “learning by research” to expand their 
technological frontier. That is not to say that there have not been successful instances 
of technology acquisition in the former countries such as in Pakistan, despite the 
general perception that such countries are hovering on the brink of disaster, but those 
examples are unique. A better understanding of the issues involved based on the 
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circumstances surrounding these success stories at the microeconomic (firm) level 
will yield valuable lessons to be learned and applied for the future.  
 
Against the backdrop of the ultimate goal of developing countries to accelerate their 
development, the aim of this chapter is to shed light on the microeconomic issues 
surrounding efforts of a domestic firm (in this case Millat Tractors Limited, a 
competitive tractor manufacturing firm in Pakistan’s automotive industry)39. This 
particular firm used strategies both to acquire foreign technology and to develop their 
indigenous technological capabilities to become globally competitive. Towards this 
end, this chapter presents a viable model of learning by a manufacturing firm in 
Pakistan. Section 6.2 presents a review of the conditions surrounding the foundation 
of the firm, as well as technology acquisition efforts at three key stages to implement, 
assimilate and improve the foreign technology acquired. Section 0 focuses on growth 
trends and the current status of the firm. Section 0 deals with the constraints faced by 
the firm in acquiring and developing its technological capabilities, while Section 0 
assesses the domestic and international competitiveness of the firm based on a price 
mark-up model and indicators of firm performance. Lastly, Section 6.6 presents the 
conclusions of the preceding discussion and analysis. 
 
6.2. FIRM LEVEL TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
LEARNING AT MILLAT TRACTORS 
To gain a fresh perspective on firm level technological development and learning in 
manufacturing firms in Pakistan, we follow Kim (1980) who adopted a slightly 
different approach to traditional studies. Kim (1980) researched firm level efforts at 
technology acquisition; how the firms acquire, assimilate and improve on imported 
technology to remain competitive in an increasingly globalized world. The 
methodology of firm level performance explores the evolution of industrial 
technology in a developing country; focussing on the process of assimilation and 
improvement of foreign technology that has been acquired, but also looking at factors 
affecting firm level technological change. Kim (1980) categorized previous studies 
looking at the role of science and technology in economic development into two 
groups. One group looks at science and technology and their role in development of 
                                                             
39 The analysis in this chapter and the one that follows is based on a series of interviews with 
key industry stakeholders conducted in Pakistan; details of which are provided in Appendix C 
229 
LDCs, focussing on scientific community, education, and S & T policies. The second 
group looks at role of international technology transfer to LDCs, focussing on role of 
MNCs and local R & D efforts. What has not been covered in sufficient detail in these 
two groups is the rationale behind acquisition of technology and the efforts to 
assimilate and improve technology that has been acquired at a firm level. What has 
also not been considered in detail has been the role and impact of state initiatives and 
other factors affecting the process of technology acquisition. Keeping these 
shortcomings of traditional studies in mind, Kim (1980)’s methodology has been 
adopted here. 
 
More specifically in the present context this methodology provides a framework for a 
comprehensive overview of the evolution of a firm and its acquisition of technology 
for the purpose of attaining competitiveness as the environment changes. The benefit 
of this approach is many fold; on the one hand a focus at the firm level and the 
implications that a deeper understanding of the technology acquisition experience at 
the firm level will have for policy formulation at the macroeconomic level. This 
methodology accounts for the fact that developing countries have used numerous 
initiatives within their general industrial policies to nurture and guide technological 
change in domestic firms. On the other hand this methodology also allows for firm 
behaviour and performance being affected by efforts of not just domestic 
stakeholders, but multinational corporations to facilitate the acquisition process. We 
now turn to the experience of Millat Tractors Limited (MTL) in technology acquisition 
and the development of technological capabilities for the purpose of enhancing 
competitiveness. 
 
6.2.1. FOUNDATION 
As brought out in Chapter 4, Pakistan lacked a viable industrial base at the time of 
independence and over the years the state took the initiative to gain access to foreign 
technology required to develop the necessary base. Technical agreements were 
signed with various foreign multinational corporations to set up manufacturing 
concerns in key industries and subsequently turn over operations to private 
businessmen. One such manufacturing concern was Rana Tractors and Equipment 
Limited (RTEL), set up in 1964 to initially import CBU tractors for sale in Pakistan, 
and eventually assemble and manufacture tractors from Semi Knock Down (SKD) kits 
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to meet local demand. The eventual goal of this endeavour was to introduce a measure 
of self-sufficiency in the domestic industry and also reduce the drain on precious 
foreign currency reserves. Majority shares in RTEL were owned by the Rana 
Khudadad family, although the company was listed on the stock exchange. RTEL 
operations were the result of a technical collaboration agreement initiated by the 
state in Pakistan and a leading foreign multinational corporation engaged in 
agricultural machinery manufacture at the time, Massey Ferguson (MF) based in UK. 
Under the terms of the agreement, MF had a zero equity share in the local 
manufacturing concern, and was only responsible for providing technical know-how, 
including all drawings and standards requirements to RTEL for the purpose of 
assembly and maintenance of MF tractors in Pakistan, with no obligation to provide 
RTEL with financial support of any kind. The only incentive provided by MF was lower 
annual prices for imported kits based on higher volumes. 
 
The province of Punjab accounts for roughly 80 percent of the market for potential of 
tractors in Pakistan, and the city of Lahore was chosen as the site for the main 
production plant. In the interim till the main plant in Lahore was brought online, an 
assembly plant was set up in Karachi in 1965 to start the assembly process of tractors 
from SKD kits. RTEL had a value of paid-up capital of PKR 2.25 million by the early 
1970s, which included plant/assets in East Pakistan, but when East Pakistan gained 
independence from Pakistan in 1971, RTEL’s East Pakistani plant/assets in Dhaka 
worth PKR 2.26 million were lost. RTEL ended up accumulating losses amounting to 
PKR 1.5 million by 1972 which had to be written off as a loss. RTEL, along with a 
significant number of other private sector enterprises, were nationalized by the 
Government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto under the Economic Reforms Order of 1972. RTEL 
was rebranded as Millat Tractors Limited (MTL) and manufacturing operations were 
taken over by Pakistan Tractor Corporation (PTC), an entity set up by the state for the 
purpose of promoting indigenization and local manufacture of tractors in Pakistan 
from Completely Knocked Down (CKD) kits. The following year a licensing and 
technology transfer agreement was signed with MF which would allow progressive 
manufacturing of tractors, while another licensing and technology transfer 
agreement was signed with Massey Ferguson’s subsidiary, Perkins Engines, UK for 
progressive manufacturing of diesel engines.  
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Following a regime change in 1991, the state reversed Bhutto’s earlier decision to 
nationalize key industries and formulated the Privatization Policy 1991 under which 
State Owned Enterprises were auctioned off. The majority of MTL employees formed 
a group, the Millat Group and bid for ownership of the company through a leveraged 
employee buyout. Funding for the buyout costing PKR 306 million came from a 
number of sources: 15 percent was personal equity of employees, 85 percent loans 
from MTL and financial institutions (including Muslim Commercial Bank). The 
employees contributing to the 15 percent equity were allocated shares and a splinter 
group of employees opposed to the buyout opted for golden handshake. Under the 
terms of the buyout, ownership of the company was transferred from the state to 
Millat Employee Trust of the Millat Group in 1992 and management of the firm, which 
had earlier been under the state bureaucracy, was handed over to MTL employees, 
primarily engineers by profession and training. In addition, workers benefits were 
partially linked to MTL’s profitability, meaning rather than bureaucrats, professionals 
(engineers) with practical knowledge and experience of products and production 
processes were responsible for determining the firm’s future direction and growth. 
Moreover, worker benefits were partially linked to firm performance, resulting in a 
strong incentive that resulted in concerted worker effort to reduce costs and improve 
efficiency in the organization, thus ensuring that the firm would become competitive 
as it grew. 
 
In the years since being privatized, MTL has time and again taken active steps to 
diversify its product portfolio, both vertically as well as horizontally. The first 
initiative involved acquisition of a 51 percent stake in a local foundry, Bolan Casting 
Limited (BCL) specializing in the production of castings, when the company was 
divested by the state in 1993. Millat Equipment Limited (MEL) was incorporated in 
1993 for the purpose of manufacturing high quality gears, and more recently, in 2002, 
MTL acquired battery manufacturing firm Rex Baren Batteries Limited (RBBL) as a 
subsidiary incorporated as Millat Industrial Products Limited (MIPL). MTL has also 
undertaken technology transfer arrangements with foreign firms in an attempt to 
diversify into other automotive products, notably Light Commercial Vehicles (LCVs) 
in collaboration with Samsung Commercial Vehicles (now defunct) and forklifts in 
collaboration with Anhui-Heli Co. Limited, China. 
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MTL’s own tractor product portfolio till 1992 was limited to two MF tractor models, 
the MF 240 (50 HP) and MF 375 (75 HP). Subsequently, in over 20 years MTL has 
managed to achieve a very high level of indigenization in tractor manufacturing, 
which has allowed it to expand the range of tractor models it manufactures and offers 
for sale from 2 to 8 different models. The product portfolio (Box 6.1 and Box 6.2 
provide a comparison of the limited portfolio in the early years versus the range of 
products offered now) of MTL has now expanded to include a range of agricultural 
implements, and different firm acquisitions have opened up the markets for batteries, 
automotive components, generators and prime movers as well. This growth of 
productive capability of the firm is an indication of the growing technological 
capabilities that are being acquired and used to increase the competitiveness of the 
firm. 
 
Box 6.1: MTL Product Portfolio – Early Years 
 
Source: MTL interviews 
 
In comparison, MTL’s competitor Al-Ghazi Tractors Limited (AGTL) in the domestic 
market is offering a comparable product mix (in terms of product specifications) of 
various tractors, agricultural implements and generators, but focusing more on the 
niche market of smart irrigation systems as opposed to MTL’s multiproduct and 
component focus (see Box 6.3 for details of AGTL’s product portfolio). Tractor models 
manufactured by both MTL and AGTL are adapted for use in the domestic market and 
suit the demands of domestic customers, and the two companies have a virtual 
monopoly on tractor supplied in Pakistan. 
 
MTL and its primary competitor in the domestic market, AGTL use production 
techniques based on the concept of mass production rather than Just In Time, which 
is in contrast to how passenger and commercial vehicles are manufactured by 
companies, in particular Japanese firms currently (as detailed in Chapter 4). However, 
both companies have the capability to manufacture slightly differentiated product 
Tractor Models
•MF 240
•MF 385
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models, rather than a mass produced unique model, evidence that Just-In-Time 
techniques have been adapted to help optimize production techniques, and the firms 
have acquired the organizational capabilities to adapt modern production techniques 
to suit their needs. 
 
Box 6.2: MTL Product Portfolio – Recent Years 
 
 Source: MTL Annual Reports, various issues 
 
On the international front, MTL faces competition from various regional companies 
in the market for basic tractors, but MTL is of the opinion that it is placed to compete 
effectively with these rivals. To facilitate international sales, MTL has recently 
established an offshore subsidiary to act as a trading company and boost sales and 
successfully negotiated with MF for access to export markets for MF branded tractors 
manufactured in Pakistan. 
 
Tractor Models
•MF 240
•MF 385
•MF 260
•MF 350 +
•MF 360
•MF 375
•MF 385 4WD
•MF 455
Agricultural 
Implements
•Mould Board Plough
•Chisel Plough
•Disc Plough
•Tine Tiller
•Disc Harrow
•Rigger
•Lawn Mower
•Post Hole Digger
•Front End Loader
•Multi-purpose Rear 
Blade
•Farm Trailer
•Hydraulic Tipping 
Trailer
•Adjustable Pintle Hook
•Jib Crane
Multi Products
•Millat Forklift Truck
•Millat Generator
•Millat Prime Mover
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Box 6.3: AGTL Product Portfolio – Current Years 
 
Source: AGTL Annual Reports, Various Issues 
 
6.2.2. STAGE I – IMPLEMENTATION 
Indigenization of tractor production was given priority by the state in 1980 and PTC 
was tasked with carrying out this process, while MTL was selected for carrying out 
this task by PTC. Tractor assembly indigenization efforts at MTL took off in earnest in 
1981 and as part of this effort, an engine assembly plant was set up for the progressive 
in-house manufacture of diesel engines for MF tractors. Of the two major tractor 
manufacturers operating in Pakistan, MTL has an in-house engine manufacturing 
plant designed specifically for its products, while AGTL purchases engines 
manufactured by another domestic firm. MTL’s engine plant has a production 
capacity of 95 engines of different specifications (3 and 4 cylinder engines), and 
production levels can be adjusted to meet demand. Various components of the engine 
are procured from MTL vendors, but all machining requirements are handled by an 
in-house machining division to ensure MF quality and precision standards are met.  
 
The in-house machining plant was inaugurated in 1984 to ensure a supply of high 
quality parts and ensure production levels at the factory could be maintained in the 
Tractor Models
•480s
•NH 5556
•Ghazi
•NH 6056
•640
•640S
•NH 7056
Agricultural Implements
•Cultivator
•Disk Harrow
•Rotavator Cum Bed 
Former
•Articulated Aerial 
Platform
•Potato Digger
•Boom Sprayer
•Mould Board Plough
•Tractor Mounted Back 
Hoe
•Road Sweeper
•Front-End Loader
•Lawn Mower
•Maize Sheller
•Disc Plough
•Front Mounted Fork Lifter
•Tractor Operated Flour 
Mill
•Safari Cabin
•Hydraulic Tipping Trolley
Multi Products
•AGTL Generator
•Smart Irrigation 
Systems
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event of disruption of parts supply from vendors. Production capacity in the 
machining division has been increased with the passage of time with the addition of 
extensions to production lines and the installation of new ones, (see Table 6.1 below 
for details). The expansion of production facilities has yielded the expected 
productivity benefits, for instance the new cylinder block line is less labour intensive 
(on average employing 15 workers on the new line versus 38 on the old line) and the 
productivity is orders of magnitude higher than that of the old cylinder block line (5 
sets per shift versus 1.26). It is also worth noting that manufacturing components for 
the newer 4 cylinder engine is a more complex task requiring more effort from 
workers and therefore having a lower worker productivity level.  
 
Table 6.1: Production Capacity and Productivity Levels for MTL In-house Machining Plant 
Component Line Year of 
Installation 
Production 
Capacity (sets) 
Per Shift 
No. of 
Workers 
Productivity 
Per Worker 
Per Shift 
Axle Housing (right and left) 1985 56 21 2.67 
Cylinder Block (old) 1984 48 38 1.26 
Cylinder Block (extension) 1999 75 15 5.00 
Cylinder Head (extension) 1999 90 15 6.00 
Center Housing (Gearbox) 1987 55 33 1.67 
Lubrication Oil Sump (MF 
240) 
1984 59 12 4.92 
Lubrication Oil Sump (MF 
385) 
1999 19 12 1.58 
Transmission Case 1985 48 33 1.45 
Source: MTL interviews 
 
According to Akhlaque (1999), the indigenization effort at MTL was supported 
externally by a favourable stance of the then Minister of Production who took office 
in 1981, and encouraged direct interaction with MTL management through an “open 
door” policy to resolve issues and bypass the bureaucratic hurdles in the public sector. 
Realizing the weak managerial and technical capabilities in the public sector, the 
Minister entrusted the running of the company to chairman of MTL, who had full 
authority to act without needing approval from or receiving any interference from the 
state. The Ministry also made investments in the domestic industry by enabling 
vendors and firms to raise the level of their technical knowledge through conferences 
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and collaborations. MTL was given clear targets for cost reduction, and the 
indigenization efforts were supported internally by a competent management team 
and technical support from MF in developing their capabilities. MTL provided 
vendors with financial and technical support to help meet their requirements and in 
turn guaranteed a market for vendor products.  
 
Engineers from MF assisted in setting up the manufacturing/assembly plant in 
Pakistan to ensure manufacturing quality standards were met. Ten engineers from 
MTL were sent abroad to train and learn from MF operations on-site on the factory 
floor. The value of each component required for the manufacture of MF Tractors was 
determined from Day 1, and at the insistence of the MoIP, the technology (royalty and 
licensing) fee charged by MF was linked to the level of indigenization achieved by 
MTL. In exchange for the technical assistance provided, MTL was obliged to pay MF a 
royalty and licensing fee (over PKR 51 million in 1995, down to slightly over PKR 30 
million in 1996 and virtually nil in recent years), and was one of the areas that MTL 
management targeted in their efforts to reduce costs as per the directives of the state. 
In contrast, MTL’s competitor in Pakistan, AGTL has managed to achieve an average 
indigenization rate of 80 percent for the various agricultural tractors it offers, but 
royalty and technical fees are still a major component for its annual cost of 
manufacturing. The early pressure at MTL to reduce costs, and being provided a 
channel to do so through the indigenization process which would allow royalty 
payments to be reduced, providing the stimulus necessary in the early 1980s for MTL 
to achieve or even surpass the indigenization targets set, as evident in Table 6.2 
below. 
 
Table 6.2: Decade-wise Indigenization Rates Achieved for MF Tractors (1980 - 2010) 
  (%) 
Decade MF 240 MF 385 
1980 46.43 24.38 
1990 79.35 48.07 
2000 89.70 68.99 
2010 92.60 80.19 
Source: Data provided by MTL  
Note:   
Rates for 1980s and 2010 are based on computations made for missing annual rates from 
data available. See Appendix D for source data 
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Due to the complexity of parts involved in the manufacture of the larger MF 385 
tractor, higher indigenization rates were achieved for the smaller MF 280 tractor 
every year, as evident from the trends in Figure 6.1, starting with 10 percent in 1981-
82 and rising sharply to 70 percent within a decade. Subsequently the rate slowed 
down but has still shown a progressive upward trend, suggesting MTL is gaining 
proficiency and experience in the manufacture of intricate machined parts in its in-
house machining plant. The impressive achievement in the early years is on account 
of the engine assembly plant coming online and MTL switching to locally produced 
components as it gained the experience and developed production capability in an 
effort to reduce costs. 
 
Figure 6.1: Progressive Indigenization Rates: MF 240 and 385 Tractors (1981 - 2013) 
 
Source: Data provided by MTL 
 
Quality of components produced at MTL and by the vendor industry was an area of 
concern for MF when the assembly plant in Pakistan was initially set up and for this 
reason a MF quality assurance inspector was based at the MTL factory for the sole 
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purpose of inspecting and approving all locally produced components to ensure MF 
quality standards were met. Whereas Japanese OEM affiliated firms had to send the 
components to Japan for testing and quality assurance, MTL had the advantage of 
having a testing lab set up on site early on, enabling MTL engineers and workers to 
benefit from more direct and timely feedback. MTL was free to produce as many or as 
few components as it determined save for those components and assemblies that are 
proprietary in design and specification to MF. There was no restriction placed on the 
source of any components as long as the specifications matched and the quality level 
was maintained. The only two restrictions on MTL were an export market cap (limit) 
wherein the company was restricted from exporting any MF components of parts 
abroad to any region. The second restriction naturally was on the manufacture of 
proprietary components, with MTL barred from reverse engineering those 
components and obligated to acquire them from MF. In later years this restriction was 
eased to allow MTL to acquire the components of matching specifications from other 
sources as long as MF quality standard was maintained. 
 
6.2.3. STAGE II – ASSIMILATION 
Assimilation of the foreign technology acquired from MF was focused along two lines; 
developing the local vendor base to meet MTL requirements, and developing in-house 
capabilities that would allow the expansion of the firm’s product line as well as 
branching out into allied fields when the capabilities had been acquired. We first turn 
to development of the local vendor base that serves the firm. After initial production 
commenced at the Lahore factory, MTL management came to the realization that 
locally manufactured parts and components would be required for the firm to remain 
profitable while also satisfying the requirement of the MoIP to reduce costs; however, 
the parts and components being supplied to MTL were not of sufficiently high quality 
to meet MF standards.  
 
When the automotive industry was first set up in Pakistan, the vendor base was very 
limited and facing many challenges in terms of quality and quantity of production, and 
only two firms, Pak Suzuki Motor Co (PSMC) - for Suzuki branded passenger cars, and 
MTL – for MF branded tractors, were their main customers in the industry. Both firms 
had different requirements and specifications for parts required, not to mention the 
fact that demand levels for each were different. On the one hand PSMC required a 
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higher volume of parts supply to ensure profitability while MTL required lower 
volumes but was more concerned with ensuring quality levels were met.  
 
MTL’s vendor base today has been developed by the pro-active efforts of the company 
on its own initiative. In the pursuit of lowering costs to ensure survival of the 
company, vendors were visited by MTL and convinced to bring production lines up to 
MF quality standards. MTL provided a great deal of assistance to the vendors willing 
to meet their requirements by educating them about MF production processes, 
providing them with the technical know-how and support, and even soft financing on 
easy terms to enable them to carry out the upgrading process successfully. MTL 
approached the IFC (International Finance Corporation) for a loan of USD 5 million40 
in 1988 to finance this development of the local vendor industry associated with MTL. 
The financing component for vendor development was in the form of advances given 
for the developing of tooling required for producing MTL specific components on 
order as well as for the procurement of raw materials needed for production. These 
advances were secured through bank/insurance guarantees and instalments were 
deducted on a pro-rata basis from bills against supplies provided to MTL. The 
outcome of this investment in vendor development has in general been positive in the 
eyes of MTL, and though admittedly not perfect, has gone a long way to ensuring the 
firm has an adequate supply of quality components for its products. In-house 
capabilities and productive capacity have also been built up (through horizontal and 
vertical expansion) to ensure any shortfall in critical component supply can be 
compensated for. 
 
Vendors for parts and components to be used in the production process are also 
subject to a rigorous screening and selection process to ensure MF quality standards 
are met, which includes an initial review by GM of Technical operations at MTL, 
followed by a visit to the vendor’s manufacturing plant and subsequent review for 
approval of vendor-ship if all MTL standards are met [see Figure 6.2 for details of 
vendor evaluation process]. This clearly defined and well documented process means 
MTL is able to select vendors that have the requisite technological capabilities and 
expertise to provide the components required and precludes vendors without the 
                                                             
40 The loan was arranged by MTL with a mark-up of 3.25 percent and carried an exchange risk 
cover of 3 percent. 
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Source: MTL Interviews 
 
Figure 6.2: Approval Process for New Vendor Selection 
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necessary qualifications from easily subverting the selection process. Discussion with 
a number of small scale vendors brought to light the general perception of these firms 
that the more connected firms resort to using what political connections they have to 
influence state policy and actions. The implications are that this allows the connected 
firms to profit from business activities in other areas instead since MTL has a very 
strict quality level to adhere to, and the vendors are obligated to meet this quality 
level to keep MTL as a customer. As pointed out earlier, MTL provides technical and 
financial assistance to vendors, in exchange offering a guaranteed market for their 
products as long as quality levels are maintained. This suggests that MTL locks in 
vendors it has helped develop thereby ensuring continuity of its components supply. 
While MF does not provide any input in vendor selection, the approval process for 
parts supplied by chosen vendors (see Figure 6.3) involves input from MF in the final 
stages before the component production commences. Again, this suggests that the 
approval process is not easily compromised by firms that do not have the requisite 
capabilities. 
 
MTL management was forward thinking and aware that future growth of the firm 
would depend on the ability of the firm to expand its product portfolio, both 
horizontally and vertically, which in turn would require the necessary capabilities to 
be acquired by its employees. Based on marketing and customer feedback, MTL began 
work on developing several components and products on its own, drawing on 
domestic R & D capabilities, namely in the form of local university research teams. 
Changes in the preparation of sheet metal components were proposed, as was 
relocation of various components. Significant investment was made in initially setting 
up the production line for the manufacture of tractors, and MTL management decided 
to forego investing in retooling the production line and switching to lean production 
till such time as it was deemed necessary and the company ready for the transition. 
MTL has therefore concentrated on optimizing the production line that had already 
set up, rather than investing in a totally new production technology which would 
require substantial effort and time (learning period) to learn and optimize and  with 
no guarantee that it would yield a rate of return as high as that currently enjoyed by 
the firm. This learning period would again be protracted, not to mention the fact that 
it would also need to be financed, which would adversely impact the profitability and 
earnings of the firm, and thus was something MTL management was not keen on.
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Figure 6.3: Process for Vendor First Piece Approval 
 
Source: MTL Interviews
243 
Major improvement to the product line have centered on upgrading the engine and 
making it more powerful to meet the needs of MTL customers in Pakistan’s rural 
areas. Subsequent improvements have been made to the engine to meet Euro 
emission standards (I and II). Due to limited development of domestic capabilities in 
R & D, it was decided to outsource research efforts to meet the first stage of emission 
standards compliance (Euro I) to an international engineering consulting firm, 
Ricardo plc. In an effort to develop in-house capabilities, the compliance effort was 
completed in collaboration with MTL engineers, so it is evident that there was a 
concerted effort to encourage learning by doing in the firm, which extended beyond 
the initial joint venture with MF. For meeting Euro II emission standards, it was 
decided to build on the capabilities developed during the previous collaboration and 
interact with a local R & D institute. MTL funded and sponsored the project to develop 
tractor engines for local application. 
 
As far as assembly and manufacture of the foreign designed engine is concerned, 
except for the fuel injection system and a handful of proprietary components, the 
remaining components are all manufactured and assembled in Pakistan. According to 
MTL executives, the firm is the only one in Pakistan to manufacture and assemble the 
engine in the country, which suggests that the firm has indeed managed to develop a 
fair amount of technological capabilities that extend beyond simple assembly of a 
product. 
 
The Joint Venture agreement signed with MF has been revised over the years to allow 
MTL access to global markets for sourcing of inputs while MF has preferential right to 
match the global price and conditions. The next phase of revisions is being negotiated 
for gaining export market access that had been restricted earlier. 
 
For continued development of its human capital, MTL currently operates an 
automobile industry related scholarship programme for its employees with the 
government of Japan, and which has no involvement from the government. The 
technical collaboration with MF included regular visits by MTL employees to MF 
factories to learn the preferred production process and techniques which have been 
incorporated into MTL operations and contributed to the development and growth of 
employee capabilities. 
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6.2.4. STAGE III - IMPROVEMENT 
The indigenization program initially implemented by the state was deemed to have 
beneficial impact on the firm’s performance and was later incorporated into 
operations at the firm. However, rather than being externally designed and 
monitored, the program was managed within the firm. MTL management also 
realized that quality control was crucial to achieving competitiveness in not just the 
domestic market, but the global market as well. 
 
Towards that end, well-defined processes were developed and put in place for making 
any changes to the design of the MTL products or introducing newly designed 
products. Feedback from customers is evaluated based not just on the basis of 
economic viability, but taking into account vendor capabilities and government 
requirements as regards the indigenization program as well in the initial prototyping 
phase. The prototype is then finalized based on identification, sourcing and 
procurement of all required subcomponents and parts. Based on performance 
evaluation and feedback from the field, the prototype product is either developed 
further or processed for final approval. The process involves finalizing the production 
procedure and preparation and approval of deletion program, procurement of parts 
and production of 1st cycle of product in collaboration with MTL engineers (see Figure 
6.4 for details of the process for design changes and Figure 6.5 for new product design 
approval). Clearly this suggests that MTL has absorbed the technology it acquired 
from its Joint Venture partner, and has started to make progress on improving the 
firm’s products and production processes using the experience it has gained. 
 
The decision to expand the firm’s product portfolio was made in the early years after 
the firm was first established. As part of that effort, automotive batteries were chosen 
an area for expansion, and a local battery manufacturer was taken over. Rex Barren 
Batteries Ltd (RBBL) was incorporated in 1986 under technical collaboration with 
Jungfer Battery Technology, Austria with production commencing in 1992. However, 
due to numerous technical and financial reasons the firm was closed down while still 
in the trial production phase. Rather than trying to develop an arms-length 
relationship with the battery manufacturer and provide the technical and financial 
assistance that would be required, a takeover was deemed to be in the long term 
interests of MTL. On successful takeover by MTL in 2002 as a subsidiary, the RBBL 
was rebranded as Millat Industrial Products Ltd (MIPL). Senior management  
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Figure 6.4: Process Established for Product Design Changes 
 
Source: MTL Interviews 
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Figure 6.5: Process Established for New Product Design 
 
Source: MTL Interviews 
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personnel from MTL were sent on deputation to MIPL to redevelop a range of 
products for the OEM market and the after-market, with assured buying by MTL. 
 
The acquisition of Bolan Castings Limited (BCL) was driven by the desire to expand 
MTL’s product portfolio as well as safeguard MTL’s in-house machining division while 
ensuring quality of key tractor and engine parts. BCL was incorporated in 1982 by 
PACO as a specialist automotive foundry manned by qualified engineers and 
technicians, and managed by MoP. The foundry was set up in 1986 in collaboration 
with Foundry Management and Design Company, UK, and commenced production the 
same year. BCL was selected as one of the firms to be privatized in 1992, much as 
RTEL had been and MTL joined with employees to buyout management control of the 
company. In exchange for management control by MTL, BCL employees were given 
incentives in the form of 10 percent shareholding in the post-privatized company, and 
performance bonuses were linked to production and profitability of the firm. 
Business volume of BCL received a boost with increased demand by MTL which 
allowed utilization of available capacity.  
 
Though MIPL and BCL have turned out to be profitable investments for MTL, the firm 
has also suffered losses over the years. Most notably, a combine harvester was 
designed and developed by MTL engineers for the domestic market, but the concept 
turned out to be less effective than envisioned and production was halted. MTL is 
currently conducting trials of a smaller version with multicrop capability for the local 
market. MTL also attempted to branch out in the automotive market by signing a 
Technical Assistance Agreement with Samsung Commercial Vehicles Ltd (SCVL) for 
the progressive manufacture of LCVs. However, the expenses incurred had to be 
written off when SCVL declared bankruptcy and closed in 2000. A timeline of major 
events at MTL is presented in below. 
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Table 6.3: Timeline of Major Events at MTL 
Year Achievement 
1964 Company incorporated as Rana Tractors and Equipment Limited 
1964 CBU Tractors imported and sold in Pakistan 
1965 Plant to assemble SKD kits set up in Karachi 
1967 Assembly plant shifted from Karachi to Lahore 
1972 Accumulated PKR 1.5 million in losses 
1972 Company nationalized and renamed Millat Tractors Limited 
1973 Licensing and transfer of technology agreement with Massey Ferguson, UK 
1973 Licensing and transfer of technology agreement with Perkins, UK 
1981 Indigenization of tractor assembly started 
1982 Inauguration of engine assembly plant 
1984 Inauguration of machining plant for manufacturing intricate components 
1990 Perkins distributor agreement 
1991 Millat Group formed to acquire 51% shares of Millat Tractors Ltd. 
1992 Management control of company handed over to Millat Group 
1992 Inauguration of new tractor assembly plant - capacity increased from 8,000 to 
15,000 units per annum 
1993 Bolan Casting Limited divested by Pakistani state - buy-out with 51% shares in 
collaboration with employees 
1994 Millat Equipment Limited established 
1994 Mass production of generating sets 
1998 ISO 9002 certification achieved 
2000 Licensing agreement with Anhui-Heli Co. Ltd., China 
2002 Quality management system upgraded to ISO 9001:2000 
2002 Millat Industrial Products Limited established 
  Source: M. T. Limited Annual Reports, various years 
6.3. GROWTH TRENDS AND CURRENT STATUS 
There has been a growing trend of farm mechanization across the globe, and in the 
developed countries, a scarcity of agricultural labour, availability of credit and 
government subsidies encouraging mechanization are driving demand for farm 
tractors. In developing countries, rising population levels are pressuring growth of 
agricultural products, and farm mechanization is considered as the route to higher 
agricultural productivity and output. The global demand for agricultural tractors has 
come to be dominated by the Asia-Pacific region, primarily driven by demand in China 
and India. While large, high-powered tractors are in demand for the large farmers in 
the US, medium power in Europe and Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region is seeming 
demand for low power tractors. Innovations in tractor design prevailing in the 
developed countries center around technologies such as suspension, lighting, 
automated steering and modern interfaces, and in developing countries the focus is 
on low cost and reliability. As a result of these factors, the market for agricultural 
machinery, and tractors has come to be dominated by a limited number of global 
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players; Deere & Company, Kioti Tractor Division Daedong-USA, Escorts Group and 
AGCO. 
 
Global tractor sales data reveals that in 2008, United States, China and India 
accounted for the bulk (13, 13 and 26 percent respectively) of global tractor sales 
(Table 6.4), and this trend has persisted till 2013 (with 9, 21 and 29 percent 
respectively). Moreover sales by Indian firms far exceeded those of the United States 
and even China, reflecting the aggressive promotion of farm mechanization by the 
Indian state and successful entry of Indian tractor manufacturers into foreign 
markets. On the other hand, Pakistan accounted for 4 percent of sales (59,968 units) 
in 2008, but due to the unfavourable economic climate, accounted for slightly over 2 
percent sales (50,593 units) in 2013, and has had limited success in entering foreign 
markets. 
 
Table 6.4: Global Tractor Sales by Major Market (2008-2013) 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Canada 28,865 23,167 22,834 24,117 25,449 27,483 
United 
States 
197,752 155,262 164,894 168,013 185,333 201,851 
Brazil 43,414 45,437 56,420 52,296 55,810 65,115 
Japan 15,629 15,318 16,363 17,222 19,001 24,721 
China 200,000 280,000 320,000 350,000 390,000 445,000 
Korea 15,179 14,717 15,280 14,291 13,471 12,853 
India 392,000 403,903 520,073 564,699 534,079 619,000 
Russian 
Federation 
38,794 13,292 21,085 36,997 41,827 40,000 
Turkey 27,022 13,758 36,072 60,466 50,320 51,000 
France 40,716 36,800 29,123 35,409 38,754 42,609 
Germany 31,250 29,464 28,587 35,977 36,264 36,248 
Italy 27,261 27,057 23,323 23,431 19,343 19,017 
United 
Kingdom 
18,564 16,326 14,486 15,217 14,964 13,490 
Pakistan 59,968 71,607 70,770 48,120 50,859 50,593 
World 1,500,000 1,450,000 1,700,000 1,900,000 1,950,000 2,150,000 
Source: Agrievolution, VDMA, PAMA    
 
The global tractor and agricultural equipment manufacturer market is dominated by 
a handful of multinational corporations specializing in the production, sale and repair 
of agricultural and construction machinery, and formed by various mergers and 
acquisitions of smaller manufacturers. The products manufactured range from 
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engines, generators, tractors, combines and harvesters and agricultural implements. 
At the top of the list is a US multinational corporation, John Deere & Company (JD), 
followed by Case-New Holland (CNH), 90 percent owned by Fiat, Italy and another US 
corporation, Allis-Gleaner Corporation (AGCO). 
 
The tractor market in India is comprised of 16 national manufacturers and production 
operations by 4 multinational corporations, led by Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd 
(MML) with a market share in excess of 40 percent. MML was formed as International 
Tractor Company (ITC) in a joint venture between International Harvester Inc (IHC) 
and Voltas Limited (VL) that began in 1963 and ended in 1971. IHC was taken over by 
MML in 1977 and by 1982 had introduced its own branded tractor, established a 
foothold in the US market in 2004 and bought a controlling stake in a Chinese tractor 
manufacturing company, Jiangling Tractor Company (JTC).  
 
There are a total of 4 assembler/suppliers of Tractors in Pakistan (according to 
PAAPAM). The lion’s share of Tractors produced in the country comes from only two 
of these; MTL and AGTL assembling Massey Ferguson and New Holland Tractors 
respectively. MTL was established in the early days of the domestic automobile 
industry’s establishment and pioneered the domestic production and assembly of 
tractors, with an initial installed capacity of 15,000 tractors per annum (with the plant 
operating a single shift) and currently having doubled its capacity to 30,000 tractors 
per annum (operating on a double shift) to meet the increased demand for tractors. 
AGTL on the other hand was incorporated in 1983, commenced assembly operations 
in 1984, but was taken over by a foreign company, Al-Futtaim in 1991, and has an 
installed capacity of 30,000 tractors per annum (operating on a single shift). Each 
company has an installed capacity of 30,000 units per annum, but due to low income 
of farmers and lack of availability of finance on easy terms, domestic demand has been 
suppressed and the companies have operated at below optimum capacity. Since 2006, 
tractor sales by MTL have consistently outpaced AGTL (this trend is evident in Figure 
6.6 below), despite having an older production plant with lower single shift capacity 
(15,000 versus 30,000), suggesting the firm has managed to establish the MF/MTL 
brand successfully, and operate competitively. Tractor sales peaked in 2011 in 
response to a reduction in sales tax on tractors for two years from 16 percent to 5 
percent (2012) and 10 percent (2013), before falling again in following year. 
 
251 
Figure 6.6: Annual Sale of Tractors in Pakistan (1989-2013) 
 
Source: Based on data collected from PAMA Website 
 
To remedy the situation of operating below capacity due to an adverse economic 
outlook in the domestic market, MTL has been actively pursuing two strategies. One 
is the design and production of a lower priced variant with more efficient diesel 
engines, and the second is negotiating with their JV partners for greater access to 
export markets. Given that the production technology in use is based on mass 
production techniques that are best suited to producing in large batches, continued 
profitability of the company hinges on keeping costs down and securing access to 
export markets. The company's business strategy also involves horizontal and 
vertical diversification; the former to reduce dependence on a single product line for 
profits, and the latter to ensure timely access to high quality components that is also 
essential for meeting the quality standards of their JV partner. The primary market 
for MTL is the province of Punjab, and MTL has established a spare parts dealer 
network that is concentrated in Punjab to support its primary customer base, while 
no dealers are in operation in Baluchistan and less than a handful in Sindh and KPK 
(as shown in Table 6.5 below). On the other hand, there has been a significant growth 
in the number of authorized workshops (see Table 6.6 for trends) dedicated to 
servicing and maintaining MTL manufactured tractors in all provinces. 
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Table 6.5: Distribution of Spare Parts Dealers by Province with Changes over Time 
Province Number of Dealers 
1996 2000 2010 2013 
Baluchistan 0 0 0 0 
NWFP (Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa - KPK) 3 3 3 3 
Punjab 41 41 41 41 
Sindh 1 1 1 1 
Total 45 45 45 45 
Source: MTL Annual Report, Various Issues 
 
Table 6.6: Distribution of Authorized Workshops by Province and Changes over Time 
Province Number 
of Cities 
Number of Workshops 
1996 2000 2010 2011 
Baluchistan 5 8 11 30 31 
NWFP (Khyber 
Pakhtoonkhwa - KPK) 
8 28 23 18 18 
Punjab 41 171 206 332 334 
Sindh 13 31 30 74 74 
Other 2 2 1 5 5 
Total 69 240 271 459 462 
Source: MTL Annual Report, Various Issues 
 
Labour productivity at MTL has increased from 18 units per worker in 1995 to 34 
units in 2012, and peaking at 47 units in 2011 when the firm was operating double 
shifts and overtime to accommodate increased demand for tractors (as shown in 
Figure 6.7). 
 
It is evident from the prices of tractors available at local dealers in Pakistan (see Box 
6.4) that the MTL brand is competitively priced, though individual tractor models 
tend to be priced on the higher side, on account of after sale services provided by MTL 
to its customers. 
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Figure 6.7: Labour Productivity and Trends in Employment at MTL 
 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from MTL Annual Reports, various issues 
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Brand and Model Price (USD) 
Massey Ferguson Tractors:  
MF 240 (50 HP):  8,954 
MF 260 (60 HP):  9,873 
MF 350 (50 HP):  9,490 
MF 360 (60 HP):  10,166 
MF 375 (75 HP):  12,718 
MF 385 2WD (85 HP) 14,122 
MF 385 4WD (85 HP) 21,076 
  
New Holland Tractors: 
NH 480 Special (50 HP) 8,852 
NH Ghazi (65 HP) 9,772 
NH 640 (75 HP) 12,246 
NH 640 Special (85 HP) 13,599 
NH 55-56 (50 HP) 9,439 
NH 60-56 (60 HP) 10,421 
NH 70-56 4wd (85 HP) 17,184 
  
Ursus Tractors:  
Ursus 2812 (50 HP) 8,635 
Ursus 3512 (60 HP) 9,735 
Source: World Trade Inc. (Tractor Dealer based in Lahore 
Note: All prices are fob Karachi, Pakistan based on container load. 
Box 6.4: Tractor Prices in Pakistan by Brand and Model 
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6.4. CONSTRAINTS FACED 
The major constraints faced by MTL in the company’s growth over the years have 
been the royalty and associated fee payments to MF for use of their proprietary 
technology and the accompanying export market limitation that has been in effect till 
recent years. Table 6.7 shows that royalty payments have been determined by net 
sales, peaking at 1.82 percent of net sales in 1999, before falling to only 0.40 percent 
the following year before they were discontinued after 2000. Exports of CBU to Africa 
have started after protracted negotiations by MTL with MF, and numerous quality 
assurance and plant visits by MF engineers. On the policy front, MTL was fortunate 
enough to have had preferential access to government departments in the formative/ 
early years which led to swift resolution of any problems or issues faced by the 
company, but since the time of liberalization, MTL has had to deal with frequent 
changes in government policy, which the company management asserts have 
adversely affected firm operations and hindered it’s growth. 
 
Table 6.7: Royalty Payments and Share in Net Sales of MTL (1995-2000) 
('000 PKR) 
Year Net sales 
('000) 
Royalty Payments 
Total Share in Net 
Sales (%) 
1995 3,003,924 51,405 1.71 
1996 3,330,334 30,029 0.90 
1999 5,365,143 97,769 1.82 
2000 22,199,909 87,975 0.40 
Source: Millat Tractors Limited Annual Reports, Various 
Issues 
 
The vendor base was found to be lacking in terms of the ability to meet MF quality 
assurance levels, and it is for that reason that the decision was made to expand 
operations horizontally in the industry and acquire Bolan Casting foundry to assure 
that costs were minimized and quality levels could be assured while maintaining 
supply levels. 
 
There were no hurdles placed in factory operations by MF; save for the strict 
adherence to quality assurance work. In fact, it was the opinion of MTL management 
that the decision to source the technology transfer from the UK afforded the company 
the flexibility to survive and continue production even in the most difficult of times. 
 
255 
On the other hand, the government department and agencies were viewed with 
suspicion (and negativity). The role of the EDB in recent years is not looked upon 
favourably by MTL employees; considered to be very bureaucratic and monitoring 
and regulation oriented interaction only while providing no meaningful assistance or 
guidance in terms of investments or projects to undertake. Considering the fact that 
the EDB is officially tasked with strengthening the engineering base of the country 
and hence developing local technological capability, this perception is unsettling. 
Visits by EDB staff to the factory were viewed as waste of valuable resources and time 
and involved disrupting daily factory operations. One MTL General Manager (GM) 
related a very interesting case regarding the workings of the EDB. A statement was 
issued by an official of the EDB in August 2012 to the effect that tractor manufacturers 
in Pakistan were using outdated (1950s) technology. However, according to a senior 
MTL GM, the company is in fact using state of the art technology which is international 
standards compliant, and the reason for this statement being issued was to justify the 
government’s decision to allow the import of competing Belarus (Russian) tractors 
from abroad. It was the considered view of this GM that the Belarus tractor in fact was 
based on old technology and more expensive than the competing MF tractor model, 
and that the EDB statement was based on their (EDB’s) reading that the differing 
model numbers used by MF (No. 415) versus MTL (No. 350) for the same tractor 
design represented outdated technology. 
 
Upon further questioning it also emerged that there was little to no direct interaction 
with the Ministry of Industries and Production as regards operations of the firm. 
Furthermore, according to MTL management, any loss making period is financed by 
the company’s own resources with no assistance or involvement from the 
government. In interviews with state officials at MoIP and EDB, it became apparent 
that the focus of the state had shifted from a more “hands–on” approach and direct 
involvement in the operations of firms to one of simply monitoring the activities of 
firms and providing a “level playing field”. MoIP actions were hamstrung by 
countervailing political directives from higher political authorities and conflicts of 
interest between different institutions, which has translated into a lack of 
coordination and information sharing between these entities. This suggests that even 
if the state were not following the Washington Consensus approach of enabling 
liberalization and open markets, the fragmentation in the political system and the lack 
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of coordination between institutions will make it exceedingly difficult to promote a 
particular industry or sector and successfully coordinate activities across sectors. 
 
6.5. FIRM COMPETITIVENESS 
According to the catching up model that was introduced in Chapter 3, we know that 
in today’s globalized world, developing countries are competing with developed 
countries and their success or failure depends on the level of competitiveness 
achieved by their domestic manufacturers. In economic theory product 
competitiveness depends on its price and quality, and manufacturing firms in 
developing countries require subsidies to compete effectively with firms in other 
countries till such time as they acquire the capabilities required to compete. 
According to Khan (2013b)’s mark-up pricing model the competitiveness and 
performance of MTL can be assessed in relation to a global leader firm in tractor 
production, in terms of the total unit cost of production plus a mark-up. In other 
words, the unit price of a product is the sum of unit prices of labour, capital and inputs 
times the mark-up. In the case of MTL, the breakdown of costs can be computed as 
follows. 
 
First of all, on the supply side, cost of manufacturing a product plays a key role in 
determining how competitive a firm’s production process is in comparison with other 
firms in the industry. As evident from the cost break-up detailed in Table 6.8, raw 
materials and stores consumed account for the bulk of the value between 2009 and 
2013. The high degree of localization achieved by the firm is reflected in the fact that 
royalty payments for use of proprietary technology are not a major component of the 
cost break-up at MTL. 
 
Unit labour cost is the ratio of wage level to level of labour productivity (output per 
hour of labour input) in the firm. Labour productivity is a measure of how effectively 
labour is being used in the production process by the firm and is affected by a number 
of factors of which we are interested in three; the rate of capacity utilization at the 
firm, the improved skills of workers and improved managerial skills. MTL plant 
capacity remained fixed at 15,000 tractors per year (single shift initially, but by 2007 
doubled to 30,000 tractors per year (double shift) to accommodate the increased 
demand and spending power of its customers (see Table 6.9 for trends in labour 
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productivity and annual firm output). Interestingly, between 1995 and 1997, there 
was under-utilization of capacity at MTL, and the number of tractors manufactured 
was well below the rated capacity, which reflected the drop in sales due to suppressed 
demand in the agricultural sector, and the restriction on exports did not allow the 
firm to take advantage of its export potential. The number of employees has been 
showing a downward trend since the late 1990s, from 531 in 1998 to 468 in 2010, 
while number of tractors manufactured has been increasing from 14,453 in 1999 to 
40,178 in 2010, by which time the firm has been operating on a double shift basis and 
employees have been putting in overtime which has allowed plant capacity to be 
doubled and the increased demand to be met. Excluding the years when the firm was 
operating at below capacity due to the downturn in the local economy, labour 
productivity has been steadily increasing, evidence that the firm has been successful 
in gaining capabilities (technological and organizational) for operating competitively. 
 
Table 6.9: Labour Productivity Trends at MTL (1995 - 2012) 
Year Number of 
employees 
Plant 
Capacity 
Tractors 
Manufactured 
Labour 
productivity 
1995** 531 15,000 9,591 18.06 
1996** 531 15,000 10,199 19.21 
1997** 531 15,000 5,523 10.40 
1998* 531 15,000 7,854 14.79 
1999 526 15,000 14,453 27.48 
2000 521 15,000 16,084 30.87 
2007 486 30,000 27,081 55.72 
2008 475 30,000 27,506 57.91 
2009 473 30,000 30,244 63.94 
2010 468 30,000 40,178 85.85 
2011 448 30,000 42,188 94.17 
2012 459 30,000 32,004 69.73 
Source: Millat Tractors Limited Annual Report, various issues 
Notes: 
* : Production shortfall due to decreased demand 
** : Data on number of employees for 1995-1997 unavailable and assumed to be static, 
and production shortfall due to drop in sales 
Labour productivity is the ratio of tractors manufactured annually to number of 
employees 
 
Unit input cost is the ratio of price of inputs to the productivity of inputs, where the 
global price of steel is used as a proxy for the price of inputs used at MTL. To 
determine the productivity of input use in the manufacturing process, an estimate of 
the total units of input used in the manufacturing process is required, which can be 
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used in turn to calculate the productivity of input used as the ratio of manufactured 
output to total units of input used. However, due to lack of available data on input use 
in the industry, a proxy is used as represented by the ratio of total input expenditure 
(in PKR) to number of tractors manufactured in a year. 
 
The third component in the cost structure of the firm is the unit capital cost; the ratio 
of price of capital to the output-capital ratio. Again, due to unavailability of an actual 
estimate for capital price, a proxy is calculated as the ratio of depreciation charge on 
land, buildings, machinery and equipment to the number of tractors manufactured in 
a year plus royalty payments (if any) for the use of proprietary technology. 
 
Taken together the three components of the price markup model are expected to 
indicate the source(s) of non-competitiveness of the late developer firm in relation to 
the global leader. Unit labour costs are showing a downward trend (line L1 in Table 
6.10), suggesting that remuneration expenditures relative to number of tractors 
manufactured is decreasing, while labour productivity is increasing. Unit input costs 
are showing an upward trend (line I1 in Table 6.10), which is not surprising since the 
company has been increasing annual purchases of stores and consumables required 
for the production of tractors every year, however, the unit costs of inputs has also 
been increasing with time. Finally, we note that the unit capital costs are decreasing 
(line K1 in Table 6.10). For a competitive firm, one would expect unit costs to decrease 
for the same quality product being produced every year and the firm gains mastery 
of its production technology, so the trend exhibited here is indicating MTL is 
becoming more efficient with the passage of time. 
 
However, it should be noted that these expenditures are in nominal terms (current 
PKR) and it would be more informative to see if these trends persist when the 
expenditure figures for all three inputs are deflated to account for inflation. Ideally 
one would deflate the expenditure figures by an index of manufacturing prices, but 
lacking a consistent index for Pakistan, we use a proxy; specifically GDP deflator. The 
downward trend for remuneration expenditures, in real terms, (line L21 in Table 
6.11) suggests that the company has been successful in keeping labour costs down as 
number of employees has been streamlined and labour productivity has been 
increased (line L3 in Table 6.11). Performance based rewards for labour have been 
increased by the firm to compensate for rising prices and costs, while number of 
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employees have decreased (line G2 in Table 6.11). Input expenditures have increased 
in real terms as well, but when coupled with the increase in capacity and production 
output that has been achieved over the years, this suggests the firm is gaining 
capabilities and becoming more competitive with the passage of time. Capital 
expenditures, comprised of depreciation charges41 for land, buildings and equipment 
and royalty payments to MF for use of their technology, show a downward trend 
which accelerated when the latter (royalty payments) were discontinued after 2000 
(line K3 in Table 6.11). Thus, despite the increased depreciation charge for machinery 
and equipment at MTL, unit capital costs while already low, have fallen even further 
in recent years. Taken together, these trends do suggest that the company has made 
progress in developing capabilities to compete successfully. 
 
In contrast to the experience of MTL, AGTL on average has a higher cost of production, 
possibly reflecting the royalty payments still being made for use of proprietary 
technology (as evident from Table 6.12 below), while labour productivity is lower 
(number of tractors produced per worker per year as reported in Table 6.13), despite 
having a higher plant capacity (30,000 tractors per year on a single shift basis) and 
employing fewer employees. 
 
 
                                                             
41 Depreciation charges by MTL are calculated by applying diminishing balance method for 
property, plant and equipment, and on straight line basis for leasehold office buildings. 
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Table 6.12: Cost of Production for AGTL (2010-2013) 
(‘000 PKR) 
Component 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share 
Total 11,886,52
1 
100.00 8,908,586 100.00 11,211,823 100.00 7,143,200 100.00 
Raw materials and 
components  
11,220,97
0 
94.40 8,349,894 93.73 10,503,891 93.69 6,584,131 92.17 
Remunerations 190,253 1.60 180,444 2.03 209,991 1.87 204,829 2.87 
Stores and 
supplies 
190,753 1.60 177,521 1.99 230,495 2.06 143,360 2.01 
Royalty 143,985 1.21 97,936 1.10 143,075 1.28 91,183 1.28 
Fuel and power 33,593 0.28 30,735 0.35 47,138 0.42 43,774 0.61 
Depreciation 23,574 0.20 25,732 0.29 27,513 0.25 29,035 0.41 
Repairs and 
maintenance 
23,334 0.20 29,686 0.33 28,882 0.26 26,960 0.38 
Travel 3,413 0.03 4,969 0.06 6,755 0.06 7,238 0.10 
Others 2,087 0.02 2,361 0.03 6,076 0.05 3,559 0.05 
Source: AGTL Annual Reports, Various Issues 
 
Table 6.13: Labour Productivity Trends at AGTL (Various Years) 
Year Tractors 
Manufactured 
Number of 
Employees 
Labour 
Productivity 
1999 12,200 498 24.5 
2000 18,425 498 37.0 
2006 26,076 422 61.8 
2007 26,380 436 60.5 
2008 27,550 423 65.1 
2009 30,351 413 73.5 
2010 29,020 404 71.8 
2011 19,936 377 52.9 
2012 23,820 370 64.4 
Source: AGTL Annual Reports, Various Issues 
 
6.6. CONCLUSION 
Building on the discussion in the preceding chapters and the case study presented 
above, we can infer a number of important findings regarding Pakistan’s initial state-
led industrial development, the evolution of political settlements in the country and 
their impact on technology acquisition efforts by the automotive industry. As evident 
from Chapter 5, the early phase of technology acquisition and capabilities 
development in the industry under state sponsored direction and control led to the 
development of substantial capacity of production by the state run enterprises, but 
only limited competitiveness was achieved, naturally leading to losses being 
sustained by individual enterprises, such as RTEL. The lack of competitiveness is 
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likely on account of the weak technological capabilities that developed in response to 
overly ambitious goals and targets that were divorced from the situation that was 
actually developing, and weak enforcement by the state (as represented by a weak 
developmental state and detailed in the discussion on political settlements and 
Pakistan’s history in Chapters 2 and 3) that led to circumvention of these targets. 
 
Recalling the characteristics of political settlements as they evolved in Pakistan 
discussed in Chapter 2, the authoritarian regime in was vulnerable to excluded 
factions, which meant policies were ineffectively implemented. Despite these 
shortcomings, the fact that the priorities of the state were aligned with the efforts of 
MTL employees to establish the recently privatised company meant that political 
settlements worked in favour of the company. However, the evidence points to 
Chibber (2003)’s hypothesis holding water in the case of Pakistan as well. In contrast 
to the case of Korea, but mirroring developments in India, it appears that by and large 
entrepreneurs were able to resist enforcement which undermined state capacity and 
prevent the formation of a strong developmental state. The fragmented state of 
political settlements in the country led to frequent changes in leadership and shifts in 
policy formulation and implementation, further exacerbating the situation. 
 
This case study has brought to light an exception to the general trend, a tractor 
manufacturing company MTL, that was encouraged to pursue a viable localization 
process and development of technological capabilities (technical as well as 
organizational) that were not impeded by foreign ownership of the production 
technology. Learning and a high level of effort to absorb the technology was induced 
through the state directive to lower costs and indigenize production of tractors. The 
perceived benefit to MTL was access to a vast domestic market unchallenged and 
higher profits through lower costs. The export market restriction imposed by MF in 
exchange for use of proprietary technology meant that the company was limited to 
offering products for the domestic market that used simpler technology than the 
corresponding global level; designed to suit the needs of domestic consumers (simple, 
sturdy tractors that farmers with rudimentary education could operate and maintain, 
as opposed to large, high technology tractors with GPS satellite guidance and cabin 
amenities) and this allowed the company to develop its capabilities and 
competitiveness in those products to the point where it is now competitively placed 
in the domestic as well as regional market. Therefore this restriction had implications 
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for the industrialization strategy adopted by MTL. Late developers typically pursue 
relating to competitiveness achieved through learning to produce high quality 
products and the latter to competitiveness in lower quality products using the 
capabilities that have been developed. In pursuing this “-strategy” (see Khan 
(2009)), MTL has focused on successfully developing improvements to the initial 
design of its product, building up the capabilities of its component supplier network, 
and expanding its product portfolio through horizontal and vertical expansion and 
acquisition using private financing on commercial terms. 
 
An examination of the competitiveness of the company using labour productivity 
trends and Khan (2013b)’s markup pricing model suggest that the company has 
achieved a measure of success in its efforts to build up capabilities and compete 
effectively with other firms. However, the analysis is constrained by the lack of 
availability of in-depth data on firm operations and performance. 
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CHAPTER 7. ATLAS HONDA MOTORCYCLES: 
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT THROUGH SELF 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Of the various sectors in the automotive industry, the motorcycle industry is notable 
for a number of characteristics that can benefit developing countries in their goal to 
industrialize and develop at a rapid pace. Typically, the motorcycle industry is 
characterized by a high level of competitiveness and rivalry among the incumbent 
firms. Each firm tends to have a specific niche market with a variety of incentives and 
innovations that are offered to customers that end up encouraging competition 
among the firms. The price differential between different brands in the market tends 
to be low and thus the firms compete in terms of the features they offer and the 
services they provide. In the past consumers used to supplement their main modes of 
transportation, the passenger car, with the motorcycle. However, now due to the 
higher fuel efficiency and greater manoeuvrability, not to mention the significantly 
cheaper price, the demand for motorcycles is rising and the expectation is that the 
motorcycle industry will continue to grow. Companies use product segmentation 
strategy to market their product to customers, providing a motorcycle for any type of 
rider. This makes the motorcycle industry ideally suited to operation in developing 
countries and able to take advantage of the ability of technologically capable local 
firms to competitively manufacture slightly differentiated products for the market. 
 
Though compared to automobiles a motorcycle is a simpler machine, there are still a 
substantial number of components that go into the manufacture of one machine. The 
complexity of the parts used in the manufacture of motorcycles is less than that of 
automobiles naturally, but substantial technological and organizational capabilities 
are still required to competitively manufacture them. Therefore it can be expected 
that firms will face significantly less difficulty in acquiring these capabilities, both in 
terms of cost of financing the loss making period of learning-by-doing and also the 
actual amount of time required before competitiveness is achieved . Once economies 
of scale are achieved and the firm is competitively placed in the market with its own 
brand, the firm is expected to take the next step of expansion into production of more 
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complex automotive models such as passenger cars. Hyundai of Korea and later Tata 
Engineering and Locomotive Company (Tata Motors) of India are two examples of 
companies from developing countries that successfully designed and produced 
passenger vehicles based on capabilities that were built up over the years. The 
expectation is that firms will build on the capabilities gained in the manufacture of 
simpler products to gain a competitive edge against other established firms and move 
up the quality ladder into the production of more complex and sophisticated 
motorcycles. Vertical integration (not necessarily in terms of ownership, but in terms 
of control over quality and dense interactions between assemblers and suppliers) 
also takes place in the industry stemming from motorcycle companies preference to 
manufacture certain components of their product in-house; to better control the flow 
of critical supplies and to also ensure that quality is maintained.  
 
Since 2000, Pakistan’s motorcycle manufacturing industry has exhibited strong 
growth performance, averaging 30 percent annual increase between 2000 and 2010. 
The demand for affordable and reliable motorcycles is present and growing in the 
domestic market as evident from the proliferation of Chinese brand motorcycles in 
the local market in recent years. A handful of domestic firms have managed to develop 
their domestic technological capabilities to the degree that majority of the 
manufacturing process has been localized and allowed the firms to enter into the 
export market. If this trend is indeed sustainable, the domestic industry should be 
able to successfully compete in the global market. Against this backdrop, the question 
arises whether firms in developing countries are developing the capabilities required 
to successfully compete in this highly competitive global market and are they making 
the transition to producing their own brands and higher value added products such 
as passenger cars. This chapter will look at the case of the oldest motorcycle 
manufacturing firm in Pakistan to assess the firm’s level of technological capabilities 
development, the competitiveness of the firm and the future prospects for product 
expansion in the context of trends in global motorcycle manufacturing.  
 
7.2. FIRM LEVEL TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES 
DEVELOPMENT AT ATLAS HONDA LIMITED 
The motorcycle manufacturing industry in Pakistan is dominated by three companies; 
Atlas Honda Limited (ATLH) is a joint venture between the Atlas Group and Honda 
268 
Motor Co. Ltd. (HMCL), Japan for the progressive assembly and manufacture of Honda 
Motor brand motorcycles in Pakistan. Honda is the largest selling brand of 
motorcycles in the country and is marketed as having an unmatched reputation for 
high quality, reliability and after-sales-service to differentiate the brand from Chinese 
clones that have started making their presence felt in recent years. The preceding 
discussion and analysis of recent trends in the industry have brought forward the fact 
that the motorcycle manufacturing industry has grown in recent years and the 
potential to become a regional player in the medium term. Domestic manufacturers 
need to focus on better utilization of the productive capacity that has been built up 
and achieve competitiveness in the domestic and export markets. ATLH in particular 
has invested heavily in building up its capacity and made efforts to improve the 
quality standard both within the firm and in domestic component suppliers as well. 
ATLH has focused on promoting domestic production of components and 
development of vendor capabilities. The discussion that follows will shed light on the 
technology acquisition efforts by ATLH since the time the company was first set up 
and assess the competitiveness of the company based on several indicators of 
performance. 
 
7.2.1. FOUNDATION 
As part of the effort to establish a presence in the motorcycle manufacturing industry, 
Atlas Group of companies established a total of three motorcycle manufacturing 
concerns; namely Atlas Epak Ltd., Panjdarya Limited, and Atlas Autos Ltd. Atlas Epak 
Ltd. was taken over by the Government of Bangladesh after the separation of 
Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971, while Panjdarya Limited and Atlas Autos 
Limited were merged in 1988 to form a single motorcycle manufacturing concern – 
Atlas Honda Limited (ATLH). In addition to the manufacture and marketing of Honda 
motorcycles in collaboration with HMCL, ATLH also manufactures a number of hi-
technology components in-house in collaboration with several leading parts 
manufacturers from Japan. Joint venture agreements have been signed with Showa 
Atsumitech, and just recently with the Denso Corporation.  
 
ATLH operates two production facilities in Pakistan; one in Karachi, Sindh and the 
second in Sheikhupura, Punjab. The Karachi “mother” plant was set up in 1964 after 
a technical agreement was signed between the Atlas Group of companies and Honda 
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Motorcycles Japan. Initially the plant averaged a daily production rate of seven 
motorcycles, which has increased to 300 motorcycles as the workers have gained 
proficiency in the production technology and plant operations have become 
established. The Karachi plant is ideally located to take advantage of the burgeoning 
component manufacturers industry established in the city. The newer production 
facilities operated by ATLH are located in Sheikhupura, and were established in 1981 
for the manufacture of newer product varieties and currently manufactures all four 
locally built models; the popular CD 70, Pridor, CG 125 and CG 125 Deluxe. 
 
7.2.2. IMPLEMENTATION, ASSIMILATION, AND IMPROVEMENT 
ATLH has undertaken to develop local manufacturing capabilities to the highest, 
economically feasible level. While a major role in localization has been assigned to 
vendor industries, Atlas has the country’s largest in-house manufacturing capability 
at its Karachi and Sheikhupura plants. To support the production facilities, the 
company has established an R&D wing and tool making facilities through CAD/CAM 
which are growing rapidly in size and function as the company expands. Atlas has 
managed to execute 12 Joint Venture/Technical Assistance Agreements between local 
vendors and foreign manufacturers for transfer of technology. Besides, Atlas has 
directly executed 9 Joint Venture/Technical Assistance Agreements other than 
Honda. 
 
ATLH management is striving to modernize company operations by adapting 
applicable aspects of research and theory and more specifically, Honda’s unique 
philosophy of hard/soft technologies to the realities of Pakistani conditions. Company 
management structure, systems and processes are changed according to the demands 
of the customer, growth and new technology. Efforts are being made to develop 
participation at all levels of personnel in decision-making and a substantial and 
effective delegation has been established at levels where applicable. Various 
participation programs such as Ala Mayar Quality Circles movement, launched in 
1985, are strongly encouraged to allow constructive self-expression and teamwork. 
The Company training and development programs encourage all members to develop 
themselves and contribute to their full potential. 
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ATLH is playing a pioneering role in creating conditions for easy use of motorcycles 
all over the country. A vast and growing network of over 1600 sales service and spare 
parts dealers has been established. In order to back up this system, Atlas has set up 
Warranty & Training Centers (WTC) in Karachi and Lahore which provide several 
courses of varying duration and complexity for motorcycle mechanics and users each 
year. Mobile training facilities take the latest know-how, technology and maintenance 
of motorcycles to major rural and urban centers around the country. 
 
ATLH has managed to expand its operations to meet local demand on a rolling basis 
since it was first established, and along the way has contributed to the growth of the 
domestic industry. Production capacity was first expanded in 1976, when the Honda 
motorcycle was well received by local consumers. A second plant commenced 
operations in 1981 after a Joint Venture agreement was signed with Honda Motor 
Company, Japan. The company achieved a major breakthrough in its operations when 
CBU motorcycles were first exported to Nepal. The export potential of the company 
being realized, ATLH signed a formal agreement with its Joint Venture partner for the 
export of motorcycles to countries in the South Asia region (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
in addition to Nepal), the Middle East and Central Asia.  
 
ATLH management has realized the long term benefits and gains from lower costs of 
localized production of components and taken steps to promote such local 
manufacturing. The steps undertaken include setting up of specialized engine 
manufacturing plants; for the CD70 engine at Karachi in 1987, and for the CD125 
engine at Skeihupura in 1991. ATLH has managed to improve machining and level of 
quality of components manufactured in-house and by component suppliers through 
improved quality control. ATLH has reached sufficient level of expertise in the 
manufacture of the brand being offered for sale in the local market that it is expanding 
the product line offered in the domestic market, and as expected of a leading motion 
motorcycle manufacturing firm it is participating in, and encouraging local R & D 
efforts to bring to market a differentiated product that appeals to local consumers. 
This includes work to ensure the new products are compliant with foreign emissions 
standards (Euro I and Euro II), which ensures that the product will be competitive 
with foreign brands in the global market (see Table 7.1 for a timeline of major events 
at ATLH. 
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Table 7.1: Timeline of Major Events at ATLH 
Year Event 
1962 Technical Assistance Agreement signed with Honda Motor Company Limited Japan 
1964 Commercial Production started 
1976 Production capacity expansion I 
1981 Commercial Production started at Panjdarya Limited as Joint Venture with Honda 
Motor Company Limited 
1981 Production capacity expansion II 
1987 CD70 Engine Project started at Karachi 
1988 Merger of Panjdarya Limited and Atlas Autos Limited 
1988 Production capacity expansion III 
1988 Joint Venture agreement signed with Honda Motor Company Limited 
1989 Export of CBU motorcycles to Nepal 
1991 CG125 Engine Project established at Sheikhupura 
1995 Export Agreement signed with Honda Motor Company Limited Japan 
1995 Exports of CBU motorcycles to Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Middle East and 
Central Asia 
1998 New CD 70 and CG 125 models launched 
1999 Sheikhupura and Karachi factories receive ISO 9002 certification 
2000 Crankshaft Project started 
2002 Deletion level reached to 87 percent (CD70) and 80 percent (CG125) 
2002 Local R & D Wing established 
2006 Established DCC (Delivery Control Center) at Sheikhupura Plant 
2006 Annual Production reaches 360,000 
2007 Successfully implemented SAP ERP to its business process, all over Pakistan 
2008 Established DCC at Karachi Plant 
2009 Launched New Model of CD 100 – Euro II 
2009 ISO 14001-2004 Environment Certificate acquisition 
2010 Launched New Model of CG 125 Deluxe – Euro II 
2012 Launched New Model Honda “Pridor” 
2012 All motorcycle models comply with EURO II (PAK-II) emissions standards 
Source: A. H. Limited Annual Reports, various years 
 
There are six departments at ATLH that handle: (i) Production Planning and Control, 
(ii) Stores, (iii) Casting (plant), (iv) Engine Manufacture (plant), (v) Manufacturing 
(plant), and (vi) Assembly (plant). The Production Planning and Control department 
issues work orders based on aggregate production planning, a master production 
schedule and material resource planning. There a total of three shops or work areas 
in the casting plant for low pressure die casting, high pressure die casting and gravity 
die casting. The engine manufacturing plant is comprised of a gear manufacturing 
shop, camshaft machining shop, cylinder-head machining shop, crankshaft machining 
shop and a crankcase machining shop. The manufacturing plant currently 
manufactures and paints fuel tanks for all models assembled in the plant. Finally, the 
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assembly plant has four shops that weld the frame, paint, assemble the engine and 
assemble the frame. According to ATLH, the latest foreign production technology is 
used to yield an annual capacity rate of 600,000 motorcycles of various models, which 
ensures the firm will remain competitive in the global market. The Karachi plant has 
an average motorcycle assembly time of 4 minutes and is now capable of producing 
250 motorcycles per day.  
 
7.3. TRENDS IN THE MOTORCYCLE INDUSTRY 
The global leader of motorcycle manufacturing in the Asian region is China, exporting 
close to half of the 17 million units it produces, followed by India. Pakistan has 
managed to marginally penetrate the export market in the region; however it is 
currently exporting only 1 percent of its total output (see Table 7.2). The industry is 
operating at well below the installed capacity of the sector (as shown in Table 7.3), 
suggesting that the industry has the potential to grow and become a regional leader 
in motorcycle manufacturing if it is able to break through the barriers that the sector 
currently faces. 
 
Table 7.2: Regional Players in Motorcycle Production and Export 
    (000's) 
 Country Production Exports Exports Share in 
Production (%) 
1 China 17,000 6,971 41.00 
2 Thailand 3,000 800 28.00 
3 India 7,700 513 7.00 
4 Vietnam 2,000 100 5.00 
5 Pakistan 751 7 1.00 
Source: Competitiveness Support Fund (2006) 
 
The motorcycle manufacturing industry in Pakistan is facing stiff competition from 
other countries in the region. According to industry stakeholders, the competition is 
exacerbated by the preferential policy stance of numerous foreign governments vis-
à-vis their own motorcycle manufacturing concerns, which is not mirrored by the 
state in Pakistan. The difference in policy perspectives may be gauged by the duty 
rates and tax rates applicable in the industry, as detailed in Table 7.4. A closer look at 
the price and duty rates for CBU, CKD and parts reveals that the price of a motorcycle 
is lowest in China, as are the duty rates, while Thailand is at the other end of the 
spectrum in applicable import duty rates. 
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Table 7.3: Installed Capacity and Motorcycle Manufacture by Main Association 
Year Manufacturer Association 
APMA PAMA Imported CBU 
from China 
Total Installed 
Capacity (2010) 
1,147,000 1,000,000 n/a 
2000 10,319 108,850  
2001 36,923 120,627 1,560 
2002 48,208 156,961 9,700 
2003 102,059 268,948 22,692 
2004 185,527 385,179 11,300 
2005 299,430 451,949 3,300 
2006 424,629 415,221 156 
2007 503,278 550,824  
2008 487,321 430,307  
2009 758,038 622,366  
2010 904,797 705,884  
Source: APMA (2014) 
 
Table 7.4: Regional Comparison of Duty and Tax Rates 
(%) 
Duty Rate Country 
China India Vietnam Thailand Pakistan 
Price (USD, C & F) 344.0 530.0 533.0 501.0 595.0 
Total Import Duty CBU 30.0 90.0 100.0 116.0 90.0 
CKD 10.0 12.5 30.0 33.0 30.0 
Parts 18.0 46.0 50.0 40-105 35-50 
Share of Total 
Revenue 
Direct 
Tax 
54.0 44.0 55.0 51.0 5.5 
Indirect 
Tax 
46.0 56.0 45.0 49.0 94.5 
No of OEMs Local 144 9 12 5 43 
Foreign 56    3 
Exporters 67 7 3 5 1 
Exports per OEM (units) 104,054 73,322 33,333 166,200 7,082 
Source: ACMA (2014), 
 SIAM (2014) 
 
More specifically, there is a very strong domestic demand for motorcycles in China. 
Japanese firms have invested heavily in the industry while the Chinese state has 
subsidized provision and cost of infrastructure such as utilities and land 
procurement, while assistance in general is provided to exporting firms (almost 40 
percent of all OEMs in the country). China has the added benefit of having a market 
presence in over 200 countries worldwide and local availability of many raw 
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materials required for manufacture of the final product. China has to import iron and 
steel and many raw materials, and the state in China gives priority to local 
development of products and hence technological capabilities. A requirement for 
setting up a Joint Venture in China is production of components for sale in China, and 
globally in developed countries. Foreign ownership of automotive plants is also 
prohibited in an effort to encourage the transfer of technology Holweg, Luo & Oliver 
(2009). However, Chinese firms at this stage are unable to truly compete with 
Japanese and other established firms in terms of quality and substantial technological 
innovations and focus on bringing to market similar products at a significantly 
cheaper price. 
 
Indian consumers represent a very strong domestic demand for locally manufactured 
motorcycles, where the component manufacturing industry has successful managed 
to develop enough technological and organizational capabilities to deliver quality 
components at competitive prices for a range of domestically produced qualities of 
motorcycles. Components used in the production of motorcycles are locally available, 
and Indian manufacturers have a strong manufacturing presence in regional and 
African markets. In the post liberalization era, a number of Joint Ventures have been 
established with local companies. 
 
Thailand’s Detroit of Asia policy aims to make the country a regional assembly hub 
with strong infrastructure support by the state that includes a number of initiatives 
such as automotive manufacturing clusters, training and component development. 
Thai OEMs are dominated by Japanese manufacturers and have a very strong export 
presence, especially with the rest of the ASEAN economies. 
 
Vietnam experienced a significant downturn in recent years in terms of the number 
of OEMs in operation, which fell from 60 to only 12. Vietnamese OEMs prefer to export 
to the ASEAN region to benefit from more favourable terms of trade but have also 
managed to export to the African market. Vietnam itself has strong domestic demand 
for motorcycles and has the benefit of low costs, suggesting it is gaining traction and 
competitiveness in the global market for motorcycles. 
 
The motorcycle manufacturing industry in Pakistan began with the technical 
collaboration signed between Honda Motorcycles, Japan and the Atlas Group of 
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Companies in 1964. Since then two other major motorcycle manufacturers from 
Japan; namely Suzuki and Yamaha have also established assembly and manufacturing 
plants in the country. DYL Motorcycles signed a technical collaboration agreement 
with Yamaha for the progressive manufacture of their brands in Pakistan 
commencing in 1976, while Suzuki entered the market in 2007. More recently, several 
Chinese companies have entered the market by assembling clones of the Honda CD70 
motorcycle; however, their individual production capacity is limited compared to the 
incumbent firms. 
 
Currently there are 43 OEM in the motorcycle manufacturing sector of Pakistan’s 
automotive industry, of which only 6 are members of Pakistan Automotive 
Manufacturers Association (PAMA), while 37 have instead formed an independent 
body, the Association of Pakistan Motorcycle Assemblers (APMA) that is not officially 
recognized by the state as a trade body at this time. In addition, there are roughly 
50,000 workers employed by 2,000 parts and component manufacturers meeting the 
supply needs of these OEMs. 
 
The three major players (Atlas Honda, Suzuki and DYL Motorcycles) in the local 
industry account for 47.8 percent of all motorcycles production capacity in the 
country, manufacturing the top Japanese brands of motorcycles. 65 small and medium 
scale manufacturers (members of APMA) combined account for the remaining 52.2 
percent capacity. Capacity utilization rates for the years 2009-10 and 2010-11 (as 
reported in Table 7.5) reveal that the industry as a whole is operating at a very high 
utilization level, and the rates have shown an improvement over the reporting period. 
More specifically, total utilization in the sector witnessed an increase of 11.4 percent 
in the span of one year; and the increase in utilization was greater (from 66.17 to 
77.55 percent) for the smaller firms in the sector (represented by APMA), though the 
three larger firms also managed to increase their rates by 7.9 percent over the same 
period (see Table 7.5). 
 
A closer examination of the trends indicates that Honda Atlas has made marked 
improvements in realizing their production potential, and Suzuki to a lesser extent, 
while DYL motorcycles has witnessed a decline. As evident from Table 7.6, Atlas 
Honda has been steadily increasing the production of motorcycles since 2003 (from 
190,679 to 636,420 in 10 years). Pak Suzuki on the other hand has witnessed a 
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general decline in the number of motorcycles produced annually; in particular since 
reaching a peak of 33,779 units in 2007 down to 20,178 in 2013, suggesting the 
company is facing stiff competition in the domestic market. In the case of DYL 
Motorcycles, the company has the installed capacity to manufacture 200,000 units 
annually, yet it has only managed to operate at over half capacity for only two years 
between 2003 and 2013. This suggests that the domestic motorcycle manufacturing 
industry not only has the capacity to become a more visible regional exporter, but the 
ability as well. 
 
Table 7.5: Installed Capacity and Utilization Rates (2009-10 and 2010-11) 
OEMs Installed Capacity 
(units) 
Capacity Utilization Rate (%) 
2009-10 2010-11 
Total 2,197,000 62.87 72.62 
PAMA 1,050,000 59.27 67.23 
APMA 1,147,000 66.17 77.55 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from PAMA and APMA 
 
Table 7.6: Production of Motorcycles by PAMA and Largest Members (2003-2013) 
(Units) 
Manufacturer 
/ Assemblers 
PAMA 
Total 
Atlas 
Honda Ltd. 
Pak Suzuki 
Motor Co. 
Ltd. 
DYL 
Motorcycles 
Ltd. 
Total 
Number of Models Offered 4 4 4 12 
Installed Capacity 800,000 50,000 200,000 1,050,000 
2003-04 303,383 190,679 27,862 50,407 268,948 
2004-05 416,189 287,291 26,308 71,580 385,179 
2005-06 520,124 360,561 16,965 74,423 451,949 
2006-07 467,267 331,621 27,309 56,291 415,221 
2007-08 660,593 452,791 33,779 64,254 550,824 
2008-09 509,054 349,525 14,592 66,190 430,307 
2009-10 736,861 483,028 18,550 120,788 622,366 
2010-11 838,665 570,777 20,259 114,845 705,881 
2011-12 828,576 588,106 21,389 85,913 695,408 
2012-13 819,556 636,420 20,178 56,223 712,821 
Source: PAMA n.d. 
 
The majority of motorcycle assemblers are concentrated in the cities of Lahore and 
Karachi, followed by Hyderabad and Gujranwala (see Table 7.7) and ideally located 
to benefit from the growing component manufacturer industry in those cities. As 
mentioned earlier, the motorcycle manufacturing industry operated along with the 
rest of the automobile sector under the Ministry of Industries and Production’s 
Deletion Policy that concluded in 2006. Between 2001 and 2006 when the policy 
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terminated, the industry made substantial progress in progressive use of locally 
manufactured parts (as shown in Table 7.8). 
 
Table 7.7: Motorcycle Manufacturer by Location and Capacity 
Location Firms Capacity 
Lahore 19 490,000 
Karachi 16 308,000 
Hyderabad 10 370,000 
Gujranwala 6 88,000 
Mirpur 2 815,000 
Bhalwalpur 1 10,000 
Faisalabad 1 10,000 
Multan 1 6,000 
Muredke 1 10,000 
Sadiqabad 1 13,000 
Swat 1 6,000 
Total 59 2,126,000 
Source: APMA (2014), 
 PAMA n.d. 
 
Table 7.8: Deletion Targets in the Motorcycle Industry (1999 - 2005) 
(%) 
Model Deletion Target 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Upto 70 cc 76.50 79.00 83.00 85.00 86.50 88.00 90.00 
70 - 100 cc   82.00 83.00 85.00 85.50 86.00 
100 - 175 cc 73.88 75.00 74.00 81.00 82.00 83.00 84.00 
Source: Engineering Development Board (EDB) and Atlas Honda Limited (ATLH) interviews 
 
The Deletion Policy was formulated for the purpose of encouraging growth of local 
industry keeping in mind the existing level of capabilities in the components industry, 
and applied to all manufacturers in the industry, be they old or new. At the time of the 
late entry of non-Japanese OEMs, the Honda CD-70 was immensely popular in the 
country, and a fairly high level of localization had already been achieved, which 
prompted the non-Japanese OEMs to clone the Honda CD-70 to take advantage of the 
state of the industry. 
 
By becoming part of the WTO, Pakistan committed to phasing out the Deletion Policy. 
In July 2005, the industry switched to the Tariff Based System (TBS) which afforded 
protection to the local industry through tariffs (the applicable rates are shown in 
Table 7.9). Import of CBU is now allowed under the TBS (albeit at 90 percent duty 
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rate) which affords manufacturers the option of importing a model to gauge market 
response before undertaking production runs.  
 
Table 7.9: Tariff Rates Applicable to the Motorcycle Industry under TBS 
(%) 
Product Duty Rate 
CBU 90 
CKD Kit - Non Localized Parts 35 
CKD Kit - Localized Parts 50 
Source: Engineering Development Board (EDB) interviews 
Note: 
CBU: Completely Built Up 
CKD: Completely Knocked Down 
TBS: Tariff Based System 
 
The duty rates applicable under the TBS are clearly designed to encourage the 
production of motorcycles ideally using localized parts since import of parts already 
being produced domestically are charged a higher rate (50 percent) than the 
comparable rate (35 percent) for parts that have not yet been localized and produced 
domestically. Finally, the import of completely built up units is discouraged by the 90 
percent duty rate applied. Clearly the incentive structure is designed to protect the 
domestic manufacturers of components first, and second to encourage production of 
parts that are components that were previously being imported, while protecting the 
local manufacturers from imported products of a comparable price. The production 
and sale of motorcycles is subject to a fairly high level of taxation; including custom 
duty, sales tax and other taxes, with direct taxes only accounting for 5.6 percent of 
total tax paid, while indirect taxes account for the remaining 94.5 percent of total tax 
paid (see Table 7.4). The high incidence of indirect taxes is an indication of the level 
of protection afforded to local manufacturers, however, a weak monitoring and 
enforcement system dampens the effect of such protection since individuals can profit 
by evading the indirect payments. The general consensus in the industry is that direct 
taxation would be preferable to indirect taxes. 
 
7.4. CONSTRAINTS FACED 
To facilitate the establishment of the domestic motorcycle manufacturing industry, 
the state initially pursued an import substitution policy to promote local content 
(production) of goods. Local content is only one of a number of strategies that the old 
industrial policy regime used, but the most significant one. The Local Content 
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Program (as detailed in Chapter 5) was an integral part of this policy, which was 
designed to encourage firms to switch to local sources for product components they 
required by offering attractive tariffs on the selected components. Firm specific LCP 
targets were formulated by the MoIP, and the perception of industry stakeholders is 
that firms with the necessary connections and financing were able to get LCP targets 
approved that provided them a hefty profit margin for several years to come. The 
political settlement that evolved in Pakistan in the post Zia democracy period allowed 
firms to use their connections and holding power to resist attempts by the state to 
discipline them. Clearly the LCP was a well-intentioned policy instruments but weak 
implementation by the state meant firms more interested in short term windfall gains 
were able to work the system to their advantage. 
 
Erratic government policy is also perceived by industry stakeholders as a major 
stumbling block in the development of the industry. In July 2000, the restrictions on 
inter-bank market were removed, and there was devaluation of the rupee (in relation 
to the US dollar), and domestic costs of production rose and exports became 
uncompetitive, while investment levels did not improve in the country, nor did 
productivity, value addition or growth in production volumes. There was also a 
general grinding down of old industrial policy instruments, tariffs were either coming 
down or were easy to bypass for smugglers, localization policies were being 
abandoned slowly etc. So just like in India, new methods of financing learning and the 
achievement of competitiveness began to emerge. For instance, ATLH responded to 
the policy change by shifting focus to accelerating localization of components and 
higher capacity utilization of the plant to reach economies of scale and thus benefit 
from cost reductions and competitiveness in the export market. To improve 
competitiveness and quality of its products, capital equipment to allow in-house 
forging of the crankshaft at Sheikhupura factory was brought online in April 2000, 
and commercial production commenced just two months later. Furthermore, ATLH 
has also set up a Research and Development Wing to explore product development 
for the local market. This suggests that the company was actively financing the 
process of learning on its own and used its connection with the Joint Venture partner 
towards that end. 
 
ATLH continued to be actively engaged with its vendors (175 in 2005) to bring vendor 
production volumes in line with firm’s production schedule. Local as well as foreign 
280 
training and development opportunities provided to vendors. Eight vendors were 
selected in 2005 for a study tour of sheet metal vendor in Thailand based on an 
assessment of their productive capacity made by ATLH engineers. 19 employees were 
sent abroad for training, while 13 were sent for local courses.  
 
7.5. FIRM COMPETITIVENESS 
The cost of producing a product of a given quality determines the competitiveness of 
a firm. Data on cost of production has been taken from various issues of ATLH Annual 
Reports. The point to be noted is that raw materials account for the bulk of costs, 
followed by royalty payments, which have increased between 2004 and 2011-12, 
possibly on account of the new production plant being installed. A major source of 
expenditure for ATLH (see Table 7.10) has remained royalty payments (5.92 percent) 
for use of proprietary technology in the production process, second only to raw 
materials and components consumed (84.05 percent). HMCL is involved in the 
application of technology being used at ATLH, as evident from the fact that the major 
management positions that deal with production technology are filled by HMCL 
employees from abroad and not local ATLH employees. 
 
The cost components that determine competitiveness in a catching-up firm such as 
ATLH can be studied by applying Khan (2013a)’s markup pricing model, where the 
unit price of a product may be estimated as the total unit cost of production plus a 
markup. As evident from the limited data presently available and the discussion that 
follows, a precise breakdown of costs is not possible at this time and makes it difficult 
to ascertain the source of low competitiveness in the company. However, it is hoped 
that this preliminary analysis will give an indication of where the problem may lie and 
guide future research when more detailed data becomes available. More specifically, 
the unit price of a product can be broken down as the sum of the unit  
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prices of labour, inputs and capital times a markup. In the case of ATLH, the 
breakdown of costs can be computed as follows.  
 
Unit labour cost is the ratio of wage level to level of labour productivity in the firm. 
Labour productivity at ATLH has increased dramatically in recent years due to 
investment in new production technology by the Atlas Group. Between 2009 and 
2011, labour productivity increased from almost 131 motorcycles per worker per 
year to 160 (as shown in Table 7.11 below)42. 
 
Table 7.11: ATLH Labour Productivity Levels (2009-11) 
Year Number of 
Employees 
Motorcycles 
Produced 
Labour 
Productivity 
2009 3,689 483,028 130.94 
2010 3,689 570,777 154.72 
2011 3,689 588,106 159.42 
Source:  Author calculations 
Note:  
Labour Productivity = Number of Motorcycles Produced 
  Number of Employees 
 
Unit input cost is the ratio of price of inputs to the productivity of inputs, where the 
global price of steel is used as a proxy for the price of inputs at ATLH. To determine 
the productivity of input use in the manufacturing process, an estimate is first derived 
of the total units of input used in the manufacturing process (ratio of total expenditure 
on raw materials and components to input price). This estimate is used to calculate 
the productivity of input used as the ratio of manufactured output to total units of 
input used. The third component in the cost structure of the firm is the unit capital 
cost; the ratio of price of capital to the output-capital ratio. Due to unavailability of 
the figure for capital stock, a proxy of the total plant capacity is used for the price of 
capital, while output-capital ratio is calculated as the manufactured output divided by 
capital used (where capital used is expenditure on depreciation and rent divided by 
price of capital). The prices used and estimates for the productivities of the various 
inputs for 2011 are reported in Table 7.12. According to the estimates, the markup 
for ATLH was 1.02 in 2011. 
 
 
                                                             
42 Data on employment rates for earlier years is not available at this time and is required. 
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Table 7.12: Markup Pricing Model for ATLH (2011) 
(PKR) 
CODE 2011 
G1 PRODUCT PRICE 85000 
G2 Number of employees 3689 
G3 Product units manufactured 588106 
G4 Exchange Rate (USD to PKR) 85.66 
L1 UNIT LABOUR COST (L3/L4) 928.76 
L2 Renumeration expenditures ('000)  546,212  
L3 Labour wage level (L2/G2) 148065.06 
L4 Labour productivity (G3/G2) 159.42 
I1 UNIT INPUT COST (I3/I6) 40927.51 
I4 Total input expenditure 24069713000 
K1 UNIT CAPITAL COST 203.90 
K3 Total capital expenditure (Depreciation + rent) 466959000 
C1 TOTAL COST (L1 + I1 + K1) 42060.17 
C2 TOTAL COST (L1 + I1 + K1) (USD) 491.01 
M1 1+m 2.02 
M2 m (M1-1) 1.02 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The corresponding calculations for a global leader motorcycle manufacturing firm are 
given in Table 7.13. A comparison of the cost breakup reveals that the major 
component of cost for ATLH is unit input cost, whereas in the case of the global leader, 
it is unit labour cost instead. This finding conforms with the traditional expectation 
that labour wages and costs in developing countries are lower in developing 
countries. According to the markup pricing model, the catching-up firm or follower 
will achieve competitiveness if 𝐶𝑄
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 ≤ 𝑃𝑄
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙. The estimated domestic cost is 
PKR 42,060.17 or USD 491.01 (Table 7.12), for a motorcycle of comparable quality 
and specifications produced by the global leader and is less than the corresponding 
cost for the global leader of USD 881.70 (Table 7.13). This suggests that ATLH is 
globally competitive, and the recent expansion of production for export purposes 
supports this finding.43 According to ATLH, the company has become globally 
competitive and is not worried about the increased competition from Chinese brands 
that have entered the market both in Pakistan and abroad. 
 
 
                                                             
43 However, due to limited availability of detailed data plant operations in both ATLH and the 
global leader, these estimates should be taken to be indicative of the competitiveness potential 
and not an estimation of the actual level of competitiveness the company has achieved. 
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Table 7.13: Markup Pricing Model for Global Leader in Motorcycle Manufacturing (2011) 
  (USD) 
CODE  2011 
G1 PRODUCT PRICE 1,000.00 
G2 Number of employees 25,000.00 
G3 Product units manufactured 550,000.00 
G4 Exchange Rate (USD to JPY) 86.00 
L1 UNIT LABOUR COST (L3/L4) 881.64 
L2 Remuneration expenditures 484,900,000 
L3 Labour wage level (L2/G2) 19,396.00 
L4 Labour productivity (G3/G2) 22.00 
I1 UNIT INPUT COST (I3/I6) 0.02 
I2 Input price (Steel price USD/tonne) 761.92 
I3 Total input expenditure (Inventory 
value in Yen) 
899,813 
I4 Total input expenditure (Inventory 
value in USD) 
10,462.94 
I5 Total input used (I4/I3) 13.73 
I6 Input productivity (G3/I5) 40,051.28 
K1 UNIT CAPITAL COST 0.04 
K2 Capital price (Capacity) 600,000 
K3 Total capital expenditure 
(Depreciation + rent) 
24,011 
K4 Total capital used (K3/K2) 0.04 
K5 Output-capital ratio ( G3/K4) 13,743,700.80 
C1 TOTAL COST (L1 + I1 + K1) 881.70 
M1 1+m 1.13 
M2 m (M1-1) 0.13 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
7.6. CONCLUSION 
The link between the changing nature of political settlements in Pakistan after 
independence and its implications for the stalled industrialization process have been 
highlighted and examined. In particular, in Chapter 2 the clientelist political 
settlement that emerged in the country in the post liberalization period was found to 
have resulted in a state that was too weak to effectively monitor and enforce an 
industrial policy geared towards development of local manufacturing capability 
through the Local Content Policy (LCP). On the one hand, the targets established by 
the Ministry of Industries and Production (MoIP) were rarely met and the state was 
ineffective in penalizing transgressing firms and on the other hand foreign firms were 
able to enforce restrictions on local firms that restricted their ability to export 
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products and achieve economies of scale. Thus, the efforts of the state in Pakistan to 
direct development of the automotive industry in the context of a clientelist political 
settlement, a weak state and foreign ownership of technology meant that the industry 
has been unable to realize its full potential, and transition from simple assembly 
operation to true manufacturing of locally designed brands (as discussed in Chapter 
5). However, that is not to say that there are no exceptions to this trend in the 
domestic industry. The case studies of the automotive component manufacturers 
experience with technology acquisition, MTL’s efforts to establish itself in the tractor 
market and experience of ATLH in motorcycle manufacturing have highlighted this 
feature of the domestic industry. 
 
As a catching up firm in a developing country striving towards economic 
development, ATLH has made considerable progress in developing the local 
capabilities in-house and of its vendors, and managed to achieve a high degree of 
localization of parts that suggest it has improved competitiveness as result. ATLH has 
adapted to the economic conditions in the domestic economy and the evolving 
clientelist political settlement and used these external stimuli to drive growth and 
competitiveness of the firm. Opening up of the domestic motorcycle market to 
Chinese manufacturers has been used as an opportunity to improve relations with 
customers and offer better after sale service. In the absence of state financing for 
further learning in the industry, ATLH has turned to other sources, including internal 
financing. The internal financing of learning at the company, which focused on 
assessing the actual gains and progress made by component suppliers and employees 
as a result of the capability development initiatives, has been successful. ATLH has 
pursued greater level of interaction with local component suppliers and facilitated 
collaboration with foreign technology providers to enhance the productive capacity 
of its suppliers in an effort to boost productivity levels and realize the full potential of 
the firm. The firm has also achieved global competitiveness as indicated by a 
preliminary analysis of the unit production costs in the markup pricing model. 
 
Finally, the analysis of experience of ATLH and the review of automotive component 
manufacturers in Chapter 4 suggests that from a more technical point of view of 
supply chain and production process management, firms in developing countries face 
a significant challenge in moving up the value chain. Production of more complex 
products will need to account for the different technological interfaces of the 
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domestic suppliers in product systems integration. Industrial policy design and 
implementation in developing countries must take this factor into account if the 
domestic industry is to progress from simple assembly operations towards more 
complex production processes. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation has examined the nexus of social distribution of power which is 
evolving and affecting the practical enforcement of particular instruments of 
financing learning, capabilities development and technology acquisition in 
developing countries. Developing countries by and large are lagging behind the 
developed countries in terms of competitiveness; a worrisome trend as it severely 
compromises their ability to match the growth trajectory of developed countries. The 
divergence between countries has increased to such an extent that a number of 
developing countries are in danger of being classified as failed states due to faltering 
social and development trends. Pakistan’s economic growth has been erratic since the 
time of independence, and efforts to acquire technology and develop capabilities and 
competitiveness have largely failed to yield the beneficial results observed in other 
developing countries pursuing similar strategies. There have, however, been 
successful instances of technology acquisition in Pakistan yielding promising results 
that warrant further investigation and analysis. 
 
The existing literature on the experience of developing countries in this area has 
focused on the case of the East Asian tigers (Amsden (1989); Kim (1997) to name a 
few) and countries such as India and Bangladesh Khan (2009). Earlier explanations 
did not give much weight to the role of technology and technological capabilities, their 
acquisition and development, in determining competitiveness of firms and thus 
growth of the economy. Instead, openness, free markets and a minimal role of the 
state were showcased as the driving force of the success stories of development in 
early mainstream explanations. Later explanations drew inspiration from the work 
on evolutionary theory to argue convincingly for the key role played by technological 
change and capabilities in driving competitiveness and growth. Research in this area, 
and in particular on the political economy reasons that can explain and account for 
the varied experience of developing countries in improving their competitiveness and 
successfully driving growth is still at a nascent stage. This thesis seeks to contribute 
to this important area of research by examining the experience of a developing 
country in acquiring and absorbing foreign technology to develop its industry and 
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competitiveness in the global market. In particular, the focus is on the experience of 
Pakistan, as this has not been analysed in great detail yet. 
 
Thus the focus of this dissertation is on exploring the emergence of two competitive 
manufacturing firms in the automotive industry in Pakistan, Millat Tractors Limited 
and Atlas Honda Limited. The two firms were established in the 1960s to reduce 
dependence on foreign import of agricultural tractors and motorcycles and facing 
similar constraints were able to position themselves in a competitive position in the 
domestic market. The main findings of the research are summarized in Section 2, and 
policy implications of the research are presented in Section 3, while Section 4 covers 
areas of future research. 
 
8.2. MAIN FINDINGS 
To begin with, it has been established that the divergence of industrial development 
and by extension, overall economic growth trends between developed and developing 
countries, and even among various groups of developing countries is a disturbing 
trend. The expectation had been that when late developers would accelerate their 
growth efforts the growth trajectories of all countries would converge. However, this 
has not turned out to be the case; several developing countries have managed to close 
the gap while the majority languished behind, and this has rekindled interest in trying 
to identify the reason for this gap.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 case studies have related successful technology acquisition by two 
manufacturing firms in a developing country to changes in manufacturing production 
processes that arose from the transformations taken place in the automotive industry 
across the globe (as detailed in Chapter 4). For example, these developments include 
changes in the work ethic of employees (see Cheng & Podolsky (1996)) as highlighted 
in Section 4.2.1. 
 
Much as the Ford Motor Company took steps towards streamlining its production 
processes and maximizing productivity by bringing in component manufacturing 
under one roof at the River Rouge facility (see Section 4.2.2.), so too have ATLH and 
to a lesser extent, MTL in the modern age, and other companies as well in similar 
industries. 
289 
Chapter 4 discussed the benefits afforded by implementing automation in the 
production line and adoption of Just-In-Time techniques by manufacturing firms. The 
primary benefit resulted from the reduced economies of scale required to become 
competitive – output of 500,000 units being required for JiT as opposed to the far 
higher output of 2 million required by mass production. Chapter 6 showed how MTL 
has adopted key aspects of Just-In-Time production techniques to its existing mass 
production system to achieve competitiveness with limited output. Thus, companies 
from developing countries can successfully adopt technology and processes that can 
prove useful in achieving competitiveness despite smaller scales of production when 
the next transformation comes about (as the analysis of developments in the industry 
in Chapter 4 suggests). On the other hand, the analysis of ATLH in Chapter 7 has 
revealed how firms in developing countries are able to implement competitive 
production technologies and techniques to dominate the domestic market and be 
poised to compete on an international level. 
 
Industrial development has been a matter of concern for the state in Pakistan, and 
technology acquisition has been used as a conduit for establishing industries and 
developing capabilities and competitiveness required. The state has utilized 
numerous financing instruments over time to guide economic activity and encourage 
learning and capability and competitiveness development in the industrial sector in 
general and the automotive industry in particular. The experience of various 
industries and firms in the country has not been as expected and the level of 
competitiveness aimed for has not emerged. Analysis of the reasons for this failure 
has tended to focus on the more traditional explanations, including the impact of 
corruption, weak rule of law, inadequate R & D and science and technology policies, 
weak capability of the bureaucracy and the state of the country’s educational and 
technical institutions. While these factors are important and certainly relevant, what 
is also important but has not been given much attention is the political settlement 
discussed in Chapter 2. In the context of foreign ownership of technology and a weak 
developmental state, the research suggests the nexus of social distribution of power 
between different groups, which is changing over time affects enforcement of 
particular instruments of financing as shown by the experience of two successful 
firms in Pakistan’s automotive industry covered in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. 
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The discussion of Pakistan’s economic performance and key political developments 
since independence have revealed that Pakistan had a very colourful history, 
managing significant growth of the economy at various points in time, only to lose the 
momentum that had been gained, shortly thereafter with a change in political 
leadership and economic policies. The demands of a growing number of groups that 
the leadership felt compelled to satisfy in order to ensure its own position and 
survivability drained already limited resources and weakened the ability of the state 
to effectively direct development efforts that would have led to growth down the line. 
The political landscape in Pakistan has become increasingly fragmented and unstable 
with frequent changes in power leading to extensive political clientelism and state 
policies had to be implemented in this unfavourable environment. Resources and 
opportunities were limited in Pakistan, and the distribution of power between 
various stakeholders affected by the development policies in the industry, has led to 
contests over potentially growth-enhancing learning rents. Proliferation of clientelist 
groups has compromised the ability of the state to forsake long term economic growth 
and development in favour of actions to ensure its own short term sustainability. 
 
The development of political settlement in two periods in Pakistan’s history is key to 
the level of industrial development that has now been achieved. One is the growth 
take-off during Ayub Khan’s rule when substantial capability was developed under 
state guidance and the second is the post-Zia ul-Haq democracy period when a 
number of private sector initiatives to develop capabilities and competitiveness 
yielded promising results. Fragmentation of the political settlement began under 
Ayub Khan’s regime when the entrepreneurs gained sufficient holding power to resist 
state control and the Basic Democracy system was introduced and continued in later 
years when Zia-ul-Haq supported previously marginalized religious parties to 
legitimize his rule. Despite having built up substantial productive capacity in the early 
stages of the industrialization effort, only limited and fairly weak technological 
capabilities developed and proved insufficient to translate into competitiveness for 
firms and as a result growth slowed down in Ayub Khan’s period. Incentives and 
compulsions to ensure capabilities developed could not be enforced effectively since 
doing so would mean alienating and losing support for staying in power. In the post-
Zia period firms with access to sufficient resources had the flexibility to further 
develop their limited capabilities and achieve a measure of competitiveness. 
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The discussion in Chapter 4 has shed light on a number of important characteristics 
of the automotive industry which are of relevance to developing countries; in 
particular the deep linkages of the industry with the rest of the manufacturing sector 
and the economy at large. Also, advances and developments in the automobile 
industry have wrought changes in society for various countries and been transferred 
to the rest of the world over time. The supply chain of the automobile industry has 
also evolved alongside the transformations taking place, allowing countries with the 
appropriate supply chains to realise the full benefit of the advances being made. 
Moreover, the structure of the industry has also changed, now marked by a rising 
number of mergers and acquisitions and growing presence of developing countries in 
emerging technologies. This suggests that the industry can play a role in the future 
transformation and growth of developing countries that are in a position to benefit 
from such a transformation and accelerate their development. Developing countries 
have used policies to shape and guide the development of their automobile industries 
with varying levels of success. A comparative look at the main characteristics of these 
policies yields valuable lessons for developing countries. A case in point is the role of 
foreign ownership of technology and the open access to markets by foreign firms has 
resulted in domestic technological capabilities in several countries (for example 
Brazil) being less than countries that limited the role of foreign firms (such as South 
Africa and South Korea). Improper implementation of protection policies designed to 
allow domestic industries to grow led to development of weak technological 
capabilities (such as in Malaysia and Pakistan). 
 
Pakistan has also experienced difficulty in breaking into the global automotive value 
chains that symbolize the industry now. The domestic industry has yet to take off and 
foreign affiliated assembly-cum-manufacturing firms command the market share of 
virtually every segment of the industry. Attempts to nurture the industry have met 
with limited success, as evidenced by the lukewarm performance of the recent 
Automobile Industry Development Policy (AIDP). Towards that end, the research has 
identified key stakeholders that are involved in the automotive industry and an 
assessment of the current level of capabilities of domestic component manufacturers 
has been made based on recent firm level survey data. The component manufacturing 
industry has been established in clusters based primarily on small and medium 
enterprises, but performance has been tempered by low levels of productivity and 
quality and thus competitiveness. There are a number of interest groups in the 
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industry (such as PAMA and PAAPAM) that compete with and impose often times 
conflicting demands on the state that can account for the weak performance of the 
sector. 
 
However, as the two case studies of relatively successful attempts at technology 
acquisition have shown, intervention even in an unfavourable policy environment can 
lead to capability development. Millat Tractors was encouraged to pursue a viable 
localization program and develop its capabilities to indigenize production of tractors, 
and was not hampered by the foreign ownership of its production technology. High 
levels of effort for learning and capability development were initially induced by the 
state and the company was able to follow a “”44 strategy in technology acquisition 
efforts and establish itself in the domestic market. Since withdrawal of state support 
and direction, the company has continued to build on the capabilities it managed to 
build up and has entered the export market in recent years to compete with foreign 
firms in the region. 
 
As detailed in Chapter 7, Atlas Honda has made considerable progress in developing 
capabilities in-house and of its vendors, from simple assembly in the early years to 
manufacturing over 90 percent of components locally (in-house and in collaboration 
with component suppliers). Technology upgradation and skill development of 
vendors has been promoted with firms from East Asia (including Thailand and Japan). 
The reduced costs have allowed it to increase its competitiveness in the local market 
by focusing on quality control and providing value added services to customers. 
 
8.3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The research presented contributes to the existing literature on development of 
capabilities and competitiveness in developing countries through acquisition of 
foreign technology but focuses on the nexus of changing social distribution of power 
that has affected how particular instruments of financing are enforced. We find that 
as in the case of developing countries such as Bangladesh and India, competitiveness 
emerges in industries where the initial capabilities have already been established. 
The research suggests opting for traditional ex ante conditions to direct industrial 
                                                             
44 see Khan (2009) 
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development in new sectors will likely not work in the case of developing countries 
such as Pakistan. Policy instruments will be required that account for the level of 
capabilities that already exist in industries and policy formulation will be required 
that pushes these industries towards the global frontier, rather than targeting 
industries where the capabilities do not exist in the first place. 
 
8.4. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis is a first attempt at analysing the development of capabilities and 
competitiveness at the firm level in two automotive industry firms in Pakistan. The 
focus has been on changing political settlements which have affected how particular 
financing instruments have been enforced previously. A deeper more detailed 
analysis of firm level performance is required before such a process can be fully 
understood and lessons drawn with implications for other industries and countries. 
It is important to frame such research in the context of the political settlements that 
exist at the time. In particular more detailed information is required of firm level 
operations and performance of domestic firms in Pakistan as well as the global leader 
for the industry segment in question. 
 
Moreover, it needs to be highlighted that this research has not considered the role of 
Research & Development, Science and Technology Policies, the institutional 
capabilities of the state and other approaches to competitiveness such as the World 
Bank cost of doing business approach. Other studies have considered these factors 
and as such the current research seeks to complement these studies by focusing on 
analysing the impact of social distribution of power on financing instruments rather 
than the impact of better rule of law, quality of the bureaucracy, corruption, quality 
level of technical learning institutions on financing, which are also important. 
Furthermore, the research aims to give an overview of key aspects of industrial 
development and policy in Pakistan rather than providing a comprehensive, in-depth 
analysis. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
Additional list of MoIP organizations: 
 Name of Organization 
1 Department of Explosives (DoE) 
2 National Fertilizer Corporation (NFC) 
3 Pakistan Gem and Jewellery Development Company (PGJDC) 
4 Pakistan Hunting and Sporting Arms Development Company (PHSADC) 
5 Pakistan Steel (PS) 
6 Pakistan Stone Development Company (PSDC) 
7 State Engineering Corporation (SEC) 
8 Enar Petro-tech Services (EPS) 
9 Utility Stores Corporation (USC) 
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APPENDIX C 
Details of Interviews Taken during Fieldwork in Pakistan 
Key stakeholders in the automotive industry in Pakistan were identified in 
consultation with a senior government official. Based on the information gathered, in 
depth interviews were conducted with a number of senior government officials in the 
Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industries and Production and the Engineering 
Development Board Board: 
 Joint Secretary - MoIP 
 Section Officer 1 - MoIP  
 Section Officer 2 - MoIP 
 Additional Secretary – Ministry of Commerce 
 EDB official 
 
Several interviews were arranged with officials at PAMA, and through them, with 
PAPAAM officials and several component manufacturers as well as representatives 
from Pak Suzuki and Toyota Indus Motors. Officials from Honda Atlas were 
unavailable for interviews at the time.  
 Director General - PAMA 
 Section Officer 1 – PAMA 
 Section Officer 2 - PAMA 
 Ex Chairman 1 - PAPAAM  
 Ex Chairman 2 - PAPAAM 
 Manager - Pak Suzuki  
 Manager 1 - Toyota Indus 
 Manager 2 - Toyota Indus 
 
Several interviews were held with managers at MTL head office and factory in Lahore: 
 Senior board member 
 GM Engineering  
 GM Quality Control 
 GM Supplier Relations  
 
Several interviews were conducted with managers at Atlas Honda Limited - Panjdarya 
site.  
319 
 
The CEO of Rubatech provided valuable insight into the operations of component 
manufacturers in Pakistan.  
 
Component manufacturer CEOs provided insight into state-private sector 
interactions in the automotive industry and confirmed details given. 
 
Open-ended interviews were guided by questionnaire designed to assess state of 
technology acquisition by domestic firms in the industry and relations with the state. 
Firms were not willing to share detailed information regarding plant operations at 
this time which would be required to assess state of firm competitiveness.  
 
Questionnaire based on the same questions was sent to all listed members of 
PAPAAM, but the response rate was very low and quality of responses was not 
sufficient to be used for analysis and comparison with JICA study data. 
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APPENDIX D 
Annual Deletion Rates at MTL 
  (%) 
Year MF 240 MF 385 
1981 - 82* 9.34  
1982 - 83 18.69  
1983 - 84 33.21  
1984 - 85 38.17  
1985 - 86 49.72 16.37 
1986 - 87 60.29 18.99 
1987 - 88 67.92 21.09 
1988 - 89 68.20 27.68 
1989 - 90 72.32 37.76 
1990 - 91 75.83 43.36 
1991 - 92 76.65 44.06 
1992 - 93 77.63 48.09 
1993 - 94 78.75 48.66 
1994 - 95 79.42 48.76 
1995 - 96 79.91 49.01 
1996 - 97 80.62 49.14 
1997 - 98 80.98 49.37 
1998 - 99 81.64 50.28 
1999 - 00 82.11 50.01 
2000 - 01 87.35 52.01 
2001 - 02 88.87 57.01 
2002 - 03 88.87 62.01 
2003 - 04 88.87 65.12 
2004 - 05* 89.34 70.00 
2005 - 06* 89.80 75.27 
2006 - 07* 90.27 76.01 
2007 - 08* 90.73 76.75 
2008 - 09* 91.20 77.49 
2009 - 10* 91.66 78.22 
2010 - 11* 92.13 78.96 
2011 - 12* 92.60 79.70 
2013 93.06 81.92 
Source: Data provided by MTL 
Note:   
* : Computed from data available 
 
 
 
 
